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This thesis examines the political trajectory of the Popular Front for the Liberation 
Palestine (PFLP) during the period from the 1982 eviction of the Palestinian factions 
from their headquarters in Beirut, to the 2006-07 division between Hamas and Fatah 
in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT). During this period, the PFLP 
experienced a process of decline that resulted in its marginalisation within the Palestine 
Liberation Organisation (PLO) and the wider Palestinian national movement. This 
study addresses the issue of the PFLP’s decline by focusing on its own political agency 
to determine the role of policy and decision making, ideology and political narrative 
in the marginalisation process.  
This work therefore, on the one hand, aims at putting the PFLP’s decline into 
historical perspective, identifying it as a process rather than simply the effect of 
outstanding events as it is often argued. On the other, its goal is to ascribe to ‘subjective 
factors’, namely aspects directly linked to the PFLP’s agency, the adequate weight in 
determining its decline. This appears particularly significant as the weakening of the 
Palestinian left has been frequently explained as a by-product of global and local 
external or ‘objective’ developments such as the downfall of the Soviet Union or the 
emergence of political Islam. By providing a comprehensive and processual analysis 
of the PFLP’s decline, this study not only aims at complementing the literature on the 
Palestinian national movement, which still lacks a focused approach on the main 
Palestinian leftist force. It also aims at shedding light on a major cause, and its 
historical origins, of the current Palestinian political impasse, namely the absence of 
an alternative between Hamas and the PNA’s governing entities, both crippled by a 
legitimacy crisis and unable to progress Palestinian interests. By virtue of its close 
survey of the PFLP’s conduct, a further goal of this thesis is to address the historical 
role of the PLO and its de-facto heir, the PNA. What is evidenced is the double, and 
contradictory, role of the essential but also constraining framework that the PLO and 
later the PNA represented for the PFLP’s policies. 
The focus on the PFLP’s political agency allows the identification of a pattern in its 
policy which affected negatively its standing within the Palestinian national 
movement. Throughout the period addressed, policy fluctuation marked the PFLP’s 
action, undermining the effectiveness of its political line and jeopardising its political 
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weight. The present study highlights how such a policy fluctuation pattern originated 
from major dilemmas and contradictions that the PFLP had to consider while 
producing its policies. The main dilemma, informing all other sources of tensions 
affecting the PFLP, has been defined as an ‘opposition-integration’ dilemma. In other 
words, the PFLP, while opposing the PLO leadership’s policies, first and foremost its 
quest for a diplomatic settlement with Israel under US patronage, needed to maintain 
its integration within the PLO regime, which represented an essential economic and 
political framework. This produced inconsistent, ‘fluctuant’ policies that prevented the 
PFLP from maintaining its political weight and stopping its marginalisation process. 
This opposition-integration dilemma was combined with other sources of tensions 
marking the PFLP such as: relations with other PLO opposition factions, relations with 
Arab partners, its contacts with Palestinian Islamists, the confrontation with the PNA 
after the 1993 Oslo accords or the internal divide between the exiled leadership and 
the cadres located in the OPT. 
The PFLP’s official publications, mainly retrieved from its mouthpiece, Al-Hadaf 
magazine, embodied the main source upon which this study relies. Beside this corpus 
of documents, other primary sources, such as documents issued by relevant actors, 
have been scrutinised, while all information has been read against the background of 
the wider academic literature currently available on the Palestinian national 
movement. This research also drew information from interviews with former and 















The present thesis studies the history of the Popular Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine (PFLP), the main Palestinian leftist faction and second movement for size 
and popularity within the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), the umbrella 
organisation internationally recognised as representative of the Palestinian people. 
This thesis addresses the period between 1982 and 2007, as the PFLP experienced a 
marginalisation process during this time lapse. Such process started after the eviction 
of the Palestinian forces from their headquarters in Beirut following the 1982 Israeli 
invasion of Lebanon and appeared completed in 2007, when the conflict between 
Fatah, ruling party of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) and Hamas, its main, 
Islamist rival, consecrated the polarisation of the Palestinian political field. 
In analysing this marginalisation process, the thesis focuses on the PFLP’s political 
agency, namely its decision-making process, policy production and the evolution of 
its political line to investigate the role of these ‘subjective factors’ in its decline. The 
goal is to outline how the PFLP responded to outstanding challenges (downfall of 
Soviet Union, rise of Islamist rivals, etc.) to provide a deeper, more complete 
description of the dynamics causing its decline. Based on this approach, this study 
describes a ‘policy fluctuation’ pattern affecting the PFLP negatively and resurfacing 
throughout the period addressed. By policy fluctuation what is meant is the PFLP’s 
inability to produce a consistent political line capable of balancing the different sources 
of pressures, both internal and external, endured over the time. The result was a 
fluctuation between such sources of pressure that undermined the effectiveness of the 
PFLP’s agenda, its political credibility and popular support. In the investigation of the 
sources of pressures, or contradictions, producing policy fluctuation, this study 
outlines a fundamental dynamic, influencing all other relevant factors: the opposition-
integration dilemma. This dilemma, characterising the PFLP all over its history but 
whose effects were exacerbated after 1982, consists in the pursuit of opposition to the 
PLO leadership, namely Fatah, while considering integration into the PLO institutions, 
and therefore its overall unity, as a priority. This dilemma combined with other 
dynamics, such as relations with other Palestinian forces, relations with regional allies 
or internal divisions, worsening the policy fluctuations pattern. 
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The thesis follows a chronological order to keep track of the aforementioned dynamics 
over the time. The first two chapters focuses on the period between 1982 and 1987. 
Specifically, they respectively treat the PFLP’s policies towards the Palestinian 
internal situation, marked by deep divisions and the PFLP’s relations with Syria and 
the USSR. The third chapter addresses the PFLP’s conduct during the first half of the 
First Intifada (1987-1990) to show how returning problems jeopardised the PFLP’s 
chances to revive its political course. The fourth chapter covers the 1990s, a decade of 
great transformations with the 1993 Oslo accords between Israel and the PLO and the 
advent of the PNA. The fifth and last chapter approaches the history of the Second 
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In September 2015, the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT) experienced an 
upsurge in tensions as masses of Palestinian youth started a ‘habba shaʿbiyya’, 
a minor popular uprising, against the Israeli occupation. Over a period of several 
months, Palestinian individuals and groups attacked Israeli settlers in the OPT, 
army outposts and soldiers as well as Israeli citizens beyond the Green Line and 
the Separation Barrier.1 Attackers were in most cases younger than twenty and 
often resorted to the use of knives, from which stemmed the name of ‘Intifada 
of the Knives’ to describe the uprising. The most striking feature of this habba 
was that most Palestinians involved in the attacks were very young and 
politically unaffiliated. In a stark contrast with its two wider precedents (the 1987 
Intifada and the 2000 Al-Aqsa Intifada), Palestinian factions did not play a direct 
and significant role in organising and orienting popular protests. Fatah’s leaders 
and officials from the Palestinian National Authority (PNA), tied to security 
cooperation with Israel under the terms of the 1993 Oslo peace accords, provided 
only token support to the Palestinian youngsters with statements justifying their 
actions. The Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas), not compromised by the 
Oslo requirements, displayed a slightly more substantial involvement as some 
attacks were claimed by cells affiliated to the organisation. Nonetheless, its 
political and military leaderships did not push for an escalation of the uprising 
and did not hold up the operations organised independently by a few Hamas 
members. Besides the two main Palestinian political forces, smaller factions with 
a remarkable militant record also did not distinguish themselves for their 
participation in the habba. For instance, the Popular Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine (PFLP), which did not abandon armed struggle and still formally 
opposes the peace process, limited itself to verbal support. Notwithstanding its 
calls for the establishment of a unified Palestinian leadership and its 
communiques recalling those published during the First Intifada, no coordinated 
                                                          
1 The so-called “Green Line” is the pre-1967 war border separating Israeli territories from those under 
the control of neighbouring Arab countries. It is still used today to refer to the demarcation line between 
formal Israeli territories and the Occupied Palestinian Territories. The “Separation Barrier” is a 700 km-
long, concrete wall running along the Green Line in the West Bank. Its track was conceived to include 
most of Israeli settlements in the West Bank as well as strategic natural resources. Consequently, it was 
mostly built within Palestinian territory. 
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action on the ground followed. Such detachment between the Palestinian factions 
and those individuals and groups carrying out the attacks highlighted the 
emergence of a disenfranchised generation raised after the Al-Aqsa Intifada that 
does not identify itself with the traditional Palestinian political forces.  
In such problem of representation lies a clear sign of the political and 
legitimacy crisis that the Palestinian national movement has experienced for at 
least a decade. While two authorities, Hamas in Gaza and the PNA and its ruling 
party Fatah in the West Bank, contend for primacy, apparently no political and 
social force is able to mobilise Palestinian society effectively on a national level, 
let alone within the Palestinian diaspora communities. Neither the PNA, as 
legacy and heir of the national project embodied by the Palestine Liberation 
Organisation (PLO), nor Hamas as its Islamist alternative, succeeded in 
achieving the Palestinian long-term goals of self-determination and statehood. 
Within this impasse, these political entities stopped providing the Palestinian 
people with a comprehensive and inclusive institutional framework in which to 
voice, struggle for, and fulfil their political and social needs.  
In light of this crisis and of the political polarisation of the Palestinian national 
movement, the issue of an alternative ‘third way’ between the ‘peace process’, 
the internationally-recognised PNA camp, and the ‘radical’ Islamist option arises 
as a central question. The political diversity of the Palestinian national 
movement points to the study of the Palestinian Left as a first step to investigate 
and understand the reasons of such absence. Indeed, the Palestinian Left’s legacy 
of both social and national emancipation, its pioneering mobilisation of labour, 
women and students as well as its historical contribution in terms of intellectual 
and ideological elaboration should represent solid bases upon which to establish 
an alternative to the current deadlock. Nonetheless, the Palestinian Left appears 
marginalised within Palestinian politics and its factions display little influence 
on the general orientations of the national movement. Therefore, studying the 
reasons behind the current condition of the Palestinian left, entails a clearer 
understanding of the crisis affecting Palestinian politics nowadays. 
The present study approaches the issue of the Palestinian Left’s decline, 
addressing the marginalisation that its main faction, the PFLP, has experienced 
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throughout the last two decades of the twentieth century and beyond. The PFLP 
was not only the main leftist faction in terms of membership, popular support 
and international recognition. Within the Palestinian national movement, and 
specifically the PLO, it also represented the first competitor for Fatah. By virtue 
of its strong adherence to armed struggle, its strict organisational rules and its 
Marxist-Leninist, but also Maoist, ideological setting, the PFLP has been 
historically considered as the hard-line, revolutionary actor within the national 
movement. In fact, its image of revolutionary ‘purity’ has been often put in 
contrast with Fatah’s pragmatism, which the PFLP itself often charged with 
opportunism. Therefore, its increasing irrelevance entailed a void in terms of 
political reference within the Palestinian national movement that appears more 
significant as the Islamist alternative faces an impasse similar to that of the 
nationalist-secular camp.  
In its analysis of the PFLP’s decline, this study adopts a historical and 
processual approach in which its conduct is put into historical perspective while 
its marginalisation is seen as a process rather than just a result of single factors 
or events. As the review of relevant literature will show, to date academic studies 
on the Palestinian national movement still lack a comprehensive, historical view 
on the decline of the major Palestinian leftist faction. However, as it has been 
argued so far, the attempt to develop a comprehensive study of the PFLP’s 
trajectory throughout its marginalisation process not only entails filling a gap in 
Palestinian political historiography. A wider goal is that of addressing a major 
factor behind the current Palestinian crisis of legitimacy and popular 
representation, namely the PFLP and other leftist factions’ inability to embody 
an effective alternative to the two main poles (Hamas and Fatah/PNA) of 
Palestinian politics. In other words, understanding the shortcomings of the 
PFLP’s political action, and the causes that produced them, means 
comprehending a major reason behind the lack of political and organisational 
renewal fuelling the current impasse of the Palestinian national movement. 
This historical and processual approach to the PFLP’s decline entails a focus 
on its collective agency conceived as the complex of narratives, priority 
formulation, positions and decisions that the PFLP adopted to tackle its political 
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crisis. The importance of such an approach lies in the possibility of drawing a 
pattern in the PFLP’s political agency. The definition of this pattern, allows us 
to challenge static views of the PFLP’s marginalisation that single out specific 
factors and events without defining a relational network. Ultimately, the 
historical perspective, coupled with the focus on agency, enables us to shed light 
on the core factors forging the PFLP’s policies, which cannot be neglected in 
achieving a comprehensive understanding of its decline and of its persistent 
marginalisation.  
The focused study of the PFLP’s marginalisation process also opens up new 
perspectives on the historical role of the PLO and its successor the PNA. By 
investigating their functioning from the PFLP’s minority and oppositional 
perspective, the PLO and the PNA not only emerge as institutional frameworks 
that embodied a political setting and target for the PFLP’s policies. In fact, the 
exploration of the PFLP’s marginalisation process allows us to investigate the 
PLO and the PNA in their double, and to a certain extent paradoxical, function 
of a constraining yet simultaneously vital framework for the PFLP’s agency. 
This perspective on the PLO and the PNA entails a reassessment of intra-
factional relations in the framework of umbrella organisations and quasi-state 
entities. The PFLP’s case thus appears linked to that of other leftist organisations 
participating in wider national fronts. While this study does not uphold a 
comparative approach, the concepts outlined herein might also be relevant for 
the study of relations among political forces in the context of national liberation 
movement in the Middle East and other areas. 
The focus on the PFLP’s decline, conceived as the weakening of a historically 
relevant leftist force, represents another reason for the relevance of this thesis 
beyond the field of Palestine studies. Indeed, the example provided herein aims 
at demonstrating that the marginalisation of once central leftist forces worldwide 
was not a mere consequence of the end of the Socialist block. Through its focus 
on political agency, this study stresses the relevance of ‘individual’ aspects, 
distinguishing single cases. While avoiding all claims of exceptionalism, this 
thesis shows the importance of relating general and specific factors in order to 
understand satisfactorily the trajectory of single political organisations. 
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Therefore, the approach adopted to analyse the PFLP’s case can also be 
considered useful to grasp the reasons behind more successful, leftist political 
experiences in the post-Cold War era, whether they be in the Middle East, 
Europe or Latin America. 
 
Subjective Factors and Policy Fluctuation. 
The history of the PFLP outlined in this thesis stretches over 25 years, between 
two of the most significant and traumatic events in the history of the Palestinian 
national movement: the eviction of the PLO from its headquarter in Beirut 
following the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon and the 2007 definitive 
geographical and political split between the Hamas-ruled Gaza and the West 
Bank under Fatah/PNA control.  
The significance of this period in relation to the PFLP lies in the gradual 
decline that the Front experienced during this time span. The loss of the Lebanese 
sanctuary in 1982 and the ensuing virtual end of armed struggle as ‘main tool to 
liberate Palestine’ was a hard blow for the whole PLO, but it marked the 
beginning of an especially critical era for the PFLP. While the PLO leadership 
could rely on wider international networks and contacts and decided to focus on 
diplomatic activity, the PFLP was deprived of such options. This, coupled with 
the diminution of the PFLP’s political autonomy, its loss of the popular and 
political support network enjoyed in Lebanon, and the renewed global interest 
in a political settlement, threw the PFLP’s ‘radical alternative’ to Fatah into 
crisis. While before 1982 the PFLP managed to exert a stronger influence within 
the PLO, in particular by constraining Arafat’s power and individualism, after 
the eviction from Beirut, its political weight appeared in decline. 
Notwithstanding the efforts that the PFLP spent to retain its weight and influence 
within the national movement, also in view of the evolving political scenarios 
which emerged between 1982 and 2007, the marginalisation process did not stop. 
The unfolding and conclusion of the Hamas-Fatah conflict in 2007 and, 
specifically, the PFLP’s conduct throughout it, represented the conclusive step 
in its declining trajectory. In the following years, the PFLP remained on the 
margins of Palestinian politics, while the whole national movement continued to 
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be faced with the impasse stemming from political polarisation, lack of renewal 
and dysfunctional institutions. Such persistent marginalisation thus prompts the 
need to investigate the PFLP’s agency and conduct to identify the reasons behind 
its ineffectiveness in retaining political influence within the Palestinian national 
movement. 
In addressing, the PFLP’s marginalisation within Palestinian politics, the 
present study borrows two categories from Jamil Hilal’s book ‘al-Yasar al-
Filastini. Ila ʾAyna? (The Palestinian Left. Where to?)’ to analyse the factors 
influencing the PFLP’s trajectory, namely ‘subjective and objective’ factors.2 
Objective factors consist of external developments and events outside the 
PFLP’s control and are often highlighted as the main causes for its decline. From 
this stems the necessity to focus on subjective factors which can be identified 
with the PFLP’s own agency in facing such developments. By prioritising 
subjective factors, this study does not aim at asserting their overall predominance 
over outstanding objective factors. Rather the goal is to problematise the issue 
of the PFLP’s decline by showing the interconnection of objective and subjective 
factors instead of pointing to an apparent causal relation. The PFLP is thus seen 
as an active agent capable of not only reacting to critical circumstances, but also 
of shaping its own fortunes within the Palestinian national movement.  
Such focus on the PFLP’s agency acquires further importance as it allows us 
to delineate a pattern in its policies that has persisted throughout different 
historical and political phases. Indeed, the observation of the PFLP’s response 
in terms of policies and political narrative to evolving, internal and external 
sources of pressure between 1982 and 2007 allows the identification of a policy 
fluctuation scheme. In the present study, policy fluctuation is conceived as the 
PFLP’s inability to balance the diversified and often contradictory factors 
affecting the production of its policy line. Such inability consequently results in 
a political agency which lacks the necessary coherence, preventing the PFLP 
from achieving the goals spelled in its agenda. Therefore, this thesis argues that 
the PFLP’s fluctuations throughout the period addressed impacted negatively 
                                                          
2 Jamil Hilal, Al-Yasar Al-Filastini. Ila ʾAyna? (The Palestinian Left. Where To?) (Ramallah: Rosa 
Luxemburg Foundation, 2009). 
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both its political effectiveness and its credibility and popularity among the 
Palestinian population. From this perspective, policy fluctuation should be 
considered a major cause for its gradual yet irreversible political marginalisation. 
Inasmuch as it represents a negative pattern, the concept of policy fluctuation 
adopted herein should not be confused with political flexibility or pragmatism. 
In relation to a political movement, pragmatism is seen as the ability to change 
fundamental positions and readdress political agency according to the evolution 
of the actual conditions in which it operates. Changes are thus supposed to have 
a deep scope and to be included in a general reformist framework. Indeed, 
pragmatism has been a feature marking all the different actors animating the 
Palestinian national movement. The lack of assets typical of state actors, such as 
a mostly undisputed territorial base or stable economic resources, has turned 
pragmatism in an essential aspect underlying the survival of Palestinian 
movements. For instance, pragmatism marked the PFLP leadership’s decision to 
fully embrace Marxist-Leninism following the DFLP’s defection, which 
challenged the PFLP on ideological grounds. In the context of intra-factional 
competition within the Palestinian national movement in the late 1960s, the 
PFLP implemented ideological reform in its contention for popular support with 
other factions. 
Conversely, policy fluctuation entails the pursuit of an inconsistent political 
line in an attempt to address clashing priorities or pressures. The political actor 
is faced with single or multiple dilemmas and fails to resolve them adequately. 
From this stems an inconsistent agency that jeopardises political effectiveness 
and credibility among the supporting base, and contributes to political 
marginalisation. In fact, fluctuant and pragmatic responses coexisted in the 
PFLP’s agency during the period addressed. However, this study argues and 
outlines that policy fluctuation ultimately prevailed over pragmatism. As the 
review of relevant literature will show, Asʿad AbuKhalil has already highlighted 
the concept of policy fluctuation in the PFLP’s case. Nonetheless, the present 
study widens the set of factors behind it outlining both the overall and specific 
aspects that led to the fluctuation pattern. Moreover, this research demonstrates 
the recurrence of such a pattern throughout the most recent history of the PFLP, 
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thus identifying in it a primary reason for its current marginalisation within 
Palestinian politics as consequence of political ineffectiveness. 
The aforementioned dilemmas can be seen as sources of pressures 
representing the points between which the PFLP’s agency oscillated. The main 
dilemma affecting the PFLP, and resurfacing throughout the period addressed, 
stemmed from its role of opposition to the Fatah leadership of the national 
movement within a context of integration and adherence to the institutional 
framework that the PLO embodied. While opposing the PLO leadership 
constantly remained a priority for the PFLP, protecting the political and 
institutional unity of the national movement was no less important.  
This study defines such dynamic as ‘opposition-integration dilemma’ which 
influenced the whole of the PFLP’s agency. While the PFLP contested 
consistently Fatah’s leadership of the PLO as well as its policies, this did not 
entail a challenge to the role and legitimacy of the PLO itself. Indeed, the PFLP’s 
first generation leaders, and particularly George Habash, shared with Yasser 
Arafat and other prominent Fatah leaders the principles characterising the PLO 
after the 1969 takeover by the armed factions. In particular, the preservation of 
Palestinian unity, the refusal of intra-Palestinian violence, and the defence of 
Palestinian political autonomy, best expressed by an independent PLO, 
constituted the basis for the PFLP’s ‘loyal opposition’ to Fatah. Moreover, the 
PLO membership granted the PFLP a level of political influence and vital 
resources for its own structure and activities unattainable outside its institutional 
framework. Access to the Palestinian National Fund or the possibility of 
participating in an internationally-recognised political platform embodied 
significant advantages for a national, liberation movement that did not enjoy the 
majority of popular support within its reference community. The PFLP’s 
adherence to the PLO platform was also linked to its attachment to the original 
rules regulating intra-factional relations, notwithstanding their gradual 
dismissal, especially after 1982. Indeed, the PFLP consistently conceived its ties 
with other Palestinian factions, also those outside the PLO, through the 
consensus-building approach that dominated Palestinian political life in the early 
years after the armed organisations’ takeover. This strengthened the PFLP’s 
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interest in maintaining integration into the Palestinian official institutions. In 
light of these aspects, the PFLP’s thrust to integration endured beyond the PLO 
marginalisation, generating a contradictory relation with the institutions 
established after the 1993 Oslo accords. 
 However, the PFLP’s membership of the PLO limited the action range of its 
opposition to Fatah in ways similar, although to a different extent, to the 
limitations that Arafat’s movement faced by participating in an umbrella 
organisation. In other words, while pursuing its own agenda, the PFLP had to 
balance constantly its priorities as an opposition party and its interests in 
preserving its integration within national institutions. This dynamic was in place, 
for instance, when the PFLP suspended its membership of the PLO Executive 
Committee in 1974 to protest the adoption of the Fatah and DFLP-backed ‘Ten-
Point Program’, which opened up the possibility of a two-state solution of the 
conflict with Israel. In fact, the suspension did not question the PFLP’s 
participation in the PLO, notwithstanding its harsh criticism of the new political 
course. However, the opposition-integration dilemma emerged with full clarity 
in the early 1980s, when majority politics disavowed the consensus principle that 
distinguished the PLO decision-making process, thus significantly reducing the 
PFLP’s power to influence, constrain or even veto Fatah’s line. Such a major 
shift in internal PLO politics had a paramount influence on how the PFLP 
responded to the challenges which emerged in the post-Beirut phase on the 
national, regional and international levels. Specifically, the result of this 
influence was the intensification of the PFLP’s policy fluctuation. 
The opposition-integration dilemma not only exacerbated the policy 
fluctuation pattern directly, but it also emphasised other contradictions affecting 
the PFLP and contributing to the inconsistency of its agency. In a context of 
power centralisation in the hands of one charismatic, internationally recognised 
leader, namely PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat, and of a parallel loss of political 
weight, the PFLP had to question its adherence to some of its tenets in order to 
protect its political leverage. Hence, the role of armed struggle, the PFLP’s idea 
of Palestinian state and the historical hard-line towards diplomatic solutions for 
the Israeli-Arab conflict, as well as relations with supposedly hostile and friendly 
28 
 
Arab regimes, came into question. Tensions were produced between these 
underpinning positions and the need for flexibility to ensure consensus within 
the PLO and, in turn, influence on its policies. Although these tensions had 
already emerged in previous circumstances, again with the PLO adoption of the 
Ten-Point Program for instance, the specific aspects of the post-Beirut phase 
emphasised their impact on the PFLP itself. 
 On the Palestinian level, the priority of implementing an effective 
counterbalance to Fatah posed the question of relations and alliances with other 
PLO opposition factions, leftist in particular. Factional priorities thus had to be 
concealed with different agendas and views on paramount issues such as peace 
plans, the role of armed struggle, relations with the Arab regimes and degree of 
opposition to Fatah. Disputes on such aspects joined long-standing leftist 
factionalism and rivalry, especially in the case of PFLP-DFLP relations, which 
hindered the implementation of effective power-sharing. The ensuing tensions 
ultimately contributed to undermining the coherence and viability of the PFLP’s 
political line. While the PFLP regularly pursued opposition through coalition 
politics, this strategy clashed with its own interest in maintaining factional 
integration in the PLO. In other words, the oppositional priority at the base of 
coalition building conflicted with the PFLP’s interest in individual integration in 
the PLO framework, thus producing an inconsistent political line. Similar 
tensions resurfaced as the PFLP attempted political association with Palestinian 
Islamists, namely Hamas and Islamic Jihad, to compact opposition against the 
1993 Israel-PLO Oslo accords. Beyond ideological differences, the Islamist, and 
particularly Hamas, challenge to the status of the PLO, and its de-facto heir the 
PNA, as supreme Palestinian institutional framework, jeopardised relations with 
the PFLP. Indeed, while in exploring coalition building with Hamas the PFLP 
pursued its oppositional agenda, its need to preserve or regain influence within 
Palestinian institutions prevented a total disengagement from the PLO/PNA 
leadership. Ultimately, the opposition-integration dilemma, and the fluctuating 
policies it engendered, made both the PFLP’s opposition and partnership in the 
institutional framework marginal within Palestinian politics.  
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The PFLP’s difficulties in addressing such underlying contradictions also 
affected its position towards its key regional partner during the 1980s, namely 
the Syrian regime. Again, the priorities of counterbalancing Arafat’s agenda 
pushed the PFLP closer to Damascus and its Palestinian proxies in terms of 
narrative and positions adopted. Nonetheless, the clear Syrian attempt to assert 
its control over the PLO compromised the effective establishment of a radical 
axis. The prevailing principle of defending Palestinian autonomy led to the 
PFLP’s alignment with fellow Palestinian factions when PLO-Syria tensions 
exacerbated.  
Policy fluctuation stemming from the opposition-integration dilemma also 
affected the PFLP in its internal dynamics, fuelling existing tensions within the 
organisation. As the centre of the Palestinian national movement relocated to the 
OPT with the outbreak of the First Intifada (1987-1993), all PLO factions with 
a significant presence there were faced with the emergence of local leaderships. 
The national movement in the OPT displayed significant differences in terms of 
organisational structure and political strategies. The presence of the Israeli 
occupier entailed the development of underground political activities, the 
formation of a flexible, less hierarchical leadership as well as the prioritisation 
of non-violent political mobilisations over armed struggle. Differences were also 
due to the specific dynamics that fostered the development of the outside and the 
inside national movement. In the diaspora, popular mobilisation was the result 
of the PLO’s performance of its quasi-state functions that accentuated the 
bureaucratisation of popular organisations. Conversely, in the OPT such 
mobilisation stemmed from collective actions and from the need to rely on 
popular political and economic support in the absence of a leadership providing 
funds and political legitimisation through its bureaucracy.3 Moreover, the special 
status of the OPT, and their primacy after the end of the PLO quasi-state in 
Lebanon, lent to the local national movement a relevance that any other 
Palestinian diaspora community did not enjoy. Therefore, the peculiar features 
and circumstances marking the movement in the OPT entailed the emergence of 
                                                          
3 For more details on this see: Jamil Hilal, “PLO Insitutions. The Challenge Ahead”, Journal of 
Palestine Studies 23, no. 1 (1993): 46-60. 
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an ‘inside-outside’ divide influencing the internal dimension of the main PLO 
factions. Although the OPT branches recognised the leadership of the exiled 
cadres, their rise to prominence represented a potential challenge to the balances 
of power both on the factional and the PLO level.  
In the PFLP’s case, the ‘inside-outside’ divide first arose in relation to its 
policy line. Thus, the inside, younger leadership supporting a tougher position 
towards Fatah’s attempts to exploit the uprising diplomatically, clashed with the 
outside, old-guard’s unwillingness to provoke a major split within the PLO. In 
this case, the opposition-integration dilemma overlapped with the inside-outside 
divide, evidencing the PFLP leadership’s interest in preserving both its grip on 
the Front as well as the influence and benefits granted by participation in the 
PLO institutions. Both these priorities coincided with maintaining the 
cohesiveness of the outside national unity. This came to the detriment of the 
oppositional agenda, particularly in the terms spelled out by the local leadership, 
resulting in the reiteration of policy fluctuation between an official objection to 
Arafat’s strategy and the continued engagement with it. The inside-outside 
divide within the PFLP resurfaced throughout the phase that followed the First 
Intifada, especially with the advent of the post-Oslo era and of the PNA’s state-
building project. Indeed, in its various resurfacings, for instance during the 
PFLP’s Fifth General Congress or the first PNA parliamentary elections, the 
divide continued to interact with the opposition-integration dilemma, 
undermining the PFLP’s strength as an opposition force and its overall stance 
within a changing political environment. 
 Finally, the investigation of the opposition-integration dilemma allows the 
delineation of a different understanding of the PLO and its principal successor, 
the PNA. While for much of its history the PLO represented for the PFLP a vital 
political, institutional and economic framework, when its process of decline 
experienced a qualitative change after the loss of the Beirut base, such a 
framework also imposed major constraints. The PFLP’s reduced political 
weight, coupled with the gradual centralisation of power into Arafat’s hands, 
turned the PLO into a paradoxical framework. On the one hand, the PFLP was 
unwilling to disengage from the PLO as it acted to preserve the political 
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influence developed by virtue of its membership. On the other, the centralisation 
and personification of power in Arafat’s leadership undermined both the 
effectiveness and the credibility of the PFLP’s opposition within the PLO 
institutions, particularly as the PLO emerged as a nationalist and institutional 
support for the Fatah’s leadership policies. Despite the official rejection of the 
PNA as a product of the Oslo accords, the PFLP entered into a similar 
relationship with it due to the overlap between PLO and PNA, and this latter 
emergence as the new main framework of the Palestinian national movement. 
 
Literature Review, First Part: The PFLP in Scholarly Literature. 
Despite the prominent role it has played within the Palestinian national 
movement and the PLO, the PFLP has rarely been the main focus of academic 
studies. The majority of works on Palestinian politics put Fatah, the PLO and, 
subsequently, the PNA’s leadership at the centre of their analyses. The literature 
on Palestinian politics thus covers a number of aspects concerning the 
Palestinian leadership, such as its social composition, its functioning and 
evolution, or its relations with both hostile and friendly regional and 
international actors. Besides this, the growth of academic interest in political 
Islam, in particular since the early 1990s, has led to the production of several 
works covering the Palestinian Islamist organisations.  
The following review of the relevant literature shows the need for a study 
addressing the third political trend in the Palestinian political field, namely the 
leftist and Marxist one. Therefore, this thesis should be considered within the 
context of academic works addressing the evolution of the Palestinian national 
movement, as it developed since the emergence of independent Palestinian 
organisations in the late 1960s. By virtue of its focus on the PFLP, the present 
study represents a contribution to the literature approaching the role of Marxism 
not only in Palestinian politics but also in the whole region. This is ensured 
through the reappraisal of the role played by ideology in the PFLP as well as 
through the analysis of the PFLP’s participation in multi-faceted political and 
institutional frameworks. Thus, the main concepts spelled throughout this thesis 
may represent some effective analytical tool to scrutinise the agency of Marxist 
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and leftist forces in the context of national liberation. This first section of the 
review addresses the relevant scholarship produced on the Palestinian national 
movement highlighting its missing points concerning the PFLP and how the 
present thesis aims at approaching them. The subsequent section surveys part of 
the literature on Egyptian communism in order to outline the potential 
connections of the PFLP’s case. 
To date, only two academic studies treated the PFLP as their main subject. 
The first example is a 1987 article by Asʿad AbuKhalil which addressed the 
PFLP’s decision-making process and its contradictions. The article focused on 
the internal factors that shaped the PFLP’s policies, such as doctrinal 
background, internal power groups, or the preponderance of George Habash’s 
personality in the decision-making process. More interestingly, AbuKhalil 
evidenced the concept of fluctuations in the PFLP’s policy orientation, as a 
consequence of those different factors influencing the PFLP’s agency. 
According to him, policy fluctuation emerged with particular clarity in the 
PFLP’s shifting foreign relations. After his survey, AbuKhalil concluded that it 
might be difficult to determine whether the PFLP’s fluctuant policy orientations 
and the moderation of its stand on several issues, stemmed from internal or 
external factors. What he stressed, is that such moderation, amounting to an 
abandonment of its founding, revolutionary principles, would likely provoke a 
deep crisis within the Popular Front.4  The present study draws from the concept 
of policy fluctuation and expands it chronologically by observing it throughout 
the period under scrutiny. Moreover, the discussion presented in this thesis 
develops such concept through the identification of more factors contributing to 
this phenomenon. This elaboration, allowed the outline of those problems 
affecting the PFLP’s agency, that beyond the issue of moderation, played a major 
role in the crisis that AbuKhalil correctly predicted.  
The only published monograph focusing on the PFLP so far is Harold M. 
Cubert’s The PFLP’s Changing Role in the Middle East, published in 1997. This 
study, after long overviews on the development of Arab nationalism and regional 
                                                          
4 Asʿad AbuKhalil, “Internal Contradictions in the PFLP: Decision Making and Policy Orientation,” 
The Middle East Journal 41, no. 3 (1987): 361–78. 
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history, argues that the reason for the PFLP’s failure to take the lead in the 
Palestinian national movement lies in its doctrinal rigidity, as opposed to Fatah’s 
successful pragmatism. According to Cubert, such rigidity produced a political 
discourse that found little resonance among the Palestinian public as well as 
preventing the PFLP from implementing the needed changes in its political line. 
This ultimately produced the PFLP’s marginalisation within the Palestinian 
national movement. Nonetheless the author displays little consideration of 
paramount aspects such as the evolution of the scenarios in which the PFLP 
acted, the internal dynamics that characterised both the PFLP and the PLO, as 
well as the actual role of ideology within the Front.5 In sum, this book does not 
address those tensions and dynamics that the present thesis aims at outlining. In 
relation to the PFLP’s ideological setting, for instance, this thesis shows that 
doctrinal inflexibility and the undisputed adherence to Marxist-Leninist and 
Maoist principles served as theoretical foundations and instruments to justify 
change in policy formulation and lower the impact of contradictory shifts. 
Moreover, thanks to the historical perspective adopted herein, it is possible to 
underline the various circumstances during which the PFLP displayed 
significant pragmatism, conversely from what Cubert argued in his book. This 
challenges the conclusion that the PFLP’s ‘inflexibility’ determined its 
marginalisation within Palestinian politics and points to shortcomings in its 
agency as a prominent cause for the weakening process 
The organisation from which the PFLP originated, the Pan-Arab and 
transnational Arab Nationalist Movement (ANM), has received wider, although 
mostly outdated, scholarly attention. Such works mainly focus on the ideological 
evolution of the movement that started as a rightist, nationalist movement in the 
early 1950s but gradually shifted towards socialism, first by virtue of its 
association with Nasser’s Egypt in the 1960s, and finally was transformed into a 
Marxist-Leninist organisation after the 1967 June War and the creation of the 
PFLP. In the account of the ANM’s process of radicalisation, the literature 
stresses the influence of regional developments and particularly the ANM’s 
failure to seize power in the Arab east, exception made for South Yemen, as a 
                                                          
5 Harold M. Cubert, The PFLP’s Changing Role in the Middle East (London: Frank Cass, 1997). 
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catalyst for the shift towards Marxism. Moreover, what is highlighted, is the 
legacy of the ANM in terms of ideological development of Arab nationalism and 
training of political leaders in several countries.6 Great relevance is also devoted 
to internal trends and rivalries within the ANM as well as to the position of its 
main leaders, such as George Habash, Hani al-Hindi, Mohsen Ibrahim and Nayef 
Hawatmeh. These insights on the ANM’s internal dynamics appear particularly 
important as they shed light on those factors that caused the early splits within 
the PFLP, above all the creation of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine (DFLP) in 1969. Thus, the mixture of ideological divergences and 
personal rivalries is highlighted to explain the ANM’s internal rifts. 
Furthermore, such works allow us to grasp the ANM’s ideological legacy within 
the PFLP, evident in the PFLP’s rejection of political settlements of the Arab-
Israeli conflict during its first decade as well as in its adherence to Pan-Arabism. 
In general terms, the literature focusing on the ANM provides the essential, 
comprehensive background to an informed study of its main offshoot and its 
relation with the rest of the PLO Left. In light of these thorough readings of the 
ANM’s course, a similar take on the PFLP appears all the more needed to expand 
the academic knowledge on a central core of the Palestinian national movement.7  
Recently, the Palestine Regional Office of the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation, 
a ‘political education’ institution affiliated to the German leftist party Die Linke, 
has sponsored some studies on the Palestinian and Arab Left which clearly 
address the condition of the PFLP. As the whole Palestinian Left today appears 
marginalised, these works focused on the main reasons determining such 
decline. The great international and regional changes which occurred throughout 
the late 1980s and early 1990s are identified as prominent causes behind the 
weakening of the Palestinian Left. The crisis of global Marxism following the 
                                                          
6 Walid Kazziha, Revolutionary Transformation in the Arab World: Habash and His Comrades from 
Nationalism to Marxism (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1975); Muhammad Jamal Barut, Harakat al-
Qawmiyyin al-ʿArab: al-Nashʾa, al-Tatawwur, al-Masaʾir (The Arab Nationalist Movement: 
Formation, Evolution and Trajectories)" (Damascus: al-Markaz al-ʿArabi li-l-Dirasat al-Istratijiyya, 
1997). 
7 Tareq Y. Ismael, The Arab Left (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1976); Basil Al-Kubeisi, 
Storia Del Movimento Dei Nazionalisti Arabi (Milano: Jaca Books, 1977); Helga Baumgarten, “The 
Three Faces / Phases of Palestinian Nationalism , 1948 – 2005,” Journal of Palestine Studies 34, no. 4 
(2005): 25–48.  
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demise of the USSR, the emergence of political Islam in the national and 
regional arenas, and the economic crisis that affected the PLO in the early 1990s 
are all events that had a negative impact on the whole Palestinian Left. On the 
Palestinian level, these works identify factors such as the advent of the Oslo era, 
the persistent fragmentation of the Palestinian Left as well as its lack of 
leadership renewal, its negligence concerning social issues and the Left’s 
controversial relation with NGOs in the OPT as the principal causes for its 
protracted marginalisation in Palestinian politics.8 In the literature approaching 
the issue of the PFLP’s decline, ideological inflexibility is also a recurrent theme. 
Its strict adherence to Marxist-Leninism is often seen as a major factor that 
historically prevented the PFLP from gaining widespread mass support among 
the Palestinian population.9 In addition, the PFLP’s lack of renewal following 
the collapse of the USSR is also evidenced as a controversial point, posing 
further obstacles in the path towards political renewal. Indeed, the PFLP is 
highlighted as the only Palestinian leftist faction that did not undertake some 
form of ideological renewal, although the measures that other organisations 
adopted in this sense are often described as being of little effectiveness 
concerning popular attractiveness and mostly formal, without any substantial 
effects, particularly concerning their organisational structures.10  
The factors outlined in these works are all fundamental to understand the 
decline and the current marginalisation of the PFLP and the Palestinian Left. 
Nonetheless, the majority of these studies does not put these events into 
historical perspective and tend to approach the matter starting from the demise 
of the Soviet Union and the advent of the Oslo era. Moreover, the literature tends 
to address the Palestinian Left as a fully homogenous group, despite some 
                                                          
8 Jamil Hilal, Al-Yasar Al-Filastini. Ila ʾAyna? (The Palestinian Left. Where To?) (Ramallah: Rosa 
Luxemburg Foundation, 2009); Hasan Ladadwe, “Al-Yasar al-Filastini: al-Waqiʿ wa al-Tahaddi (The 
Palestinian Left: Realities and Challenge),” in Itlala Awalliyya ʿala al-Yasar fi-l-Mashriq al-ʿArabi 
(Mapping of the Arab Left. Contemporary Leftist Politics in the Arab East), ed. Jamil Hilal and Katia 
Herman (Ramallah: Rosa Luxemburg Foundation, 2014); Tariq Dana, “Social Struggle and the Crisis 
of the Palestinian Left Parties,” Pal Papers, March (2016): 1–4. 
9 Ali Jarbawi, “Palestinian Politics at a Crossroads,” Journal of Palestine Studies 25, no. 4 (1996): 29–
39. 
10 Salim Tamari, “Left in Limbo : Leninist Heritage and Islamist Challenge A,” MERIP Middle East 
Report, no. 179 (1992): 16–21; Mahir Sharif, “From Marxism to Liberal Nationalism: A 
Transformation in Palestinian Marxism,” in Post-Marxism and the Middle East ed. Faleh A. Jaber 
(London: Saqi Books, 1997). 
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important differences characterising each faction. Conversely, the present study 
argues that prominent causes contributing to the PFLP’s decline emerged before 
the 1990s. In addition, although the importance of global and local developments 
cannot be underestimated, the literature still lacks an evaluation of the PFLP’s 
own agency, of its response to such challenges. What is missing is a definition 
of the subjective aspects that shaped the PFLP’s policies and led to given results. 
Assessments of the PFLP’s agency have been attempted concerning some 
specific episodes of Palestinian political history such as the signing of the Oslo 
accords in 1993 or the 2006 PLC elections in which the PFLP decided to take 
part.11 Although extremely helpful to an understanding of the PFLP’s policies in 
such circumscribed cases, these analyses need to be expanded and read against 
a wider and more comprehensive investigation of the PFLP’s agency. 
The wide corpus of literature on the PLO mostly focus on Fatah, its most 
important faction in terms of power within Palestinian institutions, popular 
following, military capabilities and international networks. More precisely, as 
Fatah and the ruling group around Arafat consistently held the reins of decision-
making, scholarly attention focuses on Fatah’s pursuit of its agenda through the 
PLO.12 Although they do not depict a monolithic picture of the PLO that does 
not reflect the variegated nature of the Palestinian national movement,13 
nonetheless these works do not investigate sufficiently the main factors that 
shaped the PFLP’s opposition to Fatah and the PLO leadership. In particular, the 
PFLP’s rejection of Fatah’s diplomatic strategy, in all of its embodiments 
throughout history, is underscored as a main source of tension between the two 
                                                          
11 See for instance Anders Strinberg, “The Damascus-Based Alliance of Palestinian Forces: A 
Primer,” Journal of Palestine Studies 29, no. 3 (2000): 60–76; Manal A. Jamal, “Beyond Fateh 
Corruption and Mass Discontent: Hamas, the Palestinian Left and the 2006 Legislative Elections,” 
British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 40, no. 3 (July 2013): 273–94. 
12 Helena Cobban, The Palestinian Liberation Organisation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1984); F. Robert Hunter, The Palestinian Uprising. A War by Other Means (London: I.B. Tauris, 
1991); Yezid Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State : The Palestinian National Movement, 
1949-1993 (Oxford: Claredon Press, 1997); Rashid Khalidi, The Iron Cage. The Story of the 
Palestinian Struggle for Statehood (Oxford: Oneworld Pubblication, 2007). 
13Nicolas Dot-Pouillard, La Mosaïque Éclatée. Une Histoire Du Mouvement National Palestinien 
(1993-2016) (Paris - Beirut: Actes Sud -Institut des Etudes Palestiniennes, 2016). This book for 
instance, provides a detailed overview of the actors and themes that animate Palestinian politics in the 
OPT, Israel as well as the Palestinian diaspora with precious insights on the Palestinian national 
movement in Lebanon and Israel. 
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main PLO factions.14 The PFLP’s doctrinal rigidity is often highlighted in 
opposition to Fatah’s pragmatism and ideological inclusiveness, for instance 
when analysing the debate on the form of the future Palestinian state that 
animated the PLO after the armed organisations took over in the late 1960s.15 
Ultimately, studies on the PLO underline the implications that the PLO, as an 
umbrella organisation, its internal opposition and its external competitors had on 
the Fatah’s leadership of the organisation and its agenda. The stress is thus on 
the restraining power that such effect had on the PLO leadership.16 Conversely, 
this study aims at evidencing the implications that PLO membership had for the 
PFLP thus delineating how such membership influenced the PFLP’s conduct and 
to what extent it represented a constraint besides offering significant benefits.  
Similarly, studies covering the post-Oslo period looked significantly at the 
agency of the Palestinian leadership within the context of the newly-established 
PNA. Attention is thus focused on how the PNA asserted its rule in the OPT and 
tried to sustain its state-building process in the realms of economy, legislation, 
security and judiciary. The careful assessment of PNA-implemented policies 
parallels a detailed discussion of the main critical aspects and dysfunctions 
affecting Palestinian self-government. Issues such as power centralisation and 
authoritarian practices, patrimonialism and corruption emerge among the main 
problematic aspects that affected PNA governance, influenced by both the 
legacy of Arafat’s leadership within the PLO and the paradigms of the Oslo 
accords such as dependence on foreign aid and security coordination with 
Israel.17    
                                                          
14 Muhammad Muslih, “Moderates and Rejectionists within the Palestine Liberation Organization,” 
Middle East Journal 30, no. 2 (1976): 127–40; Yezid Sayigh, “Struggle Within, Struggle without: The 
Transformation of PLO Politics since 1982,” International Affairs 65, no. 2 (1989). 
15 See for instance Alain Gresh, The PLO. The Struggle Within (London: Zed Books, 1988). 
16 Emile F. Sahliyeh, The PLO after the Lebanon War (Boulder: Westview Press, 1986); Rex Brynen, 
Sanctuary and Survival: The PLO in Lebanon, (Boulder: Westview Press,) 1990, 
http://prrn.mcgill.ca/research/papers/brynen2.htm. 
17 Nathan J. Brown, Palestinian Politics after the Oslo Accords: Resuming Arab Palestine (Berkeley 
and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2003); Mushtaq Husain Khan, George Giacaman, 
and Inge Amundsen, eds., State Formation in Palestine : Viability and Governance during a Social 
Transformation, (London : Routledge, 2004); Nigel Parsons, The Politics of the Palestinian Authority. 
From Oslo to Al-Aqsa (New York and London: Routledge, 2005); Asʿad Ghanem, Palestinian Politics 
after Arafat. A Failed National Movement (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010). 
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Therefore, this part of the literature draws a detailed description of post-Oslo 
Palestinian politics which is central to understanding the new dilemmas affecting 
the PFLP’s political action. In observing the post-Oslo phase, the present study 
focuses again on the PFLP’s agency within the new political context. Particular 
stress is put on the constraints that the PFLP faced in its opposition to a political 
entity that embodied the direct successor, and to a certain extent the substitute, 
of the PLO. Ultimately, the goal is to outline how the effectiveness of the PFLP’s 
policies was compromised by its unclear relation with the PNA’s institutional 
framework. In so doing, this study adds to the academic discussion on the 
Palestinian Left’s problematics and shortcomings during the Oslo era, 
particularly in the realm of civil society and NGOs,18 and its contradictory 
position towards the PNA as a central theme in understanding its decline.   
Since its establishment and rise to prominence, Hamas has also been at the 
centre of academic studies focusing on Palestinian politics. To date a remarkable 
corpus of literature on the Islamist movement has been produced, analysing the 
innovations it brought to the Palestinian national movement in terms of ideology 
and social practice as well as military and political strategy.19 Consequently, 
such academic production has clarified Hamas’ internal functioning and 
dynamics such as the relation between the exiled and the Gaza-based 
leaderships, its evolution from opposition movement to ruling party, as well as 
its successful pragmatism in engaging with the Oslo-derived political system. In 
particular, the literature seems to agree on Hamas’ trail towards de-facto 
moderation, an idea confirmed by the new charter that Hamas issued in spring 
2017.20 Beside Hamas, academic literature has also dedicated specific attention 
                                                          
18 Rema Hammami, “NGOs: The Professionalisation of Politics,” Race & Class 37, no. 51 (1995): 
51–63; Rema Hammami, “Palestinian NGOs since Oslo: From NGOs Politics to Social Movements?,” 
MERIP Middle East Report, no. 214 (2000): 16–19; Islah Jad, “NGOs: Between Buzzwords and 
Social Movements.,” Development in Practice 17, no. 4 (2007): 622–29; Benoit Challand, “A Nahda 
of Charitable Organizations? Health Service Provision and the Politics of Aid in Palestine,” 
International Journal of Middle East Studies 40, no. 2 (2008): 227–47. 
19 To quote some of the most prominent Beverley Milton-Edwards, Islamic Politics in Palestine 
(London: Tauris Academic Studies, 1996); Khaled Hroub, Hamas. Political Thought and Practice 
(Washington D.C.: Institute for Palestine Studies, 2000); Beverley Milton-Edwards and Stephen 
Farrel, Hamas. The Islamic Resistance Movement (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010); Sara Roy, Hamas 
and Civil Society in Gaza Engaging the Islamist Social Sector. (Princeton: Princeton : Princeton 
University Press, 2011). 
20 Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya-Hamas, “Wathiqat al-Mabadiʾ wa al-Siyasat al-ʿama (Charter 
of Principles and General Policies)”, may, 2017. 
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to the Islamic Jihad Movement in Palestine (Islamic Jihad), evidencing the 
diversities of Palestinian political Islam. Specifically in relation to Islamic Jihad, 
some peculiar traits are often highlighted. Its evolution as the gathering of 
different groups coalescing around the personality of Fathi Shiqaqi as well as the 
organisation’s explicit retention of the Palestinian national movement’s legacy, 
in contrast with Hamas’ challenge to it, emerge as the Islamic Jihad’s most 
important features.21 As a consequence, this body of literature on the main 
Palestinian Islamist factions further highlights the lack of a study dedicated to 
the historical development of the main Palestinian leftist faction. Nonetheless, 
the methodology employed to investigate the Islamist organisations represents a 
reference model for the present study of the PFLP. Particularly valuable was the 
recourse of these works to the combination of official documents and interviews 
with members and cadres as primary sources.  
Relying on the profiles of Palestinian political Islam detailed in the literature, 
this study engages with the relations between the PFLP and the Islamist faction. 
While Islamist-focused studies point to some of the divergences that jeopardised 
the attempts at contact with leftist factions, an approach centred on the PFLP’s 
view allows us to outline a more complete image. Besides ideological 
differences which are usually put forward as a main divide, the different 
understanding of Palestinian institutions, especially the PLO, emerges as the 
major point of fissure between the Left and the Islamists, Hamas in particular. 
In conclusion, beside addressing the division between the Islamist and the leftist 
opposition to Fatah and the PNA, the present study highlights the PFLP’s 
predicament in preserving its political role while a new radical actor embodied 
the main opposition option.  
As it has been shown, the focused study of the PFLP’s decline aims at 
complementing the scholarship on the Palestinian national movement on several 
issues. Not only the most urgent goal of providing a comprehensive analysis of 
the PFLP’s marginalisation is therefore addressed. This study also proceeds to 
                                                          
21 Meir Hatina, Islam and Salvation in Palestine: The Islamic Jihad Movement (Tel Aviv: Moshe 
Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, 2001); Wissam Alhaj, Nicolas Dot-Pouillard, 
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the reappraisal of ideology in the Popular Front, intra-factional relations and the 
role of Palestinian institutions contributing to a more complete depiction of the 
internal dynamics characterising the Palestinian national movement. 
 
Literature Review, Second Part: The Opposition-Integration Dilemma 
beyond Palestine. 
The participation of Marxist-Leninist forces in nationalist fronts or umbrella 
organisations aiming at national liberation was not a Palestinian prerogative in 
the Middle East and North Africa region. Therefore, the problems and challenges 
arising from such participation can be observed in other cases too. One of the 
main recurrent aspects is the alternation of conflict and cooperation between the 
leftist forces and the nationalist, and often military, leadership of the national 
movements. This echoes the concept of opposition-integration dilemma that 
affected severely the PFLP. Hence, the concepts elaborated in this thesis, can 
contribute to the study of intra-factional relations in different contexts. A look at 
the relevant literature, and in particular at the case of Egypt, help to demonstrate 
this point. The goal of this survey is thus to underscore the potential interactions 
between different national cases, and more specifically, the connections of the 
Palestinian case to other realities despite its own peculiarities.  
The relations between Egyptian communists and nationalist forces provide a 
first viable example. The difficult position of Egyptian communism towards 
nationalism emerges as a central aspect in the literature. This first took the shapes 
of an ideological dilemma on whether Egyptian communists should prioritise 
class struggle, and the internationalist approach that ensued, or the national 
struggle against British imperialism. While the communist movement 
experienced both cooperation and repression at the hand of the Wafd Party, the 
leading nationalist force in Egypt, during the first half of the 20th century, it 
ultimately ended up by prioritising the national effort by the Second World War 
period. At this regard, the literature shows how such orientation spread not only 
among the cadres of communist factions but also among communist trade 
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unionists.22 The dilemma exacerbated even more in the 1940s and 1950s, with 
the outbreak and conclusion of the 1948 Palestine war and the radicalisation of 
Egyptian nationalism due to the continual presence of British forces in the 
country. While support for the partition of Palestine, in alignment with Soviet 
official line, risked undermining the communists’ nationalist credentials, a 
remarkable part of Egyptian Marxism came to look at nationalism as an effective 
mean to achieve the final goal of socialist revolution. As Joel Beinin outlines 
through his Gramscian approach, the communists tried to reach their political 
goals by participating in the hegemonic bloc headed by nationalist forces, 
notably Pan-Arabist after the Free Officers’ takeover.23 However, the literature 
highlights how the dilemma between conflict and cooperation with nationalist 
forces continued to affect Egyptian communism. Indeed, such dilemma fostered 
fragmentation among its different movements, a dynamic that can be observed 
also within the Palestinian national movement, albeit with the due distinctions. 
Part of the movement was actively involved in the organisation of the military 
seizure of power as well as supporting the new regime in its first months. A 
minority trend of Egyptian Marxist however, vehemently opposed the Free 
Officers, deeming their bourgeois and military character as ultimately 
reactionary. Nevertheless, the whole of Egyptian communism was reunited by 
Nasser’s repression that hit all leftist factions with no distinctions.24 In their 
study of Egyptian communism relations with nationalism, some works underline 
the benefit that nationalist forces enjoyed from such relations in contrast with 
the few advantages reaped by the communists. Indeed, not only the Marxist Left 
provided the Free Officers with organisational support during the preparation of 
their coup. Later on, Nasser was also to implement some points that have always 
been high in the communists’ agenda such as nationalisations, land reforms and 
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closer ties with the USSR and the Socialist bloc countries. While testifying the 
Left’s inability to take a leading role in the nationalist struggle, according to 
Selma Botman, this aspect proves the relevance of communist legacy in 
Egyptian politics.25 Despite the repression endured, Egyptian communists 
continued to consider integration into the Nasserist regime even behind bars. 
Indeed, they continued to calculate that alliance with the nationalist forces would 
have brought the revolutionary change that they pursued. Nasser’s economic and 
foreign policies, especially after 1956, provided strong support for this argument, 
while also Soviet recommendations supported this orientation. As a result, the 
two main communist parties in Egypt decided to dissolve themselves in 1965 to 
join the newly formed Arab Socialist Union, Nasser’s regime single-party. The 
dissolution of independent communist organisation is not only interesting since 
it shows the ultimate choice of the Egyptian left for integration. As Beinin 
pointed out, this choice was not a mere consequence of Soviet diktats, but one 
taken in consideration of Egypt’s own political circumstances.26 The role of the 
communists’ own calculation in leading towards dissolution thus underscores 
the importance of considering individual agency in the appraisal of specific 
political trajectories. The resolution of the dilemma between opposition and 
integration in favour of this latter, represents, in the Egyptian case, the result of 
a policy orientation that the communist movement followed autonomously for a 
long time. Therefore, internal determinants seem to acquire an equal, if not a 
greater role compared to external ones, in the evolution of the Egyptian 
communist movement. 
The opposition-integration dilemma was central throughout the history of the 
PFLP’s participation in the PLO and, as the previous sections outlined, it played 
a fundamental role in its process of marginalisation. Its case can thus be linked 
to that of Egyptian communists and possibly to other realities in the region and 
elsewhere such as Iraq and South Africa. In light of this, the present study 
provides the necessary discussion of leftist-nationalist relations within a specific 
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26 Joel Beinin, “The Communist Movement and Nationalist Political Discourse in Nasirist Egypt”, The 
Middle East Journal 41, no. 4 (1987), 568-584.  
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movement for national liberation upon which possible comparisons can be 
based. Therefore, despite the peculiarities of the PFLP and the Palestinian cases, 
for instance the PFLP’s own nationalist origins, the study of its case can be 
informative to analyses approaching other political and national contexts. 
 
Primary Sources. 
In the preface to his monumental study of the Palestinian national movement’s 
quest for statehood, Yezid Sayigh points out the wide range of political 
documents published by all Palestinian factions and organisations, identifying in 
such production a fundamental source for his work:  
‘given the intense competition for adherents (and external backing), no guerrilla 
group was without at least one political weekly, and several also published their 
own soldiers' magazines, besides a variety of reports, yearbooks, and non-
periodical statements or pamphlets containing texts of speeches and other public 
messages’.27 
Official publications appear even more important when approaching the history 
of single factions as these documents not only represent the most constant source 
on each faction’s actual agency, but also provide relevant information 
concerning the ideological and organisational background to a given set of 
policies. Khaled Hroub’s study of Hamas’ political thought and practice 
represents a prominent example of this approach concerning single Palestinian 
factions. As the author himself clarifies:  
‘the contribution of (this) study lies in its almost total reliance on primary sources, 
specifically, the unpublished as well as published documents and literature of 
Hamas’.28 
The present study follows the examples provided above and therefore relies 
primarily on the PFLP’s official documents. The best source for the PFLP’s 
official publications is the magazine Al-Hadaf, founded in 1969 by prominent 
Palestinian author and PFLP member Ghassan Kanafani as the official party 
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mouthpiece. Al-Hadaf has been published weekly for most of its life but it started 
to be issued monthly in 1995, probably due to financial problems. Today, the 
magazine does not exist in its printed edition anymore but continues to publish 
as an online news platform. The types of document that Al-Hadaf has been 
publishing since its establishment range from Politburo and Central Committee 
official statements and reports to declarations directly issued by the PFLP’s 
leaders, from congress memoranda and resolutions to joint statements with other 
Palestinian, Arab and international organisations. Besides the whole range of 
official documents, Al-Hadaf also publishes interviews that the PFLP’s leaders 
released in the magazine itself or to world media, besides analysis and columns 
that clarify the PFLP’s position on the main issues at the centre of political 
debates.29  
Al-Hadaf’s editorial board was composed of top cadres who also held posts 
within the PFLP and the PLO such as Politburo members Sabi Mahi al-Din, 
Jawad ʿAql, Politburo and PNC member Omar Qattish, Maher al-Taher, Head 
of External Relations and the PFLP’s representative in the PLO Executive 
Committee, or Bassam Abu Sharif, a close advisor to George Habash before his 
defection from the PFLP to Fatah in the late 1980s. Consequently, besides 
official statements and communiques, the majority of analytical and comment 
articles came directly from the higher ranks of the Front. Beside this, other top 
PFLP’s officials also contributed frequently to Al-Hadaf. In particular, each 
official contributed to the magazine with explanatory pieces concerning his area 
of expertise, according to his post within either the PFLP or the PLO. Therefore, 
for instance, George Habash appeared in Al-Hadaf with both concise and lengthy 
illustrations of the general orientations of the PFLP’s policies, how decisions and 
shifts were grounded in the nationalist and Marxist-Leninist background of the 
Front. As further examples, as long as Abu Ali Mustafa represented the PFLP 
within the PLO Executive Committee, he wrote Al-Hadaf articles illustrating the 
rationale for the PFLP’s positions and votes in this key PLO institution, while 
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Abu Ahmad Fuʾad, long time PFLP military head, provided clarifications and 
reports on the military activities of the Front. 
Besides the PFLP’s official voices, Al-Hadaf also featured contributions from 
Palestinian, Arab and international political personalities, intellectuals and 
journalists whose views could substantiate the PFLP’s position or who addressed 
issues relevant for the Front on the national, regional and international levels. 
Moreover, interviews of and articles by representatives of other Palestinian 
factions as well as Arab and international state officials also appeared in Al-
Hadaf. These kinds of contributions are telling for the evolution of the PFLP’s 
relations with its partners. Thus, for instance, Al-Hadaf dedicated significant 
space to articles and interviews with the DFLP’s members, especially Secretary-
General Nayef Hawatmeh, when the two organisations pursued coalition 
building. As their association attempts experienced troubles or breakdowns, the 
DFLP’s officials stopped appearing regularly in Al-Hadaf.  
Al-Hadaf’s complete collection is, to date, only available at the library of the 
Institute for Palestine Studies in Beirut, where a selection of relevant documents 
issued between 1982 and 2013 has been carried out for the purposes of the 
present research. In addition to the documents retrieved from Al-Hadaf, 
publications such as booklets, pamphlets or compiled volumes of official 
documents, issued by the PFLP’s Information Department, have been employed 
extensively. These sources have been retrieved from various physical 
repositories and web sites such as the library of the Institute for Palestine Studies, 
the library of the Institut Français du Proche Orient (also based in the Lebanese 
capital) or the PFLP’s affiliated webpages.30 
Besides the PFLP’s official literature, this study also drew important 
information from documents issued by the political platforms or umbrella 
organisations in which the PFLP participated, first and foremost the PLO, as well 
as those of its political partners such as other Palestinian factions. This set of 
material, too, ranging from resolutions and statements released by the PLO and 
the PNA institutions to documents relating to opposition coalitions, has been 
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retrieved through several channels. The Journal for Palestine Studies, and 
specifically its dedicated section on primary sources, ‘Documents and Source 
Material’, provided access to a wide range of documents related to Palestinian 
affairs while, for instance, the Palestinian News and Info Agency-Wafa, today 
the PNA’s official press agency, provides valuable archival resources on 
Palestinian institutions and factions.  
Besides textual primary sources, this research also relied on interviews with 
informed people, although to a lesser extent. Current and former PFLP members 
and cadres, as well as scholars specialised in the Palestinian national movement, 
have been consulted to gain insights on the PFLP’s internal dynamics. 
Constraints related to the timing of the PhD studies as well as to the research and 
travel funds available led to the prioritisation of textual sources whose gathering 
process could be better defined in space and time.  
The greater reliance on textual sources contributed to the definition of the 
chronological scope adopted in this study. Indeed, beside the significance of 
2007 in relation to the PFLP’s marginalisation process, the gradual reduction of 
official publications, as well as the decrease in their scope in terms of political 
analysis, supported the decision to conclude the historical survey with that 
episode. It is also worth remarking that due to the preference ascribed in this 
study to written sources, more attention has been paid to ‘high level’ politics 
within the PFLP rather than grassroots politics. Nonetheless, a parallel focus on 
the PFLP’s middle cadres and militant base would make a valuable addition to 
this research. On the one hand, this would allow more insight into the PFLP’s 
internal functioning, for instance concerning top-down and bottom-up 
communication. On the other, the exploration of the PFLP’s grassroots politics 
would help to delineate the scope of the problematic aspects that the present 
study highlights concerning the Front’s agency. While representing a limit of the 
present study, these aspects also hint at the possibility to further pursue this 






Note on the Use of Sources. 
The identification of textual material as the principal source for this thesis 
entailed the definition of the appropriate method to best extract the desired 
information. To this end, the PFLP’s literature has been approached following 
both diachronic and synchronic criteria. The extensive, diachronic reading of 
official documents over the timespan covered in the present study allowed a 
reconstruction of the evolution of the PFLP’s policy line and narrative, while 
developing a deep understanding of the recurring elements marking its political 
agency. In particular, this approach enabled the detection of the PFLP’s policy 
fluctuation through the comparison of the different positions adopted on 
sensitive issues. This aspect acquires further relevance as the PFLP acted in 
highly diversified political environments and on different levels, such as war-
torn Lebanon or Israeli-occupied Palestine, within PLO institutions, and at a 
grassroots level. This not only entailed the production of a wide-ranging official 
literature to tackle all the levels in which the PFLP operated, but also facilitated 
the identification of inconsistencies and fluctuations in the PFLP’s agency.  
Moreover, the diachronic reading of the PFLP’s literature has been combined 
with the synchronic reading of contemporary primary and secondary sources. 
More precisely, the information provided by the official documents has been 
assessed in the light of both the literature produced by other relevant actors, such 
as other Palestinian factions, regional and international governments or 
international institutions, and of the broad historiography available on the 
Palestinian national movement. This approach entailed reading the corpus of the 
PFLP’s official documents ‘against the historical background of the specific 
contingent situations, such as when they were written, and when and how they 
were used in time’.31 Non-PFLP primary sources, and the relevant literature 
employed, provided such background thus allowing a more balanced assessment 
of the PFLP’s actual agency and putting its rhetoric and propaganda in historical, 
spatial and political perspective. In other words, the PFLP’s narrative, and the 
positions it expressed, have been compared directly with the narrative and the 
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positions outlined in both other factions’ literature and in the texts of accords, 
joint declarations and announcements that the PFLP either signed, supported or 
opposed.  This allows us to comprehend and outline on the one hand the PFLP’s 
interpretation and views over the main issues at stake for the Front itself and the 
whole national movement. On the other, this approach enables us to highlight 
the PFLP’s use of rhetoric, the adaption of external official documents to its own 
narrative and political line and, more importantly, the PFLP’s inconsistencies 
dictated by the multiples sources of pressure and dilemmas. This reading method 
was particularly useful, for instance, in the analysis of the PFLP’s policies in the 
context of the mid-1980s PLO split over Arafat’s diplomatic strategy and 
rapprochement with Jordan and Egypt. The survey of a wide range of documents 
rendered the evolution of the PFLP’s line, from moderate opposition to the PLO 
Chairman, passing through the exacerbation of tensions with the Fatah’s 
leadership to reconciliation in less than a five-year time span. In addition, it 
permits an outline of the diverse set of interpretations at the origins of the 
political conflict within the national movement. The PFLP’s opposition strategy 
was thus analysed against the DFLP’s softer criticism of Arafat or the Fatah 
defectors’ justification of their armed rebellion.  
The recourse to this approach mitigated the propagandistic character of the 
primary sources employed. More precisely, the double synchronic and 
diachronic reading of primary and secondary sources tackled the risk of 
excessively rendering party narrative to the detriment of the critical and 
analytical dimension of the study. In this context, the extensive space dedicated 
to the PFLP’s narrative does not aim at merely reproducing its rhetoric. The goal 
is to show how the PFLP’s political discourse accompanied its policy 
production, how ideology was adapted to support decision-making. In doing so, 
this thesis challenges common views that consider the PFLP’s policies as mainly 
dependent on its political doctrine and problematises the relations between 
ideological basis and actual policy production.  
Oral sources too were useful in balancing the rhetorical and propagandistic 
character of official literature. Moreover, interviews filled some of the gaps that 
textual sources left, and helped in challenging and evaluating the conclusions 
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drawn from the texts. The recourse to oral sources also contributed to obviating 
the unavailability of the PFLP’s internal archives. Indeed, the information 
obtained from interviews has been cross-referenced with the available official 
literature. For instance, when approaching possible changes within the PFLP 
leadership and the rise to prominence of a given leader, the comments obtained 
from interviewees have been cross-checked with the ‘presence’ of the given 
leader on the PFLP’s official press. This approach allowed this study to have an 
indicative, yet founded, idea on internal power shifts. Oral sources also 
contradicted in some instances the information gathered from official 
publication. This was particularly useful to highlight internal divisions and 
tensions that the textual sources tended to overlook. Interviews were run 
following a ‘semi-structured’ model, implying that ‘key themes of the interview’ 
were previously identified and successively ‘formulated as key questions’.32 In 
practical terms, a rough plan of each interview was prepared according to the 
profile of the interviewee. This did not entail a strict adherence to the plan, as a 
flexible approach ensured more familiarity with the interviewee who in turn 
would be more likely to disclose the desired details. Furthermore, an 
interviewee-led conversation might result in unexpected, yet valuable, 
information. Ultimately, an interviewee plan was mainly needed to avoid 
excessive deviations in the conversation track as this risk emerged particularly 
with current PFLP members who tend to reproduce party narrative and evade 
sensitive issues. 
 
Structure of the Study. 
This study follows a general chronological order to keep track of the main 
developments affecting the Palestinian national movement while observing the 
persistence of the PFLP’s policy fluctuation over the time. The themes marking 
the PFLP’s political agency, such as opposition to Arafat’s diplomatic strategy 
and adherence to Palestinian institutions, appear constant throughout the period 
under scrutiny. Therefore, by adopting a chronological approach, the present 
thesis manages on the one hand to follow and outline the evolution of the 
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political environments in which the PFLP operated over the time. On the other, 
this approach allows me to highlight the persistence of the most significant 
elements shaping the PFLP’s agency and generating the policy fluctuation 
pattern. While stressing the resurfacing of some central factors, the 
chronological order enables the analysis to outline the specificities that these 
dynamics displayed in the different historical phases. As a result, the reliance on 
chronology facilitates the comprehension of the main dynamics underway all 
through the period covered in this thesis. 
The first two chapters address the years between late 1982 up to late 1987 
during which the PLO experienced its first major internal split. The first chapter 
focuses on the PFLP’s agenda towards the PLO internal situation. Its main goal 
being countering Fatah, and specifically Arafat’s intention to start a dialogue 
with the US and its allies in the region, the PFLP aimed at building a ‘radical’ 
alternative, opposed to US-sponsored peace talks and based on an alliance of 
Palestinian leftist forces. The second chapter addresses the regional and 
international dimension of the PFLP’s agenda in the middle 1980s. After the 
relocation of its headquarter in Damascus as well as due to Syrian opposition to 
a US conflict settlement plan, the PFLP found in the Assad regime its main 
regional partner. By the same token, a strengthening of ties between the PLO 
opposition and the USSR emerged as a PFLP priority to counterbalance Arafat’s 
drift towards Washington. Nevertheless, in the attempt to implement this agenda, 
the PFLP demonstrated itself unable to conciliate the contradictory elements of 
its political agency. Consequently, the PFLP’s line fluctuated between the 
priorities stemming from the rejection of Arafat’s diplomatic strategy and the 
creation of an opposition coalition, and those deriving from its factional 
calculations and Syrian pressures. The USSR’s disengagement from the Arab-
Israeli conflict and its late rapprochement with Israel further undermined the 
PFLP’s agency and narrative. As a result, the PFLP did not play a major role in 
the final failure of Arafat’s strategy nor was it able to limit his growing power 
within the PLO. This marked a first major step in the PFLP’s marginalisation 
although the next phase presented some chances of revival. 
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The third chapter covers the first half of the First Intifada which exploded in 
December 1987 as well as the preceding entrenchment of the PLO factions in 
the OPT. For the PFLP, the different and more favourable political balance 
existing among the Palestinian factions in the OPT as well as the recovered unity 
of the PLO was a valuable chance to invert its marginalisation process and 
reassert its role within Palestinian politics. However, several sources of pressure 
returned to haunt the PFLP, so that despite a certain positive pragmatism, it 
ultimately continued to swing between clashing thrusts. The opposition to 
Fatah’s ‘concessions’ in its diplomatic strategy and the concern for the 
maintenance of PLO unity, the emergence of the inside-outside divide, and the 
rise to prominence of the Islamist ‘radical’ alternative, are some of the sources 
of pressure behind the PFLP’s fluctuations during this phase. 
 The fourth chapter tackles the decade that saw the beginning of the peace 
process era. In particular, it addresses the PFLP’s response to the 1993 Oslo 
accords and the implementation of the PNA’s state building process. In doing 
so, this chapter outlines the PFLP’s shift from total rejection of the post-Oslo 
political regime to its acceptance underscored by Abu Ali Mustafa’s return to 
the OPT. The first sections cover the PFLP’s predicament in relation to the 1991 
Gulf War and the downfall of the USSR as well as its shortcomings in attaining 
genuine party renewal. Afterwards, the focus shifts towards the PFLP’s attempts 
to form an opposition coalition to delegitimise the Oslo accords. What is stressed 
is the PFLP’s interest in acting on the institutional level and the tensions with 
other coalition associates, particularly Islamists. While addressing the 
contradictions stemming from the PFLP’s political orientations, the fourth 
chapters ultimately addresses the failure of its agenda and the ensuing efforts to 
reconcile with Fatah, accepting de-facto the post-Oslo political system 
The fifth and last chapter tackles the years that asserted the PFLP’s 
marginalisation as the unfolding of the Al-Aqsa Intifada, beginning in 2000, and 
the evolution of the Hamas-Fatah split between 2006 and 2007 demonstrated. In 
covering the Al-Aqsa Intifada, this chapter outlines the PFLP’s fluctuations and 
loss of relevance in relations to the dynamics marking the second Palestinian 
mass uprising, such as militarisation, Palestinian political fragmentation and 
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growing Fatah-Hamas polarisation. The final part of this chapter approaches the 
PFLP’s efforts to integrate the post-Intifada and. more significantly, the post-
Arafat political scenario. After fully accepting the Oslo institutions, testified by 
its participation in the 2005 presidential and the 2006 parliamentary elections, 
the PFLP struggled to maintain an active role in the heightened competition 
between Hamas and Fatah. In the conflict that followed Hamas’ victory in the 
2006 elections, the PFLP oscillated between the two sides, ultimately 
demonstrating the primacy of integration into the PLO/PNA framework above 
other priorities. Ultimately, the PFLP’s inability to disengage from a 
dysfunctional institutional framework is stressed as the main dysfunctional 
character still affecting its ‘internal opposition’. Hence, this thesis questions in 
conclusion the actual role of the PFLP within the Palestinian national movement, 
casting serious doubts on a revival of the Palestinian Left within the framework 
of its traditional, main representative. 
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Chapter 1. - After the Loss of Beirut: Years of Split.1 
 
 Introduction 
This chapter analyses the PFLP’s conduct during the critical period of split 
within the PLO that started in the wake of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 
1982 and lasted until full reconciliation was achieved in early 1987. Before 
plunging into the issue of the PFLP’s policies in the mid-1980s, a historical, 
ideological and organisational background to the Popular Front is provided. This 
aims at outlining some underlying principles and dynamics that influenced the 
PFLP’s agency since its establishment and that remerged consistently in the post-
Beirut phase up to the present day.  
Between 1982 and 1987, the PFLP’s goal was to create a ‘radical alternative’ 
to the diplomatic strategy that PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat was pursuing. To 
counter Fatah’s project of political coordination with Jordan and rapprochement 
with Egypt and, more broadly, with the US, the Popular Front made several 
attempts to create an opposition coalition to unite the Palestinian Left and, in 
general, all those forces opposed to the new course on which the PLO leadership 
was embarked. 
After clarifying the roots and the factors influencing the PFLP’s formulation 
of its own agenda at the beginning of this phase on the Palestinian level, the 
different sections of this chapter cover the evolution of the PFLP’s position 
within Palestinian internal politics according to the developments undergone by 
the PLO in this five-year period. In particular, what is stressed is the emergence 
of the opposition-integration dilemma and the related policy fluctuation pattern 
affecting the PFLP’s agency. For instance, these features appeared clearly in the 
PFLP’s repeated efforts to build a coalition to counterbalance Arafat’s growing 
centralism and his diplomatic agenda. At the same time, the PFLP’s gradual 
estrangement from Fatah, linked and proportionate to the PLO Chairman’s 
                                                          
1 Part of the issues outlined in this chapter are also featured in the following publication: Francesco 
Saverio Leopardi, “‘Coalition Politics’ and Regional Steadfastness: The Popular Front for the 
Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) Between 1983 and 1984”, Annali di Ca’ Foscari 50, 2014, 75-96. 
54 
 
pursuit of his goals, testified to a constant interest in maintaining PLO unity, 
notwithstanding the feuds dividing its factions. 
In addition, this chapter also addresses the other sources of tensions that 
concurred to the production of policy fluctuation. In this regard, the PFLP’s 
relations, and, especially, its differences with the Democratic Front for the 
Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) and the Palestinian Communist Party (PCP) over 
the line of opposition to Fatah played a central role. Similarly, the PFLP’s loyalty 
to PLO autonomy of action appeared irreconcilable with other partners of its 
coalition building, namely the Syrian-affiliated Palestinian factions. 
Ultimately, the analysis of the PFLP’s conduct between 1982 and 1987 
characterises this phase as a landmark in its marginalisation process. However, 
the processual character of such decline ensured that at this stage the PFLP was 
able to retain some of its political weight and, despite its inability to restrain 
Arafat’s policies, significant popular support. In particular, the PFLP’s 
adherence to the PLO framework played to its advantage while in the subsequent 
phases, such adherence became more problematic. 
Finally, while this chapter focuses on the PFLP’s action in the context of 
internal Palestinian conflict, the next one will examine the PFLP’s agency vis-
à-vis the Arab environments in which it operated, its stand and narrative 
concerning the Soviet Union, and how the PFLP’s action on this level 
contributed to undermine its goals as much as its limits within the Palestinian 
scenario. 
 
The PFLP’s Ideological and Organisational Background. 
This introductory section illustrates the ideological and organisational principles 
upon which the PFLP’s political agency was based. In fact, the outline of these 
aspects is fundamental to understand the ‘functioning’ of such agency after 1982.  
The PFLP was officially founded on 11 December 1967, at the initiative of 
George Habash, a Palestinian physician hailing from Lydda, and other 
Palestinian and Arab activists mostly based in Lebanon. The great majority of 
the PFLP’s leaders had been active within the Arab Nationalists Movement 
(ANM), a Pan-Arab, transnational organisation that Habash himself helped to 
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found in the early 1950s. The PFLP thus resulted from the merger of several 
organisations linked to the ANM such as the National Front for the Liberation 
of Palestine (NFLP) with previously autonomous factions such as the Palestine 
Liberation Front (PLF). The PFLP was set up following the June 1967 war that 
saw Israel conquering the remaining parts of mandatory Palestine.2 In this same 
period, the Palestinian armed organisations rose to prominence within the 
context of the Arab-Israeli conflict and regional politics. Drawing from the 
experiences of national liberation movements worldwide, such as the Algerian 
Front de Libération Nationale or the resistance movement in south Vietnam, the 
Palestinian organisations, first and foremost Fatah, aimed at leading the struggle 
against Israel, resorting to guerrilla warfare as the main mean of action. Contrary 
to events since the 1948 Nakba, the mass expulsion of Palestinians following the 
first Arab-Israeli war, independent Palestinian action was to be at the forefront 
of the effort to liberate Palestine, as the Arab nationalist regimes had 
demonstrated their inability and unwillingness to achieve liberation and return 
for the Palestinians.3 In this context, the Palestinian armed organisations, and 
Fatah in particular, started to aim at taking over the PLO. In fact, the PLO had 
been established in 1964 following an Arab summit summoned in Cairo at the 
initiative of Egyptian President Gamal ʿAbd al-Nasser. In the conception of the 
Arab Heads of State, the PLO had to work as a framework to mobilise the 
Palestinian population while keeping the growing Palestinian national 
movement under Arab control. However, the Arab setback in the June 1967 war, 
while shattering the credibility of joint Arab action, paved the way for the rise 
of independent Palestinian action. Moreover, the success of Palestinian 
guerrillas in inflicting significant damage and losses on the Israeli army, best 
exemplified by the iconic battle of Karameh of March 1968, galvanised popular 
support for the armed organisations which saw the number of their recruits 
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Tahrir Filastin (The Founding Statement of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine)” 
December 11, 1967, accessed on January 9, 2017, http://pflp-documents.org/documents/PFLP-
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(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 143–144. 
3 Paul Thomas Chamberlain, The Global Offensive. The United States, the Palestine Liberation 




increasing exponentially. Consequently, Fatah and the other factions managed 
first to earn PLO recognition during the 4th PNC in July 1968. Finally, their 
takeover was officially sanctioned during the 5th session of the PNC in February 
1969 during which Fatah asserted its control over the majority required to elect 
Yasser Arafat as new Chairman of the PLO Executive Committee.4 
The PFLP adopted Marxist-Leninism as official political doctrine in 1969 
during its Second General Congress, in what represented the final step of the 
ANM’s transition from 1950s right-wing nationalism towards the radical left.5 
In terms of political and military doctrine, the PFLP took inspiration from 
different experiences of global Marxism that were adapted to the nationalist 
character of the Palestinian struggle. In accordance with Leninist principles, the 
PFLP saw itself as the ‘vanguard of the working class’ supposed to ‘mobilise 
and prepare’ the Palestinian masses to play their ‘historical role in self and 
national liberation’.6 ‘Democratic centralism’ regulated party discipline and 
relations between the different bodies of the Front. The National Congress was 
the highest body within the PFLP, charged with defining the official line and 
electing members to the main leading institutions. The Central Committee, a 
smaller body, was to decide the party line between each session of the National 
Congress. In turn, the Political Bureau (Politburo) and the Central Leadership, 
particularly the Secretary-General, fulfilled this role when the Central 
Committee was not convened.7  
The adoption of ‘revolutionary violence’ and in particular of guerrilla warfare 
as the main tool of Palestinian liberation reflected the influence that anti-
imperialist revolutionaries such as Frantz Fanon and Ernesto ‘Che’ Guevara had 
had on the PFLP and indeed, on the whole Palestinian national movement in the 
late 1960s. At the time, for the PFLP, guerrilla warfare was the appropriate tool 
to lead a long-term struggle capable of exhausting the enemy both 
psychologically, shattering Israel’s goal of delivering security to its citizens, and 
economically, forcing it to adopt costly defence measures to counter the 
                                                          
4 Cobban, The Palestinian Liberation Organisation,28-29, 41-44. 
5 Yezid Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State : The Palestinian National Movement, 1949-
1993 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 232. 
6 Al-Jabha al-Shaʿbiyya li-Tahrir Filastin, “Al-Nizam al-Dakhili (Internal Structure),” 1971, 6–7. 
7 Ibid., 31–40. 
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Palestinian fighters’ trans-border attacks. Moreover, this military strategy also 
allowed the PFLP to mobilise the Palestinian masses and educate them in the 
tenets of Marxist-Leninism, thus realising the necessary preconditions for a 
mass-based popular war.8  
The influence of Maoism emerged with full clarity in the PFLP’s analysis of 
the political environments in which it acted. The PFLP adopted Mao’s concepts 
of ‘primary and secondary’ contradictions to determine the priority of its fight. 
For instance, when the ‘Palestinian revolution’ was launched in late 1960s, the 
effort for national liberation required prioritising the primary contradiction with 
Israel rather than class contradictions within the Palestinian fold.9 Maoism was 
at the base of the PFLP’s view of world politics and its actors divided into the 
‘friends and enemies camps’ on the national, regional and international levels. 
Therefore, the Palestinian revolution was first of all a struggle for national 
liberation but at the same time, it was also part of a regional struggle against 
‘reactionary regimes’, such as the Gulf monarchies or Jordan, which colluded 
with ‘international imperialism’, mainly identified with the United States of 
America, the ultimate enemy on the global scale. By the same token, fellow 
Palestinian organisations were the PFLP’s allies on the national level while 
nationalist regimes such as Nasserite Egypt and Baathist Iraq were partners in 
the Middle Eastern region. Finally, the PFLP saw the Palestinian revolution as 
part of the global struggle against imperialism and neo-colonialism, an 
assumption that justified the pursuit of friendly relations with the Soviet Union 
and the Socialist Bloc countries, the main sponsors of global national liberation 
movements, as well as with those movements themselves.10  
The global dimension of the struggle for liberation took tangible form with 
the famous ‘external operations’ that the PFLP carried out in various parts of the 
world between 1968 and the first half of the 1970s.11 Among these operations, 
                                                          
8 “Al-Fikr al-ʿAskari li-l-Jabha al-Shaʿbiyya li-Tahrir Filastin (The Military Doctrine of the Popular 
Front for the Liberation of Palestine)” (Beirut: Kitab al-Hadaf, 1970), 9–12; 27–30. 
9 Al-Jabha al-Shaʿbiyya li-Tahrir Filastin, "Al-Istratijiyya Al-Siyasiyya wa al-Tanzimiyya (Political 
and Organisational Strategy) ", (PFLP Information Department, 1967), 14–18. 
10 Ibid., 6–45. 
11 Chamberlain, The Global Offensive. The United States, the Palestine Liberation Organization, and 
the Making of the Post-Cold War Order, 172–174. 
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the PFLP acquired global fame for its aircraft hijackings, notably those carried 
out for the first time by a female operative, Leila Khaled, who became a symbol 
of the global, anti-imperialist movement. However, these operations also 
included collaboration with Marxist armed groups all over the world such as the 
Red Japanese Army, whose fighters received training in the PFLP’s military 
camps and carried out attacks on its behalf, such as the one at the Lod airport on 
30 May 1972.12 The concept underpinning this kind of attack was that 
‘geography did not matter much in the total war against imperialism’. In the 
PFLP’s view, the emergence of the Palestinian cause resulted from the action of 
global actors such as imperial Britain, world Zionism and the US. Consequently, 
this enabled revolutionary actors to strike ‘imperialist interests’ all over the 
world and strike the enemy ‘in any place’.13  
The nationalist, Pan-Arab origins of the PFLP were clear at its foundation, 
especially in its views concerning the form of the future state to be established 
after the defeat of Zionism. The PFLP contributed to the debate that animated 
the whole Palestinian national movement in the late 1960s with its idea of 
creating a socialist state all over the Arab Levant. This vision of a unified Arab 
entity was coupled with ideas borrowed from the experience of the Vietnamese 
resistance against US aggression. Indeed, the PFLP called for the establishment 
of a socialist regime in the countries surrounding Palestine capable of lending 
their support to the Palestinian people’s war against Israel. The ‘Arab Hanoi’ 
was soon identified with the Jordanian capital Amman, as the Hashemite 
Kingdom had become between the late 1960s and early 1970s the base of the 
Palestinian armed organisations which launched attacks against Israel from its 
soil.14 The PFLP’s aim of reversing the Jordanian monarchy was best expressed 
by the famous motto attributed to George Habash: ‘the road to Jerusalem passes 
through Amman’.15  
                                                          
12 On the Lod airport attack see Patricia G Steinhoff, “Portrait of a Terrorist: An Interview with Kozo 
Okamoto,” Asian Survey 16, no. 9 (1976): 830–45. 
13 “Al-Jabha al-Shʿabiyya wa al-ʿAmaliyyat al-Kharijiyya (The PFLP and External Operations),” in 
Munaqashat Kitab Al-Hadaf (Beirut: Al-Hadaf, 1971), 1–4. 
14 “Al-Fikr al-ʿAskari li-l-Jabha al-Shaʿbiyya li-Tahrir Filastin (The Military Doctrine of the Popular 
Front for the Liberation of Palestine),” 34–38. 
15 PFLP Information Department, Palestine: Towards a Democratic Solution (Beirut, 1970), 5–36. 
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The PFLP before 1982: Leftist Fragmentation and the Rivalry with Fatah. 
This section sketches the PFLP’s relations with the main Palestinian factions, 
evidencing both the development of intra-leftist fragmentation and the relations 
with the PLO’s leading force, Fatah. The opposition to Fatah, while forging the 
PFLP’s policies since its establishment, also produced a tension due to the 
Popular Front’s participation in the common PLO platform. Such tension 
ultimately played a central role in influencing the PFLP’s trajectory throughout 
the decades that followed the PLO eviction from Lebanon. 
In its early years, the PFLP suffered several splits which created a number of 
splinter organisations. The fractures developed along the lines of the PFLP’s 
internal currents and followed the disputes between the ‘rightist’ leadership and 
the ‘leftist’ opposition and between the ANM and the PLF groups. The first 
secession occurred in 1968, when Ahmad Jibril, a former military officer in the 
Syrian army and Head of the PLF, decided to break away from the PFLP to 
establish the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command 
(PF-GC). The group seceded mainly to retain control over the former PLF 
personnel and infrastructure but also because of its interest in prioritising 
military action over ideological theory and disputes to which the PFLP lent 
higher importance. This dispute reflected the role of geographical scattering and 
personal political courses within the Palestinian national movement. The PF-
GC’s military focus was linked to its leaders’ experience within the ranks of the 
Syrian army. Conversely, the Habash-led ANM group came to political maturity 
in the context of student political activism in Beirut, where ideological 
orientations had a greater role in forging their political consciousness.16 Beside 
this, the PF-GC’s formation also evidenced the influence of regional actors on 
the Palestinian national movement, as the Syrian regime guaranteed its 
sponsorship to the newly formed Palestinian faction. Damascus aimed at 
expanding its influence over the PLO and found in Jibril’s group a partner 
suitable for such a goal. For its part, the PF-GC would hardly have been an 
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effective political actor within the national movement without direct Syrian 
patronage.17 
In 1969, another split led to the creation of the Popular Democratic Front for 
the Liberation of Palestine, later renamed Democratic Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine. The establishment of the DFLP was the final act in the dispute between 
the PFLP’s rightist mainstream, headed by Habash, and its leftist minority 
gathered around Nayef Hawatmeh, a Jordanian-born leader of the ANM. 
Hawatmeh and his comrades criticised the PFLP leadership for its authoritarian 
drift as well as for its excessive caution in terms of military strategy. Moreover, 
the PFLP’s left was composed of younger cadres who were closer to Maoist, but 
also Trotskyist, principles, giving to the dispute both a generational and an 
ideological dimension. Finally, the split reflected an internal power struggle as 
in the months leading to the formal split, the rightist leadership replaced the left 
in key command posts while the leftists themselves publicly attacked their rivals 
thanks to their control of Al-Hourriah, the PFLP’s mouthpiece at the time. 
Ultimately, Hawatmeh’s group took advantage of Habash’s temporary detention 
by the Syrian authorities and of Fatah’s military protection to effectively secede 
from the PFLP in February 1969, thus giving birth to the second leftist force 
within the PLO.18 Beyond internal disputes, the establishment of the DFLP, but 
also that of the PF-GC, reflected the weight of personality leadership in 
Palestinian politics. Both the splinter groups were formed around a leading 
figure and in the DFLP’s case particularly, in contrast with Habash’s 
authoritative and authoritarian leadership. Moreover, the DFLP’s split embodied 
an early example of Arafat’s ability to play on the divisions within his rival 
groups in order to strengthen his position within the national movement. Fatah’s 
military support appeared essential for the PFLP’s splintering left-wing due to 
their smaller numbers as well as the potential crackdown that could come from 
Habash’s loyalists.19 This pattern of action emerged repeatedly in the policies of 
the PLO Chairman and it deeply affected the whole PLO and Fatah itself. For 
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instance, as will be shown in full details, Arafat took advantage of opposition 
divisions to bolster his nationalist stance in the face of external aggression in the 
mid-1980s. Moreover, he actively contributed to the fragmentation of Fatah and 
PLO structure by creating multiple agencies with equal or similar tasks at the 
economic, military and political levels of PLO and Fatah bureaucracy. This 
enabled him to foster rivalry among his subordinates, who competed for 
economic and political patronage, as well as to centralise the levers of power 
into his hands.20  
The rivalry with Fatah consistently marked the PFLP’s presence within the 
PLO as the two factions held opposed views on a number of core issues. Fatah 
(reverse acronym of ḥarakat al-taḥrīr al-waṭanī al-filasṭīnī- Palestinian National 
Liberation Movement) was founded between 1958 and 1959 by a group of 
Palestinian activists employed in the Gulf countries who had previously 
concluded their studies in Egypt, such as Yasser Arafat, Khalil al-Wazir and 
Mahmud Abbas. Fatah’s specificity lay in its focus on armed struggle as the 
principal mean to mobilise Palestinian refugees all over the Arab world to 
achieve the goal of liberation. In addition, Fatah stressed the importance of 
Palestinian action independent from Arab governments as well as prioritising, 
since its establishment, the pursuit of autonomous Palestinian institutions, thus 
anticipating the centrality of the search for statehood in its political agency.21 
 Since the takeover of the PLO by the armed organisations in late 1960s, Fatah 
has retained political and military supremacy over the whole Palestinian national 
movement, at least until the gradual rise to prominence of the Islamic Resistance 
Movement, Hamas. The PFLP, for its part, asserted its place as second force 
after Fatah but was never able to close the gap with Arafat’s movement. Despite 
their strong rivalry, Fatah and the PFLP had always been able to settle their 
differences politically. This was constantly the case from the early disputes on 
the allocation of factional seats within the PLO bodies in 1969-1970 up to the 
feud that divided the Palestinian factions in the mid-1980s. In that sense, a key 
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role was played by both factions’ strict adherence to the protection of Palestinian 
political independence, of the PLO as the paramount framework for it, and to the 
‘consensus principle’ that ruled relations among Palestinian organisations at 
least until the mid-1980s.22 From the PFLP’s perspective, this common ground 
with Fatah, on the one hand represented an instrument to constrain and influence 
the agenda of the leading Palestinian faction. On the other, it produced a tension 
between its bid for radical opposition and the limits stemming from its 
participation and adherence to the PLO top institutions. 
Fatah’s primacy was based on the far larger popular support it enjoyed among 
Palestinian masses compared to any other organisation. During the crucial period 
in the wake of the 1967 war, Fatah attracted large numbers of recruits by virtue 
of its undisputed focus on armed struggle and its inclusive, loose Palestinian 
nationalism. As a consequence, by mid-1968 Fatah fielded 2000 fighters in 
Jordan, by then the largest Palestinian base, out of a total of 3000 from all other 
factions. The PFLP for its part reached between 1000 and 1500 armed men only 
by 1970.23 According to other estimates, by 1969 the joint forces of Fatah and 
the PFLP totalled 30,000 to 50,000 fighters, both professionals and voluntary 
reservists, of whom the overwhelming majority belonged to Fatah.24  
When the Palestinian armed factions took over the PLO during the 5th session 
of the PNC in February 1969, seats in PLO institutions were assigned following 
quotas that reflected Fatah’s popular primacy. Indeed, Fatah managed to secure 
33 seats out of 105 within the PNC itself while the PFLP was assigned only 12. 
Similarly, Yasser Arafat was elected PLO Executive Committee Chairman and 
Fatah obtained other 3 seats in the PLO executive branch, while the PFLP, like 
other armed factions gained just 1 seat.25 Furthermore, Arafat strengthened his 
authority over the PLO thanks to the support he enjoyed among independent 
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members who assured their backing of his line in critical phases throughout his 
decades-long course as PLO Chairman.26 
In terms of differences, the ideological background was a paramount aspect 
dividing Fatah and the PFLP. Indeed, the movement founded by Yasser Arafat 
did not rely on a proper ideological setting, a feature that fostered its wide 
popular appeal. In addition, its inclusive, non-ideological Palestinian 
nationalism enabled Fatah to build working relations with both the nationalist 
Arab republics and the conservative monarchies of the region. Conversely, the 
PFLP’s adherence to Marxist-Leninism entailed an ideologically homogeneous 
membership, while its view of world politics excluded relations with 
‘reactionary’ regimes, at least in the first phases of its life.27 In fact, Fatah’s loose 
ideology and its focus on Palestine also contributed to the successful 
establishment of relations on the international level. While the PFLP’s radical, 
anti-imperialist discourse and its associations with international armed 
organisations discouraged massive support from major powers, Fatah 
established early relations with China which became a military supplier as early 
as in 1965.28 Similarly, in 1973 Fatah became the first Palestinian partner of the 
USSR, not only by virtue of its dominant position within the PLO, but also due 
to its positive stand concerning political settlement plans for the Arab-Israeli 
conflict.29  
Fatah supported non-interference in Arab affairs while the PFLP gradually 
escalated between 1968 and 1970 its calls for the overthrow of the Hashemite 
monarchy in Jordan. Indeed, while the PFLP, and the DFLP, actively sought a 
showdown with the Jordanian authorities, Fatah appeared more hesitant 
concerning an open military confrontation. Ultimately, the PFLP’s rhetoric over 
the ‘duality of power’ in Jordan contributed to the ignition of tensions between 
the armed organisations and the Jordanian government, playing a significant role 
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in King Hussein’s decision to evict militarily the PLO from his country’s soil in 
September 1970.30  
Fatah and the PFLP also displayed conflicting views over the means to 
achieve Palestinian national rights. After the eviction from Jordan and the 
relocation of the PLO to Lebanon, Fatah’s leadership aimed at strengthening the 
Palestinian quasi-state infrastructure there while exploring the possibilities to 
pursue Palestinian statehood through diplomatic means. The diplomatic turn 
emerged with full clarity in 1974, when the PLO adopted a ‘Ten Points Program’ 
during the 12th session of the PNC that called for the establishment of a 
Palestinian national authority ‘on any part of liberated land’, in a first Palestinian 
recognition of a two-state solution for the Arab-Israeli conflict.31 That same year, 
the PLO, under Arafat’s Chairmanship, gained international recognition mainly 
through the Arab League’s decision to recognise it as the ‘sole, legitimate, 
representative of the Palestinian people’ and the invitation that the UN General 
Assembly extended to Arafat, granting the PLO ‘non-member observer status’.32 
The PFLP for its part refused to renounce the long-term goal of total liberation 
and formed alongside other Palestinian factions the ‘Rejectionist Front’ to 
oppose the PLO leaderships’ ‘moderation’, while suspended its PLO Executive 
Committee membership to protest the new line. The PFLP believed that the shift 
towards diplomacy represented a ‘deviation’ from the ‘correct, revolutionary and 
nationalist line’ as stated in the Palestinian National Charter, the PLO 
constitutive document. Such deviation could lead, according to its view, to the 
‘liquidation of the Palestinian revolution’. In effect, what the PFLP rejected was 
the PLO leadership’s support for an international peace conference based on UN 
Security Council Resolution 242, issued in the wake of the 1967 war and 
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reinforced by resolution 338 that put an end to the 1973 Arab-Israeli 
confrontation.33  
Nonetheless, the PLO factions headed gradually towards reconciliation after 
the outbreak of the Lebanese Civil War in 1975. Between 1975 and 1982, the 
PLO factions cemented their cohesion in the face of external threats, both 
military and political. This drove the PFLP to re-join the PLO institutions fully, 
as its representative was back at the Executive Committee since 1978 while 
official reconciliation was achieved during the 15th PNC session in 1981. Beside 
formally asserting reconciliation within the PLO, this PNC session also signalled 
the PFLP’s de facto acceptance of the PLO interim program, as the final 
resolutions restated PLO adherence to the programme approved in the previous 
PNC sessions.34 Although the shared interest in protecting the PLO role 
militarily and politically constituted solid ground for unity, the reconciliation 
process underlined the PFLP’s tension between opposing Fatah’s agenda and its 
commitment to the protection of the PLO. This phase ultimately represented the 
first occasion on which the PFLP compromised over its oppositional role for the 
sake of PLO unity and defence. 
 In the context of the Lebanese crisis, the factions united around the protection 
of the PLO ‘state-within-the-state’. The danger derived not only from Israeli 
retaliatory air-raids on Palestinian bases in South Lebanon, but also from 
Lebanese conservative and rightist forces that saw in the Palestinian national 
movement a threat to the Lebanese political status quo. This perception was 
reinforced by the relations between the Lebanese Left and the Palestinian armed 
factions. In fact, since the PLO relocation to Lebanon, Fatah pursued non-
interference in Lebanese affair as well as good relations with all Lebanese 
political forces. However, the PFLP and the DFLP called for tighter links with 
the Lebanese National Movement (LNM), the coalition reuniting all Lebanese 
progressive forces. As the conflict exploded in spring-summer 1975, the PLO 
leadership too gradually decided to take an active part in the hostilities alongside 
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the LNM, to protect its base in Lebanon as well as to exploit the conflict to 
acquire greater diplomatic weight on the regional and international stages. The 
intervention of Syrian forces in spring 1976, to the detriment of the PLO, finally 
convinced Fatah that the PLO could not avoid full military involvement in the 
crisis as the conflict started to acquire regional and international dimensions.35 
A further threat to the PLO status in Lebanon came from Israeli involvement in 
Lebanon increasingly aimed, since the beginning of the civil war, at weakening 
and ultimately destroying the PLO infrastructure in the country. The first 
invasion in 1978 and the creation of the Israeli-proxy faction the South Lebanese 
Army (SLA) both followed this logic. 
 On the political level, the 1979 peace treaty between Egypt and Israel signed 
under US tutelage at Camp David embodied a shared danger for the whole PLO. 
The bilateral nature of the Egyptian-Israeli treaty was at odds with the PLO 
leadership goal of participating in a multilateral peace conference to settle the 
conflict. Moreover, the vague reference to the establishment of a ‘self-governing 
authority’ in the OPT prior to any Israeli withdrawal represented a threat to the 
PLO status of sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.36 The PLO 
leadership’s rejection of the Camp David treaty resonated with the PFLP’s 
overall opposition to negotiations and recognition of Israel. According to its 
analysis, the peace treaty aimed at paving the way towards normalisation 
between Israel and the Arab states. This not only entailed the ‘liquidation’ of the 
Palestinian cause, but also implied a strengthening of ‘reactionary forces’ which 
would benefit economically and politically from normalised relations with Israel 
and from US dominance in the region.37 
With recovered unity, the PLO finally faced in 1982 the greatest threat to its 
survival until then. On June 6, the Israeli army launched operation ‘Peace in 
Galilee’ and started its second invasion of Lebanon. After reaching Beirut in nine 
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days, the Israelis laid siege to the Lebanese capital, heavily shelling the western 
part of Beirut for over two months. Finally, the PLO agreed to evacuate the city 
in late August, completing the withdrawal of its forces by early September.38 
With its second, and far greater, invasion of Lebanon in 1982, Israel finally met 
its objective of putting an end to the PLO quasi-state in Lebanon, opening a new 
phase in the Palestinian struggle to achieve statehood.39 
 
Tipping the PLO Balance: The Bases of the PFLP’s Opposition to Arafat’s 
Diplomatic Strategy. 
The phase started in the very aftermath of the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, 
which lasted until December 1987 when the First Intifada erupted in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT), entailed concrete dangers of elimination 
for the PLO. The three-month long ‘Lebanon war’ witnessed the destruction of 
the PLO sanctuary in Beirut and the dispersal of thousands of Palestinian fighters 
to several Arab countries. Beside the military losses, the PLO also suffered a 
severe deterioration of its civilian infrastructure which never recovered its pre-
war condition in the following years. Deprived of its quasi-state in Lebanon, the 
PLO diplomatic position appeared greatly weakened. This was all the more 
significant as several peace plans, notably the one issued by the new US 
administration, were formulated in the wake of the PLO expulsion from Beirut.40  
Although this was not the first attempt made by regional actors to ‘liquidate’ 
the PLO, each faction realised that the ‘Palestinian revolution’ was on the brink 
of disappearance, at risk of losing completely both its independence and its 
historical gains41. The perception of an unprecedentedly dangerous situation 
was, however, the only aspect on which the diverse PLO factions agreed while 
the identification of the threatening factors and the policy priorities differed 
considerably. Therefore, according to its own perceived dangers, the PFLP 
formulated, right after the eviction from Beirut, the basis of its action in the next 
phase. 
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For the PLO leadership, the loss of a prominent place in the Lebanese arena 
jeopardised the diplomatic effort and reduced its bargaining power in the context 
of possible negotiations. From this stemmed the need to establish tighter 
relations with Jordan and Egypt and to coordinate over diplomatic strategy in 
order to counterbalance the aforementioned loss of bargaining weight.42 
Moreover, PLO Chairman Arafat was encouraged to find a common strategy 
with King Hussein of Jordan in the provisions spelled in the Reagan plan for 
peace. The US plan, while avoiding any mention of Palestinian statehood, called 
for the formation of a joint Palestinian-Jordanian delegation in view of direct 
negotiations, prelude to the establishment of a confederated state on the East and 
West banks of the Jordan River.43 The American positions drove Arafat to start 
low profile contacts with Hussein, although this at first was not confirmed 
officially. 
The PFLP had a completely opposite point of view. In the post-Beirut phase 
the Palestinian revolution had to face a defensive political battle against the 
projects for a political settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict on its different 
fronts, a battle focused on five main points: first, the Reagan plan, which denied 
to the PLO any representative role and King Hussein’s attempt to co-opt the PLO 
and benefit from an equal representative status in line with it. Second, the so-
called ‘Arab peace plan’ adopted in Fez in September 1982 which entailed the 
PLO recognition of Israel. Third, the US and Israeli plans to ‘detach’ the 
Lebanese question from that of Palestine and to transform Lebanon in the second 
step of the Camp David strategy. Fourth, the possible return of Egypt to the 
‘camp of official Arab solidarity’ after its exclusion in the wake of the peace 
treaty with Israel. Finally, the attempt by elements external to the PLO and based 
in the OPT to form an alternative representative platform and collaborate with 
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Israel, a phenomenon seen already in 1980 with the Israeli-imposed ‘Villages 
League’44 in the West Bank and Gaza.45 
  Moreover, these regional and international developments created a climate 
that fostered a spread of new political attitudes that the PFLP perceived as 
‘surrendering positions’ within the Palestinian national movement, as 
demonstrated by the PLO leadership’s orientations. The PFLP’s priority, 
therefore, was to stop such trends and keep the PLO on what it considered its 
‘natural nationalist path’, the one that the history of the Palestinian revolution 
itself as well as the Palestinian National Charter had tracked.46 The Popular Front 
throughout its history had rejected political solutions to the Palestinian question, 
mainly for ideological and strategic reasons. Its view of the struggle for 
liberation at the same time as a nationalist effort and as a revolutionary process 
towards the emancipation of the Palestinian and Arab masses, it was at odds not 
only with the idea of negotiating with the Israeli counterpart. In fact, while Israel 
was defined as the perpetrator of the continued expulsion of the Palestinian 
people from their homeland and ‘imperialist bridgehead’ in the region, 
negotiations also entailed coordination with the ‘Arab reactionary regimes’, 
interested in the preservation of ‘imperialist and capitalist influence in the 
region’.47 Thus, by virtue of its revolutionary stance, the beginning of a US-led 
peace process would entail the end of the PFLP’s raison d’être, leading therefore 
to a total marginalisation of PLO hard-line organisations. Finally, although the 
PFLP had fought against Palestinian interest in a political settlement since the 
time of the 1974 Geneva conference48, the virtual elimination of its military 
potential compromised the credibility of its rejectionist stand. 
                                                          
44 The ‘Villages League’ was composed by Israeli-appointed mayors of West Bank villages aimed at 
creating a political and administrative organisation alternative to the network of mayors loyal to the 
PLO. See Gresh, The PLO. The Struggle Within, 216–223.  
45 Bayan Sahifi Sadir ʿan al-Dawra al-Rabiʿa li-l-Lajna al-Markaziyya li-l-jabha al-Shaʿbiyya li-Tahrir 
Filastin (Press Release Issued from the Fourth Session of PFLP’s Central Committee),” Al-Hadaf, no. 
659 February 7, 1983, 6–8;   
46 Al-Taqrir al-Siyasi al-Sadir ʿan al-Lajna al-Markaziyya fi Dawratiha al-Rabiʿa Hawla Harb 
Lubnan (The Political Report Issued by the Fourth General Assembly of PFLP’s Central Committee 
on the War of Lebanon 1983) (Damascus: PFLP Information Department, 1983), 90–91.  
47Al-Jabha al-Shaʿbiyya li-Tahrir Filastin, Al-Istratijiyya Al-Siyasiyya Wa Al-Tanzimiyya (Political 
and Organisational Strategy), 10–12. 
48 Muhammad Muslih, “Moderates and Rejectionists within the Palestine Liberation Organization,” 
Middle East Journal 30, no. 2 (1976): 134–140. 
70 
 
Nevertheless, the PFLP rejected the dismissal of guerrilla warfare as the first 
instrument to lead the struggle in a context of greater emphasis on a diplomatic 
approach. For the PFLP, the military dimension represented a source of 
legitimacy far more than for Fatah. This latter organisation, relying both on a 
deeper grassroots support from the Palestinian population and on a wider 
network of international relations, enjoyed more sources of legitimisation. This 
was not the case for the PFLP which enjoyed a more restricted, though strong, 
mass support and was therefore more tightly linked to the traditional setting of 
the PLO after the takeover by the commando organisations, where military 
capabilities and effectiveness determined legitimacy and political weight.49 
In the light of these considerations, the PFLP’s task for the new stage was to 
propose and embody an alternative to the PLO leadership, to set up a radical 
option within the Palestinian national movement in order to counterbalance the 
so-called ‘moderates’ and keep the PLO on that ‘nationalist line’ where the PFLP 
could still preserve its role and influence. The deepening of the historical divide 
between ‘moderates’ and ‘rejectionists’ within the PLO emerged clearly since 
the end of 1982 and would last for the next five years. Simultaneously, the PFLP 
elaborated the concept which would guide its political action, as well as justify 
it, in the subsequent years: the insistence on rejection and the effort to rally as 
much support as possible around this call were aimed at countering the ‘attempt 
of imperialism and of the Arab reaction to distort and dissipate the Palestinian 
revolution’. From this stemmed the ‘fundamental mission’ of ‘preserving the 
national Palestinian unity on the basis of the right nationalist line’.50 From this 
perspective, all the attempts eventually made by the PFLP to build and broaden 
a ‘nationalist front’ in opposition to the PLO leadership were never intended to 
create a substitute for the PLO, but rather aimed at preserving its ‘original anti-
imperialist’ approach, the only one, according to the Popular Front, which 
ensured the unity of the Palestinian revolution. In summer 1985, in the midst of 
the so-called War of the Camps, started by the Shiʿi movement Amal in the 
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attempt to clear Beirut of the Palestinian armed presence, this concept was still 
at the centre of the PFLP’s political analysis, as the words of Taysir Quba, 
Deputy Head of the PFLP’s Political Relations Department, demonstrated:  
We [the Palestinian National Salvation Front, a coalition that grouped the PFLP and 
Syrian-proxy factions opposed to the 1985 Arafat-Hussein agreement] are the 
leadership of the Palestinian people until we guarantee the unity of the PLO on its 
anti-imperialist line.51 
The PFLP’s discourse continued to focus throughout this phase on a PLO 
internal dualism according to which legitimacy stemming from rejection and 
commitment to the resistance was opposed to ‘deviation’ from the right path 
outlined in particular by the resolutions of the 14th and, after February 1983, of 
the 16th session of the PNC. During these two sessions, the PLO condemned the 
Sadat-Begin peace treaty and stressed the PLO status of sole, legitimate 
representative of the Palestinian people as well as stated the impossibility of 
sharing this right with any actor involved and its adherence to armed struggle.52  
To bolster its perspective on Palestinian unity, in early 1983 the PFLP 
underlined the declarations issued by the leaders of other Palestinian factions 
and by prominent independent personalities who were close to its views. Al-
Hadaf not only published long ‘conversations’ with the DFLP’s Secretary-
General Nayef Hawatmeh or with Khaled al-Fahhum, PNC Speaker, but also 
reported those speeches and declarations in which Arafat espoused a more 
‘revolutionary’ rhetoric, downplaying or neglecting those occasions when Arafat 
showed a more overt disposition to dialogue with Arab actors. Conversely, when 
condemning the ‘wrong positions’ within the Palestinian national movement, the 
PFLP usually did not mention explicitly those adopting these stands, and 
preferred to refer to them as ‘Palestinian reaction’ or ‘Palestinian right’.53 
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While the call to unity aimed at compacting the Palestinian fold in the face of 
Jordanian plans, the PFLP also operated a significant shift concerning its 
medium-term goals, again in order to bolster its ‘nationalist’ stand and gather 
support around it. Before 1982, despite a de facto relinquishment of the 
‘strategic’ goal of establishing a socialist, Pan-Arab state beyond the boundaries 
of historic Palestine, the PFLP never questioned it officially. However, in the 
post-Beirut phase the Popular Front affirmed the necessity of endorsing the 
‘tactical’ call for the creation of an independent Palestinian state.54 In this new 
phase the PFLP started to support strongly the idea of a democratic state ensuring 
equal rights to both Jews and Arabs, historically claimed by Fatah, while this 
latter movement completed its shift towards the project of a mini-state on the 
West Bank and the Gaza Strip.55 
The underlying principle of the PFLP’s policies in the post-Beirut phase 
highlighted its willingness to forge its opposition within the boundaries of the 
PLO. From this stemmed the goal of gathering support from other factions 
around its own idea of Palestinian legitimacy. However, both old and new 
paradigms of Palestinian politics did not allow a straightforward realisation of 
this goal. Arafat’s growing power within the PLO, the intra-leftist divisions and 
the exposure to new external sources of pressure jeopardised the PFLP’s 
strategy. 
 
The PFLP within the PLO Internal Conflict: Rejection and Coalition 
Politics. 
The post-Beirut phase was characterized by Yasser Arafat’s efforts to harvest, at 
the international level, the fruits of his fifteen-year-long career as PLO Chairman 
and translate them into diplomatic gains. The PFLP initially hoped to contain the 
PLO leadership’s agenda through the traditional consensus-seeking approach, 
according to which the PLO Chairman’s need for wide national approval would 
entail concessions to his diplomatic line. Nonetheless, as Arafat’s resolve to 
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progress his rapprochement with Jordan, Egypt and the US created tensions 
within Fatah itself and the whole PLO, the PFLP sought to gather consensus 
around its rejectionist line, initiating a phase of coalition politics. In the pursuit 
of such goal, the PFLP displayed a major weak point, namely its inability to 
manage conflicting political thrusts such as its adherence to rejectionism, its 
willingness to remain integrated within PLO decision-making or its diverse 
partners’ agenda, both Palestinian and regional.  
As a result, this lack of a cohesive and organised response allowed Arafat to 
strengthen his position within the PLO despite the division that his line provoked 
within the national movement, revealing the weaknesses of his opponents.  
 
The 16th Palestine National Council: Constraining the Moderate 
Leadership.  
In early 1983, the PFLP aimed at constraining Arafat’s initiative which it saw as 
going too far in terms of diplomatic concessions to the various actors involved 
in the conflict. To this purpose, the Front acted according to the traditional 
pattern of PLO politics, namely it tried to mobilise the PLO opposition to 
pressurise and ultimately check the PLO Chairman. In pursuing such a goal, the 
PFLP also demonstrated its interest in preserving PLO unity and its readiness to 
agree to some concessions to ensure it. 
The Popular Front feared that in the confusion of the post-Beirut phase, the 
PLO leadership line, which did not enjoy official Palestinian recognition, could 
lead the national movement towards a quick series of concessions and 
consequently to the relinquishment of its main historical goals. The first of these 
concessions lay in the possibility of sharing the status of representative of the 
Palestinian people with Jordan, a move that the PFLP considered as the first step 
towards the acceptance of the Reagan plan and the recognition of Israel’s right 
to exist. Therefore, during the first months of 1983, the PFLP was interested in 
a rapid convocation of the 16th session of the PNC through which it hoped to halt 
the drift towards concessions.56 At the same time, the Popular Front was aware 
of the several and opposing sources of pressure exerted on the PLO by Arab 
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countries. Despite countries such as Syria and Libya expressed positions closer 
to the PFLP’s understanding of the new phase, the Popular Front was concerned 
that these pressures should not undermine the unity of the national movement in 
such delicate circumstances.57 In this context, the PFLP’s objective for the 
incoming PNC session was the preservation of unity among the Palestinian 
factions, but also the retention of a ‘nationalist’ line, namely a less 
accommodating diplomatic stance. For these reasons, the PFLP made clear its 
firm belief that the only way to achieve this was through the confirmation of the 
14th and the 15th PNC resolutions which condemned the American conflict 
settlement projects as well as the collective nature of the PLO decision-making 
process.58 
The need to find a consensus within the Palestinian fold, but also to exclude 
an excessively moderate line, prompted the PFLP’s participation in several intra-
factional meetings held during this period and signature of the programmatic 
documents issued subsequently. First the PFLP showed a more accommodating 
position towards the PLO Chairman’s participation in and contribution to the 
peace settlement proposals presented by the Arab countries and the Soviet 
Union. After three days of talks in Aden, the PFLP, the DFLP and Fatah agreed 
to give Yasser Arafat ‘political flexibility based on the Fez summit project and 
the Soviet initiatives and plans’.59 Although the document also stated that Jordan 
would not be authorised to act as a representative of the Palestinian people, this 
concession meant that, at this point, the leftist opposition did not want to veto 
Arafat’s attempts to coordinate with King Hussein, thus forcing a very risky 
showdown in terms of PLO cohesiveness. 
At the same time, the Popular Front, alongside the DFLP, continued to 
pressure the PLO leadership by making explicit its closeness to the critical 
positions expressed by Syria, Libya and their Palestinian proxies. Indeed, in mid-
January 1983 these two factions gathered in the Libyan capital Tripoli with the 
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Syrian-aligned PF-GC, Saʿiqa and the Popular Struggle Front (PSF), under 
Colonel Gaddafi ‘s patronage. The document issued was a sum of rejectionist 
stands: the five factions stated their refusal of every peace settlement entailing 
the recognition of the ‘Zionist enemy’ and affirmed that the Arab initiative 
delineated in the Fez plan, ‘aimed at reaching the Reagan plan and spread the 
Camp David blueprint’. Finally, also the possibility to share the representative 
status with Jordan was harshly condemned.60 The restatement of such 
intransigent positions only a month after the flexibility demonstrated in Aden 
appeared fairly ambiguous, but through this move the PFLP intended to pressure 
Arafat, reminding him that despite being loyal to the integrity of the PLO 
platform, it shared some major conceptions about the agenda for the new stage 
with the Syrian regime, Arafat’s main rival in the wake of the Lebanon War.61 
With these premises, the Palestinian organisations decided to convene the 
PNC in Algiers between February 14 and 22, 1983. At the end of this session, 
the higher Palestinian institutional body issued a series of resolutions that 
attempted to satisfy every faction. As a consequence, the agreed political line 
was far from being clearly defined leaving each organisation the chance to draw 
its own conclusions from the final document.62  
The PNC resolutions stressed the importance of collective leadership to 
preserve the cohesiveness of the PLO as well as the need to preserve the 
independence of Palestinian action from any Arab influence, be it Syrian or 
Jordanian. Nevertheless, the most important decisions taken during the Council 
concerned the PLO stand towards the Fez plan and Jordan. The Arab peace plan 
was defined as ‘the minimum for Arab political action’ to be ‘complemented by 
military action’.63 Notwithstanding the reference to armed struggle, clearly 
stressed to appease the opposition, such a formulation showed that the PFLP did 
not reject completely a negotiation framework contemplating the PLO’s 
recognition of Israel.  
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Regarding Jordan, the PNC decreed that in the future, relations with the 
Hashemite Kingdom could be established on the basis of a ‘confederation 
between two independent states’.64 In light of these outcomes, the PFLP and the 
rest of the leftist opposition saw just a partial fulfilment of their demands with 
reference to the establishment of tighter relations with Syria and the renewed 
recognition of the strategic nature of the alliance with the Soviet Union. 
Ultimately, not all the ‘gates to the Reagan plan’ were closed,65 as Habash 
himself had declared during his PNC speech, and Arafat was granted enough 
freedom to pursue his diplomatic line.66 
The intra-Palestinian dialogue that preceded the 16th PNC session, as well as 
the resolution that ensued, demonstrated that at this point, the PFLP prioritised 
PLO cohesiveness over opposition to Arafat’s agenda. The PFLP’s acceptance 
of the concept of political settlement confirmed the validity of this assumption. 
More specifically, Habash’s faction believed in the viability of the formation of 
a growing pole countering the diplomatic turn. Indeed, this was the goal that the 
PFLP pursued over the coming years, encouraged by the criticisms and divisions 
which emerged within Fatah due to the PLO Chairman’s political orientations.  
 
The Formation of the Joint Command and Fatah’s Internal Split. 
The establishment of a coalition of the PLO opposition factions did not only 
serve the goal of acquiring more weight within the PLO institutions. The PFLP 
aimed at emerging through factional association as the responsible actor, capable 
of attracting support also from some sectors within Fatah which did not view 
Arafat’s diplomatic orientation with favour. As Fatah’s internal strife deepened, 
spilling into a military confrontation, the coalition politics scheme, and its 
expansion, signalled the PFLP’s willingness to maintain its opposition within the 
boundaries of the PLO. However, the unfolding of Fatah’s split was to 
demonstrate the limits of coalitions politics within the national movement. 
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The PFLP started immediately to express its doubts and to a certain extent its 
disappointment with the resolutions approved at the 16th PNC. What worried 
Habash’s organisation the most was the ambiguity of the political line which 
emerged from the PNC, a lack of clarity which left too much space for 
‘interpretations and comments’ that the ‘Palestinian right could exploit to 
implement a policy of negotiation in the upcoming months’. For this reason, the 
final PNC resolution represented only the ‘minimum level’ upon which the PLO 
was able to preserve its unity. This sceptical attitude was translated into the 
formulation of two main political priorities: first, the ‘national progressive 
forces’ within the Palestinian arena had to monitor the respect of PNC 
resolutions in order to avoid any autocratic drift by the PLO leadership in 
implementing the agreed political line. In other words, the PFLP saw the 
collective leadership of the PLO as a security measure to impede Arafat’s 
imposition of his own interpretation of the PNC resolutions. Secondly, relations 
with Syria had to undergo a real ‘correction’ as the PLO and Syria were at the 
‘forefront of the defensive line’ against the ‘imperialist attack’ still going on in 
the region. Beyond the anti-imperialist rhetoric, Syria was not only the main 
PFLP supporter, but also a counterweight to Jordan’s rapprochement.67 
The PFLP’s suspicions were quickly confirmed as Arafat, despite some 
hesitation, continued his contacts with King Hussein in the attempt to make a 
breakthrough and reach an entente for coordination.68 From this stemmed the 
PFLP’s necessity to bolster its constraining power. The principal means to reach 
this goal was coordinating its efforts with the other Palestinian factions opposed 
to a PLO-Jordanian shared representation and above all to Arafat’s growing 
power within the Palestinian national movement. The pattern of ‘coalition 
politics’, namely the establishment of political alliances to bolster one faction’s 
political weight, emerged at this point and became a recurring theme in the 
PFLP’s policies for more than a decade. It signalled a condition of weakness as 
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the PFLP was now unable to erect alone a sufficient obstacle to Arafat’s 
policies.69  
In this context, the PFLP and the DFLP started to hold meetings and issue 
joint statements in which they affirmed their resolve to avoid any retreat from 
the PNC’s resolutions, namely further concessions to Jordan or any move 
perceived as favourable to American plans for the region.70 Finally, at the end of 
June, the two Fronts announced the official formation of a ‘Joint Political and 
Military Command’ as the first step towards the unification of the two main 
Marxist-Leninist forces within the PLO after more than decade since the split 
enacted by Hawatmeh and his followers. The renewed stress on the importance 
of implementing the PNC’s resolutions reflected the extent of the Popular and 
the Democratic Fronts’ concern over Arafat’s ‘deviations’ and ‘individualistic’ 
turn.71 Moreover, during summer 1983 Fatah experienced a serious internal 
crisis as an armed insurrection led by some military officers exploded in Syria-
controlled areas of Lebanon. The rebels led by Colonel Saʿid Maragha (Abu 
Musa) contested Arafat’s diplomatic strategy and affirmed that he did not 
represent the ‘common denominator’ of the Palestinian national movement 
anymore. His de facto abandonment of armed struggle and his continued 
contacts with the US and with the conservative regimes in the region resulted in 
a complete loss of legitimacy. Counting on Syrian political and material support 
the rebel officers launched an attack on Fatah forces loyal to Arafat, aiming at 
ousting the PLO Chairman.72 The Popular Front estimated that presenting a 
united Left during these circumstances could be very beneficial and strengthen 
the stands of the PLO opposition vis-à-vis the leadership.73  
The next step in this direction was the formulation and announcement of a 
‘program for unity and the democratic reform of the PLO’. In this political 
document, the Joint Command condensed its criticisms of the current 
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problematic aspects at the base of the PLO divisions in general and the Fatah 
infighting in particular. In the understanding of the Joint Command, 
organisational and political faults were intertwined: the ‘individualistic and 
factional’ approach of the PLO rightist leadership determined the on-going 
dialogue with Jordan and behind it the US. This trend represented a clear 
violation of all the subsequent PNC resolutions and was the main factor which 
led to the military uprising within Fatah itself. Despite condemning the recourse 
to violence by Abu Musa and his followers, for the Joint Command the full 
responsibility lay on the PLO leadership which failed to stand effectively against 
pressure coming from the ‘Arab reaction’ which aimed at dragging the PLO into 
the American peace camp.74 The PFLP and the DFLP were convinced that the 
implementation of collective leadership at all levels of the PLO institutions, 
besides a firm rejectionist stand vis-à-vis the Reagan plan and the Jordanian 
project for confederation, represented the solution for current PLO problems.75  
In issuing such a program the two Fronts thought they would be able to win 
a good deal of support within the Palestinian national movement and, in 
particular, among Fatah’s left-wingers as grievances towards Arafat’s 
management of the PLO in the post-Beirut phase were fairly diffuse. Not only 
the contacts with Jordan stirred resentments within Fatah, but also the 
leadership’s overall diplomatic attitude which put military reorganisation behind 
the need to keep dialogue open with all the actors involved in the different 
scenarios of the US-sponsored peace settlement, such as the Lebanese 
Authorities.76 In this framework, the Joint Command proposed and adopted a 
defensive attitude prioritising the protection of older political programs and 
positions such as those stated by the interim program issued during the 14th PNC 
session held in Damascus in 1979.77   
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In calling for a program to reform the PLO, approval of the rebels’ reasons 
but not yet an explicit call for Arafat’s resignation, full support for the Syrian 
role in the region but adherence to the independence of Palestinian action, the 
Joint Command and notably the PFLP, presented themselves as guaranteeing 
PLO unity and preserving the right political course, hoping to reverse the internal 
balance of power. As the military assault escalated, the rebels alienated 
increasingly the already marginal support they enjoyed, while Syria’s hegemonic 
designs on the PLO became more and more intolerable for its Palestinian allies, 
particularly the PFLP. What appeared as an occasion to change the ‘rightist 
course’ of the post-Beirut phase, turned into a chance for Arafat to assert his grip 
on the PLO and find further determination in the path towards the American 
sphere of influence.78 
This became fully clear with the step that the PLO Chairman decided to 
undertake in December 1983. Arafat managed successfully the situation in 
Tripoli, when Palestinian rebel forces besieged his loyalists in the Lebanese 
coastal town. Diplomatic contacts and outstanding tactical expertise by Fatah 
officials thwarted Syrian efforts to get rid of the PLO leadership. Arafat emerged 
strengthened from this confrontation: he enjoyed undisputed mass support 
throughout the whole duration of the crisis and eventually left Tripoli and 
Lebanon under US and French protection. Emboldened by this outcome, Arafat 
decided to visit Cairo and meet with President Mubarak, opening the door to the 
end of Egypt’s boycott by the PLO and the Arab countries imposed after the 
peace treaty with Israel.79 Through this step, Arafat challenged once more 
Syria’s agenda and signalled his determination to carry on with his diplomatic 
initiative. This move entailed some qualitative changes in several aspects. The 
level of contacts and negotiations between Fatah and Jordan increased and 
consequently this hardened the PFLP’s reaction, finally causing a much deeper 
split within the PLO.  
Indeed, the PFLP immediately escalated its verbal attacks against the PLO 
chairman and called for the first time for his resignation, since the meeting with 
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Hosni Mubarak represented a ‘clear deviation from what was established by 
several PNC sessions’, included the 16th. George Habash did not hesitate to 
define Arafat as ‘the Palestinian Sadat’, an expression which summarised the 
PFLP’s political understanding of Arafat’s visit to Cairo: just like the former 
Egyptian president, the PLO Chairman took this step individually, without even 
consulting with Fatah’s Revolutionary Council, and made explicit his 
determination to take part actively in the Camp David settlement model that the 
US administration was trying to impose on the whole region.80  
The PFLP now hoped that Arafat had condemned himself to isolation not only 
within the PLO and the Palestinian national movement but also within his own 
organisation. For this reason, the Popular Front directed its attacks toward the 
person of Arafat only, while being careful to respect Fatah’s adherence to the 
‘nationalist line’, or at least to the lowest common denominator of the PLO 
unity.81 The goal was once again to achieve a shift in the PLO’s internal balance.  
As Arafat’s discharge became an ‘urgent national mission’, the PFLP decided to 
step up the pattern of coalition politics and called for the formation of a ‘broader 
nationalist front’ gathering all those opposed to the ‘deviationist and defeatist 
line’.82 In this context, the PFLP and the DFLP issued a joint statement along 
with the PCP and the smaller Palestine Liberation Front (PLF) in what can be 
considered the first move towards the creation of the Democratic Alliance (DA), 
gathering the PLO leftist opposition. The statement invited ‘all nationalist forces, 
the members of the PNC and those of the Palestine Central Council (PCC), to 
raise their voice against the policy of capitulation’. Moreover, these four factions 
aimed at obtaining Arafat’s dismissal through the ‘prompt convocation’ of the 
PCC. Actually, the leftist opposition probably saw this institution, which 
fulfilled the ‘legislative function’ when the PNC was not in session, as more 
suited to its goals than the Arafat-dominated Executive Committee or the PNC 
itself, whose size made a vote for his removal more unlikely. Hence, the PFLP 
and other opposition factions pressured Fatah’s Central Committee to ‘develop 
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its position vis-à-vis Arafat’ in order to ease the convocation of the PCC, where 
Arafat would be ‘judged democratically’.83 
The development of the Fatah split tested the political effectiveness of the 
Joint Command as well as clarified its limits. Placed between Arafat’s ‘deviant’ 
path and the rebels’ excesses, the PFLP-DFLP coalition did not manage to attract 
the necessary political support within the PLO to restrain its Chairman. Indeed, 
this latter demonstrated himself able to rally nationalist support and strengthen 
factional cohesion in the face of Syrian-backed aggression. Afterwards, as the 
expanded leftist coalition embarked on a dialogue with Fatah to heal the PLO 
divisions, the PFLP needed to address factional differences in addition to 
Arafat’s reassertion of power over Fatah and the PLO.   
 
Pressures from Within, Pressure from Without: The PFLP’s Fluctuation in 
the Intra-Palestinian Dialogue.  
The intra-Palestinian dialogue that followed the conclusion of Fatah’s internal 
confrontation, allowed the tensions affecting the PFLP to emerge. The PFLP’s 
adherence to an expanded coalition scheme continued to signal its willingness to 
remain integrated within the PLO and bolster the weight of its ‘loyal’ opposition. 
However, as the Palestinian factions worked out a reconciliation agreement, the 
PFLP struggled to harmonise clashing forces that ultimately undermined its 
position. 
Despite some public criticisms and condemnations of Arafat’s talks with 
Mubarak, to which the PFLP gave excessive prominence,84 not only was the rest 
of Fatah unwilling to dismiss Arafat from his post, but several top leaders 
actually backed rapprochement with Egypt, and Fatah’s Central Committee 
avoided taking a harsh position towards him stating once and for all that his 
leadership was not questionable.85 Encouraged by such support, the PLO 
Chairman decided to resume more resolutely the contacts with King Hussein. 
These developments once again demonstrated the Left’s inability to exert 
sufficient weight to restrain Fatah’s leader. Nevertheless, the PFLP, in the 
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context of the leftist coalition it was helping to build, did not abandon its goal of 
stopping Arafat’s steps towards the ‘American settlement’ within the PLO legal 
framework. As a consequence, the position of the PFLP and the leftist opposition 
continued to fluctuate between refusing to come to terms with the PLO majority 
and openness to dialogue. As evidence of such fluctuations, the DA held a 
meeting in Aden at the end of March 1984, during which it expressed a severe 
critique of the PLO leadership’s course. The statement issued emphasised the 
traditional rejectionist calls vis-à-vis Palestinian-Jordanian coordination while 
invoking collective leadership of the PLO and a reorganisation of the seats 
within the Executive Committee capable of ensuring the implementation of a 
truly nationalist line.86 However, a month later during a meeting in Algiers, the 
same DA showed its readiness to open dialogue with Fatah and agreed with a 
delegation of its Central Committee on the necessity to convene a new session 
of the PNC after the achievement of a preliminary ‘political and organisational’ 
consensus. Actually, this last point appeared as the only tangible result of these 
preliminary talks since the document issued mostly included a series of set 
phrases on Palestinian steadfastness.87  
The Popular Front for its part viewed the results of the Algiers meeting with 
relative satisfaction: the precondition for a ‘comprehensive Palestinian national 
consensus’ before the convocation of the 17th PNC was seen as an effective card 
to impose a more acceptable compromise to Fatah, entailing the abandonment of 
Arafat-Hussein coordination.88 Indeed, the PFLP exploited regularly, throughout 
negotiations with Fatah Central Committee and after, the pretext of 
comprehensive consensus to obtain the continued deferment of the new PNC 
session. The reasons for such conduct were multi-fold. Syria’s pressure was 
undoubtedly a prominent factor fostering the PFLP’s reluctance to accept the 
convocation of the PNC as the Assad regime was still willing to put an end to 
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Arafat’s dominance of the PLO.89 Furthermore, Syria’s positions in this instance 
were consistent with the PFLP’s goal of shifting the internal Palestinian balance. 
Unlike the DFLP, the Popular Front reiterated its determination to obtain 
‘Arafat’s fall’ as well as continuing to demand the participation of Syrian-proxy 
factions in the PNC,90 notwithstanding their recourse to violence and their 
readiness to establish an alternative PLO, a principle that the PFLP always 
rejected. This attachment to PLO ‘regime-change’ was a constant in the PFLP’s 
intra-Palestinian policies as Habash’s organisation historically formulated, 
throughout the different phases of Palestinian history, the goal of substituting 
‘PLO rightist leadership’ with a ‘leftist, proletarian vanguard’.91 Thus, even 
when the DA and the Fatah Central Committee finally reached an agreement in 
Aden, in June 1984, aimed at preserving PLO unity, the confrontation could not 
be considered closed.  
The so-called ‘Aden-Algiers agreement’ appeared as a political victory for 
the PLO leftist opposition in many respects. First of all, the document envisaged 
those organisational reforms the PFLP regularly called for: the creation of a 
Secretariat-General, the expansion of the PCC powers and the establishment of 
‘special committees to supervise political affairs’ were all measures aimed at 
controlling the initiative of the PLO chairman. Furthermore, Fatah and the DA 
agreed on the inclusion of the PCP within the PLO, apparently bolstering the 
Palestinian Left’s overall position in the PNC. Concerning the political aspects 
and specifically PLO foreign policy, Fatah seemed to make a good deal of 
concessions to its leftist counterpart: indeed, the document suggested a halt to 
coordination with Jordan, restated the need to isolate Egypt as long as the 
Mubarak regime would not relinquish the Camp David agreements, and also 
affirmed the will to improve relations with Syria on a ‘Pan-Arab basis’ and on 
the basis of ‘mutual respects’ and ‘non-interference in internal affairs’.  
Conversely, the DA agreed to hold the 17th PNC no later than the 15th September 
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as well as that Arafat’s visit to Egypt, though condemned by the document, 
would be judged during the National Council rather than at the Central Council.92 
Despite these outstanding results and the positive rhetoric that welcomed 
them, there were two main factors fostering the impasse. First, immediately after 
the conclusion of the agreements, the PFLP signalled that, in its understanding, 
‘the comprehensive dialogue and consensus’ to be reached before the PNC 
should inevitably include the pro-Syrian factions, now coalesced in the National 
Alliance (NA).93 This represented by itself a huge obstacle to a real 
implementation of the Aden-Algiers agreement since the NA not only 
considered the agreement itself as the DA’s adherence to the ‘deviationist path’ 
but defined Arafat’s ouster, to be obtained out of PLO institutional legitimacy, 
as a precondition to any kind of negotiations.94 Secondly, the PLO Chairman 
largely ignored the agreement, as he continued the pursuit of rapprochement with 
Mubarak and coordination with King Hussein. Indeed, during the second part of 
summer 1984, Arafat met with the Jordanian monarch to discuss the issue of 
PLO reconciliation.95 All of these ‘Arafat violations’ were indicated by the PFLP 
as reasons for the failed implementation of the Aden-Algiers agreement; 
consequently the Front urged Fatah’s Central Committee to ‘take a clear 
position’ towards them, trying to pressure once again for a dissociation of the 
Central Committee from its leader.96  
As the set date for the PNC approached and given Arafat’s moves and 
declarations as well as the intransigence of the NA, the PFLP supported the 
deferment of the 17th session.97 Through this request, on the one hand the Popular 
Front demonstrated its sensibility to Syria’s priorities, benefitting in this also 
from Algeria’s position, which did not accept hosting the PNC if all Palestinian 
factions did not reach a global understanding. On the other, the PFLP conceived 
the confrontation with Arafat through the lens of the traditional PLO consensus 
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pattern, according to which the convocation of the PNC without a 
comprehensive consensus was not admissible. 
The PFLP’s shortcomings in understanding the changed political situation 
finally became clear in November, when Arafat, in an unprecedented step, 
decided to convene the PNC unilaterally, without the fulfilment of a national 
consensus, and on the 12th November issued invitations to the PNC members, 
bypassing the PNC Speaker al-Fahhum who refused to do so, in alignment with 
PFLP and pro-Syrian positions. Furthermore, to underline his adherence to 
coordination with Jordan, Arafat accepted King Hussein’s proposal to hold the 
session in Amman, for the first time after the 1970-71 war between PLO armed 
organisations and the Jordanian army.98 
The PFLP’s intransigence contributed to exacerbating the PLO’s internal 
crisis, letting it reach a level never observed before. Notwithstanding the DFLP’s 
criticisms, which favoured an approach more open to dialogue, in these 
circumstances the Popular Front went too far in its attempt to restrain ‘Arafat’s 
deviation’. The PFLP miscalculated Arafat’s resolve to have his collaboration 
with Jordan sanctioned by the PNC, and it ignored the diminished importance 
that consensus had in Palestinian politics at this stage. More significantly, its 
conduct showed how Habash’s organisation prioritised the preservation of a 
radical and steadfast attitude to the detriment of establishing a real and effective 
coalition with the other Palestinian leftist forces. More broadly, the PFLP’s 
conduct throughout the intra-Palestinian dialogue highlighted its difficulties in 
managing several conflicting factors. Syrian pressure, factional priorities and the 
legacy of its hard-line rejectionism resulted in an unclear set of policies that 
ultimately favoured Arafat’s agenda. 
The 17th and the 18th PNCs: From Total Rejection to Reconciliation.  
The approximately three-year-long period separating these PNC sessions was a 
hectic one. In such a time lapse the PLO leadership passed from the successful 
imposition of its line on the Palestinian national movement to the apparently 
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irreversible failure of a political process begun right after the evacuation from 
Beirut. 
At the same time, the PFLP confronted an unprecedented impasse in terms of 
political initiative. The initial diplomatic successes of the PLO Chairman 
underlined the PFLP’s lack of an adequate alternative. While Arafat, as it will 
be shown, managed to conclude positively the PNC convened in Amman and 
afterwards consecrated its choice for the Jordan option through a coordination 
agreement with King Hussein, the PFLP was only capable of replying by 
forming another coalition, the Palestine National Salvation Front (PNSF), which 
soon demonstrated limited viability and effectiveness. The PFLP was reacting to 
Arafat’s activism and also to regional developments, both positive and negative 
for the Popular Front, underscoring the political impasse it was experiencing. As 
evidence, despite the PFLP’s continuous denunciations, a bigger role in the 
failure of Arafat’s strategy was played by regional and international pressure: 
the PLO Chairman’s unwillingness to cede to US and Jordanian demands was 
the main cause of the Arafat-Hussein coordination deadlock, later leading to the 
King’s abandonment of it, a result to which the PFLP contributed only partially.  
Ultimately, the analysis of the PFLP’s conduct during these years of 
continued tensions within the PLO underscores on the one hand, the progress of 
its marginalisation process. On the other, it evidenced the prominence of full 
PLO reconciliation and reintegration among the PFLP’s goals. In fact, the PFLP 
appeared ready to open dialogue with Fatah and to drop the majority of its 
accusations against the PLO Chairman as soon as the failure of his diplomatic 
agenda forced him to return to more ‘nationalist, anti-imperialist’ positions. In 
addition, the PFLP’s participation in the PNSF also highlighted its exposure to 
Syrian external pressures that already emerged before the Amman PNC. In sum, 
the PFLP’s agency between 1984 and early 1987 put in evidence the policy 
fluctuation pattern, as the Front shifted from association with Syrian proxies to 






Arafat’s Progresses and the PFLP’s Choice of Syrian Proxies. 
The PFLP’s condemnation of the unilateral convocation of the PNC by Fatah 
Central Committee was immediate. In a Politburo statement, the Popular Front 
rejected the accusations of the ‘Palestinian rightists’ and to a certain extent, also 
of some representatives of the ‘democratic forces’ who blamed the PFLP for its 
intransigence and its continual request to delay the PNC. Rather, the Front 
underlined how, coming after Reagan’s re-election and Jordanian-Egyptian 
rapprochement, this step represented the PLO ‘deviationist leadership’s’ official 
endorsement of the political settlement plans based on the Camp David 
blueprint, the Reagan plan and the ‘delegation’ of Palestinian representation to 
Jordan, namely a global ‘liquidatory’ policy, likely to be revived under the re-
elected Reagan administration.99 Deprived of much room for action, the PFLP 
could not but call for the boycott of this ‘divisive PNC’. Moreover, although the 
DFLP decided not to participate in the Council alongside the Popular Front, 
Arafat’s step had as a consequence the de facto end of the leftist coalition. 
Indeed, Hawatmeh’s organisation declared on November 20 that it would 
‘freeze’ its participation in the Joint Command: the DFLP blamed the ‘PFLP’s 
counterproductive stand’ represented by its refusal to resume participation in the 
PLO Executive Committee before the opening of the PNC, without guarantee of 
inclusion for the pro-Syrian factions.100 
The PFLP’s hopes that the PLO Chairman would not have been able to reach 
the quorum and receive the PNC’s official approval for his diplomatic strategy 
were soon disappointed, as its call to boycott did not thwart Arafat’s goal.101 The 
meeting sealed Arafat’s policy of coordination with Jordan: after letting King 
Hussein give the opening speech, the Council charged the Executive Committee 
with ‘pursuing the dialogue with Jordan’ as well as ‘studying’ Hussein’s 
proposals, in particular the invitation to recognise UNSC Resolution 242. 
Furthermore, the PNC’s official appreciation of ‘Egypt’s increasing support for 
Palestinian goals in the period between the 16th and the 17th sessions’ made 
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explicit the PLO shift towards the Mubarak regime and its alignment with the 
so-called ‘Cairo-Amman axis’.102 
Between the end of 1984 and the beginning of 1985, the PFLP was in 
considerable disarray. Viewed from an external perspective, Arafat’s course 
could be interpreted as the choice of Jordanian tutelage, entailing a weakened 
PLO position within the framework of a US-conceived peace process.103 
Nevertheless, the PLO Chairman’s position within the PLO and more broadly 
the Palestinian national movement was bolstered after the PNC as he proved 
capable of not only imposing his line on the rest of the PLO, but also of doing 
so without concession to the opposition, shifting towards an unprecedented 
majority politics approach. This was probably something that the PFLP did not 
expect and in the aftermath of the ‘Amman Council’ it reacted with a reiteration 
of previous positions and calls: notwithstanding the failure in bringing together 
the NA and the DA, Habash repeated to the Arab and international media that 
the PFLP now ‘struggled for the organisation of a unifying national council’.104 
The call for unity and the declared adherence to the Aden-Algiers agreement, the 
principles of the Joint Command and the DA, all of which had by then lost their 
operative meaning, highlighted the PFLP’s lack of initiative. This flaw was to 
be further stressed by the next move that Arafat decided to undertake, to which 
the Popular Front replied by implementing the same pattern of coalition politics. 
Shortly after the PNC, Yasser Arafat stepped up his efforts at coordination 
with King Hussein and finally, on February 11, 1985, the two leaders announced 
their ‘bid for joint action’ in order to ‘move together towards the achievement of 
a just and peaceful settlement of the Middle East crisis’. The text of the 
agreement represented a further significant evolution in the PLO leadership 
position, which revolutionised its stand within the space of a couple of years. 
Indeed, the ‘Amman agreement’, as it became known, entailed, at least in theory, 
the PLO’s implicit acceptance of the principle of ‘land for peace’, its 
commitment to a political solution to be negotiated through an international 
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conference inclusive of all interested parties as well as, more significantly, its 
consensus to achieve Palestinian self-determination ‘within the context of the 
formation of the proposed confederated Arab States of Jordan and Palestine’.105 
The PFLP grasped the ‘qualitative’ nature of Arafat’s step and the perils it 
implied.106 The agreement and the alleged dismissal of the most important 
principles stated in the Palestine National Charter worryingly came in the 
framework of Arab and international efforts in support of the Jordanian-
Palestinian initiative, embodied by Reagan’s meeting with King Hussein and the 
Kings of Saudi Arabia and Morocco. Actually, the PFLP’s analysis correctly 
viewed the agreement as an unprecedented concession to the US first, but also 
to Israel, both of which constantly continued to refuse direct talks with the 
Palestinians, considering Jordan the only possible partner for negotiations. At 
the same time, the US and Israel alike also rejected the idea of an international 
conference entailing the participation of the USSR.107 Furthermore, although 
after the signing of the agreement the PLO Executive Committee issued a 
communique to reaffirm its rejection of UNSC resolution 242108, both Egypt and 
Jordan reaffirmed their reliance upon UN resolutions on the Arab-Israeli 
conflict, underlining that for the PLO’s Arab partners, this was not an amendable 
point.109 In this context, the PLO leadership, as underlined by the PFLP, was 
expected to endure increasing pressures once the implementation process of the 
agreement started.110 Conversely, the Popular Front seemed to have a less 
accurate analysis regarding the suitable reply to such a move. George Habash 
clarified that the only way to achieve the fall of the Arafat-Hussein agreement 
was through the creation of a ‘broad, national front’. The reiteration of such a 
call was supported by the PFLP’s optimistic view according to which the 
differences among the Palestinian opposition forces, namely between the DA 
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and the NA, would decrease in the light of Arafat’s step, allowing the possibility 
of forming a new coalition to emerge.111 Such a consideration highlighted the 
extent to which the PFLP’s agenda in this period had a ‘reactive’ character, since 
again Arafat was the one setting the terms of the Palestinian internal conflict and 
only his persistence in the diplomatic path could heal the rifts among his 
opponents. 
In the end, not all the differences within the opposition were cancelled. 
Notwithstanding its effort, the PFLP was not able to bring together the DA and 
the pro-Syrian factions: despite its condemnation of the Amman agreement, the 
DFLP was not ready to join a front reuniting all the Palestinian factions but 
Fatah, as this could further consolidate the PLO split.112 Having committed itself 
to the line of no dialogue with the PLO leadership, the PFLP moved closer to the 
NA and with its members, the PFLP-GC, the PSF, Saʿiqa and the Fatah rebels, 
declared the formation of the PNSF in late March 1985, clearly with Damascus 
favour. In this new edition of the PFLP’s scheme of coalition politics, the 
oppositional nature of the new alliance was made more explicit. In effect, beside 
renewed attachment to the PLO’s unique representative status, the two main 
‘political missions’ were the ‘fall of the Amman agreement’ and the end of the 
‘deviationist approach’ that only the ‘substitution of the rightist leadership’ 
could ensure. In reply to those, especially Fatah members and sympathisers, who 
accused the PNSF of trying to establish an alternative PLO, the founding 
document stated that the Front was just a ‘temporary framework working to 
restore the PLO national anti-imperialist line’.113 Although several members of 
the PNSF had attempted to topple Arafat militarily in the past, the PFLP mostly 
intended the new coalition as a mean to pressure the PLO leadership as this was 
in line with the policies that the Popular Front adopted since the evacuation from 
Beirut and with its attempts to build oppositional coalitions. This represented a 
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major difference with PNSF members such as Saʿiqa which remained committed 
to a military solution to Arafat’s deviation. On this basis, the PNSF’s ability to 
formulate a viable alternative within the national movement appeared limited. 
Consequently, evaluating to what extent the PNSF managed to pressure the PLO 
leadership effectively is not straightforward. Actually, this difficulty stemmed 
from several factors which influenced Arafat’s political course during 1985 and 
1986.  
First, as the PFLP expected, the US presented additional demands to the PLO. 
Initially the Americans agreed on PLO acceptance of resolution 242 after the 
first meeting between the US and the joint Palestinian-Jordanian delegation, 
supposedly as a preliminary step towards direct talks with Israel. Nevertheless, 
a short time before the scheduled meeting, Washington demanded PLO 
recognition before the beginning of the summit. Consequently, the meeting was 
cancelled as Arafat was not willing to cede on this point so rapidly, and the 
success of Hussein-Arafat coordination started to appear at risk.114  
Secondly, in May 1985, the Lebanese Shiʿi movement Amal, a faction that 
the whole PLO regarded as an ally until then, attacked the Palestinian refugee 
camps in Beirut, marking the beginning of what became immediately known as 
the ‘War of the Camps,’115 a conflict that would last until 1987. This aggression, 
which Syria approved and fostered, was aimed at liquidating the Palestinian 
armed presence in west and south Beirut so that Amal could emerge as the 
faction asserting Lebanese control over those parts of the capital. In doing so 
Amal would have been able to present itself as the Shiʿi partner of a tripartite 
agreement, signed in Damascus, involving Jumblatt’s Progressive Socialist Party 
(PSP) and the new leader of the Christian Lebanese Forces (LF), Elie Hubayqa, 
supposed to put an end to the civil war and reassert Syrian influence in the 
country.116  
  A third element further complicating the position of the PLO leadership, 
especially on the international level, was the series of operations carried out by 
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several smaller Palestinian groups against civilian targets. First, a Palestinian 
commando killed three Israelis on a yacht in Cyprus on September 25 claiming 
that they were Mossad agents. This action prompted an Israeli air raid against 
PLO headquarters in Tunis which killed 73 people. Some days later, a group of 
militants of the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF) hijacked the Italian passenger 
ship ‘Achille Lauro’ heading to Tel Aviv. These events led to a deterioration of 
PLO-Jordan relations, since the Hashemite Kingdom was undergoing strong 
Israeli and US pressure blaming Jordan for letting the PLO reorganise its military 
activities on its soil.117  
Within this context of serious obstacles, the PNSF’s opposition, alongside 
that of the DFLP and the PCP, contributed to undermining Arafat’s diplomatic 
agenda as they represented another front that the PLO Chairman had to win in 
order to advance his goals.118 From an international perspective he could appear 
unable to impose the ‘required’ step on a stubborn, pro-Syrian opposition, 
forcing him, or giving him the pretext, to avoid recognising Resolution 242.119 
In this sense, the PNSF’s hard-line opposition did have some form of influence 
on the PLO leadership.  
Nevertheless, factors such as Jordan’s vulnerability to American pressure and 
the ensuing intransigence over PLO ‘needed’ concessions’120 as well as the series 
of attacks carried out by small groups outside the Middle East, probably had 
more weight in determining the failure of this political settlement initiative.121 
Furthermore, concerning the War of the Camps, one should take into account the 
fact that this conflict negatively affected the PFLP too. Indeed, Habash’s 
organisation was put in a difficult situation when the country labelled as the main 
regional supporter of the Palestinian ‘nationalist’ line ordered the military and 
political destruction of the PLO presence in Lebanon. All these aspects should 
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lead to the conclusion that, although part of the factors causing the end of the 
diplomatic initiative, the PFLP’s policies had a limited impact. 
Beyond the political impasse that the PFLP experienced in this phase, the 
unviability of the PNSF’s framework reflected the strong presence at this stage 
of the opposition-integration dilemma. The PFLP’s attachment to the PLO 
framework clashed with the Syrian-controlled factions’ goal of putting the 
organisation under Damascus’ full control. This evidenced that the PFLP, in the 
pursuit of its opposition policies, was not prone to disengage totally from the 
PLO mainstream. In fact, the efforts that the Popular Front spent to unify the 
PLO after 1985 demonstrated its prioritisation of integration within the PLO and 
protection of its autonomy. 
 
From the Collapse of Hussein-Arafat Coordination to PLO Reconciliation: 
Unity Overrides Opposition. 
With the de facto end of the Amman agreement, the PFLP’s priority of 
compacting the PLO resurfaced. The Popular Front’s line throughout the intra-
Palestinian dialogue that followed the collapse of Arafat’s Jordan option 
signalled that despite a hard-line rhetoric, Habash’s faction was more than 
willing to moderate its opposition in order to ensure PLO unity. 
As the obstacles to Arafat’s diplomatic strategy multiplied, his efforts to 
salvage the framework of negotiations with the US and the collaboration with 
Jordan did not succeed. In an effort to reduce the negative effects of the recent 
attacks on European targets, Arafat announced in Cairo the ‘PLO’s refusal of all 
act of terrorism’ and reaffirmed its opposition to armed operation outside 
Palestine.122. Nevertheless, the PLO Chairman’s main achievement after 1982, 
namely the Amman agreement, was definitively compromised. A year after its 
signing, King Hussein announced the end of political coordination with the PLO. 
In his speech, Hussein pointed to the PLO’s lack of commitment to the 
agreement as the main cause for this disruption since this behaviour deprived 
any diplomatic initiative of the necessary credibility. Through these words, the 
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King was highlighting the PLO’s unwillingness to shift position on the UN 
resolutions.123   
All these events represented positive developments for the PFLP and the other 
PNSF factions, although the deterioration of Hussein-Arafat relations was not 
really the result of a change in the PLO leadership positions. The Popular Front 
saw the crisis of PLO-Jordan relations as confirmation of its analysis. For 
instance, the Cairo declaration proved that the PLO leadership was embarked on 
a path that could only lead to further concessions. In the PFLP’s view, it 
represented a significant step preceding the total relinquishment of armed 
struggle and the acceptance of UN resolution 242 and 338, as demanded by 
Jordan on US behalf.124 
Retaining such a sceptical attitude towards Fatah, the Popular Front reacted 
cautiously to Hussein’s abrogation of his coordination with Arafat. First, the 
King’s speech did not entail a parallel relinquishment by Fatah of the policies it 
had been pursuing for more than four years. This was telling of Fatah’s 
adherence to the peace process and of its leaning towards ‘American solutions’ 
for the region, notwithstanding the de facto end of the negotiation process and 
the PLO Executive Committee’s declaration charging US intransigence with the 
responsibility for the failure.125 Furthermore, the Popular Front interpreted 
Hussein’s announcement as a step aiming at taking the initiative and impose the 
Amman agreement as ‘the base to strengthen his position to the detriment of the 
PLO’. This was paralleled by Jordan’s efforts to expand its influence in the West 
Bank through the support of personalities outside the PLO, such as the Mayors 
of Ramallah and Nablus, linked to the Jordanian regime and likely to promote 
its line.126 
Given this phase of remarkable disarray for the PLO leadership, the 
opposition factions were presented with the opportunity to renew their initiative. 
The collapse of the Amman agreement was not the only aspect encouraging a 
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more radical agenda since several factors, specifically related to the OPT, 
represented arguments in support of a return to a ‘nationalist line’. First, since 
summer 1985, the new Israeli national unity government had introduced harsher 
measures to curb resistance activities in the West Bank and Gaza, the so-called 
‘Iron Fist’ policies. In particular, Israel started to target leading figures within 
the Palestinian national movement in the OPT, such as student and trade union 
representatives as well as journalists. Significantly, these policies were 
conceived within a new plan to administer the OPT which would include closer 
coordination with the Jordanian Authorities.127 As evidence of Israeli-Jordanian 
coordination, on the one hand King Hussein launched a five-year investment 
plan for the OPT, a ‘velvet glove’ coupling with the Israeli Iron Fist.128 On the 
other, he started to hold secret meetings with the Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon 
Peres in order to set the base for direct negotiations between the two countries. 
Although the talks were never upgraded to formal negotiations due to a negative 
vote by the Israeli cabinet on their start, these moves and contacts signalled Israel 
and Jordan’s will to marginalise the PLO in the OPT.129  
All these risks made the need for a return to a unified Palestinian initiative 
even more urgent but the internal Palestinian debate and confrontation appeared 
to follow the same pattern observed throughout the 1980s. The DFLP and the 
PFLP manifested their interest in opening dialogue with Fatah shortly after King 
Hussein’s speech, and started to hold meetings with Arafat’s faction.130  The 
PFLP joined the debate from its viewpoint of alternative opposition and the logic 
it adopted was the same as that marking the confrontation with Fatah before the 
17th PNC: the achievement of some preconditions as base for talks and the 
parallel retention of a hard-line profile. These preconditions were mainly Fatah’s 
official abrogation of the Amman agreement and the end of its relations with 
Egypt, the restatement of the national political program as ‘issued by the 
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legitimate PNC sessions’ and the implementation of a collective democratic 
leadership capable of avoiding the ‘individualism which plagued’ the PLO 
during the mid-1980s.131 Echoing the slogans launched throughout the previous 
years, the Popular Front called for the creation of the ‘largest Palestinian national 
gathering’ as a mean to pressure the PLO leadership to relinquish the Amman 
agreement. Interestingly, as it signalled the intention to achieve reconciliation, 
while the PFLP still adopted a more intransigent position vis-à-vis other 
Palestinian factions, nonetheless it started to moderate its demands concerning 
Fatah leaders. For instance, it gradually stopped calling for the ‘substitution of 
the deviant leadership,’ stressing instead the need for its retreat from ‘deviant 
positions’.132 
Despite the ‘objective conditions’, as the PFLP defined the collapse of 
Hussein-Arafat coordination and the new Jordanian policy towards the OPT, 
allowing and requiring PLO reconciliation actually emerged, the path to achieve 
it was not completely smooth.133 The PFLP’s determined adherence to its 
preconditions sparked criticisms from the DFLP which was engaged in an 
intense series of meetings with Fatah’s Central Committee between Moscow and 
Tunis. The DFLP’s Secretary-General Nayef Hawatmeh labelled the PFLP 
positions as ‘hesitant’, ‘petit-bourgeois’ and not serving the cause of unity.134 In 
rejecting these criticisms, the Popular Front pointed at Fatah’s procrastination 
concerning the abolition of the Amman agreement. The refusal to take this 
measure was due, according to the PFLP, to the predominant idea within Fatah 
that since the Middle East became an American area of influence no solution 
could be conceived outside US-imposed standards. This explained Fatah silence 
even in the face of some ‘major dangerous developments’ such as Shimon Peres’ 
visit to Morocco and, in particular, King Hussein’s decision to close twenty-five 
Fatah offices in Jordan. Therefore, the abrogation of the Amman agreement and 
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the closure to further contacts with Egypt represented the only guarantees of 
PLO return on its ‘nationalist, anti-imperialist, natural line’.135 
Despite the sharp tone of the declarations and the exchanged accusations 
which would suggest a continuing impasse, the internal dialogue was 
progressing. While not taking part directly in Fatah-DFLP-PCP talks in Tunis, 
nonetheless the PFLP did participate, clarifying through its mouthpiece its 
positions and replying to the statements issued after every round of negotiations, 
something that the Palestinian political arena had not seen for several years.136 
Another element suggesting the progression of PLO internal dialogue was the 
publication of  a joint PFLP-PCP statement in November 1986, and afterwards 
of another document issued in January 1987 by the ‘three democratic forces,’ 
namely the PFLP, the DFLP and the PCP. The significance of these statements 
was not in their content so much as in the PFLP’s return to more consistent 
coordination with the PLO moderate opposition forces actively involved in 
dialogue with the PLO leadership.137 Finally, Habash’s visit to Czechoslovakia 
and then directly to Moscow were telling of the PFLP’s approval of and 
participation in the initiative started by the new Soviet Communist Party 
Secretary-General Mikhail Gorbachev, which aimed at achieving PLO unity 
while renewing a Soviet role in the Arab-Israeli conflict.138 
The major perils threatening the PLO were still present at the beginning of 
the new year. In the OPT, Israel’s Iron Fist policy continued unabated while 
Palestinian camps in Lebanon had still to endure months under the siege imposed 
by Amal during the last phase of the War of the Camps. In light of this situation, 
in February and March intra-Palestinian consultations intensified with talks 
going on in Algeria, Tunisia and Libya. The whole PLO was directly concerned 
and summits among the different Palestinian factions were paralleled by 
meetings between Palestinian leaders and official representatives of the 
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countries hosting the talks, such as the discussions that George Habash held with 
Algerian President Shadli Ben Jadid and Libya’s Mu‘ammar Gaddafi139.  
 As a result, a breakthrough in negotiations was eventually achieved with the 
issue of two ‘political documents’ signalling the readiness of all the Palestinian 
forces to proceed towards the convocation of the 18th PNC. First and foremost, 
the ‘Tunis document’ signed by Fatah, the DFLP and the PCP on 16 March 1987 
called for the formal abrogation of the Amman agreement, letting the last 
obstacle to reconciliation finally fall. Indeed, the document also set a date for the 
start of the new PNC session, precisely on April 20, to be preceded by a ten-day-
long comprehensive dialogue.140 Afterwards, a week later, the PFLP and the 
DFLP re-joined the most radical factions such as the PF-GC and Fatah-Intifada, 
in a similar document issued in the Libyan capital Tripoli. The statement 
basically echoed the points announced by the previous statement. The two 
documents also envisaged some organisational reforms, such as the inclusion of 
the PCP within all the PLO bodies and a significant opening to a possible 
inclusion of the pro-Syrian former rebel forces.141   
Finally, after the PLO Executive Committee abrogated formally the Amman 
agreement on 19 April,142 the PNC opened its week-long sitting. The resolutions 
of the assembly reflected the impasse that the PLO went through between the 
end of 1982 and 1987. In effect, the only concrete result was the formal PLO 
leadership’s dismissal of its strategy of coordination with Jordan. Concerning all 
other aspects, and especially the political agenda, this session was very close to 
the 16th held back in 1983: the PLO reaffirmed its adherence to the peace plan 
endorsed by the Arab countries in Fez in 1982, while stating again its positive 
stance vis-à-vis an international peace conference. The PNC also asserted the 
PLO’s rejection of UNSC resolutions 242 and 338, and excluded the idea of 
confederation with Jordan; it also referred to the 16th session concerning 
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relations with Egypt, namely affirming that contacts with Mubarak’s regime 
should be proportionate to his relinquishing of the Camp David accords.143 
In the wake of the closure of the PNC, the PFLP expressed its full satisfaction 
with the results achieved: the ‘gates leading to Amman and Cairo’ were finally 
closed and the four-year lost unity was found again. The Popular Front saluted 
the reassertion of the ‘nationalist line’ as its own achievement, since the stands 
and policies it adopted throughout this phase of division demonstrated to what 
extent it contributed to the preservation of a Palestinian position challenging 
America and its supporters’ solutions for the region. There were no more 
obstacles now to full reconciliation with Syria and to the revival of a resistance 
axis capable of counterbalancing the ‘reactionary’ regimes which definitely 
failed to impose their policies on the PLO.144 
The conclusion of the PLO split in early 1987 and the PFLP’s agency through 
it reflected two features of its political course. The inability to set up a radical 
alternative within the PLO institutions and legal framework underscored the 
overall weakened position of the PFLP in the post-Beirut period. At the same 
time, the processual character of the weakening process emerged clearly in the 
mid-1980s, as the PFLP managed to retain some political weight and popularity 




The analysis of the PFLP’s conduct between the end of 1982 and early 1987 
allows some major features to emerge with clarity. First, the split with Fatah 
unfolded gradually and it is possible to identify the different steps of this break: 
Fatah’s infighting and Arafat’s visit to Cairo, the convocation of the 17th PNC in 
Jordan and finally the signing of the Amman agreement were all milestones in 
gradual but regular escalation. From this stemmed that the harshness of the 
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PFLP’s positions vis-à-vis the PLO Chairman increased, following the same 
pace. This was indicative of the fact that the PFLP’s first choice was not to break 
totally with the ‘rightist leadership,’ and confirmed its fundamental adherence to 
the PLO as the main platform to pursue its own goals. At the same time, this 
gradual estrangement from Fatah indicated also the ‘reactive’ nature of the 
PFLP’s political initiative during this period. In other words, had Arafat been 
willing to relinquish his diplomatic strategy at any point, the Popular Front 
would have appeared ready to dismiss its most intransigent calls and open a 
dialogue with the PLO leadership. Actually, this is what eventually happened: 
as soon as Arafat’s agenda reached a fatal deadlock and he was forced to pull 
back from it, displaying consequently the possibility to achieve reconciliation, 
the PFLP stopped calling for his immediate fall as a precondition for PLO unity.  
The PFLP’s agency throughout the unfolding of the PLO split ultimately 
reflected its willingness to oppose Fatah while maintaining its integration within 
the PLO. This led the PFLP to attempt to establish an opposition coalition within 
the PLO to counterbalance Arafat’s autocratic imposition of a majority principle 
on the national movement and his diplomatic strategy. However, the PFLP’s 
pursuit of a ‘loyal opposition’ to the PLO leadership was at the base of serious 
policy fluctuation. In fact, its conception of opposition to Arafat clashed with 
different sources of pressure, both internal and external. First, the PFLP’s 
rhetoric oscillated between calls for Arafat’s ousting and renewed recognition of 
the PLO Chairman as the ‘common denominator’ guaranteeing Palestinian unity. 
This appeared clearly both in the period between Arafat’s visit to Cairo and the 
signing of the Aden-Algiers agreement, and between the announcement of PLO-
Jordan coordination and its collapse. 
Secondly, the PFLP’s political line fluctuated also within the context of the 
opposition coalitions in which it participated. This stemmed from the different 
positions that the other factions held concerning Fatah’s agenda. 
Notwithstanding its overall loyal opposition to Fatah, the PFLP supported a more 
hard-line approach towards Arafat than its main leftist partners, the DFLP and 
the PCP. The DFLP consistently adopted softer positions towards Fatah since its 
inception, while the PCP was seeking PLO membership during the mid-1980s. 
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Therefore, aiming at more concessions from the PLO Chairman, the PFLP 
hesitated concerning the implementation of the Aden-Algiers agreement, 
contributing to the breakup of the DA experience. The PFLP also miscalculated 
Arafat’s resolve to pursue his diplomatic strategy and probably did not expect 
his readiness to summon the PNC without a comprehensive consensus. 
Beside internal PLO differences, the PFLP’s partnership with the Syrian 
regime represented a further source of pressure, and ultimately of fluctuation. 
While the PFLP’s rapprochement with Syria responded to the need to set up a 
regional counterbalance to Arafat’s Jordan option, Damascus’ goals were at odds 
with the PFLP’s adherence to PLO independence. In this context, Syrian 
pressures concerning the re-inclusion of the NA’s forces within the PLO played 
a paramount role in determining the PFLP’s hesitations in the wake of the Aden-
Algiers agreement. Moreover, the Syrian proxies’ consistent commitment to oust 
Arafat militarily undermined any effective coordination of opposition factions 
within the PNSF. In fact, the PFLP’s inclusion in the PNSF appeared mostly 
circumstantial, while other factions and Syria sought to set up a real challenge 
to Arafat and the PLO status quo. These differences pushed the PFLP back closer 
to the PLO mainstream, especially after Syria backed a second military assault 
on Palestinian camps in Lebanon, as will be shown in the next chapter. 
In the light of these considerations, the PFLP’s policy line failed to influence 
the external and internal developments affecting the Palestinian national 
movement. Even though Arafat’s agenda finally failed, the PFLP’s role in that 
failure was fairly limited. This phase thus signalled a serious step in the PFLP’s 
marginalisation process in which the opposition-integration dilemma and the 
policy fluctuation pattern manifested clearly. However, the overall processual 
character of the PFLP’s marginalisation emerged with positive aspects stemming 
from its adherence to the PLO framework. The PFLP’s final commitment to 
defending the PLO from external threats allowed it to retain a degree of 
credibility among Palestinian militants and population that the pro-Syrian rebel 
factions never enjoyed. This provided an essential basis for playing a significant 
role in the next phase of the Palestinian national movement history, that of the 
First Intifada starting in 1987. 
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Chapter 2 - The Radical Alternative: The PFLP’s Fluctuant 
Foreign Policy.  
 
Introduction. 
The PFLP’s internal agenda was aimed at stopping Arafat’s diplomatic strategy 
and significantly affected its priorities on the regional and international levels. 
The competitive and fragmented political environment characterising 
Palestinian politics in the post-Beirut phase was reflected in the PFLP’s efforts 
to counterbalance the PLO leadership’s leanings towards the conservative 
regimes and the United States. The general goal of this chapter is thus to outline 
how the PFLP’s orientations in foreign relations simultaneously reflected and 
contributed to its marginalisation within the Palestinian national movement. To 
this end, the present chapter first approaches the direct impact that relations with 
the Syrian regime had on the PFLP’s trajectory throughout this phase. Secondly, 
the PFLP’s positioning towards the USSR and its attempts to establish closer 
contacts are investigated to determine the Soviet role in the Popular Front’s 
opposition narrative and policies and the actual effect of this relationship. 
The PFLP’s oppositional priorities led to closer coordination with Syria not 
only as the result of the PFLP’s relocation to Damascus, but also due to the 
ostensible shared interests with the Assad regime. Nevertheless, deep-rooted 
contradictions between the PFLP and Damascus continued to affect their 
partnership and resurfaced with growing strength over the period addressed. 
Therefore, the present chapter illustrates the conditions that determined the 
PFLP-Syrian rapprochement, the narrative employed to justify this alliance, and 
the actual goals that the PFLP shared with Damascus. Subsequently, the gradual 
re-emergence of major differences is pointed out in order to outline their impact 
on the PFLP’s agency. What is stressed is the PFLP’s growing difficulty in 
harmonising Syrian hegemonic conduct towards the PLO and its historical 
commitment to the defence of Palestinian political autonomy. These 
contradicting elements ultimately fostered the PFLP’s policy fluctuation, 
undermining the viability of its ‘nationalist’ alternative to Arafat’s ‘deviationist’ 
diplomatic strategy. As evidence, this chapter addresses the final PFLP’s shift 
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from alignment with Damascus to military opposition to its proxies. This 
reflected the resurfacing of integration within the PLO and its protection from 
Arab aggression as a PFLP’s paramount priority. 
While coordination with Syria was a response to the PLO leadership’s 
contacts with Jordan, the PFLP tried to match Arafat’s orientations towards the 
US, calling for improved relations with the USSR. However, long-standing 
divergences marked PFLP-Soviet relations too, and in the post-Beirut phase, 
their goals and interests coincided only on circumscribed issues. Therefore, what 
is stressed is the tactical character of PFLP-USSR relations that, despite the 
PFLP’s rhetoric, did not achieve a strategic dimension. Although the USSR’s 
conduct did not directly impact the PFLP’s policy fluctuation, it nonetheless 
helped to jeopardise its agenda during the period under scrutiny. The clear 
contradictions between Palestinian, but also specifically PFLP, interests and 
Soviet goals undermined the credibility of a partnership with Moscow and 
bolstered the Palestinian trend calling for direct contacts with Washington. 
Ultimately, this chapter shows how pressures deriving from the PFLP’s relations 
with external partners, coupled with internal tensions, emphasising the 
opposition-integration dilemma and the ensuing negative patterns. 
 
Regional Developments and Internal Shifts: The Bases of Alignment with 
Syria. 
Coordination with Syria was a quite new element in the PFLP’s foreign policy. 
Therefore, before addressing the actual implications of the PFLP-Syrian 
relationship, an outline of the conditions that favoured such rapprochement is 
needed, to subsequently assess the impact of Syrian policies on the PFLP. 
The rapprochement started to emerge in the late 1970s and was finally 
consecrated after the 1982 Lebanon War when the PFLP decided to relocate its 
headquarters to Damascus. The alliance between Syria and the Popular Front 
was forged upon their opposition, on the one hand, to Arafat’s diplomatic 
strategy and his dialogue with Jordan and Egypt, and on the other, to bilateral 
Lebanese-Israeli negotiations held under US patronage. Both these post-1982 
developments represented an advancement of the American agenda for the 
105 
 
region aimed at achieving a global peace settlement through separate stages, a 
road map that loosely corresponded to Israel’s concept of peace.1 The success of 
these two tracks of the peace process would have entailed the PFLP’s 
marginalisation within the PLO, as highlighted in the previous chapter. The 
Assad regime, for its part, would have found itself more isolated on the regional 
level if Lebanon and Jordan reached separate peace agreements with Israel, 
under US influence.2 The Lebanese-Israeli peace talks also threatened the PFLP 
and Syria militarily, since a successful outcome would have led to a withdrawal 
of Syrian forces from Lebanon. While representing a setback for Damascus, this 
embodied an existential threat for the remaining Palestinian and specifically 
PFLP guerrillas still based in Lebanon. Since the independence in military 
activity once enjoyed in Lebanon was no longer possible in any of the countries 
surrounding Palestine, the PFLP was aware that protecting what was left of the 
Lebanese sanctuary and of the ‘Palestinian right to bear weapons’ there would 
ultimately determine its survival during the phase following the loss of Beirut.3 
 However, from its foundation and during the first half of the 1970s, the 
Popular Front was very critical towards the so-called ‘nationalist military 
regimes’ such as Syria or Egypt. If on the one hand these states were ‘tactical 
allies’ in the battle against Israel and imperialism, on the other, their failure to 
prioritise the Palestinian method of long-term guerrilla warfare represented a 
serious obstacle in what the PFLP considered the only path towards liberation. 
Furthermore, in the PFLP’s view, the ‘petit-bourgeois elites’ governing these 
states had started to forge alliances with the middle and upper bourgeoisie in 
their respective countries and, as a consequence, started to lean towards 
‘retreatist positions’, favouring a political settlement of the conflict with Israel. 
In this phase, the comprehensive revolutionary project of the PFLP was in 
contradiction with the ‘reformist’ attitude of these regimes.4 Concerning Syria 
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in particular, its intervention alongside Maronite militias to the detriment of the 
PLO and the Lebanese Left in 1976, seemed to have put it definitively within 
the enemy camp. In the late 1970s and the early 1980s, however, some major 
shifts in the regional balance of power occurred, contributing to PFLP-Syrian 
détente which was to be bolstered by the consequences of the PLO expulsion 
from Beirut.  
The signing of the Camp David agreements and the Iraqi attack on Iran, both 
in 1979, deprived the ‘anti-imperialist camp’ of two prominent actors. The 
separate peace treaty between Egypt and Israel thwarted the Syrian goal of 
reaching a comprehensive settlement involving all the actors and fronts of the 
conflict. Consequently, the Syrians needed to counterbalance the Egyptian move 
and changed their positions towards the Palestinian factions. Taking into account 
developments in the Lebanese situation, with Israel’s 1978 Litani operation and 
its growing role as ‘protector’ of the Christian rightist factions, it was clear that 
new conditions for a Palestinian-Syrian rapprochement emerged on different 
fronts.5 More specifically, the PFLP’s view concerning regional alliances 
excluded completely any linkage with ‘reactionary regimes’ and once Iraq also 
became an active member of this camp because of its attack on Iran, the Popular 
Front was left with little choice in terms of regional partnerships. 
Besides these changes on the Arab level, some shifts in the PFLP’s internal 
currents also contributed to the emergence of an alliance with Syria. Until the 
Fourth National Congress of the Popular Front held in 1981, a group headed by, 
among others, Al-Hadaf editor Bassam Abu Sharif and the PFLP’s Executive 
Committee member Abu Maher Al-Yamani, occupied a dominant position 
within the Front. This group was closer to Iraq and, in general, favoured the 
maintenance of good relations with Fatah as well as a more moderate view on 
the PLO leadership’s increased leaning towards a diplomatic strategy. 
Conversely, another group led by the PFLP Deputy Secretary-General Abu Ali 
Mustafa and Abu Ahmad Fuʾad, head of the Military Department, supported 
more coordination with Syria and the end of relations with Saddam Hussein’s 
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Iraq. According to AbuKhalil’s account, during this Congress session, Abu Ali 
Mustafa’s group gained prominence within the PFLP, partly because of George 
Habash’s inability to halt their moves despite his views differing radically from 
those of his Deputy. Indeed, the PFLP Secretary-General was not historically on 
good terms with the Syrian regime, and did not want to adopt an excessively 
harsh position regarding Fatah’s political strategy. Therefore, his failure to deter 
Abu Ali Mustafa’s group might be interpreted as a sign of weakness for Habash; 
this was probably due to the brain surgery he underwent in Beirut in 1980, which 
limited both his physical and intellectual capabilities.6 
However, according to some former and current PFLP cadres, a major split 
within the Popular Front over Syria did not occur. While different points of view 
existed, these were treated adequately and the whole PFLP aligned with the 
position issued by the Politburo. Possibly, reluctance to acknowledge such 
divisions still affects those who were directly involved, but more than two 
decades of distance, the death of the two main leaders, and looser affiliation to 
the PFLP today increase the trustworthiness of such considerations.7 This 
suggests that the PFLP’s decision to align itself more closely with Syria was 
mainly due to its calculations of the changed regional balances and the new 
situation within the Palestinian national movement, with internal rifts taking a 
more marginal role. 
Internal shifts apart, convincing the Palestinian popular and militant base 
about the new stand towards Syria was a hard task: many among the Palestinian 
population and within faction militants, PFLP included, still resented Syria 
because of its involvement in the 1976 Tell al-Zaʿtar massacre8 as well as 
because of its poor performance in confronting the Israeli army’s quick advance 
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to Beirut in summer 1982. To do so, the PFLP resorted to its accustomed 
categories inherited from Mao Tse-Tung’s analysis of Chinese society, namely 
his theory on primary and secondary contradictions.9 By virtue of this theory, 
the contradictions still existing between Syria, the PFLP and, in general, the PLO 
positions became secondary in the light of the situation that emerged after the 
Lebanon War. The PFLP started to call for a ‘scientific understanding’ of the 
divergences with Syria, on the base of ‘common interests’, first of all the 
rejection of the new ‘liquidatory peace plans’ 10 as well as concern over new 
Israeli aggression toward Syrian and Palestinian positions in Lebanon and Syria 
itself.11 The danger of an Israeli-Lebanese agreement, the end of Egypt’s 
isolation, and Jordanian plans for the West Bank represented the ‘primary 
contradiction’ between the ‘imperialist camp’ and the ‘revolutionary nationalist’ 
one. Therefore, the contradictions between the Syrian regime and the Palestinian 
revolution as a whole became secondary and priority had to be given to 
‘correcting’ relations with Syria. 
 
Presenting the Viability of Alliance with Syria. 
Throughout the months that followed the PLO eviction from Beirut, the PFLP 
and Syrian interests in Lebanon came closer. The PFLP stressed the shared 
opposition to Lebanese-Israeli peace to bolster its agenda of counterbalancing 
Arafat’s contacts with Jordan and Egypt. In the PFLP’s narrative, common 
interests in Lebanon represented a solid base for strategic coordination with the 
Assad regime and, at the same time, a viable alternative to the PLO leadership’s 
agenda. 
On 17 May 1983, Lebanon and Israel reached an agreement after several 
months of negotiations under US supervision. The accord entailed the 
withdrawal of Israeli troops as well as the end of the state of war between the 
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two countries.12 Although the text of the agreement did not contain any reference 
to Syria and the PLO, the Israelis immediately specified that the withdrawal of 
their army was conditional on a preliminary withdrawal of Syrian and Palestinian 
forces.13 In turn, the Syrians, while rejecting the agreement, posed the same 
precondition before pulling out of the neighbouring country, asking for an Israeli 
withdrawal first; consequently, the implementation of the agreement reached an 
impasse the very same day it was signed. 
 For the PFLP, the ostensible success of American diplomacy in engineering 
a Lebanese-Israeli agreement represented the definitive inclusion of the 
Lebanese Authorities, particularly the Phalangist President Amine Gemayel, 
within the Camp David strategy, of which the new agreement represented the 
‘second step’.14 Nevertheless, while this development was seen as an ‘escalation’ 
of the threats against Palestinian interests, a positive facet was that the agreement 
appeared to have bolstered the cohesion of the ‘Lebanese nationalist camp’.15 
The meeting held in Zgharta among Lebanese forces opposing the accord with 
Israel opened up the space to establish a ‘broad Lebanese nationalist front’, a 
possibility to which the PFLP looked with interest.16 In fact, the PFLP’s interest 
lay in presenting the viability of a ‘radical option’ in Lebanon, namely, the 
possibility of establishing an opposition front relying on armed struggle to 
impede the implementation of the Lebanese-Israeli agreement. Such a front, 
necessarily aligned on Syrian positions, paralleled the project of building an 
opposition coalition on the Palestinian level in order to deter the realisation of a 
rapprochement with Jordan. The ‘lesson’ of the Lebanese arena became more 
important with the foundation of the National Salvation Front (NSF), opposed 
to Gemayel’s diplomatic agenda. The NSF actually continued to be held up as 
an example after Arafat’s visit to Egypt in the wake of his evacuation from 
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Tripoli when, for instance, Abu Ali Mustafa drew a parallel between the PLO 
Chairman and Gemayel on the one hand and the Lebanese and Palestinian 
opposition on the other.17 
In the PFLP’s understanding, the Lebanese-Israeli agreement paved the way 
to including Jordan in the ‘table of negotiations’, as the third part of the Camp 
David strategy.18 Therefore, the Popular Front tried to exploit opposition to the 
agreement as a rallying cry, stressing the extent of the security threat it posed for 
Syria but also for Palestinians living in Lebanon. Furthermore, the PFLP 
repeatedly highlighted the successes scored by Lebanese and Palestinian 
guerrilla operations against Israeli troops in the Beqaʿa, reporting growing 
tensions within the enemy authorities concerning Israeli permanence in West 
Lebanon. Accordingly, it indicated armed struggle as the only way to topple the 
agreement and bring about a unilateral Israeli withdrawal.19 Throughout the 
second half of 1983, in the PFLP’s narrative, the escalation of military operations 
against occupying forces as well as the resistance of ‘Lebanese nationalists’ in 
repelling the Phalangist attack in the Mount Lebanon region were parts of the 
same fight against the implementation of the American peace settlement.20 
Moreover, the redeployment of Israeli troops, withdrawn from the Chouf in 
September, and the direct involvement of US soldiers on the side of Gemayel’s 
forces during clashes with ‘Lebanese nationalists’21 showed respectively the 
effectiveness of the ‘radical option’ and the continuous necessity to improve and 
upgrade coordination among Palestinian, Syrian and Lebanese Nationalist 
forces, clearly facing a common threat.22     
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 Eventually the Lebanese government and President Gemayel renounced the 
17 May agreement with Israel, cancelling it due to Syrian pressure and the 
impossibility of implementing an accord de facto requiring a simultaneous 
Israeli and Syrian withdrawal from the country. The PFLP saw such a 
development as confirmation of its arguments. The threat of a second victorious 
result for the American-Israeli camp managed to bring together a wide spectrum 
of forces which, despite their ideological differences, believed in the importance 
of preserving Lebanon’s sovereignty and integrity vis-à-vis Israeli hegemonic 
policies and occupation: the cancellation of the agreement proved definitively 
the effectiveness of military and political coordination with Syria. In addition, 
for the PFLP, guerrilla warfare proved once again to be the best option to 
confront Israeli military superiority as continued pressure pushed the Israelis to 
a partial unilateral withdrawal. Finally, the ‘victory’ in Lebanon represented a 
blow to Palestinian ‘deviationists’ as well. Their assumption that in the wake of 
1982 Lebanon War the ‘key to conflict resolution’ was only in American hands 
proved false.23  
To a certain extent, the PFLP’s analysis was correct. The pressure exerted by 
Syria, especially through its Lebanese and Palestinian allies, and the related 
setbacks to Phalangist and Lebanese Armed Forces against the PSP and Amal 
militias demonstrated that Gemayel was not able to put into practice a settlement 
for the Lebanese crisis without Syrian consent, thus emboldening the PFLP in 
its choice of alliance with Syria.24 Moreover, the failure of the Lebanese-Israeli 
agreements also demonstrated American misjudgement of the situation in 
Lebanon. The Reagan administration enforced an agreement without taking into 
due account the fact that, despite the setback of the 1982 Israeli invasion, Syria 
still had the power to thwart its implementation.25       
The ultimate annulment of the Lebanese-Israeli peace treaty, as well as the 
development of civil conflict, provided, according to the PFLP, hard evidence of 
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the effectiveness of coordinating with Syria. However, as the next sections will 
show, fulfilling shared goals in Lebanon also entailed the reappearance of 
underlying contradictions between the Popular Front and the Assad regime. 
 
The Backlash of the Alliance with Syria: Returning Contradictions. 
The evolution of the Lebanese scenario demonstrated that the PFLP and Syrian 
interests converged to a significant extent in that country. Consequently, Syria 
emerged as an effective partner in PFLP advocacy of a rejectionist line vis-à-vis 
the Lebanese-Israeli agreement. However, such convergence over Lebanon 
clearly did not entail an automatic coincidence of interests and priorities on other 
fronts, especially concerning the Palestinian internal arena. On that level, the 
resurfacing of inconsistent goals was a source of tension that fostered the 
negative pattern of policy fluctuation. 
 The Syrian regime had been trying consistently to assert its control over the 
PLO in order to acquire more leverage in the context of the conflict with Israel, 
especially as Sadat’s Egypt headed towards a separate peace with Tel Aviv in 
the second half of the 1970s.26 If this was the case before the second Israeli 
invasion of Lebanon, the situation did not change considerably after 1982. As in 
the  first years of the Lebanese civil war, the Syrian regime was still eager to 
take over the reins of PLO politics in order to fully control ‘the Palestinian card’ 
in the wider context of the Arab-Israeli conflict, acquiring greater military, 
diplomatic, and therefore bargaining weight in relation to its American and 
Israeli adversaries.27 To pursue this goal, President Assad needed to weaken and 
possibly remove Arafat from the PLO leadership since his policy of openness 
towards the US was, for Syrian interests, as dangerous as the 17 May agreement. 
Therefore, once the threat of a peace agreement asserting Israel’s hegemony on 
Lebanon was definitively repelled, Syria could turn its attention to the PLO with 
more confidence and act to counter Arafat’s agenda more resolutely. For this 
reason, when some Fatah military officials located in Lebanon decided to rebel 
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against the PLO Chairman in summer 1983, Syria intervened on their side and 
provided massive military support.28  
For its part, the PFLP supported calls by the Fatah rebels for reform of the 
PLO structure and decision-making process, and for the relinquishment of 
Arafat’s diplomatic path. The PFLP hoped that playing mediator between the 
opposing forces would gain it increased weight within the PLO and the 
possibility to tip the balance of power with the PLO Chairman, restraining him 
from heading closer to Jordan and the US. However, with the escalation of 
military confrontation at the end of summer 1983, and as Syrian will to end the 
existence of an independent PLO in Lebanon became manifest29, the PFLP found 
itself in a complicated position. While the Popular Front was denouncing the 
risks of Jordan’s interference in the PLO affairs and the subsequent loss of 
independence, the PLO leadership was under the attack of Syrian-proxy 
Palestinian factions whose goal, notwithstanding the possible legitimacy of 
underlying arguments for their actions, was the creation of an alternative PLO.30 
Like the other main Palestinian factions forming the core of the PLO, the PFLP 
historically refused to settle intra-Palestinian feud by military means and 
prioritised preserving the Palestinian national movement independence vis-à-vis 
the Arab regimes.31 Therefore, if on the one hand it shared the criticism of the 
Fatah leadership which led to the revolt, on the other, it could not afford to 
endorse the settlement of intra-Fatah division through military means.32 
Moreover, the ‘Syrian ally’ was disavowing painfully the PFLP’s claim that the 
‘nationalist regimes’ were qualitatively different from the ‘Arab reaction’33. 
Once again Syria demonstrated that it was ready to resort to military means to 
get rid of Palestinian armed presence, similar to Jordanian actions in 1970-71. 
However, the PFLP could not disavow the narrative it had advocated since the 
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PLO evacuated Beirut; consequently, it tended to downplay the regional 
dimension of Fatah infighting and Syrian involvement, stressing instead the 
faults of the ‘deviationist’ leadership which ultimately were at the origins of the 
crisis. Consequently, the Popular Front, alongside the DFLP, focused on the need 
for change within the PLO and while the clashes intensified the two 
organisations issued their ‘Program of Unity and Democratic Reform’. Because 
of this unclear position, the PFLP was accused of remaining culpably neutral, if 
not siding with Syria and the Fatah rebels in their attack against Arafat.34 
After the climax of the crisis was reached with the siege of Arafat and his 
loyalist forces in Tripoli, PLO mainstream forces finally evacuated the town at 
the end of December 1983. The Syrian-backed aggression, and the PLO 
Chairman’s ability to build an effective resistance, increased his popularity 
among the Palestinian public and militants: instead of weakening his leadership, 
the Syrian strategy reinforced Arafat’s grip on the PLO, moved the criticisms of 
its governance to the background, and ultimately pushed him towards an even 
more individualist attitude in his policy-making, as in the case of his 
unprecedented visit to Cairo.35  
The PFLP’s lack of concrete action reflected the status of a faction divided 
between the interests of the new regional ally and traditional concern for 
preserving Palestinian political independence. This division existed within the 
PFLP itself as Habash and the older leadership were more concerned with the 
defence of the PLO vis-à-vis Arab interference, while the pro-Syrian group led 
by the Deputy Secretary-General was more resolute in its support of Assad and 
the Fatah rebels’ campaign against Arafat.36 
  This problem resurfaced some months later when again Syrian interests and 
pressure pushed the PFLP towards an impasse which undermined the credibility 
of its proposed agenda. In June 1984, the leftist opposition and Fatah signed the 
so-called Aden-Algiers agreement, intended to implement the reconciliation of 
the PLO after the Chairman sparked a major break because of his meeting with 
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Egypt’s Mubarak. The pact included the acceptance of some important demands 
raised by the opposition, however, the Popular Front maintained an intransigent 
position, demanding the inclusion of the Fatah rebels in the reconciliation 
process envisaged by the Aden-Algiers agreement. This position eventually 
contributed to the de facto fall of the intra-Palestinian agreement and gave Arafat 
further ground to pursue his diplomatic strategy.37 Clearly Syrian pressures 
played a central role in the PFLP’s insistence on the return of the rebels to the 
PLO fold. It would be otherwise difficult to understand why the Popular Front 
gave much importance to these marginal elements within the Palestinian national 
movement38, towards whom Arafat expressed his utmost disdain and with whom 
he rejected the option of dialogue39. Furthermore, Habash was personally 
responsive to internal split and secession, as the PFLP had been the first 
Palestinian faction to experience this; consequently, he remained closer to 
Arafat’s understanding of the situation.40  
The conclusion of Fatah infighting did not, however, entail the end of the 
confrontation between the PLO Chairman and Syria, hence the PFLP’s dilemma 
persisted. The situation escalated in 1984 with Arafat’s unilateral convocation 
of the PNC in Amman and with the signing of the agreement for diplomatic 
coordination with King Hussein in February 1985. These moves also aggravated 
the internal PLO split, pushing the PFLP closer to the rebels’ position and to 
Syria, as the formation of the Palestine National Salvation Front (PNSF) 
demonstrated. Nonetheless, the contradictions between the PFLP and Syria 
which had emerged in 1983 were about to resurface in full strength in 1985. That 
year, the Palestinian factions in Lebanon faced open aggression at the hands of 
the Shiʿi Amal movement which enjoyed full Syrian backing and whose goal 
was to wipe out the Palestinian armed presence from southern and western 
Beirut. In fact, the outbreak of the conflict saw a de facto PFLP shift from 
alignment with Syria to opposing its Palestinian goals. 
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The War of the Camps: The Outbreak of PFLP-Syrian Contradictions.  
In 1985, several developments reconfigured the Lebanese scenario in terms of 
power balances, both on the level of the different Lebanese factions and the 
external forces involved in the conflict. In the wake of events such as the fall of 
the Lebanese-Israeli peace agreement, the redeployment of Israeli troops and 
sectarian clashes between Druze and Christians in the Mount Lebanon region, 
Syria recovered the setbacks endured during the 1982 Israeli invasion.41 
Increasingly, the main Lebanese factions started to look at the Assad regime as 
the only actor capable of engineering an agreement among them and stabilising 
the country. In this context, the Druze PSP, the Lebanese Forces (LF) which now 
led the Christian camp, and the Shiʿi Amal movement were the pillars of Syrian 
strategy to impose a settlement in Lebanon.42 The main obstacle to this goal was 
the Palestinian armed presence in the Beirut refugee camps and the south which 
threatened Amal hegemony in those areas. Furthermore, since spring 1985 Fatah 
started to build up its presence in order to reassert control over Palestinian-
inhabited areas, a development which worried Syria still in very tense relations 
with the PLO Chairman.43  
After trying to impose its hegemony by establishing checkpoints to control 
movement in and out of the Palestinian camps, Amal finally launched an attack 
on Sabra, Shatila and Burj al-Barajneh camps in Beirut, assisted by the 
predominantly Shiʿi Sixth Brigade of the Lebanese Army. This aggression, 
which was to last for three years, received a green light directly from Damascus 
and Amal continued to enjoy Syrian verbal and military support throughout the 
whole War of the Camps, one of the bloodiest phase of the Lebanese civil war.44 
The start of the War of the Camps also marked a qualitative development in 
the re-emergence of PFLP-Syrian contradictions. Unlike during Fatah infighting, 
in this new round of armed clashes, the Palestinian forces in Lebanon were under 
attack from an external group whose ties with the Syrian regime were all the 
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more clear. As a consequence, the PFLP, now coalesced with Syrian proxies 
within the PNSF, strived at the same time to appease the situation, preserve its 
nationalist credentials by denouncing Amal’s actions, and minimise Syrian 
involvement. In such a context, the contradictions affecting the PFLP’s agency 
emerged distinctly in parallel to the resulting policy fluctuation. Syria, seen in 
the PFLP’s agenda as its main partner in the fight against the conflict settlement 
project, gave undisputable confirmation of its hostility towards Palestinian 
independent action. Consequently, the PFLP’s historical adherence to an 
independent PLO gradually overrode its oppositional priorities. Within such a 
predicament, the PFLP’s line fluctuated between on-the-ground, military 
coordination with fellow Palestinian factions, and alignment with Syria on a 
political level. As a result, its action to dull the conflict, and regain a certain 
political leverage at least on the Palestinian level, proved impotent. Ultimately, 
this reflected the PFLP’s process of marginalisation, although its on-the-ground 
realignment with the PLO mainstream enabled the Popular Front to avoid the 
almost total irrelevance affecting the Palestinian Syrian proxies. 
 
Making Sense of the War of the Camps, Seeking Broader Legitimacy. 
As a first response to the War of the Camps, the PFLP tried to formulate an 
interpretation of events alternative to both Amal and Fatah. In doing so, the 
Popular Front aimed at disassociating Syria from Amal’s hegemonic logic while 
emerging as a potential Palestinian partner capable of restabilising security in 
the Beirut camps. The PFLP hoped that such a role could bring broader 
legitimacy both on the Palestinian and regional levels.  
When the clashes erupted, the PFLP seemed to have a clear understanding of 
what was happening. In its view, Amal’s aggression against the camps was not 
simply another outburst of violence caused by an isolated episode45, but fitted 
into a wider plan to ‘redraw the political map’ of Lebanon. Unexpectedly, the 
PFLP dismissed Amal’s claims that the attack aimed at liquidating ‘Arafat’s 
gang’ because of its role in hindering Syria’s effort to stabilise Lebanon. 
Notwithstanding the deep split with Fatah, the Popular Front affirmed that the 
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War of the Camps was simply Amal’s attempt to impose its hegemony on south-
western Beirut and southern Lebanon, thus allowing a sectarian reorganisation 
of the country. To this purpose, the presence of a force fighting for a secular, 
‘national and democratic Lebanon’, like the whole PLO, had to be eliminated. 
For this reason, the PFLP considered the agenda of the Shiʿi faction as in line 
with Israeli and Maronite projects for Lebanon.46 
Apart from the recurring reference to an Israeli conspiracy, ultimate 
explanation for all negative developments in the Lebanese civil war, the PFLP’s 
reading was not very far from reality. However, in the first phases of the 
confrontation with Amal, the Popular Front avoided making any reference to 
Syria’s role, despite the clear intervention of the Assad regime to back Amal and 
notably, despite Habash himself having left Damascus shortly after the 
beginning of the clashes, fearing retaliation by the Syrian government.47 In 
addition, the PFLP tried to maintain a perspective that saw the War of the Camps 
as a situation endangering the Palestinians, the Lebanese ‘democratic’ forces and 
Syria to the same extent. Pointing to the new Shiʿi-Maronite axis as evidence, 
the PFLP stated that Amal’s attempt to impose its supremacy on southern 
Lebanon and, more generally, on the Muslim community, served the Israeli goal 
of securing those areas from which the Israeli army had pulled out.48 
This version of the events was deliberately diffused to downplay Syrian 
involvement but was far from being a credible explanation. First of all, it 
reflected a misunderstanding of changes in the balance of power within the 
Christian camp. In fact, the rise of the LF to the detriment of the Phalangist 
movement, and in particular the assertion of Elie Hobeika’s prominence within 
this faction, corresponded to a rapprochement with the Syrian authorities and 
signalled a certain disenchantment with Israel’s capability to settle the Lebanese 
conflict.49 Moreover, it was very unlikely that the PFLP leadership had forgotten 
Amal’s favourable position towards the 1976 Syrian invasion of Lebanon. 
Similarly, the PFLP’s top leaders could not ignore the inextricable relationship 
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between Amal and the Assad regime, as the latter provided armaments and 
training at the inception of the military activities of the Shiʿi movement and 
immediately transformed it into a vehicle of its interests in the country.50 Such a 
position was evidently not tenable, especially once PFLP militias started to fight 
alongside Fatah and DFLP fighters. At the end of May, Habash released an 
interview to Radio Monte Carlo where he acknowledged the current moment of 
crisis between the Popular Front and Syria. He went even further when, 
commenting on a previous statement affirming that Amal’s aggression could not 
have taken place without a ‘green light’, he did not exclude the possibility that 
this green light was coming directly from Damascus. At the same time, any 
speculation on a rapprochement with Arafat was excluded. In the midst of the 
deep rift caused by the Arafat-Hussein agreement, Habash affirmed that while 
‘Amal was perpetrating the military slaughter of the Palestinian revolution, 
Arafat had already slaughtered it politically’.51 
With the main regional ally backing a deliberate attempt to eliminate the 
Palestinian armed presence from Lebanon and the main internal rival taking the 
lead of the Palestinian resistance, the Popular Front’s position was extremely 
delicate. In this precarious context, the PFLP tried nevertheless to draw some 
positive results from the War of the Camps. It aimed at presenting the PNSF, the 
coalition formed with Palestinian pro-Syrian factions to oppose Arafat-Hussein 
coordination, as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian nationalist line, 
something which entitled the coalition to represent the PLO more legitimately 
than Fatah, thus providing it with the necessary credibility to negotiate a political 
solution to the current crisis.52 Throughout the first month of clashes the PNSF 
supported the idea of a negotiated settlement of the conflict through the 
reformulation of Lebanese-Palestinian relations. By adopting this position, the 
PNSF aimed at meeting Amal and other Lebanese factions’ desire to prevent a 
return to the pre-1982 situation, when the PLO forces, especially Fatah, were 
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accused of ‘excesses’ in imposing their control in Lebanese-populated areas.53 
The PNSF also claimed regular contacts with the Lebanese National Democratic 
Front (LNDF), in particular Jumblatt’s PSP, to demonstrate its commitment to a 
broad and comprehensive solution. At the same time, the PNSF continued to 
mark its difference with Fatah’s leadership, affirming that unity on the battlefield 
did not signify a renewed political unity.54 The peak of this PNSF attempt to gain 
wider legitimacy was the signing of the ‘Damascus agreement’ with Amal and 
the LNDF which was supposed to end the War of the Camps definitively. The 
Syrian-brokered agreement entailed Amal’s withdrawal from areas surrounding 
the Palestinian camps, ending the siege which was starving the civilian 
population of Sabra, Shatila and Burj al-Barajneh. The security of the camps 
would still be under Palestinian responsibility but the PLO’s militiamen were 
only allowed to retain light weapons and had to surrender heavier armaments. 
But the most remarkable among the terms of the Damascus agreement was that 
all of Syria, Amal and the LNDF recognised the PNSF as the legitimate 
Palestinian representative until the ‘return of the PLO on its declared political 
program,’ namely until the relinquishment of any diplomatic initiative pointing 
towards negotiations. Finally, a series of Coordination Committees was set up 
jointly among all the parties to ensure the agreement’s implementation.55 The 
ceasefire determined by the Damascus agreement was warmly welcomed by 
several opposition Palestinian factions.  
Nevertheless, the majority of the fighting forces involved in the War of the 
Camps, belonging to Fatah and the DFLP, were not content with the formulation 
of the agreement. Jamil Hilal, the DFLP’s spokesperson at the time, declared 
that the agreement could represent a danger as recognition of the PNSF could be 
exploited to deepen the divide within the Palestinian fold, as well as representing 
the ‘annulment of previous agreement between the PLO and the Lebanese 
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government guaranteeing the right of self-administration and self-defence’.56 
However, both the PNSF’s bid for broader legitimacy and the consequent intra-
Palestinian polemic were short lived. The Syrian regime and its client 
experienced a serious setback when their Lebanese and Palestinian allies, and 
notably the PFLP, did not remain neutral as wished. This did not entail 
renunciation of the goal of liquidating the ‘Arafatist’ PLO leadership from Beirut 
and bringing the opposition more securely under Syrian patronage. In this 
framework, Syria replenished Amal’s arsenals and provided both the movement 
and the Lebanese army with dozens of tanks. At the end of August, aggression 
against the Beirut Palestinian camps started again, exposing the ephemeral 
nature of the Damascus agreement.57 
The re-ignition of violence proved the unfeasibility of the PFLP’s line to settle 
the Amal-PLO conflict. The middle ground that the PFLP adopted between 
Amal and the PLO leadership brought little leverage on the situation and did not 
lend wider influence to the Popular Front as an effective mediator and 
responsible Palestinian force. As the following section will show, the PFLP’s 
policy fluctuation played a relevant role in making its agency marginal also on 
the Lebanese stage. 
 
The Persistence of the War of the Camps. 
The continuation of the conflict between Amal and the PLO represented the final 
evidence that the PFLP’s regional goal of correcting PLO-Syrian relations was 
not viable. Moreover, further attempts that the PFLP made to play some role in 
appeasing the conflict through the PNSF underlined its oscillations on the 
political and diplomatic levels, among the actors involved. This highlighted 
again the relationship between the contradictions experienced, policy fluctuation 
and political marginalisation. 
The scepticism of other Palestinian factions and the failure to implement 
effectively the Damascus agreements due to Amal’s rearmament and its 
continuous siege of the camps were telling of the fact that both its allies and 
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enemies did not consider seriously the PNSF’s claim to represent the Palestinian 
people. On the one hand, Amal and Syria’s concern for the renewed power of 
Fatah and the Palestinian loyalists in Lebanon increased over time after the 
alleged end of the hostilities. On the other, Arafat, after the fall of his 
coordination agreement with King Hussein of Jordan, decided to boost Fatah’s 
military presence in the Palestinian camps in order to further hinder Syrian 
settlement efforts and gain some political advantages on the regional and 
international levels. In this context, he occasionally ordered a re-ignition of the 
conflict with Amal and contributed to its spread all over the Lebanese South, in 
the Sidon and Tyre areas.58 The PFLP and other factions forming the PNSF were 
stuck in the middle. The Popular Front, for its part, continued to voice its 
adherence to the Damascus agreement and to the formula of the Joint 
Committees to ensure a durable ceasefire until the final restoration of the 
‘Syrian-Lebanese Nationalist-Palestinian alliance’.59 In this framework, 
Habash’s organisation alternated criticisms and condemnation towards Amal 
and the PLO leadership, blaming the latter for giving an excuse to Amal with its 
‘deviationist policies’, while occasionally showing signs of openness to the Shiʿi 
movement and Syria.60  
The evolution of the war continued to show the huge difficulties that the PFLP 
was facing in its attempt to play an active role in solving the crisis. Such 
difficulties were first reflected by the PFLP’s adherence to the half-hearted 
attempt to find a political solution to the conflict. The support for this uncertain 
political line contrasted with some correct interpretations of the War of the 
Camps that the PFLP outlined. In effect, the analyses and statements continued 
to highlight the hegemonic and sectarian character of Amal’s policies that lay 
behind claims concerning the need to expel Arafat’s gang and disarm the 
Palestinian factions, thus securing the Lebanese South. The PFLP also 
underlined, to a more limited extent, the significance that the War of the Camps 
had for Arafat, exposing his interests in exacerbating tensions with Syria and in 
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manipulating the conflict to compact his grass-roots consensus. Amal’s 
exaggerated accusations, according to which ‘Arafat was behind any movement 
and accident occurring in Lebanon, fostered the conviction that he and the 
Palestinian people [were] the same’. Instead of fighting Arafat’s deviations, this 
was reinforcing them in the PFLP’s view.61 
However, once more the PFLP was unable to implement effective action 
following a mostly correct analysis. The conflict with Amal peaked again in 
October 1986 when the Shiʿi movement led by Nabih Berri decided to besiege 
the Rashidieh refugee camp, near Tyre. While denouncing Amal in the terms 
outlined earlier, the PFLP did not renounce negotiation with the movement 
through Syrian mediation. Despite commitment to a political solution as the ‘sole 
possible one’, voiced by the leadership in Damascus, the PFLP’s military 
officers in Lebanon decided to join the battle alongside Fatah and the DFLP, 
contravening the current line of the leadership.62 The line of the PFLP’s 
Politburo was to focus on diplomatic contacts with Syrian officials and leaders 
of the Lebanese National Forces, such as the PSP or the Popular Nasserist 
Organisation (PNO). These efforts were meant to convince Lebanese partners to 
increase their pressure on Amal, ultimately isolating the movement and forcing 
it to lift the siege on the Palestinian camps.63   
Such diplomatic efforts had little chance of succeeding. The unfolding events 
demonstrated the inability of the PNSF to speak for the whole Palestinian 
national movement. Within the Palestinian camp, the Fatah-PLO leadership was 
the only group with real control on the development of the conflict. In addition, 
despite Syria’s alleged insistence on supporting a new PNSF-led PLO, Amal did 
not consider it a force capable of guaranteeing a favourable political agreement. 
Consequently, as the PFLP itself lamented, Amal never complied with the 
different settlement proposals.64 Furthermore, none of the Lebanese factions 
involved in the conflict was able to enforce a ceasefire on Amal, despite the PSP 
now involving itself in the military confrontation with Berri’s movement. The 
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Syrian regime looked at the generalised conflict ravaging Beirut and South 
Lebanon with growing concern. Since the attempt to eradicate the PLO not only 
failed, but risked backfiring and jeopardising Syrian hegemony on Lebanon, 
Assad ordered Syrian troops to enter West Beirut in February 1987 to reinstate 
stability in the capital.65  
The Popular Front welcomed the Syrian intervention as a promising act, 
providing the right framework to end the bloodshed of the War of the Camps.66 
However, the redeployment of the Syrian army did not entail an immediate end 
to Amal’s siege. Initially, Syria refused to force the Shiʿi movement to withdraw 
its fighters from the Palestinian camps. The regime still demanded the end of 
Arafat’s command over the PLO and seemed to confirm its support for PNSF 
leadership.67 Finally, at the beginning of April, Amal and the PNSF signed a new 
ceasefire agreement and Syria decided to enforce its implementation, putting an 
end to more than six months of siege.68 As the first trucks loaded with food and 
medical aid entered the camps, the PFLP expressed its confidence in the success 
of this ceasefire, unlike previous cases when it voiced its lack of trust in Amal.69  
Besides the huge costs in terms of lives lost and gratuitous violence inflicted 
on civilian populations, the War of the Camps was also a bitter political 
experience for the PFLP. First, notwithstanding the call for restoration of the 
‘triangle of the resistance’, there were no hope of recreating any sort of genuine 
PLO-Syria alliance. Anti-Syrian sentiment grew exponentially during the 
conflict, even within the PFLP which could not but disagree with the Syrian line 
and tacitly follow the PLO leadership.70 Syria had repeatedly emerged as the 
fiercest enemy of the Palestinian armed and independent presence in Lebanon. 
In addition, the War of the Camps was a further occasion for Arafat to 
demonstrate and strengthen its control over the PLO. Indeed, the Popular Front 
had been unable to broker a durable end to the clashes through PNSF negotiation 
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with Amal, Syria and the ‘Lebanese Nationalists’. Every time Fatah was 
excluded or did not give its support, ceasefire agreements broke down, as in the 
case of the 1985 Damascus agreement. This reflected the weakness of the 
coalition created by the PFLP due to a lack of sufficient popular and militant 
support even in the country where it was supposed to be strongest. More 
generally, the developments of the War of the Camps evidenced the link between 
policy fluctuation and ineffective agency. The PFLP espoused a narrative that 
shared some of the motives animating Amal while denouncing the real goals of 
the Shiʿi movement. Moreover, while on the diplomatic level the PFLP kept 
contacts with both Damascus and Amal, on the ground the PFLP’s forces were 
aligned with the PLO mainstream. The full emergence of PFLP-Syrian 
contradictions therefore, entailed the ultimate failure of the PFLP’s agenda on 
the regional level. 
The positive point that needs to be highlighted was the PFLP’s preservation 
of a certain degree of political autonomy. Unlike the pro-Syrian factions, the 
Popular Front never considered Amal’s claims of ‘fighting the Arafatist gang’ to 
justify its attacks, and sided with the rest of the PLO even when this meant 
contravening Syria’s will. Especially in the last part of the War of the Camps, 
the PFLP stressed the importance of Palestinian ‘unity on the ground’, a 
protective condition in of Amal’s attempt to foster infightings within the 
Palestinian camp.71 The adoption of such position was a confirmation that the 
PFLP rejected PLO intestinal military confrontation and, above all, prioritised 
the defence of PLO independence and of Palestinian armed presence over the 
divisions and the political competition with Fatah. This allowed the Popular 
Front to retain its credibility among the Palestinian public unlike the pro-Syrian 
factions which experienced a definitive marginalisation. 
The final PFLP alignment with fellow Palestinian factions also underscored, 
as outlined in the previous chapter, the processual and gradual nature of its 
decline. Indeed, despite the PFLP shifting its orientations and maintaining an 
ambiguous line throughout the conflict in the camps, the final decision to side 
with the PLO mainstream brought some benefits in terms of political capital. 
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Therefore, although generally negative, the effects of the PFLP’s policy 
fluctuation were more limited at this stage.  
  
The USSR and the PFLP in the Mid-1980s: Limited Rapprochement. 
Throughout this period, the Soviet Union and its alleged support for national 
liberation movements worldwide played a specific role in the PFLP narrative. 
Beyond the tangible policies implemented by the USSR to back the Palestinian 
cause, the Popular Front needed to render a compact image of the ‘anti-
imperialist camp’ in order to bolster its radical alternative to Arafat’s diplomatic 
strategy. In a phase wherein the US was asserting its hegemony over the region 
through a possible successful outcome to the Lebanese-Israeli agreement and the 
emergence of a joint Palestinian-Jordanian representation ready to negotiate 
under US patronage, the protection of the USSR’s role and prestige in relation 
to the Palestinian national movement became a priority for the Popular Front. 
Within PFLP discourse and its stand towards Syria and Jordan, Habash’s faction 
also needed to counterbalance US influence on growing sectors of the PLO as 
well as to disavow the assumption that the Americans were the only party with 
the ‘key to a solution of the conflict in their hands’, an assumption that enjoyed 
increasing consensus within the PLO, especially at the level of the 
Chairmanship. Hoping for the creation of a Palestinian-Syrian-Soviet axis 
capable of countering American and Arab projects for a settlement, the PFLP 
called for the defence of the USSR’s image and denounced all attempts to 
‘discredit the commitment of the Socialist Bloc’ which ‘served the acceptance 
of imperialist plans’.72 
In practical terms, an improvement of PFLP-USSR relations seemed at hand 
due to the post-1982 political developments that risked marginalising the Soviet 
Union’s role in the region. In addition, Arafat’s contacts with the US apparently 
opened space for more frequent contacts between Moscow and the PLO Left, 
especially with the formation of leftist opposition coalitions. In this context, 
however, working relations would be improved in the light of tactical interests 
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rather than long-term ones. Indeed, long-standing Soviet interests and 
approaches to the Palestinian national movement and the Middle East, as will be 
shown, prevented strategic collaboration with the PFLP. Ultimately, actual 
Soviet policies in the post-Beirut phase disavowed the PFLP’s analysis of world 
power balances, contributing to undermining its overall foreign policy strategy. 
 
A Reluctant Ally: Overview of PLO, PFLP-Soviet Relations. 
The development of the PFLP’s relations with the Soviet Union in the mid-1980s 
was affected by long-standing paradigms that marked the USSR’s orientation 
towards the PLO as a whole and to the individual Palestinian factions. At the 
same time, the PFLP’s agency and the political narrative it espoused as a national 
liberation movement throughout its course, continued to influence both its view 
of Soviet involvement in the Arab-Israeli conflict as well as its direct contacts 
with Moscow. In light of this, an overview of Soviet-Palestinian relations is 
essential to grasp the evolution of the PFLP’s connection with the USSR in the 
post-Beirut phase. 
Unlike Israeli-American relations, the PLO never enjoyed systematic support 
from the Soviet Union. Soviet backing for the Palestinian national movement 
grew gradually over time but did not reach the level of strategic entente that 
distinguished the approach of all US administrations towards Israel.73 Initially, 
when the armed organisations took over, there were significant differences 
between the PLO’s and USSR’s views on the Arab-Israeli conflict and how to 
settle it.  
The USSR was among the first countries to recognise the State of Israel 
shortly after its establishment. Furthermore, the Soviets always supported the 
idea of a political solution, starting from the 1947 UN partition plan. When in 
the late 1960s/early 1970s the Palestinian factions were on the rise, the USSR 
did not hesitate to define their reliance on guerrilla warfare as ‘reckless’ and 
neglectful of the numerous ‘forms and method of struggle’ at their disposal.74 
The Soviet approach towards the Middle East historically favoured relations 
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with established governments rather than liberation movements.75 This was a 
consequence of the Cold War logic that dominated Soviet policies in the area. 
More precisely, the USSR’s approach towards national liberation movements, 
and the PLO was no exception, was mainly instrumental. Soviet priority was 
exploiting the relationship with the PLO to gain influence in the region rather 
than establishing a strategic alliance or deeper coordination as happened in the 
case of several regimes. This tactical nature of PLO-USSR relations explained 
the fluctuation of Soviet positions towards the Palestinians and the frequent 
changes in their line according to the contingent situation.76 By virtue of this 
principle, the Soviets started to upgrade their relations with the PLO more 
convincingly in the mid-1970s, when Egypt, in the wake of the October war, 
began seeking a rapprochement with the US. Such a shift was meant to 
counterbalance Sadat’s turn towards the US and from it stemmed Soviet 
diplomatic support for the PLO Chairman’s bid for international recognition in 
the second half of the 1970s.77 By the same token, the Soviet Union failed to 
provide direct military support to the PLO during Israel’s siege of Beirut in 
summer 1982, fearful that the escalation of the conflict and greater Syrian 
involvement would lead to superpower confrontation.78 
Concerning PFLP-Soviet relations, the adherence of Habash’s organisation to 
Marxist-Leninism never facilitated contacts between the two parties. First, the 
PFLP’s complete rejection of a political settlement to the conflict represented a 
major obstacle to steady coordination with the USSR. The PFLP’s long-term 
goal of escalating guerrilla warfare against Israel in order to tip the balance and 
drag the Arab states into a regional and decisive confrontation with the enemy 
was unacceptable to the Soviets. The clear Maoist influences in the PFLP’s 
ideology were not seen favourably in Moscow, which preferred establishing 
regular contacts with Fatah, not only for its larger representation in the PLO and 
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control over it, but also for the pragmatic approach that led its policies.79 The 
USSR pushed the Arab Communist parties of several countries to dissolve in 
order to join the official regime party, as for instance in Egypt, and often 
favoured the creation of direct links between the Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union (CPSU) and the regime ruling party as a way to expand Soviet influence. 
If Soviet leaders preferred to have direct contacts with ruling parties rather than 
with smaller, though fully aligned, Communist movements throughout the Arab 
world80, it is no wonder that they had outstanding problems in dealing with the 
highly fragmented reality of the PLO and thus favoured the PLO leadership as 
their main partner. 
The Popular Front, while clearly enumerating the Soviet Union within the 
‘friendly camp’ at the forefront of the ‘fight against US-led imperialism’, usually 
preferred to forge ties with the representatives of the ‘international liberation 
movement’ worldwide. This attitude was first highlighted in the PFLP’s strategy 
texts that put the Palestinian revolution within the context of the global struggle 
against imperialism and capitalism.81 More significantly the PFLP became 
renowned internationally for its networks of cooperation with a wide range of 
Marxist movements relying on the use of political violence, such as the Japanese 
Red Army (JRD), with whom it carried out several joint operations and whose 
fighters were often trained in the PFLP’s camps.82 Furthermore, especially in its 
first decade of activity, the PFLP did not refrain from criticising Soviet stands 
on the Arab-Israeli conflict and their reluctance to upgrade relations with the 
PLO. As a consequence, the Popular Front, in line with other Palestinian 
factions, often turned to the Chinese who were more willing to provide military 
assistance to the Palestinian resistance in the context of Sino-Soviet competition, 
as well as having a closer position on issues such as the role of armed struggle 
or the UN resolution concerning the Arab-Israeli conflict.83 
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In the light of these major differences, forging closer connections with 
Moscow appeared a complicated task for the PFLP. In fact, such underlying 
divergences represented a fundamental weakness in the PFLP’s foreign policy 
agenda in the mid-1980s. 
  
Circumstantial Shared Interests and Missed Improvements in PFLP-USSR 
Relations.   
In the aftermath of the 1982 PLO eviction from Beirut, the USSR reached one 
of its lowest points in terms of influence and successful initiatives both in the 
Arab world and the wider Middle Eastern region. The Soviet Union appeared to 
be immobile in its Arab policies, in particular in its treatment of the Arab-Israeli 
conflict. The causes of such inaction are to be sought in several factors. First, the 
Soviet foreign agenda was busy with the occupation of Afghanistan, invaded in 
1979, where Soviet troops were experiencing growing difficulties in facing the 
staunch resistance by local forces. The decision to invade in support of 
Hafizullah Amin’s regime caused widespread disapproval throughout the region, 
significantly affecting the USSR’s prestige in Arab and Muslim countries.84 In 
addition, the Soviet leadership was also concerned by the increasing challenge 
that the Solidarity movement in Poland posed, weakening Soviet grip on the 
East-European country. Furthermore, in more general terms, the last years of 
Brezhnev’s rule and Andropov and Chernenko’s tenures were characterised by 
an ageing CPSU Politburo which lacked a clear understanding of Soviet foreign 
policy priorities and contributed to the stagnation of the USSR’s position in the 
Arab world.85      
In this context, Soviet popularity was also running low within the Palestinian 
national movement. Many, especially at the level of the PLO leadership, 
disapproved the USSR’s inability to provide material and effective support 
during the siege of Beirut and were thus convinced that the US was the only 
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superpower with real leverage in the region.86 The PFLP was concerned by this 
turn and the growing popularity of the Reagan peace plan. Therefore, from the 
1983 16th PNC, the PFLP expended effort to defend the image of the Soviet role 
in Palestinian affairs. For instance, in justifying the USSR’s lack of initiative 
during the Lebanon War, the Popular Front fully aligned with Soviet propaganda 
that stated that limited Moscow support for the Palestinian resistance was due to 
the lack of a common Arab line and strategy capable of facing Israeli 
aggression87:  
we did not expect a Soviet ground intervention to save the Palestinian revolution 
and the Lebanese National Movement. (…) We were aware that the effectiveness 
of Soviet support was dependent upon an appropriate Arab background.88   
The limited Soviet involvement in Middle Eastern affairs in the wake of 
Brezhnev’s death was reflected also in the USSR’s main goal of preserving a 
role in the diplomatic settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict that appeared closer. 
Conversely to the PFLP’s rhetoric, the Soviets were mostly concerned at being 
excluded by American activism and would have welcomed a peace plan securing 
their role. Consequently, Arafat’s attempts to open a dialogue with the Reagan 
administration worried Moscow, which in turn could find only in the PFLP and 
other opposition factions an adequate rejection of the US peace plan. 
Nevertheless, this did not bring about immediate closer coordination with the 
Palestinian Left, and indeed the Soviets tried to cultivate relations also with the 
Jordanian regime, at the forefront of ‘Arab reaction’ according to the PFLP, in 
order to preserve their influence in the region.89 
However, Moscow’s negative stand towards the US-sponsored Lebanese-
Israeli agreement of May 1983, allowed the PFLP to hope that it would be able 
to gain more direct Soviet support and notably to exploit the Soviet position to 
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pursue its rejectionist agenda within the PLO. Both the USSR’s decision to 
replenish Syrian arsenals, stepping up its military assistance to the Assad regime, 
and clearly-voiced opposition to the 17 May agreement,90 encouraged the 
Popular Front that its line would find a positive echo regionally and 
internationally.91 A further encouragement stemmed from the USSR’s praise for 
the formation of the PFLP-DFLP Joint Command in June 1983, especially in the 
light of the feud that was escalating within Fatah. As the Soviets looked with 
concern on the development of Abu Musa’s rebellion against Arafat, the 
formation of a unified leftist platform was a positive development.92 For the Joint 
Command, whose leaders were received by the Soviet Ambassador to Syria in 
Damascus shortly after the establishment of the unified leftist leadership, the 
possibility emerged of upgrading the status of the Palestinian Left vis-à-vis the 
USSR, thus receiving wider international recognition and possibly greater 
material support.93 
Nevertheless, Moscow’s outstanding difficulty in addressing Fatah’s crisis 
and the Syrian-backed rebellion was not to help the development of the PFLP-
Soviet relations. On the one hand the USSR, dissatisfied with Arafat’s 
rapprochement with the US, approved to a certain extent the rebels’ claims, 
closer to the PFLP’s position on the matter. On the other, the Soviet Union also 
opposed the eventuality of a radical PLO under total Syrian control as this would 
entail a card less in Moscow’s hands and a serious obstacle to the success of a 
political settlement with the USSR’s participation. As a consequence, an unclear 
Soviet position, just like the stand displayed by the Popular Front, further 
diminished its influence within the PLO leadership and contributed in driving 
Arafat more convincingly towards the Reagan Plan.94 
Afterwards, the PFLP tried to stress Soviet material support for all initiatives 
aiming at Palestinian reconciliation and at the correction of relations with Syria, 
but the ensuing events were to demonstrate that such support would not imply a 
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shared view with the PFLP.95 Indeed, while Moscow looked with favour on the 
signing of the June Aden-Algiers agreement between Fatah and the Democratic 
Alliance (DA), the Soviet leadership released in July a new proposal for 
settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The plan did not differ much from the Fez 
or Brezhnev plans and based on them it affirmed the right of the future 
Palestinian State to ‘determine the character of its relations with the neighbour 
countries, including the possibility to form a confederation’, in a clear allusion 
to the project of a Palestinian-Jordanian confederated state that both Arafat and 
King Hussein seemed to pursue.96 While the PFLP could have accepted the idea 
of an international peace conference at which the USSR and US would enjoy the 
same ‘supervising’ status, Habash’s organisation had consistently opposed the 
idea of association with Jordan that it considered as a ‘deviation,’ endangering 
the PLO status of sole, legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.97 
The failure of the Aden-Algiers agreement, Arafat’s unilateral convocation of 
the 17th PNC in Amman and the agreement for joint work signed between the 
PLO Chairman and King Hussein were to show the lack of viable coordination 
between the Palestinian Marxist opposition and the Soviet Union, if not a deeply 
different point of view. Certainly, the Soviets were disappointed by Arafat’s 
decision to de facto put the PLO on the path traced by the Reagan 
administration98 but they were equally reluctant to support the PFLP’s hard line 
and foster a deeper rift within the PLO. The USSR was possibly dissatisfied with 
the demise of the DA, to which the PFLP’s intransigence contributed 
predominantly. Such a move could not but foster PLO fragmentation and 
strengthen the pro-US trend within the Palestinian national movement. The 
USSR reportedly did not urge the opposition to boycott the PNC, although it 
later endorsed such position, and more significantly did not want the Palestinian 
Left to join any Syrian-sponsored opposition coalition, namely the PNSF.99 The 
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PFLP’s decision to join the PNSF underlined the extent to which Syrian pressure 
had a greater weight on the PFLP than Soviet influence. It could hardly have 
been otherwise, since while the PFLP was mainly operating politically and 
military in areas under full Syrian control, the USSR never showed the will to 
grant greater assistance to the Palestinian leftist opposition, offering the latter 
more options in such a delicate game of balances. The Popular Front tried to 
present Soviet rejection of the Arafat-Hussein agreement as an implicit 
endorsement of the PNSF, but failing to find any appropriate statements by 
Soviet officials, it relied on comments made by political analysts of the regime 
press. Nevertheless, even those signalled their opposition to Arafat’s flirtation 
with the US rather than support for the PFLP’s line, evidencing the lack of Soviet 
interest in the PFLP’s agenda.100 
When Mikhail Gorbachev rose to power in March 1985, the legacy of the 
Brezhnev era reached its end. After initial continuity, the new leader changed 
attitude in pursuit of the main Soviet interests in the Middle East, such as 
avoiding exclusion and countering US peace initiatives.101 The main axes of the 
USSR’s policies were the exploration of new options to ensure Soviet influence 
over the region and the cultivation of relations not only with radical regimes, as 
had been the case until then, but also with conservative countries. Consequently, 
on the one hand the Soviets after almost twenty years sought to re-establish 
minimum contacts with Israel, while on the other expended efforts to improve 
relations with pro-US regimes such Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf 
petro-monarchies.102 Regarding the Palestinian scenario, the Soviet Union’s 
main concern was still embodied by the Amman agreement but, besides that, the 
explosion of the War of the Camps posed an additional dilemma: for the second 
time, Syria was trying to eradicate definitively the pro-Arafat Palestinian groups. 
As during the Fatah rebellion, the Soviets were unwilling to see the PLO 
becoming a Syrian client despite shared criticisms of Arafat’s orientation 
towards the US that also provided the pretext for Amal aggression on the camps. 
As a result, the USSR renewed its neutral stance and called for an immediate end 
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to the clashes.103 The PFLP, stuck between the opposing sides, appreciated the 
USSR’s stand as it seemed to confirm the position it expressed through the 
PNSF.104 The PNSF also tried to underline the shared view with the Soviets, 
sending a reminder to the ‘national liberation movements and the socialist 
countries’ in which it condemned both the Amal aggression and Arafat’s 
deviations in a bid to gain greater international visibility.105 
Nevertheless, while the War of the Camps continued unabated for three years, 
the Soviet Union focused its Palestinian policies on cancelling the Amman 
agreement. The announcement in February 1986 of King Hussein’s withdrawal 
from his diplomatic coordination with Arafat encouraged the Soviets to pursue 
more actively their goals. Soviet commitment in this sense was visible through 
the hosting of talks between Fatah, the DFLP and the PCP in the Czech capital 
Prague. Indeed, the direct, sustained involvement of the PCP in the talks since 
shortly after Hussein’s withdrawal signalled Soviet interest in achieving the 
reconciliation.106 
The Popular Front demonstrated enthusiasm for the renewed Soviet 
diplomatic activism which was mobilising several ‘friendly regimes’ such as 
Algeria and South Yemen. In the PFLP’s view, the USSR was actively backing 
the restoration of PLO unity on its ‘nationalist, anti-imperialist basis’ as 
advocated by the PFLP itself and this was a main linchpin of its wider Middle 
Eastern strategy to counter US policies in the region.107 However, while 
celebrating Soviet commitment to Palestinian reconciliation, the PFLP seemed 
to neglect the USSR’s parallel interest in achieving a rapprochement with Israel. 
While in other historical phases this would have provoked PFLP outrage, in such 
a critical period, when Arafat’s abandonment of the Amman agreement was at 
hand thanks to Soviet pressure, USSR-Israel contacts became secondary. 
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Soviet involvement in intra-Palestinian dialogue did not end with the 
announcement of the cancellation of the Amman agreement in March 1987.108 
Indeed, in the middle of the 18th PNC held in Algiers, the Soviet Ambassador to 
Algeria, Vasily Taratura, had to intervene to mediate a dispute between Habash 
and Hawatmeh on the one hand and Arafat on the other.109 The disagreement 
was over the definition of PLO-Egypt relations: the PFLP had already underlined 
its desire to cut contacts with the ‘Camp David regime’ but the PLO Chairman 
was unwilling to close all of his doors to Cairo.110  Thanks to Soviet mediation, 
the two parties reached an entente and agreed to define relations with Egypt 
according to the resolutions adopted at the 16th PNC session which made 
contacts with Cairo conditional on its withdrawal from the Camp David 
framework.111 
Analysing PFLP-Soviet relations in the mid-1980s and Soviet Middle Eastern 
policies during this period highlighted that contacts between the parties did not 
experience substantial improvement. The USSR’s adoption of positions 
acceptable to the PFLP line appeared as a by-product of its main policies towards 
the Arab-Israeli conflict rather than the result of a specific political line. In fact, 
in several cases, the USSR’s policies and stances contradicted PFLP discourse 
on Soviet involvement in the Middle East, jeopardising its vision of building an 
effective opposition to Fatah. Beside this, the result of the PFLP’s agency 
hindered the chance for a real upgrade of relations with the USSR. The collapse 
of leftist coalitions, in which policy fluctuation played a direct role, eliminated 
a potential platform for closer working relations with the Soviets. To conclude, 
while Soviet policies did not have a part in the PFLP’s policy fluctuation, this 
negative pattern affected the Popular Front in its linkages with Moscow. 
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Conclusions.   
The history of PFLP-Syria relations showed the tensions affecting PFLP policy 
making in the mid-1980s. More precisely, in its effort to establish effective 
political and military coordination with Damascus, the PFLP’s oppositional 
priorities came to the fore and eventually clashed with its internal thrust to 
maintain integration within the PLO framework. This led to policy fluctuation 
throughout the unfolding of the PLO split. 
In contrast with the PFLP’s rhetoric, its interests shared little common ground 
with Syrian goals. In fact, shared aims existed only in relation to the annulment 
of the Lebanese-Israeli peace agreement, when Syrian pressure led to the failure 
of US plans for political settlement in Lebanon. This meant that between mid-
1983 and 1986, the PFLP’s ‘primary contradiction’ with Syria, to put it in its 
own terms, emerged gradually to become a full-fledged dispute with the 
outbreak of the War of the Camps. Such a contradiction emerged with Syria’s 
first attempt to take over the PLO, exploiting Fatah’s internal feud in summer 
1983. Although this represented a controversial and hostile step also for the 
PFLP, which was not directly involved in the conflict, both external and internal 
factors prevented immediate estrangement from Syria.  
Clearly, the relocation of the PFLP’s headquarters to Damascus and the 
concentration of the PFLP’s military personnel in the Syrian-controlled Beqaʿa 
played a central role in this regard. Nonetheless, the PFLP’s oppositional 
priorities largely contributed to avoiding an early break with the Assad regime. 
The need to maintain a ‘revolutionary’ profile, the historical goal of constraining 
the Palestinian rightist leadership, imposing and preserving the ‘proper, 
nationalist line,’ as well as the ever-present rivalry with Fatah, are all factors that 
contributed to the adoption of given positions by the PFLP and its alignment on 
Syrian stances. This appeared evident in several events analysed throughout this 
chapter, such as the lack of a clear position towards the Fatah rebels, the 
intransigence showed during the Aden-Algiers talks and the cautious position at 
the beginning of the War of the Camps. In summary, the goal of 
counterbalancing Arafat’s agenda on the regional level also counterbalanced the 
PFLP’s concern for Palestinian political autonomy. The DFLP’s conduct during 
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this period highlighted the weight of the PFLP’s internal factors in determining 
its softer position towards Syria. The DFLP, despite experiencing similar Syrian 
pressure, maintained an overall position closer to Fatah. This was in line with 
the DFLP’s tighter historical collaboration with the PLO leadership compared to 
the PFLP’s hard-line opposition. Hence the conclusion that the PFLP’s attitude 
was equally the consequence of its own priorities as well as of its political 
tradition. Finally, the increased influence within the PFLP of the Abu Ali 
Mustafa-led pro-Syrian trend had a more marginal role in the post-Beirut phase. 
Indeed, while different internal sources denied major rifts over Syrian policies, 
the changed regional balances and the new situation within the Palestinian 
national movement had more important weight in the PFLP’s calculation 
towards the Assad regime. 
However, despite the predominance of oppositional priorities in the first 
phases of this period, the PFLP’s own thrust towards integration into the PLO 
resurfaced, in parallel to repeated Syrian aggressions against Palestinian political 
and military independence. As a result, the PFLP’s line appeared uncertain 
concerning major events shaping Palestinian politics between 1983 and 1987. 
More precisely, the PFLP’s narrative and policies fluctuated between calls and 
actual dialogue to preserve Palestinian unity and condemnations, coupled with 
relevant political partnerships, of Arafat’s diplomatic strategy. This not only 
rendered the PFLP’s ‘radical option’ less convincing, but also contributed to 
Arafat’s self-depiction as the only fully independent Palestinian leader, a 
dynamic that played a paramount role in strengthening his control over the PLO. 
Finally, the full emergence of contradiction with Syria during the War of the 
Camps signalled the ultimate PFLP prioritisation of integration within the PLO 
as well as the definitive shift from its opposition policies. The preservation of 
Palestinian autonomy prevailed over the PFLP’s oppositional priorities, leading 
to a renewed on-the-ground unity against Amal’s attacks. As mentioned earlier, 
although it underscored the frustration of the PFLP agenda in the post-Beirut 
phase, its alignment with the PLO mainstream allowed it to retain significant 
support among the rank-and-file and the wider Palestinian population. 
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PFLP-USSR relations did not have a similar impact on PFLP agency in terms 
of policy fluctuation. Thus, analysis of the PFLP’s contacts with Moscow 
between 1983 and 1987 and the place of the Soviet Union in PFLP political 
discourse, reflects a tactical relationship more than a strategic partnership. This 
was mainly due to the fact that in Moscow’s eyes, the PFLP represented a 
secondary force within a junior partner, the PLO, that could not be prioritised 
over Syria, the main Soviet ally in the region. Similarly to relations with Syria, 
PFLP and Soviet interests coincided only on specific issues, such as rejection of 
the Lebanese-Israeli agreement or of the so-called Amman agreement, as both 
risked marginalising the USSR in the context of Arab-Israeli conflict settlement. 
These circumstantial common interests were telling of the continuity of 
traditional Soviet goals and approaches towards the Middle East. Indeed, the 
avoidance of superpower confrontations, the achievement of some role in 
political settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the favouring of strategic 
relations with the Assad regime remained the paramount drivers of Soviet 
policies in the mid-1980s.  
As a consequence, while the PFLP strived to make the USSR’s policies fit 
into its own narrative, actual Soviet conduct contributed to undermining the 
viability of the alternative axis that the PFLP aimed at establishing. This was the 
case during the armed crises that the PLO faced in this period, from Fatah 
infighting to the War of the Camps, not to mention Soviet inaction during the 
1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon. The lack of direct USSR support to the PLO 
as a whole, or to those forces that claimed alignment with it, provided hard 
evidence for Arafat’s argument that only the US exerted significant leverage in 
the Arab-Israeli conflict. Finally, Gorbachev’s intention to revive Soviet-Israeli 
ties was in utter contradiction with the PFLP’s position. In addition, the PFLP’s 
own failure to establish a viable, coalesced political entity with other Palestinian 
leftist factions embodied a further impediment to improving its contacts with the 
USSR. This meant that the impact of policy fluctuation itself, given its role in 
such failure, was also felt on the international level. 
In conclusion, the opposition-integration dilemma emerged clearly in the 
PFLP’s relations with the Syrian regime. As the PFLP tried to manage its own 
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contrasting priorities, pressure from Damascus emphasised its policy fluctuation 
and had an overall negative influence on the PFLP’s political effectiveness and 
credibility in this period. In relation to the Soviet role, while the USSR’s 
influence on the PFLP did not equal Syrian pressures, Moscow’s conduct 
disavowed the PFLP’s own narrative. This ultimately jeopardised also the 
rhetoric that the Popular Front employed to bolster its political line, underscoring 
the unviability of the PFLP’s alternative to the PLO leadership’s strategy. 
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Chapter 3 - The First Intifada. Initial Opportunities, Final 
Marginalisation.1 
Introduction. 
After the deadlocks and divisions that the Palestinian national movement 
experienced throughout the 1980s, the outbreak of the First Intifada represented 
a real lifeline. For Fatah and the PLO leadership, the mass uprising of the 
Palestinian population in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT) provided 
new bases and weight to its diplomatic initiatives. For the PFLP, the factors that 
brought about the Intifada and the political environment it shaped, signalled an 
unprecedented chance to renew its action and strengthen its weakened standing 
within the PLO, reversing the process of marginalisation. With opportunity, 
however, came new challenges that affected the long-standing patterns 
characterising the PFLP’s agency. More specifically, while the opposition-
integration dilemma resurfaced in the new phase and took on deeper dimensions, 
new sources of tension emphasised its main negative effect, namely policy 
fluctuation. 
The basis for the PFLP’s renewed action in the context of the Intifada had its 
roots in the process of political penetration that the PLO factions experienced in 
the OPT during the late 1970s and the 1980s. The Popular Front, alongside Fatah 
and the DFLP, gradually asserted and deepened its presence in occupied 
Palestine through its work in the framework of trade unions and popular 
associations. The balances existing between the PLO factions in the diaspora 
were not reflected in the OPT, and when the Intifada began each of the main 
factions found equal representation in the Unified National Leadership of the 
Uprising (UNLU). This pushed the PFLP to refocus its action showing a 
remarkable ability to adapt to the new priorities set by the movement in the OPT. 
Indeed, the definitive acceptance of a political settlement and of the two-state 
solution, made possible by the pressure of the Intifada on Israel, can be seen 
through this perspective. 
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As the uprising achieved some major success during its first year, such as 
exposing Israel’s occupation on a global scale and driving Jordan to abandon its 
claim on the West Bank, the tensions mentioned earlier started to emerge. The 
first level of tensions affecting the PFLP was related to policies pursued by 
Arafat and the PLO leadership. Consistent with its pre-Intifada policies, the PLO 
Chairman sought to exploit the uprising to obtain talks with the US and Israel. 
On this issue, the PFLP was again caught between its opposition to bilateral 
negotiations and early Palestinian concessions and its concern to preserve 
Palestinian unity. Consequently, policy fluctuation re-emerged as the PFLP 
called to radicalise the protest while demonstrating its unwillingness to 
experience a major break with the PLO leadership, unlike in the mid-1980s. 
In addition to this major fault line, new tensions emerged, stemming from 
the divide between the PFLP ‘outside’ leadership and its ‘inside’ base in the 
OPT, which rose to prominence with the outbreak of the First Intifada. 
Therefore, divergences between the exiled leadership and the OPT branch over 
the PFLP’s policies toward Arafat and the support of the Intifada directly 
influenced the scheme of policy fluctuation. Moreover, internal dynamics linked 
to the old guard’s concern for its leadership in the face of the rise of OPT cadres, 
exacerbated further the inside-outside divide. Besides this, problems of 
bureaucratisation and rent-seeking also contributed to undermine the PFLP’s 
image in the eyes of the base militants. 
The emergence of Palestinian Islamists and their challenge to the PLO status 
represented the final factor affecting the PFLP’s agency during the First Intifada. 
Next to the PFLP’s shifts concerning its positions toward Hamas and the Islamic 
Jihad Movement in Palestine (Islamic Jihad), their rise to prominence led the 
PFLP to question its own oppositional role vis-à-vis Fatah in the Palestinian 
national movement. This, alongside the aforementioned dynamics, underscored 
the qualitative development, in terms of negative effect, that the PFLP’s 






Background to the Intifada: The Dynamics of PLO Penetration in the OPT. 
The Palestinian national movement in the OPT displayed its own peculiarities 
that differed from Palestinian political mobilisation in the diaspora. The location 
on the national soil, the legacy of Egyptian and Jordanian rule and, more 
significantly, the presence since 1967 of the Israeli occupation shaped the 
development of Palestinian nationalist activism in the OPT. The following 
section looks in particular at the emergence of the PLO-affiliated movement in 
the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, focusing on the central period that went from 
the second half of the 1970s until the beginning of the First Intifada in 1987. In 
these years, the national movement acquired those features and spelled out those 
political priorities that had a direct impact in the unfolding of the Intifada. These 
aspects were all the more important as they represented advantages as well as 
sources of pressure for the PFLP’s agency in the context of the First Intifada. 
After almost three decades since the eruption of the First Intifada in the OPT 
in December 1987, scholarly debate clarified that the uprising was the result of 
several interplaying factors that prepared the ground for its outbreak and secured 
its continuation over almost six years.2  The accident in  which an Israeli truck 
killed four Palestinians represented a spark that set fire to longstanding popular 
frustration and anger over the increasingly harsh conditions imposed by the 
occupation and the lack of results after twenty years since the launch of the 
‘Palestinian revolution’.3 Among these factors, PLO political agency aimed at 
organising and mobilising the Palestinian populace was paramount. It is true that 
the PLO did not ‘declare’ the unleashing of the popular revolt and that the 
                                                          
2 This is a reference to the controversy over the nature of the first Intifada that animated academic, 
media and official circles during the first years of the uprising. In-depth studies on Palestinian society 
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London: Simon & Schuster Ltd, 1990). 
Graham Fuller, The West Bank of Israel. Point of No Return (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 1989). 
3 For a more comprehensive summary of the causes underlying the first Intifada see Part 1 of Jamal R. 
Nassar and Roger Heacock, eds., Intifada. Palestine at the Crossroads (New York: Praeger, 1990).  
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factions’ leaders needed some two weeks to take full control of its activities.4 
However, the efforts expended, mainly by Fatah, the PFLP and the DFLP, to 
assert and strengthen their presence within the OPT starting from the mid-1970s 
laid down the premises and the infrastructure for a sustained popular uprising.5  
As the main PLO organisations started developing their presence in the OPT, 
they joined the restricted, but well-established, action of Palestinian 
Communists. In fact, Communist activists pioneered political mobilisation in the 
OPT, and particularly Palestinian labour organisation, as early as the late 1920s. 
In doing so, they represented the first political force challenging family-based 
civil organisation among the Palestinian population. Furthermore, their role was 
central not only in developing trade unions and Palestinian associational life, but 
also in ensuring the resilience of such social infrastructure in the face of both 
Jordanian and Israeli repression. In other words, the Palestinian communist 
movement contributed significantly in laying the foundations upon which the 
national movement grew following PLO efforts to penetrate the OPT.6 
The first explicit attempt by the PLO to establish direct links with the national 
movement within the OPT can be traced to a resolution of the 10th PNC session, 
held in Cairo in 1972. On that occasion, the Palestinian factions called for 
mobilisation of the ‘popular masses in the West Bank and Gaza’ and stated their 
‘attention for the organisation of the masses within the trade unions’ and more 
specifically endorsed this latter ‘resistance against the Histadrut’s (Israel’s 
federation of trade unions) attempts to include Palestinian workers, normalising, 
in so doing, the occupation.7 The formation of the Palestinian National Front 
(PNF) a year later can be seen as a response to the PNC call. Indeed, the PNF 
was meant to be the first coordinating body for resistance activities in the OPT 
as well as the first formal affiliation between the PLO external leadership and 
local representatives of the national movement. Although its activities had to 
                                                          
4 Ziad Abu-amr, “The Palestinian Uprising in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip,” Arab Studies 
Quarterly 10, no. 4 (1988): 384. 
5 Hiltermann, Behind the Intifada, 174–176. 
6 Joost R. Hiltermann, Behind the Intifada (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), 46-49, 57-
64. 
7 “Al-Dawra Al-ʿAshira Al-Istithnaʾiyya, Al-Qahira (The 10th Extraordinary Session, Cairo),” Wafa 
Info, accessed October 13, 2015, http://www.wafainfo.ps/atemplate.aspx?id=3247. 
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face tight Israeli repression and several of its exponents underwent arrest or 
deportation, the PNF put into practice many of the resistance tools that were to 
spread and be institutionalised during the First Intifada. Mass strikes and 
boycotts were organised successfully during the 1973 October War in support of 
the Arab armies, aimed at exerting pressure on the Israeli economy, which had 
started to exploit cheap the Palestinian workforce.8   
From the foundation of the PNF on, several events underscored the assertion 
of PLO primacy in the OPT as well as the weight of the ‘occupied homeland’ 
that started to enjoy increasing consideration from the external leadership. 
During the 12th PNC session, the PLO adopted the so-called ‘interim program’ 
that set the tactical goal of ‘establishing an independent, fighting, people’s 
national authority on any part of liberated land’.9 Such a decision marked the 
first break within the PLO as the PFLP suspended its participation in the 
Executive Committee in protest against the step. Nevertheless, it can also be 
considered a landmark in the PLO’s gradual acceptance of a two-state solution 
and a significant shift in its consideration of the OPT.10 The influence of the PLO 
continued to increase, scoring a notable result at the 1976 Municipal Elections. 
The occupation authorities decided to organise this round of electoral 
consultations in an attempt to create the basis for a Palestinian leadership 
alternative to the PLO, a longstanding Israeli goal. Nevertheless, this move 
backfired and, as the PLO decided to support the elections, almost all of its 
candidate achieved victory and took over the administration of the OPT 
municipalities.11 While the PLO was gaining momentum in the OPT as a 
reference framework, the Popular Front appeared sidelined. Indeed, the PNF 
leadership mainly included elements of the Jordanian Communist Party (JCP)12 
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10 Helena Cobban, The Palestinian Liberation Organisation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
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12 Between 1948 and 1982, the Palestinian Communists in the OPT were active within the Jordanian 




like ʿArabi ʿAwwad, and nationalist personalities linked to the DFLP and Fatah, 
but nobody connected with the PFLP was among its leaders. Furthermore, by 
rejecting the interim program, the PFLP expressed a position not in line with the 
majoritarian trend in the OPT. The PLO leadership’s stated goal of establishing 
a national authority in the OPT went along with the efforts of the resistance 
movement there to build national institutions capable of challenging the 
occupation’s establishment. More broadly, the PFLP’s rejection of a two-state 
solution did not meet the priorities of the OPT local leaders who saw the end of 
the occupation as their primary goal.13 This initially marginal role, however, did 
not prevent the PFLP from starting to pursue its own line of action in the OPT. 
Starting from 1976, the Popular Front turned to labour with the foundation of the 
‘Voluntary Work Committee’ in an attempt to set up a new union in the OPT out 
of Communist control.  The Committee was the first of its kind but did not pose 
a direct threat to the Communists’ domination of the labour movement.14  
Notwithstanding its successes, the experience of the PNF was not to last. The 
Israeli authorities intensified their repression of political activities in the OPT, 
especially after the Likud government swept into office in 1977. The deportation 
and arrest of many nationalist figures critically undermined the PNF network in 
the Territories.15 However, probably more determining in the collapse of the 
PNF was the rift between the JCP and the exponents of PLO factions, 
particularly Fatah. This latter faction was concerned with Communist 
competitors as their strong entrenchment in the OPT could represent the base for 
an alternative leadership to the PLO. For this reason, many from the Fatah 
internal conservative current did not look with favour at the PNF and the JCP 
role within it, suggesting a withdrawal from the front. Such factors drove 
Arafat’s organisation to make more efforts to assert its predominance over the 
JCP. Thus, the composition of the National Guidance Committee (NGC), a new 
coordinating body meant to counter Israel’s autonomy plan drafted in the wake 
                                                          
13 Weldon Matthews, “The Rise and Demise of the Left in the West Bank Politics: The Case of the 
Palestine National Front,” Arab Studies Quarterly 20, no. 4 (1998): 14–18. 
14 Joost Hiltermann, “Mass Mobilization under Occupation : The Emerging Trade Union Movement in 
the West Bank,” MERIP Middle East Report, no. 136 (1985): 29. 
15 Matthews, “The Rise and Demise of the Left in the West Bank Politics: The Case of the Palestine 
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147 
 
of the Camp David accords, reflected Fatah’s new take on political activism in 
the OPT. Though still present, the Communists did not exert the same degree of 
influence they enjoyed within the PNF and their number was reduced. Moreover, 
Fatah adopted a new stance on Jordan and decided to open a dialogue with the 
Hashemite Kingdom. This new relationship reshaped the balance of OPT politics 
and curtailed the Communists’ influence. As a measure to oppose the Camp 
David agreement, the Arab League decided to set up an Arab fund to finance the 
organisation of Palestinian resistance in the OPT. The Fatah-Jordan 
rapprochement was fundamental in this framework since the Arab funding was 
to be managed and channelled to the OPT by a Palestinian-Jordanian Joint 
Committee. The renewed relations between the PLO Chairman and King 
Hussein increased their leverage in the OPT political scenario to the detriment 
of the Communists and other nationalist personalities who opposed Jordan’s 
renewed ambition on the West Bank. At the same time this fostered competition 
between the leftist, nationalist wing of the OPT national movement and those 
with more conservative positions, notably Fatah, which counted on broader 
regional support.16 However, the intensification of the intra-Palestinian political 
fight, particularly the Fatah-Communist rivalry, opened some space for the 
PFLP. In the context of the overall game of balances that characterised 
Palestinian politics, the Popular Front tactically allied with the Communists with 
the aim of limiting Fatah’s expansion in the OPT.17   
Indeed, as the new decade approached, the PFLP, alongside the DFLP and 
Fatah, started to set up its own branches in the OPT to organise and mobilise the 
Palestinian population. By 1979 the PFLP had established in the OPT the ‘Action 
Front’ (jabhat al-ʿamal) to which a wide range of trade unions, students, women 
and professional associations were associated. These PFLP-backed groups had 
all the word ‘action’ in their name in order to be easily linked to the Popular 
Front. Fatah and the DFLP followed the same pattern in the build-up of their 
activities in the Territories with the foundation of respectively the ‘Youth 
Movement’ (ḥarakat al-shabība) and the ‘Unity Bloc’ (kutlat al-waḥda). In 
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embarking on this enterprise, the PLO factions challenged the primacy of the 
Communists and their ‘Progressive Bloc’ (al-kutla al-taqaddumiyya), so far the 
only political movement engaged in grassroots and labour mobilisation in the 
OPT. From this point of view, competition for the control of political life seemed 
to divide the PLO camp and the Communists. However, given the fragmentation 
of Palestinian politics in all of its expressions, the split between leftists and 
conservatives that emerged repeatedly within the PLO in the diaspora was 
reflected also within the OPT. Fatah in particular fostered the feud along this 
line, especially after the establishment of the Joint-Committee with Jordan. 
Indeed, Arafat’s faction decided, in accordance with its Jordanian partner, to 
exploit their control of the Arab finances at the expense of leftist competitors. 
The funds were then channelled mostly to local leaders whose positions were in 
line with those of Fatah-Jordan in what can be considered an effort to ‘buy’ the 
loyalty of the OPT leadership, especially that of the traditional bourgeois elites.18 
Consequently, the PFLP and the other leftist organisations focused on mass 
organisation, an orientation that proved to be a remarkable asset at the eruption 
of the Intifada when the traditional intra-Palestinian balances of power 
underwent some shifts, at least initially. 
After 1982 and the destruction of the PLO sanctuary in Lebanon, the 
Palestinian factions bolstered their activities in the OPT. The Palestinian 
Communists, after years of pressure on the Jordan-based Politburo, managed to 
establish their independent movement and in 1982, they re-established the 
Palestinian Communist Party (PCP) underscoring the rise in prominence of the 
OPT.19 Besides this, while the Israeli government outlawed the NGC in 1982, 
the PFLP for its part started to call for the revival of the PNF. In articulating this 
political priority for the OPT, the Popular Front highlighted the overall urgency 
of stopping Israeli plans to establish a collaborating ‘self-government’ in the 
West Bank and Gaza. In addition, by criticising the Palestinian Right for its 
hesitancies concerning a new National Front, the PFLP was indirectly attacking 
Fatah and Arafat for their contacts with King Hussein and the sudden return of 
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a Jordanian role in the OPT. In the PFLP’s view, the Palestinian Right was 
hesitating on such matters because of its ‘non-pervasive’ and ‘unstable’ presence 
in the OPT, a weak position that the Right was trying to cover by claiming that 
a new PNF would threaten the PLO status of sole representative of the 
Palestinian people.20 
The mid-1980s were a period of both increasing fragmentation and 
development for the national movement in the OPT. To a certain extent, the feud 
of the ‘inside’ mirrored the division of the ‘outside’. As was the case with the 
Joint Command and the Democratic Alliance, also in the OPT the Palestinian 
Left coalesced to counter the Fatah-Jordanian coordination, a trend particularly 
visible in the context of trade unions, with the General Federation (GFTU) as 
main battlefield. In 1981, the Workers’ Youth Movement (WYM), the Fatah-
controlled union, after failing to take over the GFTU from the Communists, 
decided to create a parallel General Federation and a wide range of affiliated 
unions, often existing only on paper. In doing so, Fatah intended to undermine 
its leftist rivals by excluding them bureaucratically from the main source of 
income for the national movement in the OPT, namely the Arab funds 
administered by the Joint Committee. This, however, pushed the PCP, the DFLP 
and the PFLP to intensify their grassroots activities thus enabling the Left to 
expand its base among Palestinian workers and politicising wider segments of 
the Palestinian society.21 The correspondence between political fragmentation, 
factionalism and greater popular politicisation was fully, and probably more 
clearly, visible in the field of women’s mobilisation. In fact, despite the existence 
of a General Union of Palestinian Women (GUPW), since the late 1970s or early 
1980s the main Palestinian factions created their own Women’s Associations in 
order to widen their popular base, as they had done in the context of trade unions. 
For instance, the Union of Palestinian Women’s Committees (UPWC) was 
created as the women’s association of the Action Front, affiliated to the PFLP.22 
In particular, in the case of women’s mobilisation, the methods and ideological 
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background of each faction changed little. The goal was simply to reach the 
highest number of women possible.23  
Besides the role of trade unions and professional associations, the Israeli 
prisons played a prominent role in the expansion of the national movement in 
the OPT and the penetration of the Palestinian factions. Indeed, if the attempt 
made in 1976 by the Israeli Labour Party to curtail resistance activities through 
the organisation of municipal elections resulted in the strengthening of the PLO 
presence in the Territories, Likud’s ‘Iron Fist’ policy entailing, among other 
repressive measures, frequent waves of mass imprisonments, did not achieve its 
goals either.24 While a growing number of activists filled the occupation’s jails, 
these prisoners started to organise themselves according to political affiliations. 
The prisons became a place where an outstanding number of people spent 
periods in administrative detention, without any charge. During their time behind 
bars, more experienced militants trained the rest of the inmates in ideology, 
resistance activities or the main issues concerning the Palestinian national 
movement and its organisation. In fact, the prisons became real political schools 
and those who spent a considerable term in detention were likely to take part in 
the resistance network after their liberation and contribute to the politicisation of 
their families and acquaintances.25 The prisoners swap between the PF-GC and 
Israel which occurred in 1985 clearly exemplified this dynamic. The PF-GC, 
after the capture of four Israeli soldiers in Lebanon negotiated successfully the 
liberation of approximately 1500 Palestinian militants belonging to all political 
factions active in the OPT. Those who were liberated in that occasion played a 
prominent role in the build-up of the resistance infrastructure in the years 
preceding the Intifada.26 
This overview of the development of the national movement in the OPT 
highlights those features that enabled the PFLP to play an active role in the 
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Intifada while at the same time determining some limits to its action. Political 
fragmentation and competition for popular support fostered the spread and 
strengthening of the PLO factions in the OPT. At the same time, the occupation 
and the absence of direct Arab interferences pulled the PFLP, Fatah and the 
DFLP closer in terms of long-term goals. These aspects ultimately paved the 
way to strengthening the PFLP’s opposition-integration dilemma during the 
Intifada.  
 
The Emergence of the Islamist Alternative. 
One of the political prisoners liberated in the 1985 exchange between Israel and 
the PF-GC was Sheikh Ahmad Yassin, a charismatic leader within the 
Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB). He had been arrested in 
1984 when the Israeli intelligence services uncovered a plan he was coordinating 
to acquire weapons for the organisation from the Israeli black market in 
preparation for the first MB armed operations against the occupier.27 During the 
previous decade and in the remaining years before the uprising, Yassin became 
a key figure in the Islamists’ expanding role in Palestinian society. The MB 
build-up efforts paralleled, if to a more limited extent, the PLO penetration of 
the OPT, and contributed to popular mobilisation, eventually enabling the 
Islamists to emerge as a prominent force during the Intifada and in the 
Palestinian political arena more broadly.28 The gradual rise to prominence of 
political Islam in Palestine represented a further challenge for the PLO as a 
whole and had a deep impact on the trajectory of the Palestinian Left. Indeed, 
such a rise entailed a double challenge to the PLO’s representative status and to 
the Palestinian Left as radical opposition to Fatah. 
 MB activities in the West Bank and Gaza Strip were historically dissociated 
from active resistance as their goal was ‘restructuring Palestinian society’, 
morally and culturally. In their view, before committing effectively to resistance 
against Israel, Palestinian society needed to be ‘re-Islamised’ since the spread of 
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nationalist and Marxist ideologies represented ‘corruptive agents’ preventing the 
realisation of an ‘Islamic state’, the utmost solution to the main problems 
affecting the whole Arab nation.29 However, their focus on education and 
cultural activities did not prove effective in attracting the Palestinian favour and 
consequently, their popularity was very limited at the end of the 1960s. On the 
one hand, they were rejecting armed struggle when this was propelling the PLO 
onto the regional and international scene, boosting its bid to represent the 
Palestinian people. On the other, they entered in a tacit alliance with Jordan that 
allowed MB activities in the hope of impeding the spread of Palestinian 
nationalism and Marxism, embodied by the PLO. This forged the image of the 
MB as an elitist force that worked for the status quo at the expense of Palestinian 
nationalist demands.30 Indeed, their ‘first public platform,’ the Islamic Society 
(al-jamʿiyya al-islāmiyya), established in 1967, was meant to address youth 
needs for an Islamic education through, for instance, the spread of Sayyid Qutb’s 
works on the Qurʾan. Taking advantage of the Israeli policy of ‘non-interference’ 
in Palestinian cultural and social life during the first years of the occupation, the 
MB managed to conduct their activities without significant disruption. Thus, in 
1973, the Brotherhood decided to set up a new organisation with wider scope in 
terms of activities and geographic diffusion. The creation of al-Mujammaʿ al-
Islāmī (the Islamic Centre), based in Gaza, enabled the MB to control virtually 
all the religious institutions and organization in the OPT, such as the Islamic 
University in Gaza. This centralising role of al-Mujammaʿ emerged even more 
prominently when the Gaza, West Bank and Jordan branches of the MB merged 
into one single society in the mid-1970s.31  
The Islamists gradually gained influence among the population during the 
second half of the 1970s thanks to the wide range of social services they provided 
through their clinics, kindergartens, schools and mosques. This started to create 
some tensions with both the PLO factions and the Communists and the 
foundation of the Islamic University in 1978 became the first occasion to bring 
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the MB in confrontation with Fatah. Indeed, the Brotherhood and Arafat’s 
faction started to struggle for the top posts within the newly founded University 
as both wanted to impose a president from their own ranks. The supporters of 
the opposing fronts even clashed on the streets of Gaza but as the Islamists were 
very keen on securing their control on the University, they eventually obtained 
the post of President for one of their representatives.32 
At the beginning of the 1980s tensions between the Islamists and the secular 
camp were on the rise. The most remarkable case is the attack led by several 
hundreds of MB supporters against the Red Crescent Society in Gaza, in January 
1980. The Islamists saw the Red Crescent Society as a Marxist fief and decided 
to raid it while smashing liquor stores and restaurants serving alcohol on their 
way towards their target. These episodes are still vivid in the memory of leftist 
militants from the whole OPT as they demonstrated the Islamists’ will to take 
over control of the national movement by any means, without being concerned 
about using violence in intra-Palestinian feuds.33 Resentment towards the 
Islamists increased after 1982, when the PLO faced an unprecedented crisis in 
the wake of the expulsion from Lebanon. Emboldened by regional 
developments, the Islamists thought they could represent an alternative to the 
failure of the PLO and escalated their attempts to take control of unions and 
popular associations in the OPT. In the Gaza Strip, they managed to retain a 
majority in the Engineers Union up to 1987, although they were not successful 
in taking over the Arab Medical Society which remained under the control of 
PLO and Communist affiliates. More importantly, through their control of the 
Islamic University, al-Mujammaʿ laid the foundations for broad, youthful 
popular support in Gaza.34 Meanwhile, Shaykh Yassin reserved harsh attacks for 
the PLO, rejecting categorically any cooperation with its factions, and the Israeli 
authorities turned a blind eye on the Islamists’ activities as far as they did not 
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pose a threat to Israel and fostered intra-Palestinian divisions. This could not but 
contribute to perception of the Brotherhood and the Islamists as a ‘reactionary 
force’ prioritising its struggle for power over resistance against the occupation.35 
However, the MB leadership in the OPT started to endure growing pressure 
from its base and from a younger generation of cadres because of its abstention 
from armed struggle. The allegedly successful experiences of ‘jihad’ worldwide, 
such as Afghanistan’s mujahedeen and Lebanon’s Hezbollah, seemed to suggest 
that the same strategy should be adopted to achieve the goals of liberating 
Palestine and establishing an Islamic State. In this context, in 1979 Fathi al-
Shiqaqi, after his expulsion from the MB for open advocacy of armed struggle 
and his criticism of the Brotherhood’s leadership, founded the Islamic Jihad 
Movement in Palestine (Islamic Jihad).36 His alliance with some former 
members of Fatah, who were leaning towards Islamist positions and were willing 
to revive armed struggle in the OPT, allowed the movement to develop an armed 
branch and set up the first operations against Israeli targets in the West Bank. 
Therefore, internal and external pressure on the MB was mounting in the early 
1980s and this contributed to the decision to embark on the first MB ‘jihad 
project’. Yassin was at the head of this project as he oversaw fundraising, the 
acquisition of weapons, and the necessary measure of sending some militants to 
Jordan for military training. The MB plan to obtain military material which was 
foiled by the Israeli security services and led to Yassin’s detention, was part of 
this larger project. Despite the partial failure, the project laid the foundations for 
the future military activity of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas), the 
Palestinian militant organisation established by the MB in the very first days of 
the Intifada.37 Hamas emerged as the first organisation, outside the PLO 
framework, capable of challenging its unique status. 
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Contrasting Dynamics in the First Intifada: The PFLP between 
Opportunity and Marginalisation. 
As the previous sections have shown, the Palestinian population in the OPT was 
politically mobilised to an unprecedented extent on the eve of the uprising. The 
frameworks through which this mobilisation occurred were manifold and 
originated from the longstanding efforts of Communist militants, the PLO 
external push, and more recent Islamist activism. The preparation of the 
grassroots movement was therefore paramount in the incubation period of the 
revolt. Therefore, views that depicted the PLO as either an external agitating 
force, unrelated to the national movement in the OPT, or as the only maker of 
the Intifada, do not reflect the political reality on the ground in the late 1980s. 
 The ever-increasing harshness of Israeli repressive measures and the steady 
decline of the economic situation in the Territories provided the material 
conditions for the explosion of the revolt.38 The evolution of the political setting 
in the OPT was the main factor not only behind the long duration of the Intifada, 
but also represented a development that allowed a new phase in Palestinian 
politics to arise. The PFLP, notwithstanding the serious challenges posed by the 
post-Beirut phase, managed to develop its presence in the OPT thus securing its 
place in the national movement at the explosion of the Intifada. It was mainly 
because of this strengthening process, spanning more than a decade, that the 
Popular Front had the chance to play a significant role once the Intifada began, 
obtaining a place in the UNLU. Indeed, the people of the OPT, through their 
upheaval, also gave the PFLP the opportunity to arrest and possibly invert the 
process of marginalisation which started after 1982, against which all PFLP 
leadership political manoeuvres had so far failed. 
However, the political scenario that the Intifada shaped had a direct impact 
on longstanding dynamics affecting the PFLP, and brought to the fore new 
sources of tensions. In light of this, the remaining parts of this chapter, after 
outlining the PFLP’s initial pragmatic response to the outbreak of the Intifada 
and its participation in the debate that it sparked, will address the re-emerging 
                                                          




and strengthening of the opposition-integration dilemma and its interconnection 
with the new tensions which emerged in the context of the Intifada. In following 
the conduct of the PFLP throughout the first three years of the Intifada, attention 
will be focused on the continuation of the policy fluctuation pattern and its 
detrimental effect on the PFLP’s ability to take advantage of the positive 
developments stemming from the uprising. 
 
The PFLP’s Pragmatism during the First ‘Triumphant’ Year of the 
Intifada. 
During its first year, the widespread popular uprising in the OPT saw an 
ascending trajectory in terms of growing popular participation and objectives 
achieved. As the Intifada took lead position in PLO priorities, the PFLP 
displayed a remarkable pragmatism in adapting its line and narrative to the goals 
articulated by the movement in the OPT. The PFLP developed its position in the 
intra-Palestinian debate on the means to support the Intifada and its scope, 
displaying its connection with the grassroots movement in Palestine. 
Highlighting the PFLP's conduct during the first year of the Intifada is all the 
more relevant as it contrasts with its eventual inability to capitalise on such 
positive aspects. 
Despite the role played in the OPT by the PLO-affiliated organisations and 
institutions, the eruption of such a massive uprising and its quick spread across 
the Territories caught the Palestinian factions by surprise.39 Certainly, the 
leadership of the PFLP, like the other PLO organisations, did not expect a major 
outbreak. Indeed, in the weeks preceding the 9 December road accident that 
sparked the start of the Intifada, the PFLP’s attention and political priorities were 
still those that characterised the period subsequent to the reconciliatory 18th 
PNC. The Popular Front was very concerned by regional developments, in 
particular the Arab summit held in Amman that decreed the freedom of every 
state to re-establish its relations with ‘Camp David Egypt’.40 Consequently, the 
PFLP kept stressing the centrality of armed operations against Israel as the most 
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effective means to stop the renewed efforts of many Arab regimes that were once 
again betting on American-sponsored political solutions. On the very eve of the 
Intifada, while praising a spectacular operation carried out by a PF-GC 
commando on an Israeli military base, the PFLP still called for the ‘development 
of the confrontation and the preparation to bear the burden of the long-term 
battle’.41 
However, as it became clear that the uprising was not a simple outburst of 
protests and as it started to develop its main features, the PFLP demonstrated the 
ability to adapt its discourse to the new circumstances, outlining some key points 
of its approach towards the Intifada at quite an early stage. The PFLP grasped 
the importance of what was happening and it did not hesitate to define the 
Intifada as a ‘qualitative landmark’ (maḥaṭṭa nawʿiyya).42 This definition 
became recurrent in the PFLP’s narrative and was employed to refer to the new 
kind of popular mobilisation that emerged with the Intifada, a mobilisation 
where the regular, popular dimension of the protests, with the establishment of 
Popular Committees to coordinate action, took the place of the elite armed 
operations that dominated PFLP and PLO strategy so far. Strictly related to this 
is the early emergence of the call for ‘mass civil disobedience’ as the main way 
to challenge the occupation and to establish an alternative polity in the OPT.43 
This slogan originated directly from the internal leadership in the OPT and 
proved the PFLP’s awareness concerning the new means of struggle. Moreover, 
the PFLP’s insistence on civil disobedience throughout the uprising also marked 
a difference with Fatah’s desire to exploit the Intifada in order to reach a political 
arrangement. 
A communique released in the second week of the Intifada concerning the 
organisation’s stance vis-à-vis the international community also signalled the 
adaptation of the PFLP to the new scenario. In the communique, the Popular 
Front called for international intervention in the OPT, demanding that the United 
Nations dispatch observers in order to testify to Israel’s violation of ‘UN 
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resolutions and laws and all the international charters related to human rights’.44 
The invocation of international law, especially in terms of UN resolutions, was 
an innovative aspect in PFLP policy as Habash’s organisation had criticised 
vehemently throughout its history the position expressed by the UN General 
Assembly and the Security Council, usually rejecting their provisions. The 
PFLP’s change appeared as an initial adaptation to the priorities set by the 
Intifada from the start, namely the end of the occupation and establishment of an 
independent Palestinian state in the OPT.45 The leadership of the uprising started 
to articulate these goals regularly through the distribution of leaflets that were to 
become the fundamental organising tool of the Intifada. More significantly, the 
Intifada succeeded in attracting global attention and in particular that of the UN 
Security Council that issued three different resolutions in less than a month 
condemning Israel’s violations, such as the deportation of Palestinian civilians.46 
Consequently, the PFLP adjusted its positions and discourse in order to proceed 
along the lines of the new phase and possibly take advantage of them.47 
The whole Palestinian national movement was entering a new phase of 
animated internal debate aimed at filling the new political spaces. The wider 
range of action was a result of the successful escalation of the Intifada, its 
inclusion of growing sectors of OPT society, the re-centring of Palestinian 
political balance and the impact the uprising was having at the regional and 
international levels.48 On the one hand, the new priorities represented also a 
common ground for the main PLO factions that shared the most urgent concerns, 
at least initially. All the four factions represented in the UNLU aimed at 
continuous escalation of the uprising, the reaffirmation of PLO authority in the 
OPT, the establishment of an institutional framework capable of challenging and 
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substituting that of the occupier and the diplomatic efforts needed on the 
international level to progress the demands voiced by the insurgency. In this 
context of renewed cohesiveness, the PFLP strongly defended the political and 
operational link between the PLO and the UNLU along with the other factions. 
Replying to claims coming particularly from Israeli and US officials that the 
Intifada was a ‘spontaneous’ phenomenon unrelated to PLO action, the PFLP 
stressed that the prominent PLO role was evident in the work of the Popular 
Committees and in the ‘subsequent waves’ of protests throughout the OPT towns 
and villages.49  Afterwards, the appearance of regular references to the PLO in 
leaflets issued by the UNLU settled definitively the dispute over PLO 
involvement in the leadership of the uprising. An additional contribution to PLO 
unity was the absence of some smaller PLO groups within the OPT. This 
excluded them from the decision-making process and deprived the Arab 
regimes, especially Syria, of an important tool to interfere in Palestinian affairs, 
thus fostering the cohesion of the bigger groups.50 At the same time, Fatah, the 
DFLP, the PCP and the PFLP all had to reposition themselves within the political 
scene that the Intifada was shaping. This acquired more importance because, at 
least apparently, the uprising was reshuffling the power balance among these 
forces, limiting Fatah supremacy, particularly in relation to the PFLP.51  
Therefore, the Popular Front articulated its positions, intervening constantly 
in the debate and sometimes signalling a sharp contrast with other factions or 
local actors operating in the OPT. One of the main issues animating the 
Palestinian internal confrontation was related to the timing, mode and scope of 
the PLO political initiative to settle the conflict, or in other words, how did the 
PLO have to act in order to ‘capitalise’ on the Intifada.52 For its part, the Popular 
Front had already gradually accepted the idea of an international peace 
conference in the years preceding the Intifada as outlined in the previous chapter. 
After December 1987 however, as the UNLU stated clearly among its goals the 
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achievement of a settlement through the international peace conference53, this 
became a systematic demand for the PFLP, though with specific requirements. 
In its positioning within the debate, the Popular Front did not adopt a hard-line 
position. The PFLP stated several times during the first year of the Intifada that 
both the landmark results scored by the uprising and the international détente 
allowed by the USSR-US rapprochement on a number of issues were paving the 
way towards the settlement of the conflict with Israel.54 From this position, the 
PFLP condemned the ‘nihilist current’ within the national movement, mainly 
composed of pro-Syrian elements with little if any presence in the OPT, who did 
not acknowledge the positive developments that the Intifada made possible.55 At 
the same time, the PFLP did not share the aims of those who ‘wanted to rush 
into negotiations’, even direct talks with Israel, in order to ‘catch the fruits’ of 
the Intifada momentum. Notwithstanding the undeniable achievement of the 
Intifada, the balance of power, especially on the global level, was still in favour 
of Israel and its American patron, so the uprising needed to be further escalated 
and reach the stage of a comprehensive national civil disobedience.56  
The PFLP was thus against ‘gratuitous concessions’ like readiness to enter 
into bilateral talks with Israel or even to officially recognise it displayed by a 
wide range of ‘personalities’ from Hanna Siniora, editor of the Jerusalem-based 
al-Fajr newspaper and the Gazan lawyer Fayez Abu Rahma, to former al-Hadaf 
editor and PFLP member Bassam Abu Sharif.57 Indeed, the PFLP reserved its 
strongest criticism for those intellectuals and personalities who acquired 
increasing relevance as unofficial spokespersons for the Palestinians, especially 
when an intermediate between the US or even Israel and the PLO was needed. 
Despite their PLO connection, the most prominent among them, such as Siniora 
or the Birzeit University Professor Sari Nusseibeh, were directly dependent on 
Arafat’s guidance, thus the UNLU and the rest of the PLO external leadership 
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had little influence on their initiatives.58 From this stemmed the PFLP’s 
scepticism toward these personalities who in Abu Ali Mustafa’s words were 
‘more inclined toward American solutions’.59 Habash himself admonished the 
‘personalities’ when the possibility of a meeting with US Secretary of State 
Shultz emerged, stressing that such a step would be considered as an ‘act of 
treason by the Palestinian masses’.60 However, it is worth remarking that the 
PFLP addressed its most virulent critiques to Bassam Abu Sharif, a close Arafat 
advisor since he left the Popular Front.61 The reason for such attacks is to be 
found in the so-called Abu Sharif document, an article in which he underlined 
the shared interests in peace and security of the Palestinian and the Israeli 
peoples, as well as affirmed the PLO’s acceptance of UN resolutions 242 and 
338 and its availability to start direct negotiations.62 The PFLP harshly 
condemned the document, even with a Politburo Communique, and demanded 
the intervention of the PLO Executive Committee to ‘protect politically the 
Intifada from these distortions’ which were ‘outside the national consensus’ and 
‘whitewashed Israel’s true repressive face’.63 The harsh denunciation of Abu 
Sharif might have stemmed from quarrels within the PFLP itself. Other 
personalities expressed provocative stances but Abu Sharif was by far the most 
criticised – a condemnation that was fully satisfied as the PLO Leadership 
disavowed his calls. This episode echoed the possible existence of divisions 
between ‘moderates’ and ‘hard-liners’ which affected the Popular Front in the 
early 1980s and in the post-Beirut phase.64 In this new dynamic in which 
independent figures emerged within the Intifada political landscape, the PFLP 
favoured contacts with the representatives of the OPT grassroots leadership such 
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as Bassam al-Shakʿa, the legitimate elected Nablus Mayor deposed by the Israeli 
government, or the Gaza Red Crescent President Haidar ʿAbd al-Shafi. These 
persons had long been at the forefront of the national movement in the OPT and, 
unlike Nusseibeh or Siniora, enjoyed wide popular support. Therefore, the PFLP 
often invoked their opinions to show the alignment of the internal leadership of 
the uprising with its own line, especially concerning potential political 
initiatives.65 
The dynamism of the political situation throughout the first year of the 
Intifada, and the PFLP’s response to it, was also evident in the debate around 
possible new institutional frameworks that could support the uprising 
diplomatically and strengthen the PLO presence in the OPT. Initially, the idea of 
forming a Palestinian Government in exile was put on the table.66 The PFLP did 
not oppose in principle such a measure but thought that charging the PLO with 
an additional, burdensome task was pointless. The PLO had to strengthen 
existing institutions, like the Popular Committees on the ground, and continue to 
gain international support to raise its status and reach an equal representation 
vis-à-vis Israel.67 However, the Popular Front made a reverse when a major 
development occurred in summer 1988, showing again a certain readiness to 
adapt to a fluid political scenario. In August, King Hussein of Jordan announced 
his decision to break definitively the Kingdom’s ties with the West Bank. In 
doing so, he dissolved the Jordanian parliament that included representatives 
from the OPT, cut all administrative links, and cancelled a development program 
worth 1.3 billion dollars. Hussein declared that this step came as a response to 
the wishes of Arab and PLO representatives who believed that the national 
Palestinian struggle and identity would be enhanced by the relinquishing of 
Jordan’s links with the West Bank.68 While considering such a development as 
a direct result of the Intifada, the PFLP showed all its historical distrust toward 
                                                          
65 Abu-Amr, "The 'Personalities' of the Occupied Territories, 24; Al-Hadaf, n. 897, January 31, 1988, 
12–13; Al-Hadaf, no. 919, July 18, 1988, 26–27; Al-Hadaf, no. 921, August 7, 1988, 8–10. 
66 Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State : The Palestinian National Movement, 1949-1993, 
616. 
67 Bayan Sadir ʿan al-Maktab al-Siyasi li-l-Jabha (Political Communique Issued by the PFLP’s 
Politburo)”, Al-Hadaf, no. 895, January 17, 1988, 4–6. 
68 “King Hussein, Speech on the West Bank, Amman, 3 July 1988,” Journal of Palestine Studies 18, 
no. 1 (1988): 279–283. 
163 
 
the Jordanian regime. According to the Popular Front, King Hussein’s step 
aimed at putting pressure on the PLO. George Habash in a public letter clarified 
that Hussein’s goal was to create obstacles to the PLO by producing an 
institutional vacuum. His intention was to ‘blackmail’ the Palestinian national 
movement and demonstrate its inability to manage such a critical situation.  
The PLO thus had to accept the challenge and fill the gap, reconsidering the 
idea of a government in exile as well.69 As the Jordanian move sparked an intense 
debate within the PLO, the idea of declaring the establishment of an independent 
Palestinian State in the OPT started to gain popularity. Indeed, the PLO factions 
begun discussing this potential step and after a round of consultations reached a 
first consensus, agreeing to issue a Declaration of Independence and draft an 
Independence Charter during an extraordinary session of the PNC to be held 
from 10 to 15 November 1988. The PFLP clearly welcomed the decision but 
pointed out that it should only serve the final goals of the Intifada and sustain its 
escalation. This caveat was addressed to ‘some Palestinian circles’ who saw in 
the Declaration a way to overcome the PLO program and respond to 
international pressures that urged the recognition of Israel as a base for 
negotiations.70 Nevertheless, when the text of the Declaration of Independence 
was published, followed by the 19th PNC Political Statement, it became clear 
that the PFLP had accepted some unprecedented compromises. For instance, the 
Declaration referred to the 1947 UN Partition plan to legitimise the future 
Palestinian State, implicitly recognising Israel’s right to exist, and rejected the 
use of violence to settle the Arab-Israeli conflict. By the same token, the Political 
Statement explicitly accepted UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 as 
a base for negotiations and completely omitted any reference to the Palestinian 
National Charter, preserving no role for armed struggle.71 Although the PFLP 
refused to adopt the PNC Political Statement because of its recognition of the 
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UN Resolutions, it nonetheless voted in favour of the Declaration of 
Independence signalling its attachment to PLO unity and its conformity to the 
priorities set by the Intifada, namely the establishment of a Palestinian State 
through peace negotiations. Indeed, in explaining the PFLP’s position, Habash 
invoked the will of the Intifada to justify both the de facto acceptance of a two-
state solution and the contrivers stand concerning armed struggle. The Secretary-
General affirmed that the PFLP wanted to preserve the ‘popular nature (ṭabīʿa 
jamāhīriyya)’ of the Intifada, or in other words favoured non-violent means of 
struggle that had successfully included all sectors of the Palestinian population 
in the OPT.72 The shift made by the PFLP was also evident in its arguments 
against UN Resolutions 242 and 338. While reaffirming the longstanding flaws 
of resolutions that dealt with the Palestinian question as one of refugees, the 
PFLP nonetheless stressed particularly its opposition to the timing of this 
acceptance. The PFLP believed that Israel still had the balance of power in its 
favour, but apparently was not a priori against the concept of ‘land for peace’ 
explicated by these resolutions, marking the prioritisation of the diplomatic 
initiative, a position that the pre-Intifada PFLP always refused to adopt.73 
Throughout the first hectic year of the Intifada the PFLP demonstrated itself 
capable of aligning itself with the priorities that the uprising itself articulated. 
From this stemmed its new rhetoric and positions concerning the end of the 
occupation and the political limits for settlement of the conflict. However, as the 
next sections will show in detail, the PLO leadership’s attempts to reap the 
benefits of the Intifada in terms of diplomatic initiative contributed to the re-
emergence of problematic aspects affecting PFLP’s agency, first and foremost 
policy fluctuation. As such an initiative sparked contrasting reactions in the OPT, 
the PFLP was confronted with growing popular opposition to the PLO leadership 
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Losing the Intifada Momentum. 
The end of 1988 had seen the Palestinians and the PLO make a Declaration of 
Independence and, most importantly, an unprecedented PLO push for a 
negotiated solution of the conflict with Israel. The political document ensuing 
from the 19th PNC represented what was until then the clearest expression of the 
PLO leadership’s will to pursue the path of the peace process. Consequently, 
expectations were high among the supporters of Arafat’s line. In the view of 
many top cadres, the Intifada seemed to have opened up all possibilities. In this 
context of optimism within the ‘moderates’ ranks, Arafat launched his ‘peace 
offensive’. In fact, the PLO Chairman had already started touring various 
countries to gain recognition for the newly declared Palestinian State. These 
recognitions were meant to raise PLO status worldwide and gain support for the 
organisation of an international peace conference. However, Arafat’s ultimate 
goal was opening a dialogue with the US.74 The PLO Chairman managed to start 
contacts with the Bush administration as well as indirect talks with Israeli 
officials through Palestinian personalities. Indeed, such PLO-US-Israel dialogue 
occurred through several rounds and, despite the PLO’s declared demand for an 
international conference, it was mainly based on two Israeli and American 
conceived plans. First the Shamir plan, drafted by Israel’s Likud Prime Minister, 
called for elections in the OPT to individuate a Palestinian delegation team.75 
Secondly, the Baker plan, a revised, more complicated version of the previous 
initiative, envisaged a series of indirect PLO-Israel consultations through US and 
Egyptian mediation, with the practical goal of keeping the PLO at the negotiating 
table without forcing Israel to make ‘excessive’ concessions.76  
However, at the same time, the uprising in the OPT was reaching a critical 
point. At the beginning of 1989 the Israeli Government ordered a massive 
repression campaign in an attempt to quell the Intifada. The freer hand given to 
the army resulted in increasing fatalities and injuries as well as detentions among 
the Palestinian civilian population. Israel’s goal was not only to raise the human 
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costs of the protests, but also to reassert its military control over the 
administration of the OPT which the Intifada strived to challenge since its 
inception.77 This in turn led to a radicalisation of the protest. Besides the usual 
marches, strikes and stone-throwing, more violent attacks started to occur such 
as handgun shootings and an increased use of Molotov cocktails.78 The PLO 
leadership therefore was facing two sources of pressure. On the one hand, the 
Bush administration was trying to convince Arafat to accept the Baker plan.79 
On the other, both the terms of negotiations drafted in the American-sponsored 
peace plan and Israeli repressive measures sparked disillusion among Palestinian 
grassroots militants over the chances of a political settlement in the near future. 
The most radical among them, such as local PFLP and Hamas cadres, went so 
far to accuse the external PLO leadership and Intifada leaders of being willing 
to sacrifice the original revolutionary demands of the Intifada in order to reach a 
settlement with the enemy.80 As Palestinian-US consultations proceeded 
hesitantly, no breakthrough was in sight. The PLO leadership was facing the 
serious dilemma of preserving the pace of a radicalising popular mobilisation 
without renouncing dialogue with the United States, which Arafat, in particular, 
had sought throughout the mid-1980s. 
At first analysis, the stalemate of negotiations and the margins for a possible 
radicalisation might be interpreted as two positive developments for the PFLP. 
Indeed, the difficulties that Arafat faced in pursuing his line appeared to be 
confirmation of the PFLP’s scepticism over the US’ real intentions. Besides, the 
escalating trend of the uprising apparently demonstrated the ability of the 
Popular Front to express the sentiments of the masses. A failing negotiating line 
and a radicalised uprising might have lent the PFLP’s positions more weight 
within the PLO. Nevertheless, the situation was more complex than this. The 
PFLP had to cope with a series of contrasting factors and concerns to which the 
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organisation responded ambiguously. The preservation of PLO unity, as well as 
that of the PFLP itself, were as much a concern as the attempt to regain ground 
within the internal Palestinian political competition. Moreover, as world and 
PLO attention focused on the issue of negotiations, the dynamic of confrontation 
between ‘external’ and ‘internal’ leaderships, both on the national and factional 
levels, developed in a divide that risked alienating the popular base from the 
leaders in exile. These clashing dynamics ended up fostering policy fluctuation 
which, as observed during the previous phase, undermined the PFLP’s action 
within the uprising. 
The continuation of the Intifada also brought to the fore the growing problems 
of cadre bureaucratisation and corruption, both side effects of the PLO effort to 
bypass the administrative framework of the occupation and long-standing trends 
within the PLO.81 The PFLP faced the dilemma of being the faction traditionally 
representing revolutionary commitment and honesty and at the same time being 
affected by these problems as well. A problem of credibility started to emerge as 
the PFLP resumed its calls for PLO democratic reform, as it used to do in the 
mid-1980s during the PLO formal split. The PFLP’s inability to stand up to these 
challenges contributed to transforming the Intifada from a ‘revolutionary’ 
moment to revive its action into a lost opportunity. 
 
Avoiding the Split: The PFLP’s Choice of Integration. 
Arafat’s implementation of his agenda to capitalise on the Intifada saw the re-
emergence of the PFLP’s opposition-integration dilemma. In the context of the 
Intifada, the PFLP’s unclear positioning over the PLO Chairman’s diplomatic 
strategy was more evident than in the past, as its participation in the PNC gave 
formal approval to Arafat’s line.  Fluctuations in its line resurfaced as a natural 
development of this ambiguous positioning; these were further emphasised by 
the opposition that the PLO leadership’s agenda met from grassroots movement 
in the OPT. 
While the Intifada entered its second year, the PFLP still identified achieving 
comprehensive civil disobedience as the strategic goal of the uprising. In his 
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speech to mark the 21st anniversary of the PFLP’s establishment, George Habash 
openly called for the ‘radicalisation of the Intifada’.82 At the same time, the 
Popular Front stated clearly its position within the internal Palestinian debate 
over PLO political strategy as it declared its determination to ‘hold the 
concessions in check’.83 In a scheme reminiscent of what happened in 1984-85 
when Arafat convened the PNC in Amman and signed the coordination 
agreement with King Hussein, the PFLP condemned the PLO Chairman’s 
declarations made at the UN General Assembly in Geneva in which he 
recognised Israel’s right to exist and formulated the PLO’s renunciation of 
‘terrorism’. For the PFLP this ‘lack of commitment’ to the national line 
represented a ‘return to individualist policies’ and posed a serious threat to 
national unity, putting national achievements at risk just to meet American 
requirements.84 In a display of self-confidence, Habash affirmed in an interview 
with the Lebanese newspaper al-Safir that the Popular Front ‘would have seen 
the failure of Arafat’s line towards the US in due course’.85 However, the PFLP 
leadership did not maintain such a defiant position, as it did not appear prone to 
confront Fatah as it had in the phase preceding the Intifada. Since the first steps 
of US-Palestinian dialogue, the official PFLP line alternated between criticism 
and some positive evaluations. For instance, the US acceptance of talks with 
Palestinian representatives might be seen as a successful result of the Intifada. 
After two years the Intifada reaffirmed strongly the PLO role as legitimate 
Palestinian representative, signalling this status to the international community 
and especially to the United States. The PFLP deemed such recognition coming 
from the US as an ‘historical step back’ from its unwillingness to acknowledge 
the role of the PLO and to negotiate with a Palestinian interlocutor about a 
political settlement of the conflict.86 
The alternation of criticism and praise was in conjunction with the evolution 
of Arafat’s diplomatic strategy and reflected internal opposite thrusts pushing at 
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different times for a confrontational or a reconciliatory approach. As indirect 
PLO-US talks continued on a regular basis, the Popular Front started to attack 
the core of such negotiations, namely American support for the Shamir plan and 
its central idea of elections in the OPT. Besides being in disagreement with the 
line sanctioned during the 19th PNC, the project of elections embodied yet 
another attempt by the Israeli authorities to form an alternative Palestinian 
leadership and stop the escalation of the Intifada. To demonstrate its alignment 
with the masses in the OPT, the PFLP reported the critical voices of many 
‘nationalist’ personalities opposing the Shamir Plan and underlined its proximity 
with the UNLU that stated in its 34th leaflet its rejection of the plan and its 
opposition to any form of self-government under occupation.87  
The PLO Chairman and his Deputy Salah Khalaf continued to encourage 
indirect dialogue with the Bush administration with some fairly courageous 
declarations, provoking wide discontent among the ranks of the PLO opposition, 
notably the PFLP. Both declared their support and hope for future direct, 
bilateral negotiations with Israel as well as their agreement on the idea of 
forming a common market including Jordan, Israel and the future Palestinian 
State.88 In a press statement, the PFLP declared its resolve to face such ‘rightist 
violations’ with firmness and renewed its commitment to the uprising in order 
to make it reach a ‘higher point’.89 This time the PFLP seemed initially 
determined to make action follow its bid for the escalation of the Intifada, by 
resuming cross-border attacks. In February, a PFLP commando carried out a 
joint operation with the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF) in Hasbaya, a Lebanese 
town bordering the Israeli occupied buffer zone. This operation came along with 
attacks executed by other opposition factions like the PF-GC. Although Abu 
Ahmad Fouad, the PFLP’s head of military affairs, denied that such an operation 
was meant to hinder the talks with the US, it is difficult not to see it as a way to 
pressure the PLO leadership vis-à-vis its American counterpart, after Arafat’s 
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renouncement of ‘terrorism’.90  Notwithstanding these skirmishes, the PFLP did 
not intend to provoke a major break within the PLO and sought an entente with 
Fatah as soon as the occasion arose. This attitude had already emerged in the 
pre-Intifada phase but was accentuated during the uprising and probably because 
of it. By the same token, Fatah too looked for an understanding with the 
opposition during meetings within PLO internal fora, or, in other words, tried to 
co-opt it. In accordance with this pattern, during a first halt of US-Palestinian 
dialogue, the PLO held a Central Council meeting. After publication of the 
resulting political statement, Abu Ali Mustafa, the top PFLP member taking part, 
expressed satisfaction with the ‘overall positive results’. The reaffirmation of the 
19th PNC calls to support the escalation of the Intifada, even by means of armed 
struggle, and for an international peace conference were sufficient to reinforce 
PLO unity, notwithstanding internal disputes.91 The PFLP leadership, beyond its 
rhetoric over political protection of the Intifada and action to prolong it, had by 
then chosen to prioritise cohesion of the PLO, notwithstanding Arafat’s 
concessions and lack of respect towards the official line decreed by the last PNC 
session. The exiled leaders of the Popular Front had probably come to believe, 
at least partially, in the possibility of transforming the PLO into a state thanks to 
the victories achieved by the uprising.92 
A further demonstration of the PFLP’s unwillingness to alienate the PLO 
leadership came when the internal dispute over the peace process was apparently 
reignited. While in spring 1989 the US Secretary of State James Baker tried to 
revive indirect dialogue with the PLO with his policies of mediations and ‘tailor-
made’ talks on each issue93, the PLO Chairman made another resounding gesture 
to signal his seriousness about negotiating with Israel. During a visit to Paris, he 
declared to French State Television that the Palestinian National Charter, the 
PLO founding document, was ‘obsolete’ (c’est caduc, in French). Arafat made 
this comment after being asked about one of the Charter clauses calling for the 
destruction of Israel. Moreover, he also did not rule out completely the idea of 
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elections in the OPT, hinting at a possibility of debating the Shamir-Baker plan94 
Such a declaration would have provoked an earthquake in the ranks of the 
opposition just three years earlier. The PFLP obviously did not share Arafat’s 
belief over the National Charter and Habash declared that the PLO Chairman did 
not speak in the name of the Palestinian people.95 However, the tone of the 
criticisms, even in the PFLP Politburo’s statements, was kept low-key. Arafat 
was not directly attacked, the Politburo simply warned those Palestinian voices 
speaking in favour of Baker’s ‘tailor-made’ negotiations.96 For his part, Habash 
stated that he did not agree on defining Arafat a traitor, as other opposition 
factions were suggesting. He estimated that since Shamir still refused to meet 
him, this was proof that he was not betraying the national cause. The PFLP 
Secretary-General affirmed that his faction would ‘struggle within national 
institutions to impose the correct line’ and that the Popular Front even accepted 
the idea of a referendum to decide whether the National Charter could be 
amended or not.97 Keeping divisions within the boundaries of ordinary PLO 
debate was evidently a priority for the PFLP leadership.  
In accordance with this principle, the Popular Front was interested in fostering 
the perception that the main Palestinian factions shared common intents, despite 
US-Palestinian dialogue having stirred much debate within the Palestinian 
national movement. Therefore, the PFLP welcomed the results of Fatah’s Fifth 
National Conference during which the movement formally rejected the Shamir 
plan, reaffirming its commitment to the political and diplomatic line ensued from 
the 19th PNC, after no possibility for official recognition of the PLO as a 
negotiating partner by both the US and Israel emerged during the indirect talks.98 
The concern for unity was so strong that the PFLP recognised, in a joint 
statement with Fatah in May 1990, the concept of ‘tactical flexibility’ alongside 
the right of return, self-determination and the establishment of the independent 
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state as the ‘base for the Palestinian peace project’.99 Given Arafat’s precedents 
in terms of ‘individualist’ policies, the PFLP’s position corresponded almost to 
a full alignment to whatever measure the Chairman might take to pursue the goal 
of a political settlement. 
The PFLP leadership, after having perceived the possibility of reshaping the 
balance of the Palestinian political scenario at the beginning of the Intifada, 
eventually acknowledged its inability to exert effective influence on the 
‘orientations of the PLO executive leadership’.100 As the Islamist camp, with 
Hamas at its head, continued to challenge the status of the PLO within 
Palestinian politics, refusing all invitations to enter the UNLU, the PFLP decided 
to cling to its role of loyal opposition to Fatah.101 This orientation reflected the 
PFLP’s prioritisation of integration within the PLO framework over 
estrangement due to disputes over the line pursued. The legacy of the split in the 
1980s, the actual development, albeit hesitant, of PLO-US dialogue and the 
Islamists’ rise to prominence, strengthened the PFLP’s adherence to institutional 
integration. Nonetheless, such a preference came with policy fluctuation as 
oppositional priorities still preserved their influence on the PFLP’s agency. 
 
The PFLP’s Inside-Outside Divide. 
As has been shown in the first section of this chapter, the Popular Front was 
capable of building a significant, grassroots presence in the OPT throughout the 
1980s, ensuring its participation in the UNLU after the outbreak of the Intifada. 
The relationship between the ‘inside’ network and the ‘outside’ leadership did 
not correspond to the one between the latter and any of the PFLP’s branches in 
the diaspora. Given the peculiar situation of the OPT, contacts were less 
straightforward and the PFLP movement in the Territories (PFLP-OPT) enjoyed 
a qualitatively different status that fitted into the same pattern of relations 
existing between the UNLU and the PLO.102 Clearly, the political status of the 
PFLP-OPT was also raised due to directly engaging in the effort to sustain the 
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uprising. Hence, a tension between the old guard in exile and cadres in the inside 
emerged, especially as the two groups started to diverge on political lines. This 
inside-outside dynamic represented a further source of pressure on the PFLP 
which had clear repercussions for its agency. 
During the first months of the uprising coordination between the PFLP-OPT 
and the exiled leadership worked smoothly. As was the case for the other 
factions, the PFLP was interested in empowering further its structure in the OPT, 
widening the dimensions and scope of the Popular Committees. The Popular 
Front also needed to demonstrate tight bonds between the inside and outside in 
order to respond to hostile propaganda that was trying to discredit the PLO by 
denying its involvement in the Intifada. To disavow such claims, the PFLP 
stressed the liaison role played by the Popular Committees as well as emphasised 
that the inside leadership acknowledged the legitimacy of the PLO.103 The 
relatively quick changes in the PFLP’s position towards the issue of political 
settlement, the idea of an international conference and full acceptance of the two-
state solution showed responsiveness to the priorities dictated by the ‘masses’ in 
the OPT. As the PFLP-OPT was mainly an underground organisation it badly 
needed to find a political echo in the external leadership. The latter, for its part, 
aimed at transforming the PFLP-OPT into its main branch after the decades of 
prominence enjoyed by the Jordanian and Lebanese diasporas.104 The outside 
and inside were equally determined to reach the overall goal of empowering 
Palestinian institutions to challenge the infrastructure of the occupation. 
However, the old guard in exile did not view with full favour the potential 
emergence of a new generation of cadres and leaders and wanted to maintain its 
control over the reins of the organisation. This trend was observable in all the 
main PLO factions and the PFLP was no exception.105 The main division 
between the PFLP-OPT and the outside leadership emerged over the PFLP’s line 
towards Fatah’s leading role in shaping Palestinian political initiative and the 
measures Arafat was taking to pursue his diplomatic agenda. As long as the 
                                                          
103 Al-Hadaf, no. 895, January 17, 1988 7–9. 
104 Al-Hadaf, no. 898, February 7, 1988, 12–15. 




PFLP kept denouncing the Palestinian Right’s attempts to capitalise too early on 
the Intifada, the grassroots movement was satisfied with its leadership voicing a 
hard-line position in the OPT and prioritising the ‘revolutionary’ effort. 
However, as was outlined earlier, the PFLP’s official line started to appear more 
ambiguous after the beginning of US-PLO indirect dialogue and this fostered 
discontent among the rank and file. The PFLP-OPT saw Arafat as committed to 
pursuing his personal agenda, ‘diverting’ the Intifada to achieve his goal. In the 
light of this, the grassroots movement did not understand why, despite 
denouncing the PLO Chairman’s violations, the external leadership was 
reluctant to adopt a more intransigent line and, if needed, to challenge more 
seriously Arafat’s leading position. As the external leadership continued to hold 
an ambiguous position towards Fatah’s policies, dissatisfaction grew within the 
PFLP-OPT and the overall popularity of the faction started to shrink.106  
Besides such ambiguity, phenomena of bureaucratisation, corruption and 
rent-seeking among the PFLP’s higher cadres contributed to foster the divide. 
These problems emerged more seriously when, between 1989 and 1990, the 
institutional framework of the PLO in the OPT formed by the Popular 
Committees, the trade unions and the associations had expanded significantly. 
As several local leaders were associated with episodes of corruption, the distance 
between the popular base and the leadership widened.107 In the light of these 
phenomena, while the PFLP started to call for ‘democratic reforms’ in the PLO 
and for the creation of a control system to eradicate corruption and rent-seeking, 
it did not enjoy popular credibility. The PFLP’s external leadership was 
denouncing a major issue threatening the status of the whole PLO while 
pretending that this did not affect the organisation itself.108 The credibility of the 
outside leadership’s calls for reform was even lower in the eyes of its base, as it 
started to demand a reformulation of the factions’ quota during the future session 
of the PNC. While the PFLP called for PLO reform, invoking the need for 
representation of the Intifada demands, such calls did not envisage wider 
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recognition for representatives of the national movement in the OPT. Ultimately 
in another example of policy fluctuation, on the one hand the PFLP leadership 
demanded in official documents and declarations a more equal position vis-à-vis 
Arafat, while on the other, it justified moderation towards the ‘Right’s 
violations,’ appealing to its concern for unity.109 
Moreover, to a certain extent the external leadership started to appear 
alienated from the PFLP-OPT and the situation on the ground. For instance, little 
notice was given to the voice of the PFLP-OPT in Al-Hadaf. While Politburo 
statements, declarations and interviews released by top leaders in exile appeared 
frequently in the official mouthpiece, the political documents issued by the 
internal movement were published very rarely. Throughout 1989 and 1990 only 
two communiques by the PFLP-OPT found their way in the PFLP official press. 
The insistence of these published communiques on the recognition of the link 
between the UNLU and the PLO, as well as the stress on the prominence of 
national institutions, reflected the outside leadership’s need to demonstrate its 
control over the inside. In addition, the criticisms that these documents addressed 
to Arafat’s strategy and his interest in the Shamir plan responded to the logics of 
the PFLP’s institutional opposition rather than outlining the PFLP-OPT’s own 
oppositional agenda.110  
The main effect of the inside-outside divide within the PFLP was to 
strengthen the external leadership’s push towards integration. Adherence to the 
leverage stemming from the PLO institutional integration went along with 
continued control within the PFLP. The PFLP-OPT drew its political legitimacy 
from its popular entrenchment and was less dependent, unlike the diaspora 
leadership, on the PLO institutional framework as it took shape outside the OPT. 
Therefore, local cadres were more likely to head for a harsher confrontation with 
Fatah, if not to disengage from the PLO decision-making process. Thus, for the 
PFLP leadership, validating the line upheld by the PFLP-OPT entailed 
questioning its own role within the PLO institutions.111 The divide between the 
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outside leadership and the PFLP-OPT widened in the following years, especially 
after the advent of the Oslo era and despite the relocation of the PFLP’s exiled 
leadership in the OPT. Similarly, there was a continuing problem of lack of 
clarity in the PFLP line toward the peace process, and in the meaning of the 
PFLP’s opposition to Fatah, notably in the light of Hamas’ ascendance as the 
Arafat faction’s main competitor.112 
 
The Problematic Encounter with Political Islam. 
The dynamics leading to the spread of the Islamist factions’ popularity in the 
OPT provided the basis for competition with the PLO within the national 
movement. The Intifada, since its very beginning, saw the Islamist camp, and in 
particular Hamas, launching the first serious challenge to the dominant secular 
nationalist factions in order to gain predominance in the Palestinian political 
arena. As evidence of this, Hamas, as well as Islamic Jihad, never fully 
coordinated with the PLO factions in the organisation and support of the 
uprising. Although the Islamists did respect the UNLU instructions and schedule 
on strikes, boycotts and marches, both Hamas and Islamic Jihad published their 
own leaflets and set their own resistance activities. Particularly in Hamas’ case, 
the leadership aimed at weighing up the strength of the movement and 
demonstrate an equal, if not superior, capability to mobilise the Palestinian 
masses when compared to the PLO.113 As regards the PFLP, the challenge was 
twofold inasmuch as the Islamists were not only ideologically at odds with the 
Popular Front, but were also rising as a new radical actor in opposition to the 
PLO leadership. Both Hamas and Islamic Jihad were deeply involved in fields 
where the Left had always been very present, ranging from social services or 
trade unions to underground guerrilla operations. Despite the direct threat that 
the Islamists represented to the PFLP’s popular base, the Front did not organise 
a consistent response. This was due initially to an underestimation of the 
Islamists’ entrenchment among the population of the OPT that many PLO 
activists and leaders displayed.114 The PFLP, at least during the first years of the 
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Intifada, also underestimated the Islamists’ challenge, particularly in Hamas’ 
case, to PLO primacy. Therefore, the PFLP’s attitude towards the Islamic 
Resistance Movement appeared rather unclear, paralleling the inconsistencies 
displayed towards other political challenges that emerged during the Intifada. 
More precisely, Hamas and Islamic Jihad’s emergence accentuated the PFLP’s 
opposition-integration dilemma. The Islamists’ growing relevance was a 
materialisation of an effective alternative to the PFLP’s own opposition to the 
PLO leadership. As a result, especially in the wake of the First Intifada, this 
development emphasised the PFLP’s fluctuation between adherence to the 
Fatah-led PLO and Hamas’ opposition policies. 
The PFLP and its official press did not pay much attention to Hamas until the 
end of 1988, when competition within the Palestinian camp started to be more 
evident in the light of the PLO’s ‘peace offensive’. At this stage the Popular 
Front was very critical toward Hamas because of its decision to act outside the 
framework of the UNLU. As Deputy Secretary-General Abu Ali Mustafa 
maintained, ‘Hamas’ refusal to join the national institution was causing its retreat 
from the Intifada because popular consensus stood with the slogans and priorities 
set by the PLO-affiliated organisations’.115 Despite such claims, Hamas’ agenda 
continued to concern the PFLP as demonstrated by its attempt to discredit the 
policies of the Islamic Resistance Movement. In the context of intense debate 
about the Shamir plan, the Popular Front blamed Hamas for its readiness to 
maintain contacts with the Israeli authorities, affirming that some Hamas 
representatives had met with Defence Minister Rabin. In addition, the PFLP 
denounced Shaikh Yassin’s support for the idea of elections in the OPT under 
international supervision, aimed at selecting Palestinian representatives who 
would start talks with Israel and its international partners. As this project served 
Israel’s goal to undermine PLO authority in the Territories, Hamas’ position was 
seen as an attempt to benefit from a possible weakening of the PLO.116 
Notwithstanding the conflicting positions, the PFLP started to change its 
attitude toward the Islamists by virtue of both their growing popularity among 
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the masses and divergences with the PLO leadership concerning the line to 
support the Intifada diplomatically. The Popular Front shared Fatah’s goal of 
containing Hamas’ growth as the new radical actor.117 However, the PFLP saw 
in the Islamists a potential ally in its effort to counterbalance the PLO leadership. 
From this stemmed the PFLP’s repeated calls for Hamas to join ‘national 
institutions,’ the UNLU first of all.118 The new approach demonstrated that the 
Popular Front understood its relations with Hamas through the traditional pattern 
of intra-Palestinian relations. As had been the case with Fatah on several 
occasions, political and ideological differences could be downplayed in the light 
of the common nationalist struggle with Israel that represented the ultimate 
‘common denominator’. Nevertheless, if the PLO itself had already dropped the 
principle of ‘consensus politics’, as the results of the 19th PNC showed119, it was 
very unlikely that Hamas would embrace it, especially because of its bid for 
predominance within Palestinian politics. In fact, during the first and most 
serious attempt to include Hamas in the PLO in spring 1990, the Islamist 
movement compromised all chances to join upcoming PNC sessions by 
demanding a share of 40 to 50 seats in the Council. Such a request showed 
Hamas resolve to equal Fatah and its rejection of the traditional patterns of PLO 
politics.120  
The PFLP’s attempts to nurture more positive contacts with the Islamist camp 
combined with a certain adoption of Islamist rhetoric. The Popular Front’s 
leaders started to quote figures like ʿ Omar ibn al-Khuttab and Shaikh ʿIzz al-Din 
al-Qassam alongside the usual personae of Marxist heritage and Islamic feasts 
were included in the PFLP’s political calendar. These steps aimed at showing 
how the Popular Front legitimised the emerging Islamist movement as an 
historical part of Palestinian nationalism. Furthermore, they also embodied the 
PFLP’s willingness to address an allegedly more ‘Islamised Palestinian 
public’.121       
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This first look at the PFLP’s attitude towards the rising Islamist movement in 
the first years of the Intifada highlights the adoption of a shifting line and a 
misconception of the challenge that Hamas in particular represented against the 
PLO. Pursuing its goal of undermining the position and credibility of the PLO, 
Hamas always saw its contacts with the PFLP as instrumental to fostering 
internal divisions; from this also stemmed Hamas’ view of the Popular Front as 
a junior part in attempts at association that followed the Oslo accords.122 The 
PFLP’s unquestionable loyalty to the PLO further complicated its positioning 
toward the Islamists and in general within the Palestinian national movement. 
The traditional role of ‘loyal opposition’123 quickly lost its theoretical and 
practical role in the light of Hamas and Islamic Jihad’s rise as new radical 
opposition to the PLO leadership. In the mid-1980s this position was due to the 
PFLP’s attachment to ‘PLO legality’ in order to contrast what it saw as Arafat’s 
deviations from the correct PLO nationalist line. With the rise to prominence of 
the OPT as the new centre of conflict and the emergence of a powerful force 
outside the PLO framework, the Popular Front’s focus on ‘respect for national 
institutions’ lost at least some of its political urgency. Consequently, the PFLP’s 
agency appeared more and more stuck between Fatah’s agenda, centred on 
opening a process of political settlement with Israel, and Hamas’ challenge to 
this project. This problematic position remained unresolved for the PFLP 
throughout the following decade, causing the resurfacing of an uncertain policy 
concerning the Islamists, fluctuating between contrast and coordination. 
 
Conclusions. 
This account of the PFLP’s conduct during the first three years of the Intifada 
pointed out the inability of the organisation to take advantage of its relatively 
stronger position in the context of Palestinian politics in the OPT and of the 
Intifada itself. The outbreak of the uprising, while setting the priority of 
achieving a political settlement of the conflict, opened up the possibility of a 
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settlement without the danger of Jordanian interference and with the PLO on an 
equal footing vis-à-vis all the actors involved. In light of such development, the 
PFLP showed pragmatism in adapting its line to the objectives articulated by the 
movement in the OPT. This, while reflecting the PFLP’s entrenchment in the 
OPT, also demonstrated a certain ability to renew its political line and discourse. 
Therefore, considering Arafat’s precipitous willingness to enter into 
negotiations, the Popular Front had a chance to emerge as the revolutionary, 
committed force within the PLO, possibly widening its popularity in the OPT, 
by protecting with greater force the revolutionary ethos of the Intifada and 
mounting a more convincing opposition to the PLO leadership’s efforts to 
capitalise on the uprising. This is particularly true if one takes into consideration 
the radicalisation that the uprising experienced in its second year. Israeli 
repression, the hesitation of US-Palestinian dialogue, and popular scepticism 
towards the peace process were all factors that might have played in the PFLP’s 
interests.  
In understanding the causes of such failure, the pattern of policy fluctuation 
emerges again as a central point. While new sources of tension fostered the 
PFLP’s fluctuations in the context of the First Intifada, the opposition-
integration dilemma continued to have an overall influence on its agency. 
Consequently, the negative dynamic of fluctuations affected the PFLP 
repeatedly during the first phase of the uprising. 
First, the external PFLP leadership was unwilling to cause another split in the 
PLO, after what the national movement had experienced during the mid-1980s 
in terms of intra-Palestinian armed confrontations, Arafat’s ‘individualist’ turn 
and the self-exclusion of the PFLP from the highest PLO institutional bodies. 
Furthermore, as the Islamist camp started to pose a serious threat to the status of 
nationalist-secular forces, the PFLP leadership favoured cohesion with the PLO 
Right, rather than really challenging the latter’s dominant position. In this 
approach, it is possible to identify an attitude that the PFLP continued to show 
after the advent of the Oslo era and still possibly displays today. The PFLP’s 
‘desperation for relevance’, combined with its historical adherence to integration 
within the PLO, prevented it from breaking with the PLO mainstream, 
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notwithstanding its violations and authoritarian policies.124 As a consequence, 
the PFLP’s policies toward the PLO leadership appeared uncertain and unclear, 
as the stances adopted during the 19th PNC and in relation to US-Israel-PLO 
indirect dialogue exemplified.  
Secondly, the tension stemming from the PFLP’s own ‘inside-outside’ divide 
contributed to policy fluctuation. On this level, the PFLP external leadership’s 
concern for integration in the PLO combined with other factors to undermine its 
overall political strength. Consequently, while officially calling for nation-wide 
civil disobedience, the PFLP leadership did not challenge directly Arafat’s 
policies as the PFLP-OPT wished. As a result, the external leadership did not 
favour radicalisation of the protests, in contrast with its official line. Such 
reluctance ultimately distanced the two segments of the PFLP. This approach of 
the ‘outside’ was also the result of the exiled leaders’ unwillingness to foster a 
new generation of cadres capable of threatening their control over the 
organisation. In addition, the phenomena of bureaucratisation and rent-seeking 
that started to affect the PFLP also fostered doubts among the base militants and 
jeopardised the credibility of PFLP political action.  
Finally, the PFLP maintained an unclear position toward the Islamists and 
notably Hamas, shifting from total rejection to attempts to cultivate friendly 
contacts as the Islamists asserted their prominence in the Palestinian political 
landscape. The rise of the Islamist camp, as it became clearer in the following 
years, exacerbated the PFLP’s opposition-integration dilemma. On the one hand, 
the emergence of a Palestinian force outside the PLO aroused the PFLP’s 
concern for the preservation of PLO integration, and the relevance stemming 
from it. On the other, it started to question the PFLP’s own oppositional role. 
The PFLP’s fluctuations in relation to the Islamist camp inevitably undermined 
the effectiveness of the party’s agency and proved a further burden in the task of 
relaunching its role within the Palestinian national movement.  
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To conclude, the evolution of the PFLP’s line during the first three years of 
the Intifada reflected its inability to fully exploit this chance to renew its political 
initiative and weight. Although the uprising continued until the signing of the 
Oslo Agreement in 1993, the PFLP had by 1990 expended most of the political 
capital accumulated during the 1980s and the first year of the Intifada. Ultimately 
this missed opportunity had a paramount effect on the definitive marginalisation 
experienced by the PFLP in the following years. In addition, as a further negative 
fallout, the First Intifada definitively transformed the PFLP’s adherence to the 









The tensions and their consequences outlined in the previous chapters continued 
to act on the PFLP throughout the 1990s. By the same token, the opposition-
integration dilemma continued to permeate the sources of pressure directly 
affecting the PFLP. In fact, from beginning to end, the decade addressed in this 
chapter emphasised the dilemma. More specifically, major external events, from 
the Gulf War and the collapse of the USSR in 1991 to the 1993 Oslo accords, 
and internal PFLP responses, complicated its relationship of conflict and 
dependence with Palestinian institutions. Furthermore, the Oslo era, as will be 
shown, saw the strengthening of those tensions that appeared during the uprising, 
such as the contrast between the Damascus-based leadership and the PFLP-OPT 
or the polarisation between the Arafat-led ‘peace camp’ and the strengthening 
Islamist opposition. The main result of such developments was the perpetuation 
of policy fluctuation which manifested itself both concerning the overall issue 
of rejection or acceptance of the post-Oslo political reality and in relation to the 
specific issues mentioned. 
The first setting for the PFLP’s predicament was its own Fifth National 
Congress, held in 1993. On this occasion, the PFLP demonstrated its inability to 
renew its theoretical background, its organisational structure, and its political 
program. On this occasion, some of the tensions evidenced above, such as the 
PFLP’s dependence on the PLO framework, the bureaucratisation of its structure 
and the outside-inside divide, forged a conservative approach in the leadership 
which prevented genuine change. 
The PLO and Israel’s signing of the Declaration of Principle (DoP) in 
September 1993 concretised those ‘liquidatory’ solutions that the PFLP rejected 
throughout its history. Its response to this, however, reflected the PFLP’s 
dependence on the PLO framework notwithstanding the unprecedented turn 
taken by its leadership. Indeed, the PFLP tried to delegitimise the Oslo peace 
process on the PLO institutional level by trying to coalesce opposition to the 
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accords and boycotting the Oslo-derived institutions and procedures. The main 
result of this orientation was the establishment of the Unified Leadership with 
the DFLP, a renewed version of coalition politics. 
However, as this chapter aims at illustrating, this policy line appeared not 
only ineffective but also highlighted the PFLP’s inconsistencies and fluctuations 
in formulating its agenda. As a result, at the end of the decade, the PFLP’s own 
political role appeared under question, as its opposition proved ineffective in 
influencing the course of PLO policy. In outlining the unfolding of this 
trajectory, the present chapter will address the main levels on which the PFLP’s 
agency reflected the influence of the opposition-integration dilemma while at the 
same time, strengthening it. 
First, the ineffectiveness of the PFLP’s institutional opposition to the Oslo 
accords and its state-building process evidenced its main contradictory shift. As 
the Popular Front failed to delegitimise Arafat’s agenda, it started to give mixed 
signals of acceptance of the new political reality quite early on, raising doubts 
about its role in the new scenario. Secondly, the PFLP’s institutional orientation 
contradicted its own calls for grassroots resistance to Oslo and the PNA. Besides 
reflecting the results of the PFLP’s main dilemma, this approach also revealed 
the external leadership’s tensions with cadres in the OPT. The growing 
estrangement from local leaders and activists further undermined its oppositional 
role and overall political weight. This was all the more evident as the Islamist 
factions, and particularly Hamas, continued to bolster their presence on the 
grassroots level. The PFLP’s adherence to the PLO framework itself represented 
a major obstacle for the establishment of working relations with the Islamist 
factions, particularly Hamas. While the latter upheld its challenge to the PLO 
status, the PFLP embarked on an uncertain association attempt that did not 
produce actual policies. As a result, the PFLP’s fluctuations became evident 
when the Front promptly disengaged from the failing coalition with the Islamists 
to reopen dialogue with Fatah. Finally, the failure of institutional opposition 
undermined the longest example of PFLP-DFLP coalition. Again, in 
contradiction with the narrative and policies adopted in the wake of the Oslo 
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accords, the PFLP and DFLP started separate talks with Fatah aimed at reaching 
a settlement on the reorganisation of their presence in the OPT. 
Ultimately, this chapter will show how the PFLP’s conduct in the 1990s led 
to its de facto acceptance of the post-Oslo political regime, which complicated 
its association with Palestinian institutions, mostly due to the contradictory 
relation with the PNA. Simultaneously, however, it also exacerbated its 
condition as an opposition faction in the light of Hamas’ definitive assertion as 
radical opponent to the PLO leadership. 
 
A Weakened PLO. 
The overall precarious condition that characterised the PLO at the beginning of 
the 1990s clearly had a direct impact on the PFLP. Therefore, to assess correctly 
the limits of the Popular Front’s conduct in this phase, it is necessary to outline 
briefly those external developments that affected the Palestinian national 
movement negatively. Such events, which marked the final years of the First 
Intifada, paved the way to the exacerbation of the PFLP’s own dilemmas. 
The PNC’s 20th session was convened from 23-28 September 1991, three 
years after the 19th, ‘Intifada session’ that declared the independence of the State 
of Palestine. This declaration symbolised the positive momentum of the popular 
uprising in the OPT, the real possibility of seeing the end of Israeli occupation 
within a few years. Three years later, while the Intifada could not be considered 
concluded, the PLO appeared severely weakened, a condition clearly reflected 
in the outcome of the new PNC session. If during the 19th PNC, the PLO 
proposed its own peace initiative and made its bid for statehood clear through 
the declaration of independence, the 20th session merely provided a positive 
response to US Secretary of State Baker’s proposal to convene a regional peace 
conference, underscoring the passive stance of the PLO. The US plan entailed 
the formation of a joint Palestinian-Jordanian delegation in order to bypass 
Israel’s refusal to sit at the same table with the PLO as well as the absence of 
any delegate from Jerusalem and the diaspora.1 Although this meant diluting the 
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PLO’s representative role and possibly excluding many Palestinians from the 
solution, the Palestinian leadership believed it necessary to deal with the ‘current 
situation’ with a ‘spirit of political responsibility and national realism’2, or to put 
it bluntly, to drop some of the previously irrevocable preconditions. Indeed, the 
weaker position of the PLO leadership was the consequence of several global 
and regional developments that compromised its political strategy, its resources 
and its overall condition.  
The first event that resulted in one of the most detrimental periods in the 
history of the PLO was the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in summer 1990 and the 
subsequent US decision to attack Iraq to restore Kuwaiti independence in 
January 1991. PLO support for Iraq, mainly motivated by the widespread 
popularity that Saddam Hussein enjoyed among the Palestinian population, 
backfired painfully. As the second Gulf war ended with the debacle of the Iraqi 
retreat, the PLO not only lost the support of the last ‘confrontational’ Arab 
regime, but also saw its main financial backers in the Gulf withdrawing their 
funding and, especially in the case of Kuwait, expelling the numerous Palestinian 
communities in retaliation for PLO support for Iraq.3 
Secondly, on the international level, the gradual decline of the Soviet Union 
and its final dissolution in December 1991 saw the end of all counterweight to 
US influence in the Middle East, finally letting emerge Washington as the only 
broker for a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The new US global 
dominance was reflected in the organisation of the aforementioned peace 
conference that eventually took place in Madrid, in November 1991. Both during 
the Gulf War and during the ensuing diplomatic efforts to organise the Madrid 
conference, the USSR fully collaborated with the US, marking the advent of a 
new, American-dominated phase in the Middle East peace process.4 
The overall negative situation of the Intifada in the OPT only added to the 
PLO’s vulnerability. Although protests and violent confrontations between 
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demonstrators and the Israeli army occurred on a daily basis, the Intifada was in 
stalemate, unable to produce further political results. The Israeli arrest and 
killing campaigns eliminated many experienced leading activists, while at the 
same time the PLO Chairman consistently pursued a policy aimed at fragmenting 
the national movement in the OPT in order to concentrate power in his own 
hands. For this reason, Arafat allocated PLO funds to institution and personnel 
according to political loyalty, much to the detriment of genuine resistance 
activities. These two factors ultimately contributed to the decline of the ‘mass 
character’ of the Intifada favouring its militarisation and jeopardising the 
political effectiveness of popular protests.5 In this overall negative context, the 
PFLP tried to re-formulate its own political line in the wake of its failure to 
achieve significant advantages during the ascending phase of the First Intifada. 
 
Uncertainty before the Watershed: The PFLP between the Intifada and 
Oslo. 
If the PLO leadership had to cope with a crisis of unprecedented dimensions, 
this implied in turn that the PFLP had to face even more unfavourable conditions. 
This was ascribable to its political line over national and regional issues as well 
as to its limited political and economic resources compared to Fatah. The PFLP 
was entering another period of unprecedented challenges, but without the 
impetus the Intifada had offered four years earlier. This aspect could only 
emphasise the fluctuating character of the PFLP’s response to such challenges, 
producing uncertain policies towards other Palestinian actors, often inconsistent 
with the slogans formulated. 
The PFLP deeply felt the backlash of the Gulf War both politically and 
economically. First, the outcome of the American offensive highlighted the 
PFLP’s miscalculation in assessing the regional and global balance of power: as 
the Cold War order vanished following the USSR’s demise, the Popular Front 
saw in the rise of Iraq an alternative counterweight to US-Israeli and Arab 
‘reactionary’ interests. That is why the PFLP leadership deemed possible linking 
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the end of Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait to the withdrawal of Israeli and Syrian 
forces from Lebanon and the end of Israel’s occupation of the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip, as Saddam Hussein himself demanded.6 Secondly, the economic 
fallout from the Gulf War hit the PFLP very hard. Since the Palestine National 
Fund represented the main source of income for the faction, the cut of Gulf 
countries’ financings to the PLO was particularly felt. In addition, and correlated 
with PLO’s overall straitened circumstances, Arafat’s neopatrimonial 
management of funds apparently increased starting from 1991-92. According to 
PFLP cadres in the OPT, the disruption of the regular flow of funds was due to 
the PLO Chairman’s intention to curb internal opposition to the peace process.7 
Since 1988-89 Arafat bolstered his leverage in the national movement in the 
OPT by increasing significantly the allocation of funds while excluding local 
bodies, such as the UNLU, from managing PLO finances.8 In the following 
years, Arafat’s neopatrimonial tendencies accentuated, especially after the 
establishment of the PNA, and such economic conduct was perceived also by 
PFLP cadres located in the diaspora.9 
Hence, the PFLP’s stand during the 20th PNC exposed this difficult status and 
its leaders did not hide their frustration in commenting on the Council’s 
resolutions. For Habash, such resolutions were ‘not a Palestinian [peace] 
initiative, but just a response to Baker’s plans’. The PFLP feared exclusive US 
custodianship of the peace process and was afraid that the PLO leadership’s 
pliability would pave the way to the fall of once central Palestinian demands 
such as an end to settlement activity or the inclusion of Jerusalem in 
discussions.10 Despite these concerns, if the PFLP had been already unable to 
constrain the PLO leadership during the 19th PNC session, it appeared powerless 
at the 20th. Incapable of presenting an effective political opposition and 
hesitating on withdrawal from the PLO institutions, as Habash explained, the 
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PFLP wanted to focus on building up ‘grassroots unity’, or to say with its slogan 
‘the unity of rocks and molotov’, concentrating its efforts on the ‘struggle side’ 
rather than on the ‘diplomatic side’ of PLO activities.11 The formulation of these 
goals implied that the Popular Front still trusted in the Intifada’s potential to 
change the balance within the PLO in favour of a more ‘confrontational’ stance 
in the long term. Despite such confidence in the uprising, PFLP-affiliated 
organisations in the OPT did not count for the majority of the national movement 
and the external leadership did not have full control on its branches either. This 
was shown by the rise of armed groups whose main mission was targeting 
Israel’s Palestinian collaborators. The ‘Red Eagle Group’, one of the most active 
among this kind of organisation, claimed affiliation with the PFLP but was not 
established following orders from the leadership. Local, young PFLP cadres, 
such as Ayman al-Rizza and ʿIlm al-Din Shahin, were behind the creation of the 
group and acted in total autonomy from the exiled leaders.12 Although the 
Popular Front supported its actions against collaborator networks13, the Red 
Eagle Group was not accountable either to the external leadership or to the 
PFLP’s representatives in the OPT and UNLU. This emerged clearly when the 
UNLU itself issued calls for restraint after these groups’ behaviour appeared 
increasingly arbitrary.14 
Despite the alleged priority of expanding popular mobilisation, the PFLP’s 
attention was turned away from the OPT by the PLO Central Council official 
decision to join the Madrid conference based on US and Israeli terms.15 
Following the PLO leadership’s relinquishment of its minimum demands to join 
the new American initiative, the PFLP replied by ‘freezing’ its membership of 
the Executive Committee. According to Politburo member ‘Abd al-Rahim 
Malluh, the suspension came to highlight the erroneous position of the 
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‘executive leadership’, namely its decision to join a peace plan aimed at 
implementing nothing less than the 1979 Camp David provisions for Palestine 
that did not include statehood but only ‘self-administration’. However, on this 
occasion as well, the PFLP’s reluctance to disengage from the PLO emerged 
clearly. Malluh and Habash, in a joint press conference, clarified that the 
membership freeze did not aim at threatening the unity of the PLO, despite 
apparently irreconcilable differences. When asked about the convergence of 
interests with Hamas and the pro-Syrian factions, the two leaders specified that 
these contacts wanted indeed to explore a common strategy to stand up to the 
PLO Chairman, but that the PFLP by no means sought to establish an alternative 
to the PLO.16 
 Nevertheless, coalition politics re-emerged as a way for the PFLP to resist 
Fatah supremacy. The PLO’s full acceptance of American demands raised 
criticism within the DFLP, so Hawatmeh’s organisation agreed to coordinate 
again with the Popular Front. The shift towards the PFLP was also encouraged 
by Yasser ʿAbd Rabbo’s secession, along with other DFLP cadres, and his 
creation of a new faction, the Democratic Palestinian Union (Fidaʾ), closer to 
Fatah. In the light of this split, the DFLP leadership could not support the peace 
process openly and decided to side with the opposition at first17. Thus, while the 
PCP mounted the peace bandwagon, the PFLP and DFLP issued a joint statement 
along with the PLF and PPSF. The four factions called all Palestinian factions 
and forces to join them and reject the ‘self-government conspiracy’ as well as to 
open ‘a dialogue comprehensive of all national and Islamist orientations’ aimed 
at paving the way to a more inclusive PLO.18  
In sum, on the eve of the 1993 Oslo accords, the PFLP’s agency continued to 
be strained by the tension deriving from the conflict between its loyalty to the 
PLO framework and its rejection of the ‘peace process’. Indeed, the PFLP’s 
problems in formulating a practicable line and responding to the major changes 
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affecting the Palestinian national movements emerged clearly during its Fifth 
National Congress. 
 
The PFLP’s Conservation Priorities at its Fifth National Congress. 
The attention dedicated to this session of the PFLP’s National Congress provides 
an insight into the core problems affecting the Popular Front in the first half of 
the 1990s. Moreover, the overview of the PFLP’s shortcomings in addressing 
ideological and political change highlights the connection between factors 
fostering adherence to the PLO framework and those at the base of such failed 
renewal. 
The Fifth National Congress of the Popular Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine, dedicated to the ‘Martyrs of the Intifada,’ was convened in Damascus, 
from 12-17 February, 1993. Twelve years after its previous congress, the PFLP 
could not postpone the new round any longer given the historical developments 
that the Palestinian national movement was experiencing. The declining 
trajectory of the Intifada, the dissolution of the Socialist Bloc and the apparently 
irresistible US ‘peace machine’ were all issues putting the PLO at a fateful 
crossroads.19 The PFLP, for its part, needed to redefine its basic theoretical, 
political and military orientations as well as to review its structure and leadership 
in order to stand up effectively to such threatening historical drivers. However, 
the PFLP also needed to overcome many obstacles in order to achieve genuine 
change such as the total absence of strategic planning over the last decade, the 
continued grip of first-generation cadres on the Politburo, and the ideological 
challenges stemming from the USSR’s downfall and the rise of political Islam. 
Such obstacles were all intertwined and, in particular, the predominance of the 
founding group, and their political experience, was tightly connected with the 
lack of strategic thinking.  
Paramount among the variety of factors determining the prevalence of tactic 
over strategy were the events that the PFLP leadership experienced during the 
Lebanese period and the years preceding the 1987 Intifada. After the relocation 
from Jordan to Lebanon in the early 1970s, and particularly since the outbreak 
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of civil war in 1975, one of the main PLO priorities was to preserve the political, 
economic and military authority that it had been able to establish within the 
country. The continually evolving scenario of the Lebanese conflict, marked by 
multiple interventions from external actors and shifting alliances among 
Lebanese and foreign forces, heavily influenced the decision-making process 
which often resulted in ‘event-driven’ policies aimed at the survival of the PLO 
quasi-state infrastructure in Lebanon.20 Besides this, the Popular Front was more 
sensitive to all forms of external pressure, given its smaller popular base and 
more limited resources compared to Fatah. In addition, the PFLP’s Marxism and 
its tight links with the Lebanese Left engendered much more hostility within the 
Lebanese Right than Fatah’s loosely-defined nationalism, increasing the Front’s 
exposure to security threats.21 The prioritisation of survival acquired even more 
importance for the PFLP after the eviction of the Palestinian armed organisations 
from Beirut following the 1982 Israeli invasion. In the mid-1980s ‘liquidation’ 
for the PFLP could come either from hostile forces in the region or from a 
possible success of Arafat’s diplomatic strategy, not to mention difficulties 
stemming from relations with the new Syrian host.22 
The Lebanese period is central to understanding the PFLP’s problems with 
strategy not only because of its political trajectory during these years. The PLO’s 
evolution from a revolutionary movement to a quasi-state entity had deep 
repercussions for PFLP internal structure and practice, determining a 
bureaucratisation of its membership and leadership. The creation of more 
structured institutions, and, most notably, the funds flowing to the PFLP through 
PLO channels encouraged the ‘professionalisation’ of political activism much to 
the detriment of revolutionary ethos.23 Consequently, the preservation of 
bureaucratic structures, and the benefits stemming from them, became a concern 
that tacitly influenced the Popular Front’s agency and represented an obstacle to 
change that would endanger established positions within the organisation. 
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Furthermore, the bureaucratic structure also represented an instrument available 
to the leadership in order to exert a stronger control on the faction’s 
membership.24  
Therefore, the PFLP’s need to maintain integration within the PLO 
institutions, and the bureaucratisation of its structure, tightly linked to such a 
need, fostered a conservative approach in the PFLP leadership. As a 
consequence, the congress was ultimately unable to make a thorough review of 
the PFLP’s trajectory and lay the foundation of a renewed party with a renewed 
strategy. In the light of this failure, the PFLP held even less adequate political 
means to confront the phase that opened after September 1993. 
 
Undisputable Ideology. 
The PFLP’s undisputed adherence to Marxist-Leninism has been often described 
as the consequence of a dogmatic approach to political ideology.25 However, as 
the observation of its conduct during previous phases evidenced, such adherence 
rather reflected the PFLP leadership’s interest in ensuring control over the Front. 
Besides, the continuous recourse to Marxist and Maoist analytical categories 
served the PFLP’s need to justify policy shifts. The Fifth National Congress and 
the lack of significant ideological renewal underscored the need of the PFLP’s 
top leaders to maintain their grip during such a critical phase. As further evidence 
of this, the PFLP resorted to Marxist analysis to support a political narrative that 
justified its traditional role within the PLO and deflect criticisms of the 
leadership, particularly concerning the issue of party bureaucratisation. 
The crisis of global Marxism following the demise of the Soviet Union 
sparked, within the Palestinian Left, different degrees of ideological reform. This 
ranged from the PCP’s transformation into the Palestine People’s Party (PPP) 
and its abandonment of Marxist-Leninism, to re-evaluation of ‘democratic 
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centralism’ within the DFLP.26 Conversely, the PFLP confirmed its main 
ideological cornerstones, proceeding with only a temperate critique of selected 
aspects. According to the theoretical document of the Fifth Congress, the validity 
of Marxism, and its ‘scientific reading of society’ as the starting point of political 
praxis was not to be questioned as it represented a ‘living model, not a frozen 
doctrine’.27 The adoption of ‘historical dialectical materialism’ entailed that the 
PFLP’s Marxism was in ‘a continued, dialectical relation with the reality and the 
praxis’, enabling the party not only to comprehend societal and historical 
changes but also to formulate a proper political response to them. By virtue of 
this founding principle, Marxism was still ‘an idea favourable to the interests of 
the working class, an ideology for the revolutionary change of society and a 
practice for radical transformation’.28 However, in 1993, the PFLP was probably 
at the furthest point from being the proletarian party it aimed at becoming in its 
earlier phases.29 The leadership was still mainly composed of figures of 
bourgeois background such as Habash himself or ʿAbd al-Rahim Malluh. In 
addition, the bureaucratisation of the party membership that emerged during the 
Lebanese period and became highly controversial in the context of PLO 
economic hardships distanced the PFLP even further from the ideal proletarian 
organisation capable of ‘mobilising the revolutionary classes’. The apparent 
renewed emphasis on Marxism also contrasted with the PFLP’s inclusive idea 
of the Palestinian national movement. Although the working class was again put 
at the centre of the liberation struggle, the Popular Front believed that, given the 
contradiction between Palestinian national aspirations and the Zionist project, all 
sectors of the Palestinian society and political arena could be considered as 
driving forces of the revolution.30 However, as the secret talks that led to the 
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Oslo Accords and the resulting establishment of new Palestinian institutions 
demonstrated, the PLO political leadership and its economic partners were 
mainly interested in acquiring control over the administration of the OPT and 
benefitting from normalisation with Israel. The PFLP failed to prioritise the 
contradiction between this position and the interests of either Palestinians in the 
diaspora or the lower strata of Palestinian society in the OPT who respectively 
were totally ignored by the agreements and whose conditions would deteriorate 
under the Oslo economic regime.31 
Notwithstanding the crisis affecting international as well as Palestinian 
Marxists, the PFLP saw in the degeneration of the Soviet model the main reason 
behind the current situation of Marxism worldwide. According to its view, the 
advent of Stalinism enshrined the hegemony of bureaucrats within the Party, 
which ceased to represent the proletariat and started reflecting the interests of 
Party elites and, ultimately, of state power. This negative trend was further 
exacerbated during the Brezhnev era when the Party leadership and Secretary-
General ‘became the sole source of authority sanctioning the correct line’. 
Palestinian and Arab Marxists’ mistake was that of following Soviet Marxism 
as an ‘undisputable dogma’. The only criticism that the PFLP addressed to its 
own conduct concerned its inability to spread the correct interpretation of 
Marxism as an ‘evolving political praxis rather than a frozen dogma’ due to 
‘negative historical circumstances’. Beyond that, the Congress theoretical 
document contained only vague calls for the democratisation and renewal of the 
Party structure and invited its members not to see it as the only authority 
establishing the correct vision of Marxism, two steps needed to unify Palestinian 
Marxists.32  
This survey of the PFLP’s handling of ideological renewal evidences the 
sharp contradictions between its discourse and practice, which support the view 
of adherence to Marxism as an instrument of factional control. This approach 
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will be further cleared in the next section which addresses the preservation of 
organisational principles and the lack of programmatic planning. 
 
The Persistence of Organisational and Programmatic Shortcomings. 
The Congress documents on organisational structure and the program for the 
new phase reflected even more clearly the PFLP’s conservative approach. The 
insistence on traditional organisational and political principles underscored the 
lack of major reorientation in the PFLP’s line. In turn, this appeared linked with 
the leadership’s priority of ensuring its control during the new stage.  
These calls were echoed in the organisational report of the congress which 
emphasised the concept of ‘transformation’ to adapt the Front to the current 
political circumstances. Again, the adoption and spread throughout the PFLP’s 
structures and membership of dialectic materialism was seen as an adequate 
mechanism to achieve this transformation, without the need to actually change 
the structure of the organisation. The main PFLP bodies remained unchanged, 
and so did relations among them. Indeed, despite a renewed stress on the 
implementation of ‘collective leadership’ at all levels, the concept of ‘democratic 
centralism’ was restated various times.33 The reaffirmation of this concept 
contrasted with calls for renewal and democratisation and the denunciation of 
‘party ideological dictatorship’ and personality cult that PFLP cadres themselves 
spelled out during the congress. The decision-making process within the PFLP 
has always been very hierarchical with the Politburo, and often the Secretary-
General was able to impose the line, without consideration or toleration of 
internal divergences.34 This not only contributed to the splits that occurred in the 
PFLP’s early years, but also prevented the emergence of a new leadership from 
the experience of the Intifada in the OPT, as was outlined in the previous chapter. 
As evidence of this, during the congress itself several cadres were elected as new 
Politburo and Central Committee members, but none of these came from the 
OPT, underscoring the ‘outside’ resolve to maintain predominance over the 
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‘inside’.35 In doing so, the PFLP failed to achieve change where it was most 
needed, namely in the grip on power of the external leadership and in its attitude 
towards promoting the role of grassroots leaders.  
The political program issued by the congress highlighted again the 
shallowness of the PFLP’s policy review process. The main tasks identified in 
the document alternated recurring goals such as the fight against solutions based 
on the Camp David blueprint and working for the preservation of the PLO unity, 
to objectives which had emerged during the Intifada like the empowerment of 
popular institutions and prioritising resistance activities in the OPT as the main 
stage of the conflict. All the points listed ultimately referred to the overall, 
historical goal of preventing the ‘liquidation of the Palestinian cause’ that 
became more significant than ever in light of the PLO leadership’s commitment 
to the US peace plan.36 However, such juxtaposition of slogans from different 
phases of the PLO trajectory was telling of the lack of strategic planning while, 
at the same time, it aimed at conferring a nominal comprehensiveness on the 
PFLP’s program.  
Besides the leadership’s problems, such superficiality in the PFLP’s planning 
effort was strictly related to the shortcomings that the PFLP’s analysis presented 
concerning its relations with the PLO leadership. Consistent with its rejectionist 
position, the PFLP emphasised the dangers stemming from the PLO leadership’s 
policies and full adherence to the US settlement project. Furthermore, the PFLP 
also identified in the unprecedented concentration of power into Arafat’s hands 
one of the main reasons behind PLO acceptance of the peace process opened in 
Madrid. Nonetheless, the PFLP’s analysis failed to reach the core issue lying at 
the basis of Arafat’s unreserved embrace of the Madrid process. This orientation 
was due the PLO leadership’s urgency to strike a deal that would allow its 
definitive transformation into a governing entity, salvaging it from the nearly 
fatal decline of the post-Gulf War phase.37 Apparently ignoring this shift, the 
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PFLP conceived its relationship with the ‘bourgeois, executive leadership’ as 
regulated by the principle of a dialectic ‘unity-conflict-unity process’. The PLO, 
fully considered as a liberation front, was still a viable umbrella, overarching all 
political and class differences under the prominence of the ‘contradiction’ with 
Israel.38 In the light of this analytical misconception, the PFLP could also ascribe 
the causes of the main PLO ills, such as the bureaucratisation of its personnel, to 
the misbehaviour of a personalised elite rather than to long-standing problems 
that concerned directly the PFLP as well. Consequently, the spread of corruption 
and rent-seeking, which in turn favoured support for a political settlement under 
US conditions, were due to the ‘bourgeois elements’ of the liberation movement 
that had been holding continuously the reins of power and that negatively 
influenced broad sectors of the national movement beyond the leading circle.39 
In other words, in its official analysis, the PFLP held Arafat and his circle of 
Fatah and independent associates responsible for such negative trends. Adopting 
this point of view, however, the PFLP failed to acknowledge its own 
embroilment into the bureaucratisation process. Although to a lesser extent if 
compared to Fatah, the PFLP’s cadres, especially those based in the diaspora, 
were affected by rent-seeking patterns which fuelled a conservative approach in 
policy production40. Therefore, the dependence of the PFLP’s structure on PLO 
funds undermined formulation of and support for policies that questioned the 
framework which ensured the party’s own finances. 
By the same token, the PFLP’s conception of relations within the PLO 
determined its line towards both the other ‘democratic opposition forces’ and the 
new Islamist organisations, despite their refusal to join the PLO. Concerning 
relations with the leftist factions, the PFLP affirmed that although tighter 
collaboration should be sought in order to stand up to the ‘bourgeois leadership’ 
this should not come at the expense of ‘common, national action to tackle the 
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main contradiction with Israel’.41 Such position reflected the PFLP’s reluctance 
to work for a genuine coalition with the rest of the Left, and particularly the 
DFLP, raising serious questions about the viability of the new, post-Oslo 
attempts at coordination. On the one hand the ‘fundamental contradiction’ with 
the enemy was invoked to discourage excessive intra-leftist coordination which 
supposedly would have a detrimental influence on national unity. On the other, 
the PFLP presented such contradiction as a base for an understanding with 
Hamas and Islamic Jihad in order to work together against ‘liquidatory plans’. 
However, the congress political report did not develop the idea any further, 
signalling the PFLP’s lack of clarity regarding the Islamists and its inability to 
acknowledge the challenge posed to the PLO by those forces, especially 
Hamas.42 
To conclude, this analysis of the 1993 PFLP’s Fifth National Congress 
outlines three, interrelated problems. First, the Popular Front did not take any 
resolution having a strategic depth, nor was it able to renew the membership of 
its leading bodies. The PFLP leadership, locked in a stalemate worse than that 
experienced by the PLO leadership, was unable to conceive a long-term political 
line. The study of the new phase and its understanding was identified as a 
mission itself and the mechanical adoption and implementation of certain 
principles, dialectic materialism above all, was seen as an automatic way to 
achieve change. Secondly, the fundamental tension between collaboration with 
the ‘bourgeois leadership’ and conflict with it shaped the PFLP’s analysis of the 
new phase. The inability to resolve this tension paralleled the party’s failure to 
resolve its main internal contradiction, namely that stemming from its role of 
opposition faction at the same time as its engagement as well as dependence on 
the PLO establishment. Finally, these two features emerging from the result of 
the 1993 congress appeared connected with PFLP leadership concern for its 
power within the organisation. The lack of organisational and programmatic 
renewal as well as the reiteration of traditional views of the PLO were related to 
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the preservation of the status quo within the PFLP, thus with the preservation of 
control in the hands of the exiled leadership. 
 
The Oslo Accords. 
The PLO-Israel peace accord, and the way it was negotiated, not only attracted 
PFLP rejection but apparently provoked a break with the PLO framework. 
Nonetheless, the PFLP’s concern for integration resurfaced in the formulation of 
its oppositional narrative which was eventually reframed as a fight for the PLO 
institutions. 
The Declaration of Principles (DoP) signed by the PLO and Israel in 
September 1993 represented, for wide sectors of the Palestinian national 
movement, what Edward Said called ‘an instrument of Palestinian surrender, a 
Palestinian Versailles’.43 Such a negative view of the historical agreement, 
achieved through almost a year of secret negotiations in the Norwegian capital 
Oslo, was due to the PLO Chairman’s acceptance of some of the most 
unfavourable conditions ever proposed to the PLO by its US and Israeli 
counterparts. The official renunciation of armed struggle, the acceptance of self-
administration instead of statehood, and the exclusion of core issues such as the 
fate of Palestinian refugees or an end to Israeli settlement activity were seen as 
a suppression of the Palestinian people’s rights. More than this, the accords 
represented the abandonment of what the PLO had achieved until then, 
particularly in terms of production of international law safeguarding Palestinian 
rights. The DoP referred only to the narrowest interpretation of UN Security 
Council Resolution 242 while ignoring any other resolution on the conflict. This 
meant that Arafat renounced most of the legal tools fundamental to advancing 
the Palestinian case on core aspects of the conflict such as the modalities and 
timing of Israel’s withdrawal from the OPT.44 
Inevitably, the PFLP joined the variegated group of opponents of the Oslo 
Accords. In the words of George Habash, ‘Arafat signed the act of humiliation 
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and betrayal, the surrender of our people’s rights to return, to independence and 
to the state; (…) a victory they [the Israelis] never dreamt of’.45 More 
specifically, for the PFLP, the concession of the PLO leadership over the issues 
of refugees, settlements and the end of the Intifada embodied its estrangement 
from the PLO liberation program and denial of its National Charter.46 This, in 
the PFLP’s view, was tantamount to losing completely the legitimacy stemming 
from the ‘nationalist’ tasks undertaken by the PLO throughout its historical 
trajectory. Again, the PFLP and the PLO leadership had contrasting conceptions 
of legitimisation deriving from this different understanding of the PLO’s essence 
as an institution. While the PFLP still adhered to ‘revolutionary’ sources of 
legitimacy, Arafat and his circle sought to legitimise their line by virtue of the 
international recognition that the Oslo accords received.47 Furthermore, the 
PFLP did not reject the DoP only because of its ideological underpinnings and 
its envisaged provisions to create a Palestinian self-administering authority. 
The secret Oslo negotiations and the signing of the accords represented 
another landmark in the PFLP’s marginalisation process, similar to Arafat’s 
unilateral convocation of the 17th Amman PNC, when without a prior consensus 
among the PLO factions, the Chairman succeeded in imposing his diplomatic 
line over the whole organisation.48 Through the Amman PNC, Arafat dismissed 
the founding PLO principle of consensus politics; through the Oslo accords, he 
dismissed any need for PLO sanction whatsoever. Moreover, the DoP 
represented a fait accompli that the PLO leadership presented to its leftist as well 
as its emerging Islamist opposition. Consequently, the Popular Front was not 
only deprived of any meaningful role within the PLO, but was ‘outlawed’ by the 
‘new legality’ set up in Oslo, unless it decided to join the incumbent political 
regime.  
Implicitly acknowledging this development, the PFLP’s Central Committee 
affirmed in its statement that ‘the leadership realised its political and economic 
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interests through the direct linkage with the imperialist and the Zionist plans’.49 
In the face of the new legitimisation mechanism that was being delineated, the 
PFLP expressed an initial refusal to take part. Abu Ali Mustafa clarified the 
position of his faction, confirming that the Popular Front rejected an alleged 
request from Arafat to join his institution-building efforts, though from a 
position of internal opposition, underscoring the Popular Front’s unwillingness 
to further endanger the PLO. This would have meant helping the PLO Chairman 
confer additional credibility on his upcoming PNA. Nevertheless, Arafat ‘broke 
all the bridges and destroyed all common denominators’ and this made 
‘impossible any encounter between his path and that of the PFLP’.50 From this 
position stemmed the PFLP’s call for the formation of a ‘wider national front, 
for a wider representation’. In other words, the Popular Front aimed at rallying 
the remaining nationalist forces as well as Islamist movements to form a political 
bloc capable of competing for nationalist legitimacy with the PLO leadership.51  
However, the task did not come without its challenges and contradictions. 
This return to coalition politics drew much criticism because of past, failed 
experiences, as many deemed it a repetition of an outdated political rhetoric. The 
PFLP’s leaders themselves admitted also the difficulty of building closer 
coordination with ideologically different partners such as Hamas and the Islamic 
Jihad. Besides, the PFLP’s intention to claim the PLO for ‘those committed to 
its nationalist line’ entailed an ultimate unwillingness to disengage from it, a 
position that contradicted with the Islamists’ lack of interest in joining the PLO.52 
Finally, the PFLP also renewed its commitment to strengthen its grassroots 
activities and returned to stress, at least verbally, the central role of armed 
struggle, this time in the OPT, as a mean to prevent Arafat from settling his ‘self-
administering entity’.53 While focusing on grassroots mobilisation was an urgent 
necessity for a faction that was experiencing institutional marginalisation, this 
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was to contrast paradoxically with the PFLP leadership’s fear of being sidelined 
within the PLO institutions themselves. Indeed, because of this concern, the 
PFLP’s leaders in the diaspora risked prioritising a diplomatic and institutional 
battle against the ruling Fatah elite to the detriment of a long-term investment in 
the development of its popular base in the OPT. 
 
Return to Coalition Politics. 
The post-Gulf War scenario confirmed the pattern regulating relations between 
the PFLP and DFLP: unity on the PLO level entailed distance and often 
competition between the two leftist factions, as observed during the first Intifada. 
Split between the ‘rightist’ leadership and its opposition on the left brought 
coordination between the two Fronts, out of necessity. The rapprochement 
between the Popular and the Democratic Fronts started in the wake of the Madrid 
conference; in September 1992, a year before the signing of the DoP, the two 
organisations declared the formation of a Unified Leadership. Announcing the 
renewed unity of their leaderships, the PFLP and the DFLP set as their main 
priority delegitimization of the PLO Right. The formulation of such a goal 
underscored the pre-eminence for both factions of action on the institutional 
level, despite references to grassroots mobilisation.  
From the prioritisation of institutional politics stemmed their calls for a 
referendum to gather the opinion of the ‘Palestinian masses’ outside and inside 
the OPT on their future and national course, as well as for a general strike to 
reject the ‘self-administration project’.54 The idea of a referendum kept being 
raised by the PFLP throughout the eve and aftermath of the DoP but remained 
little more than rhetoric. Conversely, this specific call for a strike received a 
mixed popular response, with stronger participation in the Lebanese and Syrian 
refugee camps and in Gaza, and a milder one in the West Bank and Jordan.55 
Nonetheless, a certain margin of action for the Unified Leadership seemed to 
emerge.  
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With the signing of the Oslo accords, the necessity of maintaining more 
consistent coordination became urgent. As mentioned earlier, the new 
association initiative raised scepticism across the national movement since it was 
seen as an automatic reply of the leftist opposition, empty of any actual 
consequence. Therefore, the PFLP needed to boost the credibility of the Unified 
Leadership and point out the qualitative difference between this new attempt at 
association with the Democratic Front and the past failed experiences. In a 
display of self-awareness, George Habash provided his analysis of the causes 
behind the failure of the Left in restraining the PLO leadership’s concessions. 
Interestingly, the Secretary-General affirmed that ‘the leftist democratic 
alternative did not materialise because it had been unable to present itself, in its 
practice, as radically different from the Right’. For this reason, explained 
Habash, a gap arose between the official program and the actual agency of the 
leftist forces. Furthermore, he also noted that the leftist factions should promote 
a new ‘national unity’ on the basis of ‘grassroots support and not of high-level 
contacts among the top cadres’. This entailed pursuing a political practice 
prioritising a social program around which popular support might be gathered. 
By virtue of this awareness, the PFLP and DFLP started a new associative effort 
that differed qualitatively from previous examples, especially in the light of the 
unprecedented challenge posed by the beginning of the peace process. The 
signing of the DoP enabled the Popular and Democratic Fronts to overcome their 
differences in ‘political tactics,’ underscoring their joint goal of impeding the 
implementation of the accords.56 Talking about the ‘objective and subjective’ 
reasons behind the need for unity of the Left, Abu Ali Mustafa reiterated some 
of these arguments. In particular, he went even further in his criticism of the 
Palestinian Left by saying that relations among the leftist factions had often been 
marked by ‘practices whose raison d’être was simply factional interest’. This 
contributed to confusing the difference between the ‘democratic forces’ and 
‘rightist bureaucratic apparatuses’ that led the campaign towards a ‘liquidatory’ 
solution.57 In the light of this self-criticism, the Popular Front appeared to push 
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into the background the factionalism and contrast between the DFLP’s 
‘moderation’ and the PFLP’s intransigence towards Fatah, two factors that 
contributed to previous failures. 
The PFLP’s analysis was nonetheless limited and did not acknowledge the 
basic flaws that hampered the action of the PLO Left in the past and would 
compromise its action in the current phase too. Both the PFLP’s Secretary-
General and his Deputy highlighted correctly some major problems, especially 
in underlining the Left’s inability to make clear its distance from the PLO Right. 
However, in doing so, they were once again unable, or unwilling, to emphasise 
the fundamental characteristics that the PFLP and DFLP shared with the Fatah 
leadership such as the bureaucratisation of the Fronts’ personnel or the ‘outside’ 
leadership’s overriding concern for self-preservation. For instance, 
bureaucratisation implied the PFLP and DFLP’s dependence on the PLO 
structure, limiting the room for manoeuvre to the space within the national 
institutions. As soon as the two Fronts were confronted with their inability to 
restrain Fatah within this space, the effectiveness of their coordination could be 
automatically questioned, opening a return to individual initiative.  
Ultimately, the formation of the Unified Leadership did recall the previous 
coalitions of leftist forces in terms of practices and political contents. 
Nevertheless, as a DFLP Politburo member explained, the two Fronts’ 
unification was necessary to secure a space for ‘democratic forces’ in the 
reconfiguration of Palestinian politics prompted by the huge and divisive impact 
of the Oslo accords.58 In other words, behind the goal of rebuilding the PLO 
institutions starting from an effective leftist, nationalist platform lay the PFLP 
and DFLP’s hopes that such a reconfiguration would bring them increased 
political weight.  
 
The Institutional Limits of Islamist-Leftist Association. 
Besides their bilateral coordination, the Popular and Democratic Fronts 
continued to pursue their declared goal of forming a ‘broad front comprehensive 
of all democratic, nationalist and Islamist forces’ opposed to the Oslo agenda. 
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This led to increased contacts with Hamas and Islamic Jihad as well as with other 
opposition factions based in Syria, and to the formation of the Alliance of 
Palestinian Forces (APF) immediately after the DoP was signed. Since this first 
attempt at association, the main problems affecting Islamist-leftist relations 
emerged clearly. The experience of the APF evidenced to what extent PLO status 
represented the ultimate barrier to effective working relations between leftist and 
Islamist factions. In particular, the PFLP’s participation in the APF highlighted 
how its adherence to the PLO framework, and the ensuing linkages with Fatah, 
clashed with its own opposition to the Palestinian leadership, shared with the 
Islamist camp. Consequently, this contradiction fostered policy fluctuation 
between superficial collaboration with Hamas and Islamic Jihad and dialogue 
with Fatah, the PLO and the PNA leadership.  
The association of leftist factions with those who the PFLP defined as 
‘fundamentalists’ just few years earlier, was another consequence of the 
reconfiguration of the Palestinian political camp that lay at the true core of the 
dispute with Fatah. In other words, apart from the ‘common denominator’ of 
opposition to the Oslo accords, the coalition was born from the need to find new 
counterweights to Arafat, particularly in the PFLP’s case.59 Therefore, the main 
rationale pushing the Popular Front towards an understanding with the Islamists 
lay in the realm of PLO ‘high politics’, in the traditional conception that the 
opposition, unable to impose its line, could at least thwart the leadership’s 
agenda through unconventional, tactical alliances. In the light of this overall 
goal, the Popular Front also hoped to reach a more consistent ‘ground 
cooperation’ with Hamas and Islamic Jihad in order to set up joint actions in the 
OPT pressuring Fatah and the PLO leadership.60 
Circumstances apparently forced the leftist and Islamist factions towards 
coordination; as evidence of this, it took several months before the different 
organisations managed to define the APF’s organisational structure and provided 
it with an initial political program. The formulation of the program itself and the 
rules supposed to coordinate relations within the Alliance were telling of the 
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considerable differences among its members. For instance, the APF was 
provided with a Central Leadership and a General Secretariat where two and one 
delegates respectively represented each faction during the meeting of these two 
bodies. This structure supposedly responded to the need for a collective decision-
making process defining the APF’s political line.61 Nevertheless, it rather 
reflected the lack of common ground in terms of ideology and political priorities 
that prevented the establishment of a more efficient executive body. Such 
differences also surfaced in how the document defined the PLO, hinting at the 
long debate that took place before the right formulation was found. The PLO 
was defined as a ‘national achievement whose successes were to be preserved 
and its institutions rebuilt on a democratic basis’.62 This definition reflected how 
the PFLP, even if it was a junior part in it, did not see the alliance as a long-term 
framework of action. In fact, Habash himself continued to stress the PFLP’s 
unwillingness to create ‘a new PLO’, a position that underlined the ultimate 
contradiction between the PFLP and DFLP’s allegiance to the PLO and the 
Islamists’ autonomy from it.63 Indeed, Hamas’ rationale behind the attempted 
associations with the Palestinian Left was undermining the PLO cohesion and 
its credibility as representative institution. Given Hamas’ historical goal of 
challenging the PLO on this ground, the Islamist faction tried to take advantage 
of internal PLO turbulence by actively contributing to its split.64 From this 
position also stemmed Hamas’ determination to be the leading force within the 
opposition camp by virtue of its wide popular base in the OPT. The PFLP, for 
its part, was arguably reluctant to disengage from a Fatah-dominated PLO to 
commit to a Hamas-dominated opposition. Consequently, these frictions further 
hindered the establishment of effective coordination on the ground in terms of 
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military action, non-violent protest and political collaboration at a grassroots 
level.65 
These obstacles affected negatively the development of the ‘broad front’ 
which still failed to materialise, despite the progress of the Oslo agenda raising 
growing scepticism among Palestinian officials and public opinion. Indeed, 
while the signing of the DoP received a mixed response in terms of support and 
opposition from public opinion in the OPT, this was not the case for the Gaza-
Jericho agreement signed in Cairo in February 1994.66 The PLO and Israeli 
officials gathered in the Egyptian capital to define the establishment of 
Palestinian self-rule on the designated area. This entailed a precise understanding 
on some sensitive issues such as control of borders and the status of Israeli 
settlements in Gaza-Jericho. Ultimately, not only did Israel retain full control on 
both the borders with Egypt and Jordan, but also enlarged the size of areas 
around the settlements, which remained outside Palestinian administration. Once 
the details of the Cairo agreement were made public, popular discontent towards 
what was interpreted as capitulation became widespread in the OPT.67 Moreover, 
the progress, and popularity, of the peace process experienced a more serious 
setback shortly after the Cairo agreement, when Baruch Goldstein, a settler 
affiliated to the Jewish far-right Kach movement, shot dead 29 Palestinian 
worshippers at the Ibrahimi mosque in Hebron. The massacre was followed by 
popular uproar throughout the OPT and diaspora and protests soon started to 
target the Oslo accords as well. The Israeli crackdown on Palestinian 
demonstrations and the Rabin government’s reluctance to tackle the settler 
movement, exemplified by the curfew imposed on the Palestinian residents of 
Hebron to protect the 450 settlers living in the old town, questioned the meaning 
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of a peace process that was not ending Israel’s repressive measures.68 The PFLP-
DFLP Unified Leadership described the crackdown as an ‘extension of the 
Ibrahimi mosque massacre’ while Oslo represented a ‘framework to 
institutionalise the occupation and ensure the preservation of the settlements’.69 
In the light of these events, the Popular and Democratic Fronts once more 
demanded Arafat’s resignation and called for ‘democratic elections to select a 
new, legitimate leadership’.70 Afterwards, in a bid to bolster their challenge to 
the Fatah leadership of the PLO, the PFLP and DFLP drafted a ‘National 
Salvation Program’, displaying their determination to pursue the unification 
process. The two factions intended this program as a ‘base for a comprehensive 
dialogue’ around which all opposition figures and organisations could gather. 
The document supported all means of struggle against occupation forces and 
called for the boycott of all the ‘self-administration authority’ institutions. The 
takeover of the PLO, restructuring of its institutions and cancellation of the Oslo 
accords were set as the ultimate goals of the opposition front. The coalition, as 
envisaged in the program, was to be founded on a democratic basis in contrast 
to the autocratic turn of the PLO leadership that led to the DoP and Oslo 
agreement. Therefore, the document proposed the organisation of ‘conferences’ 
both inside and outside Palestine to coordinate opposition activities.71 If on the 
one hand, the National Salvation Program signalled the Left’s attempt to form 
an alternative grouping within the PLO legitimated by its adherence to the 
‘nationalist agenda’, on the other, it also underscored the difficulties of the 
opposition in creating a more cohesive political body. Ultimately, this program 
appeared as a more structured call for opposition unity, but did not solve the 
organisational problems and political differences that afflicted the APF. 
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Throughout the second half of 1994, PFLP-DFLP relations appeared tighter 
than ever, and after the publication of the National Salvation Program, the 
Politburos of the two factions announced the implementation of ‘preparatory 
steps to form a united front’ by the end of the year.72 Conversely, the situation 
within the APF did not improve at all after the issuing of the program and the 
PFLP’s leaders publicly voiced their disappointment, acknowledging the limits 
of the alliance. Abu Ali Mustafa simply affirmed that the ‘performance of the 
opposition was below the required level’, while Politburo member Malluh 
maintained that ‘nobody expected that the establishment of any new grouping 
would have been enough to invert the balance of power within the PLO’. 
Furthermore, he added that the APF ‘quickly demonstrated its inability to 
become an effective coalition capable of mobilising the opposition (…) due to 
specific internal reasons’.73 The situation appeared even clearer for PFLP 
members in the OPT as demonstrated by Ghazi Abu Jiab, a Gazan activist who 
affirmed, as early as September 1994, that ‘the attempt by the Damascus-based 
leadership to forge an alliance (with Hamas) on the ground has proven a failure 
and is now over’.74 The condition of the APF did not improve during the 
following year and by mid-1995, the failure of this coalition was recognised 
officially by PFLP leaders. According to Malluh, the opposition did not grasp 
the ‘common denominators’ between the Islamist and nationalist dimensions 
stemming from the ‘aggression’ that the ‘Oslo team’ led to Palestinian unity. 
Consequently, the opposition factions were unable to overcome ‘tactical, 
ideological differences’ since only coordination between organisations that 
shared a common ideological background seemed viable.75 However, this was 
not entirely true as the Popular Front managed to maintain friendly relations with 
Islamic Jihad. This was evident in the space Al-Hadaf dedicated to interviews 
with Islamic Jihad’s Secretary-General Fathi al-Shiqaqi. The Islamist leader was 
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actually seen as a suitable partner for dialogue needed to ‘expose and overcome’ 
the contradictions existing between the ‘democratic and Islamist currents’.76 In 
the PFLP’s view, Islamic Jihad started to distinguish itself from Hamas by 
prioritising ‘core nationalist, Palestinian values’ over the Islamist social 
agenda.77 Indeed, Islamic Jihad embraced the ideological heritage of the 
Palestinian national movement and retained its revolutionary, anti-imperialist 
discourse downplaying ideological and religious differences for the sake of the 
primacy of the national question. Islamic Jihad did not adopt political Islam as a 
total rupture with the legacy of the secular organisations that traditionally 
animated the Palestinian national movement, hence the coexistence of Maoist 
principles alongside the tenets preached by Ruhollah Khomeini within Islamic 
Jihad’s political doctrine. Such an inclusive approach emphasised common 
points with the PFLP, in contrast with Hamas’ focus on the ‘Islamisation of 
society’ that fostered the scepticism of leftist factions.78  
Beyond ideological differences, the issue of commitment to the PLO 
framework was at the core of the APF’s unviability. The Islamist and leftist 
forces shared the same view and analysis of the Oslo accords but did not agree 
on their understanding of the PLO and traditional Palestinian institutions.79 The 
Unified Leadership’s unquestionable adherence to the PLO was at odds with 
Hamas and Islamic Jihad’s priority of self-assertion and challenge to the 
Palestinian political establishment. This discordant point prevented, during this 
stage as well as throughout subsequent phases, any strategic coordination, 
leaving room only for occasional collaboration. Furthermore, in the PFLP’s case, 
a short-lived involvement in the APF underscored the inconsistencies surfacing 
between shared political analyses and positions with the Islamists, concerning 
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the PNA and common ground with Fatah, stemming from decades-long 
experience within the PLO. 
 
Heights and Decline of the Unified Leadership: Joint Opposition, Separate 
Integration. 
In accordance with Malluh’s considerations, the PFLP-DFLP’s Unified 
Leadership remained active throughout the following years while the APF 
became little more than a label for the anti-Oslo organisations. The two Marxist 
factions continued to coordinate their positions and to adhere to an overall 
rejection of the peace process and the institutional steps that it entailed. 1996 
represented a central year for the course of the Unified Leadership, marking its 
highest point and the beginning of its demise. Therefore, the exploration of the 
PFLP and DFLP’s policies between late 1995 and early 1997 outlines not only 
the influence of short-term results on the experience of the Unified Leadership 
and its factions’ political readjustment. It also helps to clarify the patterns 
governing the PFLP and DFLP’s action to reintegrate Palestinian institutions. 
The PFLP and DFLP opposed the September 1995 Taba agreement (Oslo II) 
and, more significantly, both organisations decided to boycott the January 1996 
general elections for the first Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) and for the 
PNA President. Through the boycott, the Unified Leadership aimed at 
delegitimising the institutions envisaged by the Oslo peace process and thus 
strike a severe blow to the PNA and to Arafat’s agenda.80 This coordinated 
boycott marked a high point in terms of collaboration between the Popular and 
Democratic Fronts. During the past experiences of coalition building, the two 
factions split on more than one occasion exactly on participation in official PLO 
events, notably the PNC, with the PFLP espousing a more intransigent stance 
and a DFLP willing to find a common ground with Fatah, notwithstanding its 
leader’s ‘deviations’.  
Nonetheless, the PFLP and DFLP policies towards the general election 
resulted in a complete failure. Indeed, the high election turnout (71,6% of total 
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registered voters)81 not only gave further legitimacy to Yasser Arafat but also 
jeopardised the already precarious credibility of the Unified Leadership’s 
political line.82 Although the backlash of the failed boycott could have been fatal 
to PFLP-DFLP coordination, the two Fronts decided to maintain the unity of 
their Political Bureaus in the following months. The next step of the 
confrontation with the PLO leadership was to occur at the upcoming 21st session 
of the PNC, expected to vote on the Israeli-required amendments to the 
Palestinian National Charter, in particular cancellation of ‘those articles of the 
Palestinian Covenant which [denied] Israel’s right to exist’.83 Reaffirming the 
unity of the leftist opposition, George Habash and Nayef Hawatmeh declared, 
during a rally marking the DFLP’s 27th anniversary, their factions’ rejection of 
‘any amendment to the National Charter’, a move that equated to ‘emptying the 
PLO of its nationalist and combatant content’.84  
However, in the wake of the 21st PNC session, the Unified Leadership started 
to lose its cohesiveness, although its leaders repeated that they were working to 
realise a proper merger of the two Fronts. Shortly after the conclusion of the 
PNC, the Popular Front announced the suspension of its membership from all 
PLO institutions. The DFLP did not undertake such a step, showing its openness 
to re-establishing normal relations with Fatah.85  
In June, signalling its willingness to engage with the institution-building 
debate, the PFLP presented its own initiative to ‘reorganise the Palestinian 
house’. Short of options after Arafat’s successes at the general elections and the 
PNC, and in an attempt to capitalise on concern raised by the arrival in power of 
a new Likud-led government in Israel, the Popular Front hoped to garner support 
around its initiative among the different trends of Oslo critics. That is why the 
call for dialogue focused on the main points of the nationalist agenda for the 
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OPT, such as the protection of Jerusalem, the fight against the settlements and 
the protection of democracy within the new institutions and OPT society at large. 
Despite its supposed centrality for the leftist agenda in the post-election scenario, 
this initiative was not the result of the PFLP-DFLP common platform, as only 
the Popular Front’s Central Committee issued and subscribed to it. 86 As a year 
earlier, in March 1997, the PFLP took part in the DFLP’s celebration of the 
anniversary of its foundation, at which Hawatmeh restated his faction’s support 
for the ‘Unified Leadership of the opposition’.87 By this time, however, the 
Popular and Democratic Fronts’ union was more rhetorical than real and all 
projects of coalition or merger were de facto abandoned, only to be reconsidered 
again in the early 2000s.  
The failure of the political line conceived in the framework of the Unified 
Leadership clearly had a major role in determining the PFLP and DFLP leaders’ 
dissatisfactions with unity. If the exceptional nature of the Oslo accords as well 
as the strong emergence of the Islamist pole within Palestinian politics had 
fostered one of the longest examples of leftist coalitions, the ineffectiveness of 
its policies and the seemingly irresistible affirmation of the PLO Chairman’s 
agenda managed to counterweight such unifying factors and contributed to the 
end of the Unified Leadership. The creation of a joint decision-making body 
served the goal of exerting greater institutional influence. After the general 
elections and the PNC, it became clear that the Unified Leadership could not 
achieve such an objective and consequently it lost its fundamental political 
significance. In addition, factional distrust cannot be neglected as at this stage, 
it started to resurface, influencing contacts between the PFLP and DFLP’s 
cadres, especially at a middle level and within the OPT. Both sides held the other 
accountable for the failure to build a new, unified organisation but they were in 
fact unwilling to renounce the positions of control that the leaders and cadres 
enjoyed in their original factions. In particular, DFLP members accused the 
PFLP’s of displaying superiority towards the Democratic Front inasmuch as the 
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Popular Front considered itself the leading faction of the Palestinian Left. In turn, 
PFLP members condemned the DFLP’s for their alleged willingness to adopt a 
softer position regarding the Oslo accords and PLO leadership in the hope of 
benefitting politically and economically from engaging in PNA institutions.88 
With the breakup of the PFLP-DFLP Unified Leadership, the two factions 
pursued dialogue with Fatah and the PNA on an individual basis in order to 
‘normalise’ their relations and possibly explore the possibility of joining the Oslo 
institutions. The separate processes of reconciliation with Fatah allowed the 
differing views the two Front held on the matter to emerge. While the PFLP was 
more cautious in its dialogue with Arafat’s faction, the DFLP aimed at 
participating directly in the negotiating process with Israel as part of the PLO 
delegation.89 Ultimately, by engaging in this dialogue, the Popular and 
Democratic Fronts confirmed the pattern according to which the fragmentation 
of the Palestinian Left drove its main factions to reconsider their relations with 
the PLO mainstream in an attempt to find a settlement with it. In addition, the 
failure of the PFLP-DFLP oppositional agenda not only signalled a fairly sudden 
shift in their orientations towards Fatah and the PNA. It also showed that the 
research and retention of PLO integration occurred on a factional basis, although 
engaging the old and new Palestinian institutions did not represent an 
overwhelmingly divisive point between the PFLP and DFLP at this stage. 
 
Between Rejection and Acceptance. 
Throughout its membership of the PLO, the Popular Front’s position towards the 
Fatah line often evolved from total refusal to pragmatic acceptance of the fait 
accompli. In the trajectory leading to acceptance of the new political reality, the 
Popular Front followed a pattern that kept occurring several times. Rejection was 
first followed by the attempt to form a counterweight to Fatah’s dominating 
position in the PLO by trying to establish a coalition with other factions. The 
coalition then appears increasingly unable to meet its own goals, allowing some 
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of the Left’s deep-rooted problems to emerge. The opposition alliance fails to 
attract enough popular support for its alternative programme, external sponsors 
tend to look at it as an instrument for expanding their own influence, and the 
factions composing it do not coordinate effectively within PLO bodies due to 
diverging interests and mutual distrust. Because of this failure, a dialogue with 
the contending part starts on a bilateral basis, facilitated by the PFLP’s historic 
concern for the preservation of PLO unity. Ultimately, the PFLP ends up 
accepting the new political status quo, sticking to the role of loyal opposition. 
Such acceptance leads in turn to a subsequent reframing of the political narrative 
in order to justify the shift. Such a pattern represented the primary level of the 
PFLP’s policy fluctuation and, as the present study aims at demonstrating, was 
directly linked to the opposition-integration dilemma experienced by the Popular 
Front. 
The gradual shift from rejection to acceptance occurred, for instance, with the 
1974 Ten Points Program, the approval of which at the 12th PNC prompted the 
PFLP’s suspension of its participation in the PLO Executive Committee. 
Consequently, the PFLP became the main faction within the ‘Rejection Front’ 
that aimed at opposing Fatah’s ‘moderate’ line. Inability to confront Arafat’s 
faction within PLO institutional bodies and the difficulty of managing intra-
factional relations prevented the Rejection Front from pursuing its main goal. 
These problems, coupled with broader regional developments, such as the 
Egypt-Israel Camp David agreement, finally determined the PFLP’s acceptance 
of the Ten Points Program by 1979.90 This pattern resurfaced again in the mid-
1980s and, predictably, in the wake of the DoP and Gaza-Jericho agreement. In 
the post-Oslo phase, the acceptance process was gradual and, specifically, 
characterised by the predicament of finding a viable third way between the two 
‘new’ main poles of Palestinian politics, namely the PNA and its Islamist 
opposition, while shifting closer to one or the other according to the PFLP’s 
political priorities. Therefore, the growing polarisation of post-Oslo Palestinian 
politics exacerbated the PFLP’s policy fluctuation. In this context, the Popular 
                                                          




Front tended to adopt an official discourse condemning the overall tenets and 
establishment of the post-Oslo Palestinian politics and institutions, displaying a 
narrative closer to Hamas’ view. At the same time, it nonetheless submitted to 
the Oslo establishment by gradually joining some of its institutions, thus crossing 
de-facto the line that separated the PFLP from the ‘Oslo camp’. Such 
predicament continued to mark the whole Palestinian Left’s experience 
throughout the following decade and remains controversial today. 
  
A Gradual Shift: Seeking Integration, Preserving Authority.    
In the post-Oslo political scenario, the gradual shift towards acceptance of the 
new status quo started with the PFLP’s early engagement in the political debate 
prompted by the first PNA measures. The Popular Front thus started to intervene 
in the Oslo-driven state-building process and on the reorganisation of institutions 
in the OPT. In these initial phases of its acceptance of post-Oslo politics, the 
PFLP responded due to its concern to retain influence over local institutions, but 
also because of the exiled leadership’s desire to reassert its control over the 
PFLP’s OPT branch. Both political and organisational divergences fuelled the 
inside-outside divide after the Oslo accords, and while this phenomenon affected 
all PLO factions, in the PFLP’s case, it emphasised the oscillations of its political 
line.  
Notwithstanding the PFLP’s discourse around the ‘lost legitimacy of the PLO 
leadership’ and the official boycott of the self-administration institutions, the 
first signs of PFLP-Fatah dialogue emerged in the second half of 1994. Indeed, 
the PFLP agreed to hold talks with Fatah concerning the formation of 
municipalities in the OPT in the hope of retaining some influence within local 
institutions. Although ultimately the Popular Front did not play a relevant role 
in the process, a first shift in its rhetoric occurred, showing how the PFLP was 
starting to accept the rules of post-Oslo Palestinian politics. As Arafat selected 
municipalities’ staff according to political loyalty, a new priority for the PFLP 
was counteracting the ‘dictatorial’ trends that characterised the installation of the 
PNA.91 
                                                          
91 Usher, Barghouti, and Abu Jiab, “Arafat and the Opposition,” 24. 
218 
 
Throughout 1995, the Popular Front did not relinquish its condemnation of 
the ‘surrender path’ undertaken by the PLO leadership, continually denouncing 
the overall underpinnings of the Oslo process as well as expressing its rejection 
of the new agreements signed by the PLO and Israel.92 In particular, it articulated 
concern over the Taba agreement, which envisioned the creation of three types 
of areas in the OPT, regulating and further limiting Palestinian sovereignty over 
the Territories.93 Nonetheless, the PFLP demonstrated its interest in engaging in 
the political debate according to the new coordinates of Palestinian politics set 
by the Oslo accords. An example of this approach was provided by the PFLP’s 
reaction to publication of the draft law on political parties issued by the PNA.94 
The Unified Leadership issued a statement to express its disapproval concerning 
the bill, in which its condemnation stemmed partly from official opposition to 
the Oslo accords, but also from disagreement with the specific provisions 
included in the draft law itself. The Popular and Democratic Fronts condemned 
the bill because it was issued by an authority whose legitimacy derived from the 
Oslo process. At the same time, they criticised the fact that the law had been 
drafted directly by the PNA Presidency ‘in absence of a legislative authority’, 
and called all critics, including Oslo supporters such as the PPP and Fidaʾ, to 
demand that the President transfer his authority on the matter to the Committee 
for Parties Licensing. The issues of democracy and plurality resurfaced again, as 
the document pointed to the authoritarian trends of the self-administration 
government that retained a veto power on which parties could be admitted into 
the political game. In another sign suggesting acknowledgement of the new 
status quo, the Unified Leadership questioned the Palestinian people on ‘what 
kind of state’ they wanted to build in ‘this transitional phase’. 95 
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The January 1996 general elections represented a real turning point in the 
PFLP’s acceptance of the new political context, and showed the connection 
between shifts in policy orientation and the inside-outside divide. At this stage, 
delegitimization of the Oslo process and of Arafat’s authority was still the main 
goal of the PFLP leadership. In light of this, the Popular Front’s leaders could 
not agree to take part in an electoral process whose main goals were 
demonstrating popular support for the peace accords and giving ‘Arafat a 
mandate’ and ‘legitimacy to a new political order’.96 In the PFLP’s view, the 
whole process simply entailed providing a ‘nationalist cover’ to yet another of 
‘Israel’s victories’. Furthermore, the Popular Front contested the democratic 
bases of the electoral process.97 The electoral law had been imposed by the 
PNA’s Executive without prior debate and the adoption of a ‘district-based, 
winner-take-all electoral system’ favoured local elite groups as well as 
candidates affiliated to Arafat. These groups, despite their lack of national 
consensus, were able to exert strong leverage on a local basis through providing 
services and assistance to their constituencies. Conversely, the electoral system 
was more unfavourable to smaller PLO factions such as the PFLP, stronger on a 
national level but unable to compete on such a basis within each district.98 
Notwithstanding this general stance in favour of a boycott, the PFLP 
leadership did not enjoy a full internal consensus. As during the First Intifada, 
local PFLP members did not agree with the line dictated by the external 
leadership. However, if during the uprising the emergence of such a division 
could be seen as a new phenomenon, in the post-Oslo phase it became structural 
and continued to concern all the PLO factions. Of all the elements that 
characterised the divide between the outside and the inside branches of the 
Palestinian national movement, the most significant was the different structure 
of political organisation and mobilisation. While in the diaspora political 
mobilisation tended to follow a ‘top-down’ trend, with the political and military 
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leaders prompting the engagement of the Palestinian masses, in the OPT the 
conditions experienced by the population favoured grassroots mobilisation. 
Outside the OPT, the PLO created those civil and military institutions that 
shaped diaspora civil society and enabled the political mobilisation of 
Palestinian refugees. The growth of the institutional dimension and the 
bureaucratisation process experienced during the Lebanese phase emphasised 
this aspect, as the PLO started to draw its legitimacy also from implementation 
of its ‘quasi-state’ functions. Conversely, the presence of the Occupation 
prevented the formation of fully structured political entities, favouring the spread 
of grassroots organisations such as trade unions and popular committees. This 
kind of political mobilisation fostered a more inclusive decision-making process 
that was to conflict with the hierarchical structure of the PLO executive bodies.99  
Indeed, the inside-outside divide was more manifest within Fatah, particularly 
because Arafat relied on formerly Tunis-based cadres to set up the PNA 
institutions following the Gaza-Jericho agreement. Afterwards, a fully-fledged 
political battle broke out within the ranks of Fatah as general elections were 
being organised. The returnees tried to assert themselves over local leaders 
within Fatah’s official lists, enjoying in so doing Arafat’s full backing.100 
Although inside-outside competition was not so open within the Popular Front, 
given the leadership’s initial refusal to return to the OPT, the exiled leaders of 
the organisation did actively obstruct the rise of possible internal competitors on 
several occasions. First, according to some reports, the PFLP aligned with other 
PLO factions during the 1991 20th PNC in obstructing a proposal by the PPP to 
allow more OPT activists to be represented within PLO institutions.101 
Furthermore, as was made clear earlier, the PFLP’s 1993 Fifth General Congress 
did not elect any OPT cadres to the Politburo or Central Council of the 
organisation. The external leadership’s desire to cling to internal power was 
made clear as soon as the facts disavowed the line that the ‘outside’ had imposed 
concerning the 1996 election. In the aftermath of the vote, the PFLP leadership 
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started working to move its veteran leaders into the OPT, exploiting the new 
PNC’s sessions as the first opportunity to fulfil this task. 
 In relation to the elections, the strife within the PFLP was due to local cadres’ 
fear that the boycott would further marginalise the PFLP. Such concern led some 
leaders in the OPT to urge the Politburo in Damascus to accept the new 
institutions as a matter of fact and oppose Fatah and the other supporters of the 
peace process from inside the Oslo political regime. Al-Hadaf’s Editor-in-Chief 
Fahd al-Qudsi dismissed these concerns as simply mistaken because the priority 
for the opposition was ‘removing any nationalist justification’ from the political 
operation that lied behind the elections.102 However, among these OPT cadres, 
Ryad al-Malky and Ghazi Abu Jiab voiced publicly their opposition to the line 
adopted by the exiled leadership and decided to defy the orders coming from 
Damascus and run in the election. Ultimately, al-Malky ceded to internal 
pressures and renounced to his candidature while Abu Jiab held his position and 
joined a Gaza list that saw Haydar ʿAbd al-Shafi, the widely-respected former 
director of the Red Crescent Society, at its head.103 The wide popular turnout of 
the elections finally proved mistaken all the PFLP leadership’s calculations, 
underscoring its alienation from OPT grassroots politics. The blow was 
particularly severe for the whole leftist opposition because an overwhelming 
majority of its supporters went to the polls to cast their ballot and some of its 
local cadres gained seats as independents.104 This demonstrated that the PLO 
leftist opposition did not hold total control over its membership in the OPT. In 
fact, the erosion of the Left’s entrenchment in the Territories during the first half 
of the 1990s was linked to the lack of democracy within the leftist factions. The 
leadership’s imposition of its decisions concerned both the members’ political 
line and the orientations of the associated organisations in terms of projects and 
activities. Consequently, such strict implementation of democratic centralism 
pushed an increasing number of grassroots activists to disillusionment and to 
abandon their organisations.105   
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The utter failure of the boycott strategy had a direct impact on the PFLP, 
which decided to attend the 21st session of the PNC to be held in Gaza in April 
1996. This meant that the Popular Front’s leadership had decided to return to the 
OPT under the provisions of the Oslo accords. Such a decision prompted harsh 
criticisms from the Islamist opposition, which supposedly was still in partnership 
with the PFLP within the framework of the APF.106 Indeed, after refusing to 
provide a ‘nationalist cover’ to the PLO leadership and Israel plans, the Popular 
Front allowed its members to attend a PNC session supposed to deliver what the 
Israeli side required during bilateral negotiations, namely the treatment of such 
a highly sensitive issue as amendment of the Palestinian National Charter. Thus, 
Malluh’s intervention during the Council to condemn ‘any modification of the 
Charter’ did not appear credible, underscoring the PFLP’s predicament.107 
The development of the PFLP leadership’s efforts on the institutional level 
showed the interconnection between the failure of its strategy and its concerns 
over internal power. Both these factors contributed to the shift towards increased 
dialogue with the PNA and acceptance of the post-Oslo status quo. In other 
words, within the tension between opposition and integration, these aspects tilted 
the balance in favour of the PFLP’s quest for re-inclusion in both the old and 
new Palestinian institutions.  
 
Looking for a Settlement: The Final Shift towards Integration. 
Starting from late 1996, the PFLP definitively reoriented its political action in 
order to reach a settlement with Fatah and the PNA concerning its presence in 
the OPT. This change in policy orientation marked the last step of the PFLP’s 
major shift from total rejection of the post-Oslo regime to its acceptance. In other 
words, it represented the outcome of policy fluctuation on its main level, 
prompted by failure of the PFLP’s oppositional agenda and its need to preserve 
some political influence through the reorganisation of its structure in the OPT 
according to the post-Oslo coordinates. 
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Finally, the Popular Front displayed officially its willingness to open a new 
course and start a comprehensive dialogue in June 1996, with the circulation of 
a ‘political initiative to reorganise the Palestinian house’. The initiative aimed at 
‘opening the way of dialogue among all the Palestinian political forces and 
trends (…) and restore national unity’. The logical starting point of the document 
was the result of the Israeli elections, in which, unexpectedly, the right-wing 
Likud party led by Benjamin Netanyahu defeated Shimon Peres’ Labour Party, 
raising serious concerns within the peace camp. The PFLP claimed that in the 
light of the Oslo failure and the rise to power in Israel of a political force openly 
opposed to the peace process, a new space for the reconsideration of the 
‘nationalist program’ had emerged.108  
In order to support politically the initiative, PFLP leaders such as Taysir 
Qubʿa stressed the ‘historical commitment’ of the Popular Front to the fight 
against all national fragmentations and underlined how mending the division 
could also promote democracy and repel authoritarianism in the new Palestinian 
political arena.109 The shift in PFLP discourse emerged clearly in a Central 
Committee statement issued in December 1996 in which the Popular Front 
prioritised the need for a ‘field unity to confront the [Israeli] policies of 
settlement, judaisation and siege’.110 In addition to this, according to some 
reports, during this Central Council session the PFLP decided to allow its 
members to join the lower ranks of the PNA institutions, specifically the public 
administration and the Civil Police. The boycott of upper posts that entailed 
direct contact with the Israeli counterpart remained intact; nonetheless, a line had 
clearly been crossed.111  
The dialogue continued at difference paces throughout 1997 but nonetheless 
it started to have its first major effects. After ʿAbd al-Rahim Malluh’s return, the 
PFLP started considering the relocation of other high profile cadres to the OPT. 
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According to the declaration released by Abu Ali Mustafa in the wake of his 
return to the OPT in September 1999, the Popular Front had already decided in 
1996 to dispatch its Deputy Secretary-General to the territories but a last-minute 
Israeli refusal delayed Mustafa’s instalment ‘inside’ Palestine.112 Nevertheless, 
at this stage, rumours about the possible return of George Habash himself started 
to spread when the Secretary-General set the new PFLP focus by declaring that 
‘the contradiction with the enemy had to be prioritised over all other 
contradictions’ in a clear reference to divergences with the PNA. In this regard, 
Habash specified that the Popular Front intended to settle all differences within 
the Palestinian camp democratically, renewing the PFLP’s availability to discuss 
all aspects concerning the crisis of intra-Palestinian relations.113  
The Popular Front once again resorted extensively to its traditional Maoist 
concept of ‘changing contradictions’ to justify its shifting line and even hard-
liners, notably Abu Ali Mustafa, consistently adhered to the new narrative.114 
Besides being addressed to the PFLP’s own base, this discourse also aimed at 
responding to attacks coming from Hamas. Beyond the overall rejection of the 
Oslo accords and institutions, the Islamist movement was displeased by the final 
PFLP choice to remain within the traditional framework of the Palestinian 
national movement. In a phase at which the peace process was ostensibly 
delivering some of its promises in the forms of elections and direct Palestinian 
administration, the orientation of the PLO secular opposition did not play in 
favour of Hamas’ claim to lead the national movement.115 In addition to ‘primary 
and secondary contradictions’, the Popular Front ideologues tried to justify their 
faction’s stance by also invoking the place that the PLO, as utmost national 
framework and achievement, had always occupied in the PFLP’s view of the 
Palestinian national movement. By claiming its commitment to ‘reform and 
rebuilding’ of the PLO, the Popular Front artificially separated it from the 
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overlapping PNA. As Malluh maintained, while great dangers to the cause still 
stemmed from self-administration, a common agenda was nonetheless needed to 
tackle those issues on which a consensus could be built, namely resistance to 
Israel’s colonial practices on the ground such as settlement construction and 
political arrests.116 Such positions underscored both the PFLP’s fluctuating line 
as well as its inability to propose an alternative, notwithstanding that the 
frameworks of the APF and, more significantly, the Unified Leadership still 
existed. As had already emerged clearly, and would again surface in future 
phases, the dependence of the PFLP’s bureaucratic apparatus on the PLO 
represented an insurmountable barrier to its political agency. 
The PFLP’s willingness, therefore, to pursue dialogue with Fatah and the 
PNA ultimately reflected its weaker position. The Popular Front wanted to 
reorganise its network in the Territories and to this end it needed to find a 
settlement with its counterparts as soon as possible. From this, stemmed the 
frustration when Arafat delayed his response to the PFLP’s dialogue initiative or 
when a given talks session failed to achieve the hoped results.117 The Fatah-PFLP 
dialogue was finally upgraded in summer 1999, when a PFLP Central 
Committee delegation headed by Abu Ali Mustafa met with a Fatah team chaired 
by Arafat himself in Cairo. Shortly after, another round of talks in Amman was 
concluded with the issue of a joint Fatah-PFLP statement. The talks officially 
focused on a review process of intra-Palestinian relations and supposedly of the 
whole trajectory of the Palestinian question since the signing of the Oslo accords. 
This entailed finding some common ground concerning adherence to the ‘PLO 
nationalist program’, activities to confront Israel’s policies, and the necessary 
‘steps towards the statehood declaration’. The PFLP, for its part, put particular 
stress on the reform of PLO institutions, from trade unions in the OPT to the 
higher institutional bodies, and particularly the reactivation of the PNC, 
conceived as the ‘true Palestinian Parliament’ whose members were to be 
directly elected by the people, whatever its location.118 However, given the 
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PFLP’s priority of tackling its organisational problems in the OPT, the main 
issues at stake were the return of Abu Ali Mustafa to the Territories and the 
release of PFLP activists detained in PNA prisons.119 The return of the Labour 
Party to power in Israel in May 1999 probably contributed to achieving the most 
important of these two goals, notably the return of the PFLP’s Deputy-Secretary 
General to the OPT. After Arafat obtained the necessary approval from the 
Israeli authorities, Abu Ali Mustafa crossed the Allenby Bridge and arrived in 
Jericho on September 30 1999, making his return to Palestine after 32 years of 
exile.120 
The entrance into the territories of the next PFLP Secretary-General marked 
the final acceptance of the post-Oslo status quo. Although the PFLP still believed 
that the national movement was in a phase of national liberation, offering no real 
space for state building, at the same time it wanted to ‘secure a political, 
organisational and institutional structure likely to form a strong foundation upon 
which to declare a Palestinian State,’ as Abu Ali said in an interview shortly 
before his return. The Deputy-Secretary went so far as to say that the PFLP might 
not oppose a final status agreement, were its content to satisfy requirements 
concerning Palestinian sovereignty and right of return for Palestinian 
refugees.121 The PFLP continued to affirm its rejection of the PNA as a direct 
emanation of the Oslo agreement, but the de facto settlement it found with the 
self-administration governing faction, implied that the PFLP continued to adhere 
to its role of loyal opposition. This ultimate shift underscored the PFLP’s final 
prioritisation of political and institutional integration over its oppositional role, 
confirming the repetition of a pattern observed several times during previous 
phases. However, the outbreak of the Al-Aqsa Intifada in September 2000 would 
show the definitive marginalisation that the PFLP now experienced. The 
opposition-integration dilemma continued to determine the PFLP’s agency and 
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policy fluctuation occurred with even more clarity as the new uprising unleashed 
a further reconfiguration of Palestinian political balances. 
 
Conclusions. 
The study of the PFLP’s conduct throughout the 1990s evidences two levels of 
fluctuation. First, a macro-level, consisting of the shift from total rejection of the 
Oslo accords to de facto acceptance of the political scenario shaped by the peace 
process. Secondly, a micro-level that affected the PFLP’s approach towards 
relations with other Palestinian factions and its base in the OPT. 
The opposition-integration dilemma continued to represent a major cause of 
PFLP policy fluctuation. Outstanding events, such as the 1991 US attack on Iraq 
and the collapse of the USSR, had a negative fallout, emphasising the PFLP’s 
dilemma. The economic crisis and the demise of a paramount political model 
that these two events sparked strengthened the PFLP’s need to maintain 
integration in the PLO notwithstanding the 1993 Oslo accords. Such an issue 
determined the PFLP’s focus on institutional politics in its attempt to confront 
the accords themselves. 
The PFLP’s predicament already appeared clear during its 1993 Fifth 
National Congress. The absence of ideological renewal, the minor relevance of 
organisational reshuffling, and the lack of a program for the new phase reflected 
such conditions. The failure to achieve genuine renewal stemmed from the lack 
of strategic planning which was in turn linked to the dependence of the PFLP 
leadership on the PLO framework as well as to the bureaucratisation of the 
PFLP’s structure. This forged an overall conservative approach that served the 
PFLP leadership goal of maintaining control over the organisation. 
The signing of the Oslo accords brought the PFLP’s opposition-integration 
dilemma to an unprecedented level. While Arafat committed the PLO to a 
conflict settlement that the Front historically opposed, the PFLP was unable, and 
unwilling, to emancipate itself from it, consequently working for an unlikely 
change of balance within the PLO. The formation of the PFLP-DFLP Unified 
Leadership represented an attempt to delegitimise the PLO Chairman’s line 
within national institutions. To this end, the Unified Leadership’s attempted 
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association with the Islamist opposition within the framework of the APF 
developed. While in contrast with the PFLP’s own rhetoric calling for grassroots 
mobilisation against the Oslo accords, the focus on PLO institutional politics 
also reflected the outside leadership’s will to prevent inside cadres from gaining 
prominence. Indeed, several local PFLP leaders increasingly called for 
opposition to Arafat from within the PNA. However, the prioritisation of PNA 
politics over the PLO might have entailed a rise of PFLP leaders already in the 
OPT to the detriment of the exiled leadership.  
Ultimately, the line of PLO institutional opposition proved both ineffective 
and counterproductive. The PFLP’s position towards the 1996 Palestinian 
general elections was a case in point. The wide turnout evidenced the PFLP 
leadership’s alienation from OPT politics as well as the gap with its base, while 
the boycott ended up strengthening the legitimacy of the post-Oslo political 
regime. On the OPT ground, the PFLP’s lack of action appeared all the more ill-
fated as the PNA asserted its presence while Islamist factions, especially Hamas, 
continued to enlarge their grassroots presence. The subsequent PFLP leadership 
decision to return to Palestine under the terms of the Oslo accords not only 
marked the utter failure of its strategy and its will to maintain authority over the 
local organisation, but also underscored the final step of fluctuation on the 
macro-level. 
The PFLP’s adherence to the PLO framework also embodied the cause behind 
the unviability of associations with the Islamist factions. Beyond ideological 
differences, such a stance clashed with the Islamists’ refusal to recognise the 
primacy of the PLO. As this point prevented effective coordination, the PFLP 
shifted back towards dialogue with Fatah. However, in the light of the Oslo 
accords, the PFLP’s ‘loyal opposition’ fostered the perceived absence of any 
differences within the PLO as well as the lack of credibility of the PFLP’s 
opposition. 
  The prevalence of ‘institution politics’ and the persistence of factional 
calculations lay also behind the failure of the Unified Leadership. On the one 
hand, the ineffective policies of ‘institutional’ delegitimization undermined the 
credibility of the Unified Leadership’s opposition. On the other, the two Fronts’ 
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leadership reluctance to share control over their factions represented a further 
obstacle to the realisation of genuine unity. This, in turn, led both factions to 
seek a separate settlement with the PNA once the possibility of stopping its rise 
vanished. Such an orientation represented remarkable inconsistency, as effective 
coordination would have brought more political weight within the PNA. 
At the end of the decade, the PFLP had to confront a well-established Islamist 
opposition which increasingly delegitimised the Left’s oppositional role within 
the PLO, especially as the PNA de facto overrode it. At the same time, the 
PFLP’s unclear acceptance of the PNA paved the way towards a complication 







Chapter 5 - The Al-Aqsa Intifada and after: The PFLP’s 
Contradictions in the New Millennium. 
 
Introduction. 
The failure to delegitimise the Oslo peace process and the institutions it 
established led the PFLP to deal with the PNA and the post-Oslo political regime 
as an enduring reality. Therefore, starting from the second half of the 1990s and 
throughout the 2000s, the PFLP sought integration into this political regime, 
while trying to reformulate the bases for its opposition to the PLO and PNA 
leadership. Consequently, the tensions stemming from the opposition-
integration dilemma appeared strengthened, rendering the policy fluctuation 
pattern more evident. As was the case in previous phases, the wider opposition-
integration dilemma combined with specific sources of tension emerged in this 
period. The conditions of post-Oslo politics, the specific dynamics of the Al-
Aqsa Intifada and the exacerbation of the Hamas-Fatah competition combined 
with the overall contradiction affecting the PFLP’s agency. In this context, its 
marginalisation appeared solidified, leaving the Popular Front close to total 
irrelevance.   
In the late 1990s and until the outbreak of the Al-Aqsa Intifada in September 
2000, the PFLP focused its narrative on the need to democratise the OPT 
political arena and the PNA’s institutions. On an official level, the PFLP called 
for reactivation of the PLO to oversee the functioning of the PNA as well as for 
stronger national unity in the fight against the PNA’s corruption and autocratic 
practices. On an informal level, activists from the PFLP and other leftist forces 
committed their efforts to fostering civil society politics as a barrier to the PNA’s 
power. This occurred mainly within the framework of the fast-developing NGO 
sector. However, the de facto supremacy of the PNA, and within it of Fatah 
leadership, over the PLO, raised serious doubts over the viability of the PFLP’s 
line. Moreover, as the PLO increasingly played a mere nominal role in granting 
formal recognition to the PNA, the PFLP’s participation in its institutions 
contributed to strengthening the legitimacy of the PNA without an actual chance 
to influence its policies. The leftist activists’ commitment in an NGO sector fully 
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dependent on the economic and political Oslo regime accentuated the lack of 
practical implications of the PFLP and the Palestinian Left’s opposition.  
The beginning of the Al-Aqsa Intifada implied the possibility of a 
rearrangement of the Palestinian political arena. The wide popular rejection of 
the peace process could bring about a consensus-based rapprochement among 
the Palestinian factions, a prospect that would ensure more leverage to small 
factions such as the PFLP. Nevertheless, the development of the uprising, in 
particular its militarisation, the fragmentation of the Palestinian camp, and the 
Hamas-Fatah/PNA polarisation, emphasised the PFLP’s oscillation between 
resistance and political settlement. On the military level, the PFLP alternated 
joint operations alongside other forces with actions dictated by intra-factional 
competition and the need to retaliate against Israel. On the political level, the 
PFLP pushed for a new consensus within the Palestinian national movement 
through a series of ‘national initiatives’ intended to foster intra-factional 
dialogue. However, Hamas and Fatah/PNA priorities, respectively the 
continuation of the Intifada and the enforcement of a unilateral Palestinian 
ceasefire, appeared irreconcilable. Consequently, the PFLP’s efforts to mediate 
evidenced its fluctuation between a ‘resistant’ and a ‘pragmatic’ discourse, 
resulting in a token attempt to carve a role in the polarising Palestinian arena. 
These developments, alongside the harsh repression that the PFLP experienced 
at the hands of both Israel and the PNA Security Forces, turned the Al-Aqsa 
Intifada from a possible opportunity into a further step towards marginalisation. 
After Arafat’s death in November 2004 and the end of the uprising in 
February 2005, the PFLP continued to aim at integration within a Palestinian 
polity in transition. This led to full acceptance of the post-Oslo institutions and 
the PFLP’s participation in both the 2005 presidential and the 2006 legislative 
ballots. Nonetheless the Hamas-Fatah/PNA polarisation and power conflict 
further highlighted the PFLP’s shifting positions. Ultimately, the PFLP’s 
political and economic dependence from the PLO/PNA framework was at the 
base of its shift from support of Hamas to alignment with Fatah during the 2006-
2007 conflict. In sum, as the following chapter will show, the enduring PFLP 
inability to disengage from the traditional Palestinian political framework 
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perpetuated its policy fluctuation as the Front struggled to retain its oppositional 
role.  
 
The Need for New Bases for the PFLP’s Opposition Line.   
One of the main symptoms of the crisis that the PFLP had been experiencing 
since the loss of the Lebanese sanctuary was its constant and unsuccessful quest 
for a new political initiative that could compete with Fatah’s agenda. The fast-
changing scenarios in which the PFLP operated forced it to rethink the 
framework of its opposition to the PLO leadership several times. After 1982, the 
PFLP tried to present its alternative on the basis of a radical option opposed to 
Arafat’s leanings toward the US and the so-called Jordan option. Again, during 
the first phases of the 1987 Intifada, the PFLP focused on achieving mass civil 
disobedience to restrain a PLO leadership willing to capitalise diplomatically on 
the Intifada. After the signing of the 1993 Oslo accords, the radical foundation 
of the PFLP’s initiatives appeared increasingly weaker. The emergence of 
Hamas as new, main opposition force as well as the popular inability to 
dissociate the leftist factions from the PLO leadership jeopardised the PFLP’s 
chances of setting up a credible and effective counterweight to the ‘Oslo team’.  
With the ultimate failure to delegitimise the peace process and Abu Ali 
Mustafa’s resettlement in the OPT yet another phase opened. Never before the 
PFLP had to rethink its priorities and its tactical goals to this extent. Such tasks 
appeared even more urgent as the deadline for final status negotiations between 
Israel and the PLO approached. The settlement of the conflict that might ensue 
from final status talks, in the PFLP’s view, still equated to the liquidation of the 
Palestinian cause. During the first half of 2000, the PFLP sought new 
foundations for its action and new interim goals.  
 
Integrating the PNA: Democratisation and Commitment to Civil Society. 
After Abu Ali Mustafa’s return to the OPT in late 1999 and the de-facto 
acceptance of the post-Oslo political scenario, the PFLP had to come to terms 
with the inconsistencies that such a step entailed. In fact, such inconsistencies 
emerged as soon as the high-profile dialogue between the PFLP and Fatah started 
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in early 1999. The main issue that the contacts with Fatah had raised was a 
possible PFLP acceptance of the PNA’s legitimacy and a potential interest in 
joining its institutions.1 Hence, as the PFLP continued to stress its opposition to 
Oslo, it now had to reformulate the basis of its oppositional role. In the attempt 
to fulfil this task, the PFLP thus had to resolve the contradiction stemming from 
acknowledging the PNA while opposing its founding principles and its agenda. 
This position mirrored to some extent that which the Popular Front maintained 
towards the PLO in previous phases and reflected its unwillingness to disengage 
from participation in Palestinian institutions.  
In this context, the PFLP’s official narrative focused on democratising the 
Palestinian political arena in the OPT and the PNA’s practices. Such focus on 
democratisation aimed at capitalising on the discontent provoked by widespread 
corruption within the PNA’s bureaucracy as well as by the authoritarian practices 
of its security services. As the PNA settled in the OPT, Arafat employed the 
nascent public sector to reconstruct his patronage network. His absolute control 
of state bureaucracy enabled the PNA President to keep control on PLO 
returnees, local activists and notables alike through their inclusion or exclusion 
from the public service.2 This, in turn, fostered corruption and rent-seeking 
patterns all through the echelons of the PNA’s public sector, which ensured 
loyalty to the Palestinian political leadership.3 The PNA leadership also enforced 
its rule on the OPT by relying on multiple security services which were created 
both to respect the security requirements envisaged in the Oslo accords and to 
incorporate the returnee and local PLO military personnel. Consequently, 
policing the Palestinian population and repressing opposition to the PNA state-
building project quickly became a paramount priority for Palestinian self-
government.4 
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Many leftist activists, therefore, saw a chance to counter the PNA’s 
corruption and authoritarianism by empowering Palestinian civil society, and in 
particular its main actors, namely the Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs). 
The effort to democratise the Oslo-derived Palestinian polity thus equated to 
building a counterweight to the PNA’s leadership. Civil society and NGOs 
apparently provided a suitable space to achieve this goal.5 Nevertheless, as the 
NGOs became increasingly embedded into the post-Oslo economic and political 
regime, their development contributed to the state-building process, ultimately 
bolstering the legitimacy of the PNA that represented the core of such a process. 
The NGOs’ recourse to the legislative and judiciary bodies, as is shown in this 
section, reinforced the PNA’s state functions without ultimately succeeding in 
embodying an effective counterbalance to it.6 
On the level of the official narrative, the PFLP framed the basis of its line 
starting from the need to define this new phase in the course of the Palestinian 
national movement. As the PLO Executive Council member ʿAbd al-Rahim 
Malluh clarified, the Popular Front needed to challenge Fatah and the PNA’s 
public discourse aimed at presenting the current phase as one of coexistence with 
Israel, in which nationalist commitment equated to contributing to the state-
building effort. Despite the implementation of the Oslo accords and the 
establishment of a self-governing authority with limited powers, the core of the 
Palestinian issue remained unresolved. The Palestinian national movement was 
still going through a phase of national liberation, but its political forces had to 
renew the understanding of this concept. In Malluh’s words, this entailed 
rebuilding the ‘national institutions of the Palestinian people’, first and foremost 
the PLO. Interestingly, the PNA figured as well. Its reconstruction on a 
democratic basis could ‘provide a solid base for Palestinian unity’.7 Thus, the 
issue of the democratisation of the OPT political space started to acquire 
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centrality in the PFLP’s view. As Abu Ali Mustafa also pointed out, the presence 
of the PNA, and of its political and institutional by-products, was a matter of 
fact. Its corruption, its lack of sovereignty, its autocratic practices that mirrored 
those of the Arab regimes, however, harmed political mobilisation against the 
occupation. Democratising Palestinian society then was fundamental to re-
establish a national authority capable of waging the battle for an independent 
Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital and ensuring the right of return for 
Palestinian refugees.8 The discourse around democratisation signalled the 
PFLP’s willingness to participate in the state-building process. The Popular 
Front did not intend to take part directly in such an endeavour by joining the 
PNA government. Nonetheless, the stress on the importance of local elections, 
supposedly planned for late 2000, underscored the changed assessment towards 
the new Palestinian polity.9 
The PFLP’s discourse around democratisation and modification of the PNA’s 
functions found a possible realisation in the NGO sector. The Palestinian NGOs 
active in the OPT at the beginning of the 1990s had their origins in the factional 
organisations, such as trade unions and women associations, that had developed 
throughout the previous fifteen years. As mentioned in chapter three, these 
organisations were started at the initiative of the PLO factions, above all the 
PFLP, DFLP and Fatah, which wanted to build up their presence in the OPT. 
Through this effort, the PLO factions challenged the longstanding presence of 
Palestinian Communists who had dominated political associational life until the 
late 1970s. PLO penetration in the OPT throughout the 1980s engendered an 
intense political competition among Palestinian factions, which in turn resulted 
in the multiplication of popular organisations thus compacting and widening 
political mobilisation in the OPT. Moreover, the emergence of political Islam in 
the 1980s contributed to the politicisation of the Palestinian population living 
under Israeli occupation. The factional cadres, and the organisations they 
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established, formed the backbone and the local leadership of the national 
movement during the First Intifada.10  
Towards the end of the First Intifada, the PLO-affiliated associations started 
to experience a transformation in terms of structure, goals and underpinning 
ethos that gradually turned the mass-based movements into professional NGOs. 
As Jordan cut its administrative and economic ties with the OPT in 1988 and the 
1991 Gulf war stopped the influx of Arab funds, the Palestinian civil society 
organisations started turning to Western donors to gain the necessary finances. 
European and American money, however, came with new requirements such as 
a focus on human rights and development, project-based intervention and 
notably a non-partisan approach. This entailed that the organisations providing 
all kind of services to the population should stop playing the role of political 
mobilisers that had allowed the growth of the national movement in the OPT 
during the 1980s.11 As a result, NGOs became more professionalised and less 
politicised as well as gradually lost their direct contact with popular 
constituencies.12 Nonetheless, as the PNA installed itself in the OPT, the NGOs, 
and the civil society they represented, appeared as one of the few spaces 
effectively independent from the new ruling entity. The NGOs’ economic 
independence started to attract many opposition figures despite their elitist and 
liberalised profile. The NGOs’ ability to preserve independent sources of income 
and the presence in its management boards of several leftist opponents fuelled a 
confrontation with the PNA, giving the perception that civil society was really 
the new bulwark of the national movement.13 The apparent transformation of the 
NGOs into an effective oppositional body reached a high point with the 
formation of the Palestinian NGO Network (PNGO) between 1993 and 1994.  
Palestinian NGOs thus formed an effective lobbying group that included the 
largest organisations and was led by secular and leftist activists coming in 
particular from the PPP and the PFLP.14 After its formation, the PNGO clashed 
with the PNA over new legislation regulating NGO status and activity. Between 
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1995 and 2000, the PNGO conducted a hard lobbying campaign directed at the 
newly established PLC as well as at foreign donors. In doing so, it managed to 
secure the necessary support to oppose the PNA-promoted draft law that entailed 
government licensing and control over the NGOs. After a five-year battle fought 
on local and international media and within the PNA’s legislative, executive and 
judiciary institutions, the PNGO had its own draft law approved by the PLC. 
Nonetheless the PNA ultimately managed to assert state control over the NGOs 
thanks to the registration and reporting requirements foreseen in the law.15  
The conclusion of the conflict over the NGO law essentially marked the end 
of the debate about their potential transformation into fully-fledged oppositional 
social movements. At this point it was clear that the NGOs benefitted 
significantly from the expertise of leftist activists, in particular in establishing 
their own lobbying group. Conversely, the traditional leftist factions did not draw 
observable advantages from this relationship which in turn evidenced their 
crisis.16 The leftist factions experienced a significant shrinkage in their party 
membership, as even a high-ranking official such as Abu Ali Mustafa 
acknowledged in reference to the PFLP17, and saw a steady flow of middle 
cadres heading towards the NGOs. On the one hand, these activists were looking 
for new possibilities to renew their commitment in the post-Oslo scenario, and 
apparently the NGOs were the only institutions to provide such framework. On 
the other, as the leftist factions were no longer able to maintain their social 
infrastructure, due to economic and organisational crises, the NGOs emerged as 
the best employment option for activists with significant expertise.18 The 
diminution of active members coupled with the inability to attract mass support 
further exacerbated the leftist factions’ problems of internal renewal.  
In addition to this, as the NGOs and the broader context of civil society failed 
to engender an effective surrogate for an opposition party, the leftist factions 
were left dealing only with the negative effects of the NGOs’ professionalisation. 
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The new western-funded projects favoured a depoliticised approach on issues 
such as economic development, women’s empowerment and human rights that 
appeared divorced from the OPT reality on the ground. Forced to respect the 
donors’ prerequisite of supporting the state-building effort as conceived by the 
peace process, the NGOs’ projects could no longer contextualise development 
into the framework of the ongoing occupation and Israel’s colonial practices nor 
formulate a narrative placed within the context of national liberation. As a 
consequence, there was no space left for any action aiming at fostering the target 
groups’ political consciousness, as was the case before the Oslo era. The NGOs 
shifted their focus towards service provision, thus looking at their target groups 
as mere recipients of their activities rather than active stakeholders.19 This 
depoliticising trend was further strengthened as lucrative jobs in the NGOs 
attracted increasing numbers of young professionals issuing from the urban elite. 
The influx of these figures widened the gap with the popular masses and 
exacerbated the NGOs’ elitist profile.20 As leftist activists and secular 
professionals became more and more embroiled in the NGO sector, while the 
leftist factions were still pondering on how to renew their political agency, the 
vacuum they left in the field of popular mobilisation was quickly filled by 
exponents of the Islamist camp. Hamas’ grassroots and charitable organisations, 
for instance, independent from the professional scheme that international donors 
imposed on secular NGOs, managed to spread their own militant approach and 
to increase their popularity among the Palestinian population.21 
Ultimately, the Palestinian leftist activists’ refuge in civil society ended up 
strengthening the entrenchment of the negative economic and political 
consequences of the Oslo accords, such as the dependence of Palestinian society 
on foreign funding and the depoliticization of civil society movements. This had 
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a double negative effect on the leftist factions as they appeared increasingly 
compromised by association with the Oslo regime they claimed to oppose, 
particularly a hard-line opposition faction such as the PFLP. In addition, the 
development that the NGO sector underwent reinforced the status of the Islamist 
forces, further discrediting leftist opposition. 
 
The PFLP’s Sixth National Congress: The Resurfacing Contradictions of 
‘Institutional’ Opposition. 
The new round of the National Congress articulated the PFLP’s attempts to 
frame its new role of opposition to the PNA within the post-Oslo political 
regime. The PFLP’s rhetoric stressed the role that a reactivated PLO could play 
in providing a forum for democratic debate, thus opening up the possibility of 
adopting a different Palestinian confrontational and negotiating line. 
Nonetheless, the PFLP’s discourse on PLO reform clashed with the actual 
functioning of the Palestinian umbrella organisation and its role since the Oslo 
accords. This underscored the contradictions within the PFLP’s narrative which 
aimed at arguing the viability of an ‘institutional’ opposition. Moreover, the 
results of the congress reflected more the PFLP’s interest in integrating 
Palestinian institutions than its resolve to embody an opposition ‘from within’. 
Ultimately, far from delineating a clear line, the Sixth National Congress’ main 
implication was Abu Ali Mustafa’s succession to George Habash at the head of 
the Front. 
The PFLP trope, according to which the national movement was still facing 
a phase of national liberation, was meant to oppose PNA discourse in support of 
the peace process. Nonetheless, the PFLP could invoke this argument also to 
justify its desire to maintain contact with Fatah and the PNA. Indeed, in the 
context of a struggle for national liberation, the PFLP could still identify in the 
clash with Israel the primary contradiction that the national movement had to 
tackle. This allowed the PFLP to consider the achievement of national unity, 
based on a ‘common denominator program’, a strategic goal.22 However, in the 
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light of the past failure to effectively delegitimise the Oslo accords, this position 
reflected the PFLP’s need to come to terms with the PNA. Furthermore, as the 
September 2000 deadline for final-status negotiations between Israel and the 
PLO approached, the PFLP’s favour towards dialogue with the PNA appeared 
as a hint to its intention to have some role in it. The PFLP could not directly 
participate in negotiations but Abu Ali Mustafa did not exclude the possibility 
of accepting, in some form, the political order emerging from potentially 
successful final-status talks.23 Concerning negotiations, the PFLP essentially 
called for a re-inclusion of UN Security Council (UNSC) resolutions, number 
194 in particular, stating the expelled Palestinians’ right of return, into the peace 
process after the Oslo accord had de facto excluded them. The underpinning 
principle was lending true sovereignty to the PNA and that required going 
beyond Oslo’s narrow terms.24  
The PFLP’s interest in keeping at least one foot in the framework of political 
settlement was also reflected in its suspension of armed operations against the 
occupation over the second half of the 1990s. In addition, even its official line 
stated that each method of leading the struggle had to be ‘employed according 
to the specificities of each phase’, a clear reference to its halt of military 
activity.25 The PFLP’s focus on institutional politics was also evident in its stress 
on reviving the role of the PLO. According to the Popular Front, the PLO still 
represented the ground upon which Palestinian unity should be established, as 
well as the space to fight ‘Oslo legitimacy’.26 However, if this analysis might 
have been true in theory, the reality of PLO dysfunction underscored the PFLP’s 
inability to formulate an alternative to traditional PLO politics as well as its 
economic dependence on it.  After the Oslo accords, Arafat essentially paralysed 
the PLO institutions: the PNC, for instance, convened one last time in 1996 only 
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to meet Israeli requirements for the progress of the peace process.27 Consequent 
upon active PLO disempowerment, popular disaffection towards it grew steadily 
both in the diaspora and particularly in the OPT.28 Notwithstanding the changed 
circumstances, the PFLP was unable to resolve the contradiction stemming from 
its relationship with the PLO. The PLO provided a theoretical framework in 
which the PFLP’s discourse over the priorities of the new phase, such as 
emphasising the contradiction with Israel to achieve Palestinian unity, was still 
viable. Nonetheless, as the PNA de facto replaced the PLO, the PFLP’s 
adherence to it continued to undermine its claimed oppositional role.  
Besides discussing the new PFLP political line, the National Congress also 
had to formalise George Habash’s resignation from his post of Secretary-
General, an intention that Al-Hakim had already made public in April that year.29 
Cleary, Abu Ali Mustafa was to fill the vacant position in the first, regular 
turnover at the head of a Palestinian faction. The succession was smooth as 
Habash’s resignation was long-expected in light of his health conditions. If his 
capabilities had already been limited following a stroke in 1980, twenty years 
later he reportedly was no longer able to work on PFLP affairs more than four 
hours a day.30 In his speech addressing the Congress, Habash denied that his 
renouncement was related to his health in order to avoid casting doubts on his 
leadership throughout his last years in command. According to the official 
version, his resignation was to be an example to encourage renewal within the 
organisation, particularly in a phase when change at the head of the organisation 
was supposedly a priority.31 As Habash resigned some rumours ascribed this 
decision to dissent with Abu Ali Mustafa over the PFLP’s future line. Although 
a disagreement between the two leaders might have been true, it is not clear on 
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what issues they clashed. According to different sources, Habash did not support 
dialogue with Fatah which started in 1999 and supported a renewal of armed 
struggle in the OPT, possibly in order to hamper the PNA’s state-building 
effort.32 Probably, disagreement occurred over the degree of recognition that the 
PFLP had to lend to the PNA, nonetheless this does not seem sufficient to 
motivate a resignation. Indeed, one of the main reasons that pushed Abu Ali to 
resettle in the OPT was the need to reorganise the PFLP’s network, military 
branch included.33 The new Secretary-General’s desire to keep the military 
option ready ultimately found hard evidence in the operations that the PFLP was 
able to launch in the context of the Al-Aqsa Intifada, most notably the 
assassination of the Israeli Minister of tourism Rehavam Ze’evi in October 2001. 
On the eve of the second Intifada, armed struggle had been paused but certainly 
not discarded. 
Ultimately, the new round of the National Congress did not bring much clarity 
to the PFLP’s political line. Rather, it reflected the predicament that the faction 
was experiencing in formulating a viable ‘institutional’ opposition to the PNA’s 
leadership. Indeed, as the PLO institutions appeared weakened and subject to 
PNA control, while an inclusion of Palestinian Islamist forces was not in sight, 
the PFLP’s propositions had little likelihood of being implemented. Rather, the 
unviability of the PFLP’s line underscored its willingness to delineate a 
theoretical framework that would justify the pursuit of dialogue with the PNA 
and PLO leadership. The PFLP narrative on its political priorities was on the one 
hand telling of the PFLP’s interest in participating in the post-Oslo political 
regime. On the other, it delineated an unclear positioning within the national 
movement that contributed to the PFLP’s fluctuation.  The unresolved dilemma 
of the PFLP’s ‘institutional’ opposition was reflected in its new Secretary-
General’s decision to pursue contacts with the PNA and PLO leadership while 
overseeing a military reorganisation in the OPT.  
 
                                                          
32 Mustafa and Hawatimah, “The Palestinian Secular Opposition at a Crossroads,” 18; “Mustaqbal al-
Jabha al-Shaʿbiyya li-Tahrir Filastin Baʿd George Habash (The PFLP’s Future after George Habash).” 
33 Conversation with Professor Mahmoud Swayd, Former-Director of the Institute for Palestine 
Studies, Beirut, June 2015, Interview with former PFLP-OPT Cadre Issam Hijjawi, Edinburgh, 
November 9, 2015. 
244 
 
The Outbreak of the Al-Aqsa Intifada. 
Before addressing the PFLP’s conduct during the second Palestinian mass 
uprising, an outline of the factors that led to its outbreak as well as of the major 
features that characterised the Al-Aqsa Intifada is needed. In particular, specific 
aspects which emerged during the Second Intifada greatly affected the PFLP’s 
own agency, contributing to its policy fluctuation. From this stems the need to 
delineate the most prominent features of the Al-Aqsa Intifada such as its 
militarisation, intra-Palestinian competition and the fragmentation of the 
Palestinian political and military agency. 
As happened with the first mass uprising against the occupation in 1987, more 
than a decade later, a catalytic event set fire to long-standing popular discontent. 
On 28 September 2000, the Likud leader Ariel Sharon embarked on a 
provocative walk on al-Haram al-Sharif to assert the right of all Israelis to visit 
the Temple Mount. Widespread popular demonstrations exploded throughout 
the whole OPT shortly after Sharon’s tour, in protest against what Palestinians 
saw as the Likud leader’s intention to display ultimate Israeli sovereignty over 
the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount area since 1967.34  
However, the underlying factors that led to the so-called Al-Aqsa Intifada 
took root in an almost decade-long deceitful peace process. Since the 1991 
Madrid conference and after the establishment of the PNA in 1994, the Israeli 
authorities retained full and tight control over the West Bank and Gaza. As the 
five-year transitory period preceding final-status talks expired, the Israeli army 
did not complete the series of three gradual redeployments meant to end its 
presence in the OPT. Meanwhile, settlement activity continued unabated, 
contributing to the fragmentation of Palestinian territory through the 
construction and expansion of settlements on Palestinian soil and the creation of 
an infrastructure network reserved for the settler population. As a consequence, 
the Gaza Strip and the West Bank remained essentially separated, the eastern 
part of Jerusalem, supposed to be the capital of the future Palestinian state, was 
sealed off from the rest of the West Bank, and this latter territory was de-facto 
                                                          




divided into a northern and a southern canton. The whole structure of Israel’s 
occupation remained in place and some of its practices, such as the closure of 
specific areas as a measure of collective punishment, were routinized. In fact, 
the Oslo peace process allowed the production of new Israeli ‘facts on the 
grounds’ as well as new repressive practices that rendered the goal of a 
functioning Palestinian state on the OPT essentially unviable.35  
The overlapping PLO/PNA leadership, both as a negotiating party and as a 
government on the ground, thus appeared unable to deliver the expected goals 
of the peace process, first and foremost a relatively quick end to the occupation. 
The uninterrupted Israeli colonisation of Palestinian land and the PNA’s lack of 
sovereignty compromised popular confidence in the state-building process. 
Symbolic of a renewed colonial relationship was the cooperation between the 
numerous Palestinian security services and Israel’s internal intelligence agency, 
Shin Bet. Indeed, as Israel retained full control on the ground, the PNA’s 
attempts to advance its state-building process in the economic, social and 
political fields required the consensus of the occupation authorities. Such 
consensus was in turn bound to the PNA’s effectiveness in policing the 
Palestinian population on behalf of the Israeli authorities.36 In light of these 
developments, as some polls run after the first mass protests showed, a majority 
of the OPT Palestinian population now opposed the Oslo peace process while 
the great part of Palestinians supported the resumption of armed struggle as a 
resistance tool.37 
In this context, US President Bill Clinton decided to proceed with the 
supervision of final-status talks, extending his official invitation to the Israeli 
and Palestinian delegations. According to the Oslo accords, final-status 
negotiations were to deliver a settlement to core Israeli-Palestinian conflict 
issues such as the status of Jerusalem, the Palestinian refugees’ right of return or 
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control over OPT borders and natural resources. The supposed outcome of such 
talks was the official end of the conflict and the proclamation of a Palestinian 
State alongside Israel.38 However, Israeli ‘facts on the ground,’ while 
compromising the PNA’s viability, also jeopardised the chance of success of 
final-status talks. Furthermore, at Camp David the PLO delegation was 
presented with an Israeli settlement proposal, the scope of which was far more 
limited than envisaged in the Oslo accords. For instance, the proposal did not 
contemplate full Palestinian sovereignty over east Jerusalem and asked for the 
end of any claim related to the refugees’ right of return in exchange for the 
repatriation of a few thousand Palestinian exiles.39 Accepting such clauses would 
have meant crossing those ‘red lines’ upon which the remainder of the PNA’s 
legitimacy depended. Finally, the Camp David talks collapsed, sealing the de-
facto end of the peace process conceived in Oslo and Cairo. Against this 
background, Ariel Sharon decided to visit al-Haram al-Sharif, with the consent 
of the Labour-led government, thus triggering an uprising that the Camp David 
negotiations had significantly contributed to fuel.40   
After this overview of the circumstances that led to the outbreak of the Al-
Aqsa Intifada, it is worth delineating some of its main characteristics before 
analysing the PFLP’s involvement in it. The main difference between the First 
and the Second Intifadas lies in the militarisation that rapidly turned the initial 
non-violent marches and demonstrations into armed clashes fought on the 
frontline of Israeli checkpoints and settlements. Unlike the 1987 uprising, 
Palestinian civil society was completely absent from the scene in what appeared 
to be a direct result of the Oslo-led disempowerment of grassroots organisations 
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in the OPT.41 The professionalisation that NGOs experienced since the Oslo 
accords led them to focus on advocacy actions such documenting the number of 
Palestinian fatalities, arrests, Israel’s breaching of human rights etc. However, 
such focus on advocacy prevented the NGOs from playing a role in fostering 
non-violent resistance and other methods of political mobilisation. Moreover, 
dependence on foreign funding entailed a dissociation from any formal 
cooperation with the Palestinian factions that ranged from the lack of support to 
political initiative to the adoption of critical positions towards the resumption of 
armed struggle.42 The militarisation was a result of the Israeli recourse to 
disproportionate force to curb the initial unarmed demonstrations. Therefore, 
Palestinian armed operations increased, reaching a pace of 30-40 attacks daily 
between October and November 2000.43 Moreover, at the end of October, 
Islamic Jihad carried out the first suicide bombing of the Al-Aqsa Intifada. 
Between November and December 2001, the Israeli army started to hit Fatah and 
PNA forces, such as Force 17, Arafat’s presidential guard. Alongside this 
approach came the first targeted assassination of Palestinian leaders, a tactic to 
which Israel resorted regularly throughout its history but that intensified during 
the Al-Aqsa Intifada. As a result, Israel killed 339 Palestinians, of whom 210 
were the actual targets, in this kind of operation between 2000 and 2006. The 
reasons and goals pushing Israel to increase targeted killing were manifold, 
ranging from pressuring Palestinian leaders to stop attacks, weakening the armed 
organisations’ military commands, to eliminating ‘unwanted’ Palestinian leaders 
and derailing negotiation initiatives.44  
At the forefront of the Palestinian military response to the Israeli crackdown 
was Fatah ‘tanzim’45, a label that loosely referred to the network of Fatah cadres 
and leaders in the OPT. Far from being a fully structured group, the tanzim 
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originated from the ‘inside’ leadership which had emerged during the first 
Intifada and that was largely incorporated into the PNA’s ministries and security 
forces after the Oslo accords. Although the tanzim declared its support for the 
peace process and the PNA’s state-building process, it embodied the voice of 
opposition within the ruling party. As such, its leaders often spoke against 
corruption within the PNA and called for democratic reform. Probably the most 
prominent among these cadres was Marwan Barghouti, Fatah’s West Bank 
Secretary. Their main goals were shifting the balance of decision-making from 
the returnee leadership to the ‘inside’ cadres as well as preserving Fatah’s status 
of nationalist movement, acting as autonomously as possible from the PNA.46 
Such autonomy was nonetheless to be useful for Arafat himself after the 
outbreak of the Al-Aqsa Intifada. The PNA President was clearly not in a 
position that allowed him to take direct lead of the Intifada, notably in the light 
of PNA-Israel security cooperation. However, he could neither order his forces 
to quell the uprising in a move that entailed igniting popular revolt against the 
PNA. Consequently, Arafat allowed the tanzim to regroup local militias into the 
Fatah-linked Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades (AMB). Moreover, the tanzim also 
oversaw the formation of the National and Islamic Higher Committee for the 
Follow-Up of the Intifada (NIHC), a loose umbrella meant to gather all the 
factions of the national movement but that fell short of being equivalent to the 
first Intifada’s Unified National Leadership.  Arafat hoped that military pressure 
and the international repercussions of the uprising might provide some 
diplomatic gain vis-à-vis Israel. However, the tanzim soon decided to mount 
systematic attacks on settlements and checkpoints in order to raise the cost of 
occupation.47 The involvement of the tanzim and Arafat’s attempt to impose a 
kind of ‘remote control’ over the uprising underscored the lack of a centralised 
leadership directing the efforts of the Al-Aqsa Intifada. Thus, in contrast with 
the 1987 Intifada, the second uprising appeared a heavily militarised enterprise, 
devoid of a structured leadership and a wide mass entrenchment.   
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At the beginning of the Al-Aqsa Intifada the tanzim and Fatah were clearly 
driving the Palestinian initiative while the PLO opposition factions, particularly 
the PFLP, contributed to the military effort in order to foster the renewed 
resistance ethos. In this initial phase, a gap between Hamas and Fatah emerged 
as the latter movement took the lead of the Palestinian military response. This 
was mainly a result of Fatah’s opportunity to exploit the military and logistical 
infrastructure developed during the Oslo interim phase. By virtue of the military 
assistance received since the Oslo accords, both Fatah’s own forces and the 
PNA’s apparatus could count on more fighters and a greater amount of weapons 
compared to Hamas. Although initially the tanzim did not rely extensively on the 
PNA’s military capabilities, this situation changed with the formation of the 
AMB. For its part Hamas did not exclude political and military cooperation with 
the tanzim under the umbrella of the NIHC, nonetheless competition among the 
two major forces could not be avoided in the long term. The high level of 
violence that characterised the Al-Aqsa Intifada and the harsh Israeli repression 
thus provided Hamas with the appropriate background to resume suicide 
bombings in March 2001. Indeed, besides inflicting heavy losses on the enemy, 
this tactic allowed Hamas to match Fatah both in terms of popularity and military 
initiative while contrasting Arafat’s attempt to score diplomatic points thanks to 
the Intifada.48 
In summary, the transformation of the Palestinian uprising into a military 
insurgency and the competition among Palestinian factions, in particular 
between Hamas and Fatah, emerged quickly as the main features of the Al-Aqsa 
Intifada. Nonetheless, in its first phases, the PFLP saw it as an opportunity for a 
rearrangement of the Palestinian national movement based on greater consensus 




                                                          




The PFLP’s View of the Al-Aqsa Intifada: From a New National Front to a 
Bipolar System. 
As public demonstrations and confrontations between Palestinians and the 
Israeli army swept quickly across the OPT following Sharon’s visit to al-Haram 
al-Sharif, the PFLP welcomed the outbreak of the new Al-Aqsa Intifada. In the 
words of Maher al-Taher’s, the PFLP’s responsible for ‘external affairs’, the 
uprising represented a ‘major landmark’ from which to draw some ‘historical 
lessons’. For the PFLP’s leader, the most important of these lessons was that the 
Oslo peace process was facing a definitive deadlock, as the Intifada expressed 
popular rejection of a political settlement that brought the Palestinian population 
worse living conditions, flawed institutions and no end to the occupation.49 Three 
months into the Intifada, Abu Ali Mustafa, provided his own analysis of the new 
political situation, delineating what would roughly remain the PFLP’s political 
line throughout the uprising. According to the Secretary-General, the 
militarisation of the Intifada underscored the persistent conflictual nature of the 
Palestinian cause, disavowing all those in the US, Israel and Palestine who 
believed that negotiations would be the only arena for Palestinian-Israeli 
confrontation. The new circumstances called the Palestinian national movement 
to unify its political underpinning and restore the strategic scope of its action. In 
practical terms this meant supporting resistance activities and demanding the 
implementation of ‘international resolutions’ on Palestine that were de facto 
discarded in the Oslo accords.50 Displaying a certain political realism, the PFLP 
supported throughout the Al-Aqsa Intifada the unification of Palestinian efforts 
and the end of American tutelage in the negotiating process.  
However, if finding a common denominator first among opposition factions, 
subsequently with Fatah, proved impossible during the Oslo years, this task 
appeared extremely challenging even in the light of the new Intifada. After the 
initial limited ground coordination experienced within the NIHC, the PFLP was 
faced with the problem of surviving politically the harsh competition among the 
three main political groupings which emerged in the context of the Intifada: 
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Hamas, leading the radical resistance camp, the tanzim/Fatah middle leadership 
trying to assert itself within the organisation, and the Fatah/PNA old guard who, 
tainted with the Oslo peace process, attempted to exploit the Intifada to salvage 
the negotiating process.51 The political reconfiguration caused by the Intifada 
entailed  more limited political space for the PFLP as well as a military gap that 
was difficult to fill despite some major operations accomplished between 2001 
and 2005. As Hamas and the Fatah/PNA camp emerged as the main competing 
poles within the national movement, the PFLP started to mediate between the 
former’s hard line and the latter’s diplomatic priorities. The goal was embodying 
an effective liaison, thus asserting a functional and useful position within 
Palestinian politics. Further complicating the PFLP’s position, the Israeli arrest 
and assassination campaigns hit the Front very hard, particularly considering its 
smaller size compared to other factions. The Al-Aqsa Intifada thus represented 
yet another cornerstone of the PFLP’s weakening process, further limiting its 
political options. 
 
Joining the Fight: The PFLP between Militarisation and Palestinian 
Fragmentation. 
The Al-Aqsa Intifada rapidly acquired the features of a fully-fledged 
asymmetrical war. Nonetheless, despite the broad support that armed struggle 
enjoyed among the Palestinian factions, such consensus did not translate into an 
effective political coordination while intra-factional competition gained 
prominence. In this context, the PFLP’s ideas on the reconfiguration of the 
Palestinian national movement found little margin for realisation. 
The PFLP did not judge the rapid militarisation of the Al-Aqsa Intifada 
negatively, although this prevented large popular participation. Notwithstanding 
the violence unleashed in the new uprising and the sharp difference with the 
1987 Intifada, the PFLP believed that the return to armed struggle was a sign of 
the new phase that required military action, alongside other means, to redress the 
unbalanced confrontation with Israel.52 Moreover, the Fatah middle cadres and 
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PNA security officers’ leading role in the military initiative, as well as the 
formation of the cross factional Popular Committees, allowed the PFLP to hope 
that a critical mass within Fatah was now in favour of relinquishing the failing 
Oslo peace process. In fact, all levels and branches of the PNA’s security 
apparatus participated to some extent in the military effort by providing fighting 
forces, logistic and organisational support or funding.53 In this context, the PFLP 
actively joined the AMB in launching armed operations against targets both 
within and beyond the green line. Although the AMB had a much greater 
capability to mount military operations, the PFLP’s action demonstrated that the 
reorganisation of the military network supervised by Abu Ali had been effective. 
As of April 2001, the Popular Front went as far as to claim that its ‘military 
branch, the Forces of Popular Resistance (FPR), accomplished more than 140 
operations’, ranging from ambushes at military outposts to mortar shelling and 
car bombs. The PFLP underlined how a significant part of these operations had 
been carried out jointly with the AMB.54 While this number appears to be an 
exaggeration that probably included unplanned operations led by unaffiliated 
individuals and groups, nonetheless the PFLP was in fact behind five car bombs 
between February and July 2001 demonstrating the FPR’s ability to hit all over 
historic Palestine, from settlements in the West Bank to West Jerusalem and the 
outskirts of Tel Aviv.55 
However, the military escalation of the Intifada was not paralleled by tangible 
political developments concerning the formation of a unified leadership. The 
PFLP criticised the PNA for not giving a clear sign that it was fully supportive 
of the ‘new phase of the struggle’ by cutting all contacts with Israel and the US. 
Throughout the first half of 2001, the PFLP continuously invited the PNA to 
‘exploit’ the positive ‘factors’ which had emerged during the Intifada to 
overcome the Oslo framework and bring back UN resolutions to the negotiating 
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table, thus correcting the clear unbalance stemming from the 1993 accords. The 
on-the-ground coordination and the wide popular demonstrations of solidarity 
with the Intifada happening all over the Arab world represented, in the Front’s 
view, a potential support base to advance new diplomatic demands. 
Nevertheless, the PNA’s hesitations risked jeopardising these initial 
achievements brought about by the Al-Aqsa Intifada.56 
By May 2001, some main negative trends clearly emerged in the evolution of 
the uprising, first and foremost competition among the Palestinian factions. The 
Islamist factions, and particularly Hamas, launched their full-scale suicide 
bombing campaigns against both military and civilian targets. As pointed out 
earlier, the reason sparking the resumption of Hamas suicide bombings was the 
necessity to match AMB/Fatah military superiority. Furthermore, as Israeli 
responses increasingly involved targeted assassinations of factional activists and 
cadres, retaliatory operations started to dominate Palestinian military operations. 
This was particularly evident concerning Hamas and Islamic Jihad which 
suffered the highest toll of the Israeli assassination campaign and employed 
suicide bombers to systematically retaliate for their losses.57 The PFLP saw a 
detrimental ‘individualistic’ turn in both the predominance of retaliatory actions 
on the military level and the PNA leadership’s ‘bureaucratic’ adherence to the 
Oslo framework on the political one. Such potentially dangerous developments 
could only be tackled by giving a strategic scope to the agency of the national 
movement. For the PFLP, the most urgent step to achieve this goal was forming 
a national unity and emergency government capable of overseeing the planning 
of resistance activities while addressing ‘internal contradictions’ that might lead 
to intra-Palestinian conflict.  
In a further display of pragmatism, the PFLP identified in the call for 
‘international temporary protection’ in the OPT the first step that the PNA should 
undertake to capitalise effectively on the uprising.58 In line with this goal, the 
PFLP’s cadres tried to move on the regional level especially because substantial 
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Arab support for the Intifada still failed to materialise. Indeed, ʿAbd al-Rahim 
Malluh, acting as NIHC representative, demanded Arab parties during their 
Third General Congress to lobby both their own governments as well as other 
countries in favour of exerting more diplomatic pressure on Israel.59 
However, the PFLP did not have the means to influence the Palestinian 
national movement in that direction. Relegated to the virtually inactive PLO 
institutions, the PFLP had no minimum leverage on the PNA. The same was true 
for the NIHC, dominated by Hamas and Fatah’s tanzim/AMB and unable to go 
beyond coordination in single military operations and joint political slogans. As 
the Al-Aqsa Intifada progressed, factional agendas acquired more importance 
whereas the uprising was either paying back or harming single factions in terms 
of popularity. Indeed, polls on the popularity of the Palestinian factions run 
throughout the Intifada hinted at a sharp increase for Hamas, which polled better 
than Fatah, and a clear decline for leftist factions.60 Moreover, as the scale of 
violence continued to mount, the PFLP got trapped in those negative dynamics 
it denounced, especially at the on-the-ground, military level. The Israeli targeted 
assassination of Abu Ali Mustafa, on August 27, 2001, further pushed the PFLP 
towards the global Palestinian military trend of single-faction, retaliatory armed 
operations.61 As Israel’s assassination campaign dealt a hard blow to the PFLP, 
it also highlighted Abu Ali Mustafa’s prominence as national leader while 
reflecting the PFLP’s marginalisation as a political force. The air raid that struck 
Abu Ali Mustafa’s office in al-Bireh was the first targeting a high profile 
Palestinian leader. However, few other PFLP members were targeted after him, 
namely 7 between 2000 and 2004. This figure underscored the Israeli army and 
intelligence perception of the diminished threat posed by the PFLP, especially if 
compared not only to the 119 Hamas and 73 AMB members killed, but also to 
the 35 Islamic Jihad operatives hit by targeted assassinations.62 
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The PFLP’s Retaliation and the Election of Ahmad Saʿadat. 
In light of the unprecedented circumstances stemming from Abu Ali’s death, the 
PFLP was able to give a rapid response to its short-term priorities: replying to 
the blow suffered and filling in the post at the head of the Front. The PFLP’s 
ability to fulfil these tasks appears particularly significant if viewed against the 
conduct of the Popular Front in the remaining years of the Al-Aqsa Intifada. 
Indeed, the retaliatory operation organised by the PFLP and the election of a 
leader who issued from the OPT network could hint at both an effective military 
apparatus and to change in the leadership profile. However, in the longer term, 
this episode further weakened the PFLP due to its own inability to renew its 
strategic agenda, allowing the usual patterns of its agency to re-emerge, and 
because of the difficulty of coping with the larger scale consequence of its 
actions. 
The PFLP acknowledged the ‘martyrdom’ of its Secretary-General with a 
statement of the leadership in Damascus, a few hours after the Israeli helicopters 
stormed the building where Abu Ali’s office was located. The statement vowed 
not to ‘soften the reply to this crime’ and affirmed that the PFLP would be up to 
the challenge that this entailed.63 To a certain extent, Israel’s decision to 
assassinate Abu Ali, and eliminate the security threat stemming from his 
command, further confirmed the effectiveness of the late PFLP leader in 
restructuring the militant network of the organisation in the OPT. 
Notwithstanding the PFLP’s marginal role, Israel moved to kill Abu Ali Mustafa 
both because of his leading military role and in light of his high political and 
symbolic relevance. Besides hitting the military organisational capabilities of the 
Palestinian factions, targeted killings also aimed at eliminating those figures who 
were politically and diplomatically hostile to Israel, leaving space to more 
pliable Palestinian partners.64 
In the immediate aftermath of Abu Ali’s death, the PFLP stressed repeatedly 
that retaliation was its top priority. Once again, the organisation demonstrated 
its ability to plan and carry out a sophisticated operation in response to such a 
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serious loss. Nonetheless, through its actions, the PFLP helped to unleash events 
that were beyond its own control, thus confirming its weaknesses whilst 
simultaneously bringing a harsh wave of repression upon itself. Ultimately, the 
PFLP’s response to the killing of its Secretary-General reflected the extent to 
which its agency responded to tactical rather than strategic concerns. 
The PFLP’s retaliation came after the Islamic forty-day mourning period, 
namely on 17 October 2001, in the form of the well-planned killing of Rehavam 
Ze’evi, Minister of Tourism in Sharon’s cabinet. The PFLP identified Ze’evi as 
the selected target not only for his official post in the Israeli government. Leader 
of the nationalist Moledet party, the PFLP saw Ze’evi as embodying an 
‘extremist’ right-wing trend ‘even according to Israeli standards’. His calls for 
the ‘ethnic cleansing’ of Palestinians and his adamant opposition to the right of 
return made him an appropriate objective.65 The successful operation 
represented the assassination of the highest Israeli official that a Palestinian 
faction ever accomplished. The cell of the ‘Abu Ali Mustafa Brigades’, the new 
name of the PFLP’s armed branch, that carried out the mission was composed of 
four people under the supervision of ʿ Ahid Abu Ghalma, the head of the ‘Front’s 
military apparatus’. The group gathered information according to which Ze’evi 
would lodge at the Hyatt Regency Hotel, in East Jerusalem on the day of the 
operation. In the early morning of 17 October, after spending the night in a room 
of the hotel booked under a false name, two PFLP operatives blocked Ze’evi in 
his room and shot him dead.66 On the same day, the PFLP also carried out a 
suicide bombing that hit an Israeli army outpost in Gaza leaving two soldiers 
injured in the first confirmed PFLP attack of this kind.67  
Shortly after the PFLP commando executed Ze’evi’s assassination, an official 
statement issued from the Abu Ali Mustafa Brigades publicly claimed the 
PFLP’s responsibility for the killing of the Minister of Tourism.68 The Israeli 
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army did not wait long to respond. The following day Sharon authorised a full-
scale military operation all over the West Bank and for the first time since the 
outbreak of the Al-Aqsa Intifada, the Israeli army reoccupied the West Bank’s 
main cities starting with Jenin, Nablus and Ramallah and completing the 
occupation of the main inhabited centres by 22 October. The declared goal was 
forcing Arafat to arrest those who assassinated Ze’evi while definitively quelling 
the Palestinian factions’ military activities. Although the Israeli army withdrew 
its forces on 26 November after international pressure on Sharon’s executive, 
the government ordered a new operation a couple of weeks later in which the 
armed forces directly targeted the PNA’s institutions and, most notably, started 
to restrict Arafat’s movements; he was de facto confined to the Muqataʿa, the 
compound where he resided in Ramallah from then on.69  
 In addition to retaliating for Abu Ali Mustafa’s death, the PFLP needed to 
elect a new Secretary-General. The circumstances did not allow the organisation 
of a new round of the PFLP General Congress, thus the Central Committee 
carried out the election. The Committee held three separate sessions in 
Damascus, the West Bank and Gaza, and its choice of candidates reflected the 
definitive shift of the PFLP leadership toward ‘inside’ cadres. Indeed, the 
PFLP’s leaders took into consideration the names of two OPT leaders, namely 
Ribhi Haddad and Ahmad Saʿadat, both prominent leaders of the Palestinian 
prisoners’ movement.70 Ultimately, the committee elected Saʿadat as the new 
PFLP Secretary-General on 3 October, 2001 while ʿAbd al-Rahim Malluh was 
assigned the post of deputy.71 Saʿadat’s name was not among those of the most 
renowned PFLP leaders; this was mainly due to his involvement in the PFLP’s 
underground network in the OPT. The new Secretary-General had experienced 
several arrests by the Israeli forces since a very young age, while after the PNA’s 
establishment it also detained him multiple times. Moreover, from 1994 until his 
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election to the Secretariat, he fulfilled the post of PFLP Head in the West Bank.72 
Despite the different political backgrounds of the late Abu Ali and Saʿadat, this 
did not lead to significant change in the PFLP’s agenda. Saʿadat’s incarceration 
in the months following Ze’evi’s killing undoubtedly limited his ability to 
influence the party line. Nonetheless, the underpinning factors determining the 
PFLP’s policies remained relevant in the wake of this major episode, 
reconfirming the importance of the PFLP’s quest for a better-defined political 
role in the changing political scenario. Moreover, analysis of the PFLP response 
to Abu Ali’s assassination highlights the Front’s ability to answer its tactical 
priorities while not achieving change in the strategic dimension. 
 
After Abu Ali: ‘Defensive Shield’ and the PFLP’s Shift towards Mediation. 
The escalation of Israel’s military intervention in the OPT marked the first half 
of 2002. Its reinvasion of the West Bank, beyond the high level of destruction 
that it caused, left its signs on the Palestinian factions’ conduct within the 
continuing Intifada. The PFLP’s military endeavour, as was already highlighted, 
displayed the same dynamics that affected other factions and that were 
emphasised in the context of the Israeli military escalation. This, in turn, 
evidenced the contradiction afflicting the PFLP, between a military approach 
dictated by factional priorities and a political discourse aimed at mediating 
between Hamas and Fatah. 
Although the Sharon government had been planning such a step in the 
previous months, Ze’evi’s assassination provided the necessary pretext for a 
reoccupation of the territories and towns located in Area A, under full Palestinian 
civil and military jurisdiction according to the Oslo Accords.73 Thus, the PFLP’s 
own high-profile revenge coupled with the wide retaliatory campaign to which 
both the AMB and Hamas were committed. Between 2001 and early 2002, 
Hamas’ suicide bombings multiplied, often hitting beyond the Green Line and 
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inflicting severe civilian casualties.74 At the same time, it became clear that the 
Israeli government aimed at total military victory and potentially at the 
destruction of the PNA. Within this escalation of the conflict, Israel’s request to 
the PNA to surrender the commandos responsible for Ze’evi’s killing constituted 
one of the main covers for the siege that the Israeli army laid on the Muqataʿa.75 
Consequently, pressure mounted on the PFLP from both Israeli security forces 
that started targeting and arresting an increasing number of Popular Front 
militants, and the PNA that moved likewise prompted by Israeli request to 
‘ensure security’. In this situation, the PFLP’s room for political manoeuvre 
appeared restricted. On the one hand, the military dynamics of the Al-Aqsa 
Intifada, as well as the popularity that Hamas’ actions enjoyed among the 
Palestinian population, pushed the PFLP to both organise retaliatory operations 
and to resort to Hamas’ own military strategy with the launch of suicide 
bombings. On the other, national unity remained a priority therefore the Popular 
Front continued to maintain a line of contact with Hamas and the PNA in an 
effort that at times appeared either rhetorical or unrealistic. 
This approach clearly emerged in Saʿadat’s declarations shortly before the 
PNA’s General Intelligence Service arrested him on 15 January 2002 and 
subsequently handed him over to the Presidential Guard.76 For instance, in one 
of his first interviews, the new PFLP Secretary-General affirmed that the main 
problem afflicting the Intifada was that military unity among the factions had 
not been matched by a parallel political unity. Some sort of basic political 
coordination appeared all the more crucial since after the 11 September attacks 
and the consequent US ‘war on terror’, the ‘Palestinian struggle faced a hostile 
international environment’. In a first display of the PFLP’s mediating role, 
Saʿadat invited Hamas and the PNA to pause their irreconcilable respective calls 
for an immediate end to American tutelage on the peace process and for the 
implementation of US-drafted plans to stop the Intifada. Saʿadat went so far as 
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to maintain that in the light of Israeli military escalation, the Palestinian factions 
should put their positions on negotiations aside and create the conditions for a 
‘minimum-level dialogue’ that could ‘immunise the national movement from the 
danger’ of intra-Palestinian fight.77 In line with this position, the PFLP criticised 
the PNA for responding promptly to US and international pressures as Arafat 
adopted several measures to ensure calm by calling for a ceasefire, outlawing all 
armed groups that did not abide by it and proceeding with the detention of dozens 
of militants from all organisations.78 By the same token, the PFLP espoused 
critical views concerning Hamas and Islamic Jihad’s military strategy. Although 
suicide bombings represented a legitimate means in the fight against occupation, 
the Islamists’ resort to this practice lacked sufficient consideration of strategy 
and long-term goals. The PFLP accepted the view that suicide bombings could 
be carried out all over the whole of Palestine, particularly in the light of Israel’s 
‘reservists’ policy’ which widened the category of military personnel. 
Nonetheless, the Palestinian resistance should prioritise settlements and military 
installation in the OPT as even the long-term goal of total liberation, which the 
PFLP had substantially abandoned, could be achieved only by first ending the 
occupation of Gaza and the West Bank. The PFLP also condemned the Islamists’ 
ideological framework of suicide bombings. According to the Popular Front, 
their insistence on religious values and individual, spiritual recompense stripped 
these operations of their nationalist meaning and failed to underscore how 
‘martyrdom’ was for a collective cause, not for the self. 79  
Despite the official ideological framework and the criticism addressed to 
‘individualist’ practices as well as the lack of strategic depth in resistance 
activities, these dynamics did not leave the PFLP unaffected, underscoring a 
certain gap between the political and the military leadership and, again, between 
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‘outside’ perceptions and ‘inside’ realities. On the one hand, the political 
leadership, still partly located outside the OPT, formulated a political discourse 
focused on collective action and nationalist priorities. On the other, the cadres as 
well as the rank-and-file were more responsive to the priorities of both 
countering Israeli military operations and asserting their presence within 
Palestinian resistance activities. In fact, 2002 was the year in which the PFLP 
carried out the highest number of suicide bombings, namely 4 over a total of 7/9 
between 2001 and 2005.80 Alongside other kinds of operations, these attacks 
were often carried out as a retaliation or in protest against Israel and PNA’s 
detention of the PFLP’s top leaders, after Malluh too was arrested. The 
operations took place mainly in West Bank settlements but attackers also pushed 
beyond the Green Line, carrying out operations as far as the city of Netanya.81 
Ultimately the PFLP’s military action, although far more limited than that of 
Hamas or of the Fatah-affiliated groups, displayed the prominence of factional 
priorities in line with the general trend of Palestinian armed struggle during the 
Al-Aqsa Intifada. The PFLP’s decision to launch suicide bombings itself was 
largely due to intra-factional competition for popular support. As Hamas’ 
strategies gathered popular consensus, the PFLP embarked on this kind of 
operation in an attempt to respond to pressures coming from its base.82 
Moreover, the Israeli closures and sieges imposed on the West Bank urban 
centres, particularly during operation Defensive Shield in Spring 2002, 
fragmented Palestinian military practice. This negative development affected the 
Abu Ali Mustafa Brigades, similar to impacts on the tanzim/AMB and other 
groups mainly based in the West Bank.83 In a further similarity with the tanzim, 
the PFLP leadership and ground network in the West Bank suffered the harsh 
Israeli crackdown while Hamas’ leaders in Gaza remained temporarily 
untouched. As of June 2002, besides numbers of militants, eight PFLP Central 
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Committee members were detained, either by Israel or the PNA. Among them, 
and in addition to Secretary-General Saʿadat, were his deputy Malluh, Politburo 
Member and PFLP Spokesperson ʿAli Jaradat, as well as Military Leader ʿAhid 
Abu Ghalma.84 
After Operation Defensive Shield, the Al-Aqsa Intifada was far from over but 
followed a pattern that repeated itself until Arafat’s death in November 2004 and 
the end of the uprising in February 2005. Confined to his compound, the PNA 
President had little choice but to try to respond to US and Israeli requirements in 
order to avoid the Israeli army moving to either arrest or kill him. Thus, the PNA 
embarked on a double track of talks with the US and Israel on the one hand and 
with the Palestinian factions on the other. The main goal of the intra-Palestinian 
dialogue was securing a stable ceasefire that, in the PNA’s hopes, would 
prefigure an end to the Israeli assault in the OPT and the siege on the Muqataʿa.85 
In these circumstances, the PFLP hoped to play a positive role in drawing Hamas 
and Fatah closer.  This was not only to attempt to forge the long-invoked unified 
leadership, but also to counterbalance the ‘external’ pressure for reform that 
clashed with the PFLP’s vision for change. By the end of the uprising’s second 
year the PFLP was left with few means to continue a military effort that totally 
lacked any strategic depth. Deprived of both one of its historical leaders and his 
successor, the Popular Front turned all of its attention to intra-factional and 
institutional politics to salvage its already limited political weight within an 
uncertain political landscape. 
 
The PFLP’s Mediation in the Intra-Palestinian Dialogue. 
The final years of the Al-Aqsa Intifada were marked by the PNA’s attempts to 
reassert some degree of control on the Palestinian ‘street’ involved in the 
confrontation against Israel while trying to respond to US and Israeli political 
requirements in order to relieve the military pressure that the Sharon government 
continued to exert. This prompted an intra-Palestinian dialogue focused on 
reforming the PNA in which the PFLP appeared interested as it still pursued, on 
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the political level, a reconfiguration of the Palestinian national movement based 
on consensus. Therefore, the PFLP gradually shifted towards a role of mediation 
that tried to address both Hamas’ hard line and the PNA’s need to recompose the 
national movement under its leadership. Consequently, the PFLP’s narrative and 
line continued to fluctuate between the priorities spelled by the two main, 
contrasting poles of Palestinian politics. 
As part of the deal that put an end to Operation Defensive Shield in May 2002, 
the PNA agreed to transfer Saʿadat and other Palestinian prisoners from the 
Muqataʿa compound to Jericho prison, where their custody would be under US 
and UK supervision.86 This formula eliminated one of the Sharon government’s 
main pretexts to corner Arafat both militarily and diplomatically. However, US 
and Israeli pressures on the PNA’s President did not stop as both parties started 
to call for in-depth reform of the PNA’s institutional structure and security 
forces. The first demand advanced by both the Bush administration and the 
Sharon government was essentially a change in the PNA’s leadership as Arafat 
no longer represented a ‘suitable’ partner for negotiations.87 In sum, the US and 
Israeli governments demanded the empowerment of the PNA government while 
seeking the emancipation of the executive from the President. Pressure in this 
direction eventually resulted in Arafat’s appointment in March 2003 of Mahmud 
Abbas (Abu Mazen) as first PNA Prime Minister. The publication of the US-
drafted ‘Road Map for peace in the Middle East’ a month after Abbas’ 
appointment, in which the concept of empowering an autonomous Palestinian 
government was restated, confirmed the Bush administration’s willingness to 
sideline Arafat.88 In addition, the US and Israel also invoked the unification of 
the different Palestinian security services. This measure would allow the 
realisation of some conditions that both Washington and Tel Aviv deemed 
essential, namely halting the participation of the PNA’s security forces in the 
Intifada and their return to coordination with the Israeli counterpart in policing 
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Palestinian resistance activities.89 Although the US agenda for change pursued a 
reassertion of control over the PNA and the suppression of Palestinian military 
activity, it nonetheless fostered a momentum of debate around reform, in which 
the whole national movement participated. Starting from totally different point 
of views, all actors concerned with the evolution of Palestinian politics since the 
Al-Aqsa Intifada were interested in deep change within the PNA. 
The issue of reforms became central in the debate within the Palestinian 
national movement, following Arafat’s own call for change in the aftermath of 
Defensive Shield. Hence, the Palestinian factions started a series of talks with 
the inclusion of the Islamist factions, notably Hamas, aimed at drafting a 
common political line. Reforming the PNA had been a PFLP slogan since the 
beginning of the Al-Aqsa Intifada, as the organisation itself underlined 
contentiously in a statement issued in response to Arafat’s announcement.  
Nevertheless, the kind of reform that the US and Israel pushed for was totally in 
contrast with the PFLP view of democratising the PNA’s institutions and 
revitalising the PLO.90 From this stemmed the PFLP’s efforts to ensure a full 
and protracted participation of the Islamist factions in the intra-Palestinian 
dialogue. At the same time, a successful mediation between Hamas and Fatah 
would have guaranteed to the PFLP an ‘institutional’ role within Palestinian 
politics. The PFLP’s willingness to grant the PNA a nationalist cover, its 
discourse around ‘turning the PNA into a national and political entity for the 
people’ standing up to US and Israeli agendas, should be viewed through this 
perspective.91  
In this context, the PFLP presented to the whole Palestinian national 
movement several ‘initiatives’ or ‘visions’ throughout 2003 in the attempt to 
foster intra-Palestinian dialogue. The main challenge that the PFLP had to face 
in this action was to contain the polarisation process of Palestinian politics which 
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was well underway in the midst of the Al-Aqsa Intifada.92 Such proposals 
revolved around the idea of forming a unified national leadership and reviving 
the framework of the PLO. Both veteran PLO factions and the Islamist 
organisations were to be full partners in the unified leadership. Such leadership 
would be charged with implementing a ‘nationalist program’ in support of the 
Intifada as well as supervising a wide electoral process to renew all national 
institutions, from municipalities up to the PNC.93 The generality of political 
slogans and of the long-term goals linked to these initiatives contrasted with the 
detailed description of how to ensure the process of dialogue and readjust 
Palestinian political balances. This hinted at the fact that the PFLP’s real interests 
lay in the process of dialogue itself, a process that would guarantee its role of 
mediation. 
Nonetheless, after almost a year since its beginning, the intra-Palestinian 
dialogue failed to reach a breakthrough. Hamas repeatedly refused to recognise 
the PLO as sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people as well as not 
wanting to formally commit to the framework of a Palestinian state limited to 
the OPT.94 In light of such difficulties, the PFLP tried to adapt its proposals in 
order to lend them more credibility in Hamas’ eyes. The new initiatives, issued 
between April and September 2003, called for the inclusion of additional Hamas 
and Islamic Jihad representatives within a ‘temporary’ unified leadership 
alongside the Secretaries-General of all the Palestinian factions, PLO Executive 
Committee members and independent personalities. In a further clarification of 
the institutional implications of its initiatives, the PFLP outlined a kind of chain 
of command according to which, after the completion of the electoral process, 
the enlarged PLO would exert control over a PNA entrusted with the task of 
carrying out the parts of the program relating to the OPT.95 Beyond these aspects 
related to institutional reform, the PFLP tried to bolster its initiative by invoking 
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a halt to the fragmentation of the Palestinian national movement. Indeed, if the 
unfolding of the Al-Aqsa Intifada and the Israeli military response to it had 
favoured fragmentation within the Palestinian camp, according to Saʿadat, the 
US call for a new Palestinian leadership, and their requirements concerning a 
stronger, autonomous government, underscored the divisive effect of the Road 
Map.96 
Indeed, US and Israeli practices did foster Palestinian political fragmentation. 
The unabated Israeli arrest and assassination campaigns undermined the weak 
basis of intra-Palestinian dialogue embodied by the unilateral ceasefire that 
Abbas, newly nominated Palestinian Premier, managed to broker among all 
factions in summer 2003. Nonetheless, the continued Israeli military assault 
could not but push towards the re-ignition of violence and the resumption of 
suicide operations.97 However, internal factors also impeded a wider and more 
effective dialogue. If on the one hand, both the Bush administration and the 
Sharon government overtly called for ‘regime change’ in Ramallah, on the other 
all Palestinian factions started to ponder a post-Arafat scenario. Hamas, for 
instance, was experiencing a phase of internal debate between the ‘inside’ 
leadership favourable to the acceptance of the post-Oslo political system and the 
‘outside’ cadres, more tied to the importance of armed struggle. At the same 
time, the Islamist movement kept escalating its military operations to reinforce 
its political position within the Palestinian arena as well as bolster its popularity. 
Indeed, by the second half of 2002, Hamas saw its popular support rising thanks 
to its military effectiveness and its undisputed commitment to armed resistance 
which contrasted with Fatah’s divisions and the PNA’s adherence to peace 
negotiations. Moreover, Hamas’ efficient welfare network further highlighted its 
ability to support the population in the dire conditions of the uprising, again, in 
opposition to the PNA’s besieged and dysfunctional institutions.98 Therefore, 
Hamas’ calculation did not change even after Israel’s assassination of its spiritual 
leader Shaikh Ahmad Yassin and top leader ʿAbd al-ʿAziz al-Rantisi, as well as 
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after Sharon announced his decision to disengage army and settlement 
installations from the Gaza Strip.99 Hamas needed to keep up a resistance effort 
that was significantly increasing its popularity in the OPT before times were ripe 
for intra-Palestinian political settlement.100 
The PFLP, too, was interested in finding its role in case Arafat really would 
leave power and intra-Palestinian talks on reforms would reach a breakthrough. 
Despite the statements affirming the intention and the need to continue the 
Intifada, the PFLP did not have the material means nor a leadership willing to 
pursue an escalation. In fact, the PFLP fully abided by the Abbas-negotiated 
ceasefire in June 2003 and although Palestinian armed attacks resumed after less 
than two months, the PFLP did not claim any operation until March 2004.101 
This hinted at the PFLP’s interest in bolstering intra-Palestinian dialogue 
initiative, even when these came as a response to US pressure such as in the case 
of the Abbas-brokered ceasefire. However, the prolonged absence of the PFLP 
from the military scene was also telling of its material and organisational 
problems, aggravated by the harsh Israeli and PNA repression that hit the Front. 
Moreover, the PFLP continued to take part in the Palestinian debate emphasising 
institutional rearrangement in the OPT and detailing its view on the future role 
of the PNA’s institutions. Be it the Municipalities, the Security Forces or the 
PLC, the PFLP did not question their legitimacy as Oslo creations anymore but 
saw these institutions as the only basis upon which to rebuild the Palestinian 
national movement and the only framework that might ensure the survival of the 
Front itself.102 In the polarised political field that the Al-Aqsa Intifada helped to 
shape, the PFLP tried to fill the narrow space left between Hamas and 
Fatah/PNA. Since the beginning of intra-Palestinian talks in late 2002/early 
2003, the PFLP started swinging between the acceptance of potentially unifying 
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political programs and adherence to armed struggle in the context of the ongoing 
military uprising on the ground.103 
Yasser Arafat died on November 11, 2004 and the Palestinian national 
movement as a whole entered almost immediately a phase of transition, the first 
consequence of which was the end of the Al-Aqsa Intifada. The PFLP’s 
readiness to fully embrace such a transition appeared clear in its decision not to 
boycott the January 2005 presidential election set to elect Arafat’s successor. 
Unlike Hamas, which boycotted the presidential ballot, the PFLP believed in the 
‘need to run (…) the elections’ in the delicate phase that started after Arafat 
passed away.104 However, the PFLP decided to avoid presenting its own 
candidate for the presidency and instead supported the bid of former PPP 
Secretary-General Mustafa Barghouti.105 Although the PFLP did not support 
Abbas during the election, it nonetheless ensured its ‘collaboration on the shared 
parts of the political program’.106 More than having actual implications, such 
willingness to collaborate from an opposition stand, signalled the PFLP’s 
support for the Abbas-led transition. Finally, after the newly elected PNA 
President successfully negotiated with Israel in Sharm el-Sheikh a mutual 
ceasefire in February 2005, the PFLP de facto accepted the end of the Second 
Intifada a month later. Alongside all other Palestinian factions, the PFLP signed 
the ‘Cairo Declaration’ in March 2005, according to which the Palestinian forces 
agreed to respect ‘the current climate of calm’ existing in the OPT after the 
Sharm el-Sheikh talks.107  
After more than four years of militarised uprising, the PFLP reached an 
unprecedented low in its overall condition. The gap with Fatah and Hamas in 
terms of popularity further increased during the Al-Aqsa Intifada, and was 
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eventually solidified during the 2006 legislative elections.108 The lower degree 
of repression endured during the uprising compared to the other major 
Palestinian factions was telling of the PFLP’s reduced weight. Furthermore, Abu 
Ali Mustafa’s assassination and Ahmad Saʿadat’s continued detention as results 
of the Intifada dynamics further weakened the PFLP. These two major events 
underscored the lack of leadership renewal, particularly in relation to Abu Ali’s 
death, as no PFLP top leader could match him in terms of popularity, national 
stature and experience. Saʿadat’s leadership benefitted from his credentials as 
underground activist and leader of the prisoners’ movement, but his continued 
detention deprived him of the chance to effectively take the reins of the Front. 
The remaining representatives of the PFLP’s Politburo and Central Committee 
were still divided between Damascus, such as Abu Ahmad Fouad or Maher al-
Taher, and the OPT as in Jamil al-Majdalawi and ʿAbd al-Rahim Malluh’s case. 
These personalities drew their political legitimacy from the institutional role they 
had within the PFLP and the PLO but did not enjoy the grassroots popular 
support of Hamas’ cadres and leaders. Thus, the PFLP’s elitist profile appeared 
further emphasised in the concluding years of the uprising. At the same time, 
lacking a strong leadership and a clear political line, the PFLP, like Fatah’s 
tanzim, was drawn into the revenge-driven Palestinian military response that 
ultimately favoured only Hamas in political terms.109  
Marginalised and unable to sustain the Intifada effort, the PFLP leadership 
started adhering to a mediating role that produced an official discourse focused 
on resistance and unity contrasting with the PFLP’s abidance to Abbas’ 
transition plan. In the light of its mediating position, a new embodiment of the 
opposition-integration dilemma, the PFLP’s policy fluctuation was further 
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The 2006 Legislative Elections and the Hamas-Fatah Split: The Opposition-
Integration Dilemma in Post-Arafat Palestinian Politics. 
The narrative accompanying the PFLP’s positions during the post-Intifada phase 
did not differ considerably from that underlying its positions on the eve of the 
uprising. Unable to stop and delegitimise the Oslo state-building process at the 
end of the 1990s, the PFLP was left with the only choice of embracing it, thus 
pushing its historical role of ‘loyal opposition’ one step forward. Democratising 
the Oslo-derived institutions, transforming them into the new core of a unified 
national movement, alongside a reactivated PLO, became the new overall 
political goal. Similarly, slogans pointing at democratisation and unity 
accompanied the PFLP’s participation in the post-Intifada political and 
institutional reorganisation of the Palestinian national movement. From this 
perspective, elections represented an essential step in that direction.110  
The rationale behind the PFLP’s decision to join the PNA institutions 
stemmed from its need to secure some legitimacy in an increasingly polarised 
political environment. In fact, on the one hand, Mahmud Abbas wanted to use 
the electoral process to compact Fatah behind his new leadership and 
subsequently give a new start to the peace process with Israel. On the other, 
Hamas after the Al-Aqsa Intifada was for the first time in a political position that 
allowed it to challenge Fatah primacy over the Palestinian national movement.111 
While the two main Palestinian organisations had conflicting agendas, rendering 
the possibility of long-term collaboration unlikely, the PFLP needed to 
institutionalise its political presence and carve out a role for itself between the 
two poles. As the PFLP sought inclusion into the new political regime, some 
major inconsistencies resurfaced in its conduct both during the electoral process 
and throughout the Hamas-Fatah crisis. The main critical points stemmed from 
the unresolved conflict between its oppositional role and the need for integration 
and the enduring fragmentation of the Palestinian Left. In particular, the PFLP’s 
dilemma on opposition-integration resulted in a contradictory relation with 
Hamas. In the post-Intifada phase, the PFLP and Hamas seemed to be closer in 
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their opposition to Fatah and the PNA’s leadership. The two movements forged 
a tactical alliance during the 2005 Municipal Election that, brought for instance, 
the appointment of PFLP-affiliated candidate Janet Mikhaʾil as mayor of 
Ramallah.112 Nonetheless, the PFLP’s need to remain engaged within the PLO 
and PNA framework determined, as it will be shown, a shift closer to Fatah and 
the PNA leadership. 
The decision to run in the January 2006 elections set to define the new 
composition of the PLC posed the issue of forming a common list of ‘democratic 
and leftist forces’. In the run-up to the ballot, the main Palestinian leftist forces 
thus held talks to reach an agreement on the composition of the common 
electoral list.113 The Palestinian Left had already supported different candidates 
during the 2005 presidential election and, despite several rounds of talks, 
factionalism continued to haunt the Popular and Democratic Fronts, the PPP, 
Fidaʾ and Mustafa Barghouti’s Palestinian National Initiative (PNI).114 
Ultimately, after months of talks, Ahmad Saʿadat announced to the Palestinian 
news agency Wafa that the PFLP would run its own list in the upcoming 
elections in the light of the failure to reach an entente among all forces. The 
PFLP Secretary-General first mentioned differences over ‘projects to settle the 
Arab-Israeli conflict’, most notably the Road Map, as a reason behind the failure 
of talks. Disputes over the approach towards the Road Map stirred divisions 
particularly between the PFLP and the DFLP as the latter movement maintained 
a more positive view of the US plan. However, Saʿadat also acknowledged 
disagreement over the composition of the list itself and the allocation of shares 
to each faction.  The PFLP and the DFLP did not manage to agree on the order 
of candidates running the list as well as on the weight each faction should enjoy. 
In addition, the PNI was unwilling to concede the ‘lion’s share’ to the PFLP and 
its leader refused to give up figuring as the front runner.115 Both factions 
reportedly claimed they should be allocated the 20 per cent of the seats won in 
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the elections, as each of them took credit for the 20 per cent that Barghouti scored 
during the previous 2005 Presidential elections.116 
As a consequence, the Palestinian leftist factions formed three different lists, 
thus irremediably scattering their supporters’ vote. This appeared particularly 
penalising in the light of the parallel proportional and district-based systems that 
the electoral law delineated. Ultimately, the division of leftist forces as well as 
the lack of a grassroots-based campaign resulted in a disappointing result that 
brought only three seats to the PFLP and a total of seven to the whole Left.117 
Therefore, the electoral performance represented a litmus of the PFLP’s political 
marginalisation. Furthermore, while divisions emerged as the main cause of 
electoral failure, it also highlighted the inconsistency of the PFLP’s discourse. 
Indeed, the stress put on the importance of ‘common denominators’ among the 
Palestinian factions found no confirmation in the PFLP’s own practice as it was 
clearly unable to find a denominator uniting the Palestinian Left. 
Internal struggles also crippled Fatah as the reformist new guard tried to 
challenge the conservative old guard leadership. Indeed, Mahmud Abbas 
managed to close the ranks of the movement just one week before the election, 
unifying the official Fatah list with an independent list assembled by the 
reformists.118 Divisions, the absence of a proper electoral campaign and 
association with a dysfunctional and corrupt PNA resulted in Fatah’s resounding 
defeat. Conversely, Hamas was ready to capitalise on popular discontent towards 
the PNA. A well-organised campaign that touched all electoral districts and a 
program centred on reforming all aspects of Palestinian institutions and 
governance allowed Hamas’ ‘Change and Reform’ list to win 74 seats in stark 
contrast to the 45 seats assigned to Fatah.119  
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Although opinion polls predicted that Hamas would score a good result in the 
election, none of the parties in the ballot expected such an overwhelming 
victory.120 Fatah’s reaction, as that of Israel and the US, was one of shock and 
rejection. In the initial aftermath of the election, Fatah’s leadership consistently 
rejected Hamas’ proposals to form a national unity government, while Abbas 
extended presidential control over the PNA Security Forces as well as the 
Finance and Information Ministries in violation of the Basic Law that ascribed 
authority over these institutions to the Prime Minister. The Israeli government, 
for its part, accompanied its refusal to recognise the new Palestinian government 
with a set of economic sanctions as it stopped transferring taxes to the PNA. The 
US aligned with Israel’s position and conditioned its recognition of the 
government on Hamas’ acceptance of the Oslo accords and Israel’s right to exist 
as well as the abandonment of armed struggle.121 Abbas’ move to contain the 
new Hamas government signalled the first phase of a power struggle that did not 
remain limited within the PNA. As the new parliament and government took 
office, tensions between the two poles of the Palestinian national movement 
moved from institutions to the OPT street, particularly in Gaza. Violent 
demonstrations led by Fatah activists alternated with clashes between forces 
loyal to the two movements and armed skirmishes became more frequent at the 
end of the year.122 
While Hamas-Fatah tensions heightened in the wake of the elections, the 
PFLP positioned itself in between the two poles of Palestinian politics. On the 
one hand, the Popular Front welcomed Hamas’ success as a ‘victory of the 
Intifada program’ which implied the Palestinian people’s rejection of the Oslo 
paradigm. On the other, Hamas’ reluctance to join the PLO as well as 
divergences over UN resolutions, especially number 194 which sanctioned the 
Palestinian refugees’ right of return, prevented the PFLP’s full embrace of the 
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new Hamas government. Ultimately, the PFLP manifested its willingness to 
collaborate with Hamas in reforming the PNA while also expressing solidarity 
for the ‘external pressure’ that the Islamist movement endured following its 
electoral success.123 Therefore, during the first session of the new PLC, Jamil al-
Majdalawi declared that the PFLP would grant its vote of confidence to the 
incumbent Hamas government, though the aforementioned differences 
prevented the Popular Front from directly joining the cabinet.124 The events 
surrounding its Secretary-General probably pushed the PFLP closer to Hamas in 
this first phase. On 14 March 2006, the Israeli army launched a raid on Jericho 
prison aimed at seizing a group of ‘wanted’ detainees, among whom figured 
Ahmad Saʿadat. The US and UK forces supposed to monitor the PNA detention 
of Saʿadat and his fellow prisoners withdrew from their positions, allowing the 
Israeli army to besiege the detention facility and seize the prisoners, who were 
eventually transferred onto Israeli soil.125 The PFLP harshly criticised the PNA, 
despite its security forces resisting the attackers for twelve hours, and Saʾeb 
ʿErekat, Minster of Negotiations, acknowledged the PNA’s mistake in detaining 
Saʿadat. According to the PFLP, the ‘Palestinian official leadership’ abided by 
the agreement concerning Saʿadat in the hope of acquiring a better position at 
the negotiating table, but the Israeli raid showed that ‘these illusions collapsed 
just like the Jericho prison walls’.126 
However, with the ongoing Hamas-Fatah power struggle, the PFLP moved 
towards a neutral position between the two contenders as it hoped that mediation 
would grant it a national role. In this context, a few months after refusing to take 
part in the first Hamas-proposed national unity government, the PFLP adopted 
the formation of a consensus executive as its main political priority. Therefore, 
the PFLP endorsed a ‘National Consensus Document’ drafted by a group of high 
profile prisoners, ranging from Fatah’s Marwan Barghouti and Hamas’ ʿAbd al-
Khalik al-Natshe to PFLP’s ʿAbd al-Rahim Malluh. The document, submitted to 
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all leaders of the Palestinian national movement, called for the reactivation of 
the PLO while identifying the protection of the PNA as a top priority given its 
status of ‘core of the future State of Palestine’. In an attempt to settle the issues 
at the centre of the intra-Palestinian conflict, the document identified the PLO 
leadership and the PNA presidency as the actor in charge of negotiations, while 
inviting the PLC, now under Hamas control, to legislate on the functioning of 
the security apparatus in order to avoid ‘political and partisan actions by 
members of the security services’.127 
However, the call coming from the Israeli prisons did not raise much interest 
in its supposed recipients. The PFLP basically supported the document because 
it proposed an ideal settlement of a two-faction conflict where all Palestinian 
actors would play a role. Furthermore, the document delineated an artificial 
balance between the PLO and the PNA according to which the latter was 
emanation of the first. However, this view apparently ignored the overlap 
between PNA and PLO as well as the fact that the Hamas-Fatah dispute revolved 
around control over the OPT and the PNA’s institutions with no regard for wider 
political frameworks. This view was in line with PFLP’s goal but could not work 
as a viable base for reconciliation.128  
The PFLP’s stand towards the unfolding of the Hamas-Fatah confrontation 
throughout 2007 confirmed that, beyond political rhetoric, its main goal was 
seeking institutional integration from a possible intra-factional settlement. In 
fact, the PFLP’s rejection of the February 2007 Mecca Agreement that Hamas 
and Fatah reached thanks to Saudi mediation, came as an evidence of this. The 
document signed in Mecca essentially stated that the two factions agreed to stop 
Palestinian infighting while affirming the principle of Hamas-Fatah power-
sharing, calling for a new national unity government. The signed text of the 
agreement came with a letter that Abbas addressed to Hamas Prime Minister 
Ismaʿil Haniyeh in which the PNA President called on the Prime Minister to 
‘respect the international and Arab resolutions and the agreements signed by the 
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PLO’.129 The PFLP put forward the contents of this letter to justify its negative 
position toward the Mecca agreement. According to its Politburo Statement, the 
reference to PLO-Israeli agreements prevented the PFLP’s participation in the 
national unity government. Therefore, while it welcomed the end of intra-
Palestinian clashes, the PFLP defined the bilateral agreement as a regression 
from the National Consensus Document and also criticised the factional 
redistribution between Fatah and Hamas.130 But what the PFLP really protested 
was its exclusion from this reconciliation deal and the bilateral nature of the 
agreement. In fact, Hamas had signalled its acceptance of the Oslo accords’ 
result when Khalid Mishʿal publicly declared that his movement recognised that 
the ‘PNA was founded on the basis of Oslo’ and agreed to ‘deal with this 
reality’.131 As the contending parties seemed resolved to head towards 
reconciliation, the PFLP line fluctuated, following its need for institutional 
integration. 
 
The ‘First Palestinian Coup’ or the PFLP’s Ultimate Choice for Integration. 
The final phases of the Hamas-Fatah conflict in 2007 showed that the PFLP 
ultimately prioritised its engagement within the framework of traditional PLO 
and PNA institutions over its oppositional role. Indeed, if both Hamas and 
Fatah/PNA pursued hegemonic policies in the context of their confrontation, the 
PFLP ended up prioritising the legitimacy of institutions over the legitimacy of 
the electoral process. However, this put the PFLP’s political credibility in further 
jeopardy and reiterated its pattern of fluctuations. 
Despite Fatah and Hamas apparently abiding to the terms of the Mecca 
agreement, a true, viable reconciliation could not be implemented. Intra-
factional clashes continued regularly in the first half of 2007 while the 
institutional impasse due to the block on international aid to the Hamas 
government aggravated the degradation of security in the OPT, particularly in 
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Gaza. More importantly, both Fatah and Hamas were increasingly engaged in an 
arms race aimed at acquiring military superiority in order to prevail in case of a 
final showdown.132 Within Fatah, hard-line elements supporting the idea of 
removing Hamas from power militarily had acquired considerable power, also 
thanks to US support for their line. Most prominent among them was 
Muhammad Dahlan, former head of the PNA’s Preventive Security Forces and 
Fatah strongman in Gaza. Thanks to the US-Fatah hardliners coordination, in 
late 2006 military aid started to flow towards those branches of the security 
services falling under presidential control and headed by Fatah hard liners.133 By 
the same token Hamas, reportedly relying on Iranian support, strengthened its 
own armed branch, the al-Qassam brigades, as well as the Executive Security 
Forces established right after the formation of the first Hamas government.134 
While clashes continued unabated and security in the OPT deteriorated, rumours 
of an impending Fatah-led coup started to spread. Tensions peaked in June 2007 
when, after renewed Fatah-Hamas armed confrontation in Gaza, Hamas forces 
seized control of the whole Strip, taking over the PNA’s administrative and 
security institutions and expelling Fatah partisans in a pre-emptive move aimed 
at preventing a Fatah coup.135 
The PFLP, which had repeatedly denounced the ‘militarisation’ of the Fatah-
Hamas conflict and the ensuing arms race between the two factions, did not 
hesitate to condemn Hamas’ takeover as the ‘first Palestinian coup d’état’. In the 
words of Politburo member Abu Ali Hasan, Hamas’ move represented a coup 
against ‘Palestinian legitimacy and its institutions’. More specifically it was a 
coup against the provisions of the Mecca agreement, against the national unity 
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government and against the principle of ‘political partnership’ stated by the 
PNA’s laws.136 The position that the PFLP adopted towards the Hamas seizure 
appeared in contradiction, at least partially, with the stances maintained since the 
2006 legislative election. Indeed, the PFLP denounced the violation of a specific 
agreement that the Popular Front itself rejected as well as the collapse of a 
national unity government in which it refused to partake.  
More generally, as the PFLP condemned Hamas’ breach of the legitimacy 
stemming from the PNA’s institutions and laws, it seemed to sanctify a 
legitimacy that it had long contested and that stemmed from a set of Israel-PLO 
accords it still rejected. Ultimately, the PFLP completed a trajectory that brought 
it from a position closer to the newly-elected Hamas government to one closer 
to Fatah and the PNA Presidency. Although the Popular Front criticised Abbas’ 
decision to dissolve the national unity government and establish an emergency 
executive, its position substantially validated Fatah’s stance towards Hamas.137 
In fact, in the PFLP’s narration of the crisis, Hamas’ military takeover was seen 
as a major turning point irremediably aggravating the intra-Palestinian power 
struggle. Nonetheless, the PFLP failed to put on the same level the US-Fatah 
contacts that consistently tried to undermine Hamas’ democratically elected 
government. Although reference to ‘external pressures’ on the Haniyeh 
government were present in the PFLP’s discourse, there was no mention of the 
widely known relationship between the Bush administration and Fatah hard-
liners led by Muhammad Dahlan. The PFLP mainly stressed how Hamas’ 
military seizure of the Gaza Strip fulfilled the long-standing Israeli goal of 
fragmenting the Palestinian polity in the OPT or how it represented a step against 
the ‘Palestinian democratic tradition’ of intra-factional dialogue and consensus 
seeking.138 Furthermore, in an institutional step that provided a nationalist cover 
to the Fatah-controlled PNA, the PFLP participated in the PLO Central Council 
meeting convened in the aftermath of Hamas’ takeover. Although the PFLP 
opposed the measures approved by the Council, such as the establishment of an 
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emergency cabinet or the approval of Abbas’ participation in a new round of US-
supervised negotiations with Israel, its participation helped to ensure the 
necessary institutional cover to the PNA. This point appears more relevant if one 
takes into consideration the PFLP’s frequent decision in its history to boycott 
PLO institutions in order to deprive them of national legitimacy when it opposed 
the line of the PLO leadership.139  
Despite its nominal opposition to Abbas’ line in the wake of the crisis and his 
decision to pursue talks with Israel in the following years, the PFLP de facto 
sided with the Fatah-controlled PNA during the height of the conflict. Thus, the 
fluctuation of the PFLP’s position throughout the 2006-2007 events was telling 
of its inability to adopt a truly independent position. This was due to the PFLP 
leadership’s economic and political dependence on the framework of the PLO 
and, after 2006, on that of the PNA institutions. Therefore, facing the formation 
of two distinct Palestinian polities, the PFLP needed to stand closer to its 
traditional reference framework (the PLO/PNA) which ensured institutional 
integration and economic survival for its cadres. The continuous inability of the 
PFLP, and indeed of the whole Palestinian Left, to ‘de-participate’ from this 
framework prevented the emergence of a viable ‘third way’, notwithstanding the 
PFLP’s early calls in that sense.140 Consequently, the credibility of the PFLP’s 
political agency appeared definitively jeopardised and its mediation attempts as 
little more than a rhetorical exercise. This was evident in the limited popularity 
that the PFLP continued to enjoy among the Palestinian masses. The poor 
electoral performance during local and student council elections in the following 
years throughout the West Bank, in which lists associated with the PFLP 
generally did not go beyond the five or seven seats obtained, reflected to some 
extent the persistent inability of the Popular Front to reverse such a decline in its 
popularity.141 Today, the PFLP’s marginalisation appears all the more 
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irreversible in light of the continued political and geographical polarisation of 
Palestinian politics. The seemingly unresolvable division between Hamas and 
Fatah and the serious dysfunction of both the Hamas government in Gaza and 
the Fatah-controlled PNA in the West Bank is determining an ongoing crisis of 
leadership legitimacy.142  
Notwithstanding the need for an alternative to the current bipolar impasse, the 
PFLP, along all other Palestinian factions, has been consistently unable to 
embody it due to its dependence on traditional, yet dysfunctional, tools of intra-
Palestinian dialogue and from void Palestinian institutions.  
  
Conclusions. 
Between Abu Ali Mustafa’s return to Palestine in 1999 and the 2007 Hamas-
Fatah split, the PFLP’s opposition-integration dilemma continued to exert its 
influence, intertwining with the peculiar tensions which emerged during this 
period. Thus, policy fluctuation continued to mark the PFLP’s agency as it 
sought integration into a transforming Palestinian political environment. In fact, 
maintaining some form of political influence by participating in the post-Oslo 
system had been the PFLP’s main goal since the second half of the 1990s and 
continued to be a priority through the phases covered in this chapter. The 
unfolding of the Al-Aqsa Intifada, the tensions that its dynamics produced, as 
well as its political results, shaped the following phase and exacerbated the 
opposition-integration dilemma, emphasising the PFLP’s fluctuations. 
The discourse around the democratisation of the OPT political space and the 
transformation of the PNA institutions into the new core of the Palestinian 
national movement signalled the PFLP’s shift towards active participation in the 
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post-Oslo regime. The PFLP thus seemed to call for opposition to the PNA’s 
leadership rather than to the PNA itself an Oslo-derived institution. This new 
opposition trend in the PFLP, and in the whole Left, took the form, on an 
informal level of the engagement of leftist activists in civil society politics and 
more specifically in NGO activities. At an institutional and formal level, the 
PFLP called for reform of the PLO in order to supervise the PNA and for 
renewed unity of the national movement to fight PNA corruption and 
authoritarian drift, a task that required continued contact with Fatah’s leadership. 
However, on an institutional level, the conflation of the PLO and the PNA, and 
the role of the first as ‘nationalist cover’ for the latter, deprived the PFLP’s 
discourse of practical implications. On a civil society level, the role of leftist 
activist within western-funded NGOs fostered the perception of a Palestinian 
Left fully compromised with the Oslo political and economic regime. Therefore, 
the PFLP oscillated between its oppositional discourse and de facto inclusion 
into the Oslo political system on which it had no real influence. Consequently, 
while the PFLP’s opposition appeared token, this reinforced Hamas’ stand as the 
real radical opposition force. 
With the outbreak of the Al-Aqsa Intifada, the PFLP hoped for a 
reconfiguration of the Palestinian national movement based on consensus among 
the factions, a context in which it would have exerted greater influence. This 
represented the ideal scenario for the PFLP’s inclusion into a national movement 
distancing itself from strict adherence to the terms of the Oslo accords. However, 
the peculiar dynamics of the Al-Aqsa Intifada drove the PFLP to fluctuate 
between a ‘resistant’ discourse closer to Hamas and a pragmatic approach 
concerning national unity and possible new frameworks for the peace process 
closer to Fatah’s leadership and the PNA. As the uprising quickly evolved into 
an asymmetrical military confrontation, the PFLP called for coordination among 
the Palestinian factions. In fact, the PFLP’s own actions swung between joint 
armed operations and single actions that followed either a retaliatory pattern or 
priorities dictated by intra-factional competition, as the recourse to suicide 
bombings demonstrated. On the political level, too, factional calculations 
prevailed over collective action, an aspect that appeared particularly clear after 
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Israel’s reoccupation of the West Bank in 2002, the intensification of US and 
Israeli efforts to replace the Palestinian leadership, and the beginning of 
Palestinian dialogue on reforming the PNA and PLO institutions that initially 
involved all factions. On the one hand, Hamas prioritised the continuation of 
military confrontation to reinforce its political position as Palestinian radical 
actor. On the other, the PNA’s rationale for supporting intra-factional dialogue 
stemmed from its need to enforce a unilateral ceasefire, thus alleviating Israeli 
military pressure. Similarly, Arafat’s call to reform the PNA was a step to 
comply with US and Israeli requirements. In this context, the PFLP’s ‘national 
initiative’ aimed at realising consensus among the factions, and displayed 
positions responding both to Hamas and PNA priorities, underscoring the 
mediating role that the PFLP was willing to play and its positions moving 
between the line of the two main Palestinian forces. Ultimately, the Al-Aqsa 
Intifada showed the PFLP’s predicament and its policy fluctuation on the 
military and political level. This, coupled with the severe repression experienced 
that peaked with Abu Ali Mustafa’s assassination, made the Al-Aqsa Intifada a 
milestone of the PFLP’s political marginalisation. 
Following Arafat’s death and the end of the uprising, the PFLP’s main 
priority was again institutional integration into the new political arena that was 
being shaped. This led the Popular Front to full acceptance of the PNA’s Oslo-
derived institutions despite its formal rejection of the US-supervised peace 
process. Therefore, the PFLP supported all the institutional steps of the post-
Intifada transition, such as the 2005 presidential elections and the 2006 
legislative elections. However, the need for institutional inclusion emphasised 
the PFLP’s inconsistencies in the new political environment. Moreover, its 
shortcomings in terms of coalition building and electoral campaigning, linked to 
the long-standing issue of leftist factionalism, further highlighted the party’s 
political decline. As the Hamas-Fatah conflict intensified following the 
Islamists’ electoral victory, the PFLP moved from a position closer to Hamas in 
the wake of the elections to siding with Fatah after the Islamist takeover of Gaza 
in June 2007. In this case too, the PFLP’s inability to disengage from the 
PLO/PNA’s institutional framework was at the base of its policy fluctuation.  
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To conclude, the issue of institutional integration and the policy fluctuations 
that derived from it remain relevant in the framework of the continued PFLP 
marginalisation. Despite the legitimacy crisis that both Hamas and the 
Fatah/PNA camp currently experience, the PFLP appears unable to embody an 
effective ‘third way’ due to its fluctuation between its traditional role of 
opponent of the Oslo peace process and its need to integrate into the political 
system that this process has created. This conclusion ultimately highlights the 
role that the PFLP’s agency, and specifically its policy fluctuation, still continues 



































The present study has adopted a historical and processual perspective to address 
the decline that the PFLP experienced between 1982 and 2007, ultimately 
determining its marginalisation within Palestinian politics. The significance of 
an in-depth analysis of this process of decline lies in its role within the current 
crisis of legitimacy and representation that is affecting the Palestinian national 
movement. Indeed, the inability of the Palestinian Left and its main faction to 
embody an alternative to the two governing entities in the OPT, Hamas in Gaza 
and the PNA in the West Bank, is a fundamental factor behind such a crisis. Both 
the historical and processual perspectives that inform this study involved 
focusing on the PFLP’s political agency in order to investigate the Front’s own 
response (subjective factors) to the major challenges (objective factors) that 
emerged during the period under scrutiny. The focus on subjective factors 
entailed a problematisation of the PFLP’s marginalisation process. The goal was 
outlining the interconnections among multiple elements rather than relying on 
causal explanations according to which decline was the mere result of objective 
factors. This ultimately allowed a more comprehensive understanding of the 
PFLP’s political trajectory in which common views were reassessed and 
challenged.   
As a result, this thesis identifies the fundamental tension that marked the 
PFLP’s political agency throughout the 25-year period covered. Such a tension, 
or dilemma, derived from the PFLP’s contradictory position of adherence to the 
PLO as its main institutional framework whilst maintaining an opposition to the 
Fatah leadership controlling the PLO. As the boundaries between the PNA and 
the PLO appeared increasingly blurred after the 1993 Oslo accords, such a 
tension remained in place. While rejecting the process that established the PNA, 
the PFLP maintained its association with its ruling party Fatah, and did not 
disengage from a PLO de facto deprived of its authority by the PNA. The present 
study describes this underlying tension influencing the PFLP’s agency as an 
opposition-integration dilemma, since the PFLP tried to balance its opposition 
role with its interest in remaining integrated within the official Palestinian 
institutions. Although this tension had always marked the PFLP’s actions since 
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it joined the PLO, the changed paradigms of Palestinian politics in the post-
Beirut phase (the virtual end of the PFLP’s military potential, the loss of material 
and popular support enjoyed in Lebanon, its leadership’s relocation to 
Damascus, and Arafat’s centralisation of decision-making) worsened its effects. 
Beside identifying such opposition-integration dilemma, this study also 
defined the policy pattern that such tensions produced as well as highlighting the 
interconnection of this fundamental tension with other sources of pressure 
influencing the PFLP. The PFLP’s attempts to balance these two contrasting 
political dynamics ultimately resulted in a pattern of policy fluctuation. In other 
words, the PFLP’s political line in the attempt to respond to both its oppositional 
agenda and its priority of integration within the Palestinian political system 
fluctuated, consequently undermining the effectiveness of its agency and its 
political credibility. While policy fluctuation stemmed mainly from the 
opposition-integration dilemma, other contradictions or sources of pressure 
emphasised this negative pattern. In fact, the PFLP’s agency fluctuated due to a 
number of contrasting factors: rejection of political settlement and the primacy 
of diplomatic strategies, protection of Palestinian political autonomy and 
regional allies’ hegemonic agendas, friction between the exiled PFLP leadership 
and its activist base in the OPT, and factional calculation and coalition politics 
were among the main contradictions that the PFLP faced throughout the period 
covered. 
The pattern of policy fluctuation stemming from several levels of tensions 
and the underlying opposition-integration dilemma consistently undermined the 
PFLP’s position within the Palestinian national movement, contributing to its 
current marginalisation. Notwithstanding the evolving political scenarios in 
which the PFLP acted between 1982 and 2007, inconsistencies in policy 
production continued to compromise the PFLP’s attempt to retain or regain its 
political weight. Therefore, the resurfacing of the policy fluctuation pattern over 
the decades observed in this study points to the centrality of this dynamic among 
the factors behind the PFLP’s decline. More precisely, while negative external 
developments (such as the loss of the Beirut base or the 1991 PLO economic 
crisis following the Gulf War) represented objective blows to the PFLP’s 
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position within the national movement, policy fluctuation exacerbated the 
consequences of these negative events, as well as preventing the PFLP from 
benefitting from advantages and opportunities which arose. 
The focus on the PFLP’s political agency led also to a more precise 
understanding of the role of ideological doctrine, challenging the widespread 
conception that the PFLP’s inflexible adherence to Marxist-Leninist and Maoist 
principles represented a cause per se of its decline. In fact, the PFLP leadership 
resorted to the organisational models derived from Lenin or the analytical and 
rhetorical tools drawn from Mao to maintain control over the Front and to justify 
the frequent shifts of its political line. Democratic centralism was used to 
preserve the exiled leadership’s grip on the PFLP, particularly when the inside-
outside divide emerged prominently, while, for instance, Mao’s concept of 
primary and secondary contradictions was invoked frequently to support the 
resumption of coordination with Fatah after a phase of dispute. Therefore, the 
exploration of the PFLP’s use of its ideological doctrine allowed on the one hand 
to highlight a certain pragmatism, as ideology served the PFLP’s political shifts, 
thus disavowing those views that claim an overall PFLP intransigence. On the 
other, it underlined the pervasiveness of the policy fluctuation pattern as it 
strongly influenced the PFLP’s reliance on its doctrinal tenets. 
The persistence of the opposition-integration dilemma and the consequent 
policy fluctuation pattern questioned the very role of the PFLP within the 
Palestinian national movement. The PFLP’s re-emerging inability to both 
influence the Palestinian political mainstream and to embody an effective 
opposition raises serious doubts about the possibility of a revival of the 
Palestinian Left within the context of its historical factions. Put differently, the 
core problems affecting the PFLP’s agency seemed to compromise its bid to 
embody the alternative ‘third way’ within the currently polarised Palestinian 
national movement. 
 
Different Phases, Constant Fluctuations. 
The resurfacing of the opposition-integration dilemma, its interconnection with 
other sources of tensions, as well as the persistence of the policy fluctuation 
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pattern underscored their centrality in understanding the PFLP’s decline. 
According to each phase the dominant opposition-integration dilemma 
combined with specific tensions, ensuring the reproduction of policy 
fluctuations. The following overview recalls the recurrence of these aspects 
throughout the timespan studied.  
In the wake of the 1982 PLO evacuation from Lebanon, the PFLP’s efforts to 
create a ‘radical alternative’ to Arafat’s diplomatic strategy failed to harmonise 
the tensions stemming from major divergences with its political partners. Its 
pursuit of a hard line towards the PLO Chairman played a central role in 
compromising its coalition with the DFLP and PCP. Conversely, the PFLP’s 
commitment to Palestinian political independence rendered collaboration with 
the Syrian regime unviable, due to Damascus’ hegemonic projects on the PLO. 
In this context, the PFLP’s line fluctuated between its opposition priorities, 
pushing it closer to Syria and its Palestinian proxies, and its concern for 
integration that entailed a de facto acceptance of Arafat’s line. Moreover, such 
an alternative could not find the necessary international scope in the Soviet 
Union, either during post-Brezhnev inaction nor under Gorbachev’s new course. 
Ultimately, the failure of the PFLP’s agenda in this period, due to its swings 
between multiple sources of tensions, contributed to strengthening Arafat’s grip 
on the PLO.   
Analysis of the PFLP’s conduct during the First Intifada highlighted on the 
one hand a certain pragmatism and the ability to adapt its political line to the 
priorities of the national movement in the OPT. On the other, it showed the re-
emergence of the opposition-integration dilemma and its intersection with newly 
appeared dynamics such as the inside-outside divide or the rise to prominence of 
political Islam. In this context, policy fluctuation resurfaced first in the 
formulation of an unclear opposition line towards Fatah’s indirect dialogue with 
the US. While criticising the PLO Chairman’s diplomatic orientations, the PFLP 
leadership was unable and unwilling to disengage from the PLO to build a 
genuine alternative to Fatah’s agenda. Significantly, the exiled leadership’s 
reluctance to validate the more radical line of the PFLP cadres in the OPT 
favoured the ‘loyal opposition’ line, which in turn undermined the actual chances 
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of restraining Arafat. Integration within the PLO framework, and the ensuing 
institutional relevance, prevailed over grassroots mobilisation, compromising 
the positive developments that the First Intifada brought about. Furthermore, the 
PFLP also displayed an uncertain line towards the rising Islamist factions, 
notably Hamas. Initial rejection was followed by attempts at coordination that 
reflected the PFLP’s attempt to bring the Islamists into the PLO fold where they 
could help to counterbalance Fatah’s primacy. Ultimately, the rise of Hamas to 
the role of new radical opposition underscored the PFLP’s predicament. The 
effectiveness of its role of ‘loyal opposition’ within the PLO was questioned as 
a new radical actor directly challenged the PLO diplomatic strategy from outside 
its framework. 
During the 1990s, the persistence of fundamental contradictions in the 
PFLP’s policy production combined with the unprecedented challenges that 
emerged during the first half of this decade. In its response to the crisis of global 
Marxism, the PFLP leadership displayed a conservative approach in which 
adherence to the tenets of Marxist-Leninism and a lack of organisational renewal 
stemmed from the continued grip on the PFLP of a bureaucratised leadership. 
Self-conservatism also influenced the PFLP’s response to the 1993 Oslo accords 
as integration into the PLO framework compromised its efforts to counter the 
peace process. Notwithstanding its calls for the establishment of a broad front 
against Oslo, grassroots mobilisation, and revival of national institutions, the 
PFLP’s agency reflected the prioritisation of institutional politics and factional 
calculation over coalition building, elitist political manoeuvring and a growing 
integration into the system the PFLP claimed to oppose. These dynamics 
appeared clear in the dispute with its Islamist partners within the Alliance of 
Palestinian forces, in the divergences with its OPT cadres, and in the individual 
reintegration into the post-Oslo system that the PFLP and the DFLP sought after 
the failure of the Unified Leadership. Abu Ali Mustafa’s return to the OPT in 
1999 after a three-year-long dialogue with Fatah and the PNA signalled both the 
continued primacy of integration over opposition as well as a major shift in the 
PFLP’s policy orientations. 
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Equally significant in reflecting its contradictory policy production was the 
PFLP’s prioritisation of the struggle to ‘democratise’ the OPT political space, 
the PNA included. A growing number of PFLP cadres and other leftist activists 
committed to civil society politics, namely joined the mushrooming NGO sector, 
as the new bulwark of the Palestinian national movement and counterweight to 
the PNA. However, in doing so they fostered a network of organisations deeply 
dependent on the post-Oslo economic and political system. Thus, while the PFLP 
was caught in the middle of such contradictions and policy shifts, the PNA 
successfully established its rule over the OPT and Hamas rose to prominence as 
the only alternative to a compromised PLO/PNA camp with which the PFLP was 
also ultimately associated. 
With the outbreak in September 2000 of the Al-Aqsa Intifada, once again the 
peculiar dynamics of this new phase emphasised the PFLP’s long-standing 
problematics. Harsh Israeli repression, the militarisation of the uprising, the lack 
of a coordinated Palestinian action and the increasing polarisation between 
Hamas and the Fatah/PNA camp strengthened the PFLP’s fluctuations on 
different levels. Militarily, while the PFLP invoked collective, coordinated 
action and condemned the individualistic turn in Palestinian military resistance, 
retaliatory patterns of action and competition for popularity among the 
Palestinian factions seemed to dominate PFLP practice. On the political level, 
the confrontation between the PNA/Fatah and Hamas drove the PFLP to play the 
role of mediator. Consequently, the PFLP oscillated between Hamas’ insistence 
on armed resistance and rejection of all reformulated settlement projects and 
Fatah’s calls to reform the PNA and restart the peace process. Such fluctuations 
signalled the persistence of the PFLP’s opposition-integration dilemma in a 
context of growing political irrelevance. In addition, the Israeli campaign of 
arrests and targeted killings, coupled with the PNA’s own repression, best 
exemplified by the assassination of Abu Ali Mustafa and the detention of Ahmad 
Saʿadat, further weakened the PFLP leadership. 
Following Arafat’s death and the end of the Al-Aqsa Intifada, the PFLP’s 
urgency to integrate into the new Palestinian political scenario led to its 
participation in the PNA’s legislative and the presidential elections, respectively 
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in 2005 and 2006. As Hamas also joined the 2006 elections for the PLC, 
achieving a historic victory, the PFLP continued to fluctuate between the two 
major political forces. Between 2005 and 2007, the PFLP passed from local 
coordination with Hamas during municipal elections, to granting external 
support to its government in 2006, and finally to condemning its military seizure 
of the Gaza Strip in 2007. Again, the PFLP’s dependence on the PLO/PNA 
framework was at the base of its fluctuation and its decision to side with Fatah 
and the PNA leadership, despite its manoeuvres to reverse the democratically 
elected Hamas government.  
The protracted PFLP inability to disengage from delegitimised and 
dysfunctional Palestinian institutions reflected the persistence of its opposition-
integration dilemma. Furthermore, the PFLP’s unclear positioning during the 
2006-2007 Hamas-Fatah split, and its continued adherence to a token mediating 
role well after the occurrence of such a split, confirmed the presence of a policy 
fluctuation pattern. In the light of this, today, unless such fundamental 
contradictions are resolved, the PFLP has little chance of finding new effective 
agency, reacquiring its lost political weight, and embodying an alternative to the 
current Palestinian political deadlock.  
 
Implications of the Study. 
This research represents an addition to the current literature on the Palestinian 
national movement that lacked a PFLP-dedicated study of such scope. One 
implication of such an addition is related to our understanding of the PLO role 
and functioning. Indeed, the outline of the opposition-integration dilemma 
allows an understanding of the PLO not only as the paramount platform of 
political action for its members. From the PFLP’s oppositional perspective, the 
PLO framework consistently posed major constraints on its agency, something 
that did not concern other representatives of Palestinian radical politics, first and 
foremost Hamas and Islamic Jihad. This appears particularly clear with the 
decline of the PLO itself that followed the Oslo accords and establishment of the 
PNA. Given the PFLP’s constant adherence to the PLO, despite its virtual 
disappearance, its institutional framework continued to affect the formulation of 
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the Front’s narrative and policies, ultimately embodying a barrier to its political 
revival. 
The most important implication of the present study lies in its contribution to 
an understanding of the PFLP’s predicament and decline. Indeed, the present 
research complements socio-economic reasons for the decline of the PFLP with 
factors stemming from its own political agency, thus filling a gap in the current 
literature and historiography that tends to focus on the former factors. In addition 
to improving the knowledge of the PFLP, this study can also help in 
understanding the current Palestinian political impasse, as Palestinian politics in 
the OPT and the diaspora alike are experiencing a crisis of legitimacy and 
representation. Therefore, the issue of the PFLP’s inability to set up an effective 
Palestinian ‘third way’ is not only telling of its persistent marginalisation. In fact, 
given the absence of other actors effectively challenging the polarisation of 
Palestinian politics, the PFLP’s failure in pursuing such a goal represents a 
central cause of the long-standing Palestinian political deadlock. More 
specifically, the priorities shaping the PFLP’s policies, first and foremost 
integration into the Palestinian institutional frameworks, point in turn to its 
shortcomings in addressing central issues that should be at the centre of an 
effective leftist alternative. A political agency focused on institutional policies 
drove the PFLP to neglect the current underrepresentation of Palestinian 
diaspora communities in the national movement. Similarly, such an institutional 
focus prevented the formulation of a political discourse and line tackling the 
serious social issues affecting the Palestinian population in the OPT. For 
instance, the PFLP stopped addressing labour organisation, widespread youth 
unemployment and growing poverty in its political proposals. These aspects 
combined with the PFLP’s unwillingness, as well as that of other leftist forces, 
to disengage from dysfunctional institutional frameworks, thus protracting the 
current impasse of the Palestinian national movement. 
On another level, the points made throughout the study concerning the 
PFLP’s need for integration in the Palestinian institutions, its lack of ideological 
and organisational renewal and the gradual alienation of grassroots support, help 
to explain its position concerning the most recent developments in the 
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Palestinian struggle for emancipation. For instance, the PFLP’s ‘tactical’ support 
of the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) campaign against Israel rather 
than a ‘strategic’ embrace or the lack of a developing position in the debate over 
possible alternatives to the two-state solution reflect the stagnation of PFLP 
political thinking. Such stagnation is widely linked to the problematic aspects 
that the present study highlights, such as its inability to disengage from 
traditional Palestinian political institutions and platforms. 
The focused analysis of the PFLP’s decline featured in this study also 
demonstrated the need to further investigate both the decline, the survival and in 
some cases the resurgence of leftist factions worldwide, after the demise of the 
USSR. The prominent role played by subjective factors in determining the 
PFLP’s marginalisation suggests that these aspects should receive more attention 
in evaluating the experience of leftist organisations. The PFLP represents a case 
in which specific factors contributed to its decline as much as, or even more than, 
the crisis of global socialism. This might be the case for other leftist factions in 
the region and beyond while in other instances, subjective factors may have 
determined the resilience and resurgence of leftist politics, notwithstanding a 
global negative trend. 
Some of the concepts elaborated on the PFLP’s case may result informative 
for the study of other national liberation movements in the region and beyond.  
Above all, the concept of opposition-integration dilemma might be employed in 
the analysis of Marxist factions’ participation to wider national fronts. The 
Middle East and North Africa offer some examples (e.g. Egypt) of leftist forces 
competing and collaborating with the nationalist leaderships of the movement in 
which they took part. The idea of applying the concepts outlined in this thesis to 
other cases also hints to possible comparative approaches. Thus, the in-depth 
treatment of the PFLP’s case represents the needed bases from which to move 
with possible comparison. In other words, the present study provides some 
preliminary concept elaboration on a leftist national liberation movement whose 
development is essential prior to a comparison with any similar organisation. In 
fact, the concern for a thorough discussion of key ideas is what determined the 
choice to focus on the PFLP’s case, thus paving the way to a comparative 
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expansion of this study. The benefits of such preliminary elaboration are better 
evidenced if the hybrid nature of the PLO and the PNA, as non-state actors with 
fundamentally state-like characteristics, is taken into consideration. The political 
dynamics that both the PLO and the PNA engendered, and the discussion of the 
PFLP’s relation with them, suggest that the case outlined in this study may not 
only be compared to factions within national liberation movements, but also to 
organisations acting in the framework of state politics. 
Beside the concepts elaboration, also the methodology and the perspective 
adopted in this research might be borrowed in the context of investigations 
looking at either other Palestinian factions or opposition forces in other national 
frameworks. Indeed, the diachronic-synchronic reading of textual, primary 
sources could be easily replicated in other instances as well as the use of focus 
on political agency as analytical lens to appraise political trajectories. Again, the 
present study embodied a viable implementation of such methodological 
approaches which should precede the replication of methodology in potential 
comparative frameworks. 
To conclude, this study is also a contribution to the academic and public 
debate on possible new and alternative forms of Palestinian political 
organisation. Such a contribution, grounded in the field of historiography, 
complements the spreading interest that academia is showing towards new 
political phenomena marking the current Palestinian national movement, BDS 
above all. Furthermore, since well-established Palestinian political actors seem 
unable today to ensure any progress for the Palestinian cause, it is paramount to 
look at the history of the Palestinian national movement to identify those factors 
that determined the current circumstances and continue to foster the political 
impasse. Only by challenging long-standing assumptions and internal 
contradictions can the actors of the Palestinian national movement achieve a 
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